IR 05000321/1990011

Insp Repts 50-321/90-11 & 50-366/90-11 on 900416-20.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Actions on Previous Insp Findings

ML20042G608
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/03/1990
From:	Jape F, Moore R, Wright R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20042G604	List: IR 05000321/1990011 ML20042G603
References
50-321-90-11, 50-366-90-11, NUDOCS 9005150152
Download: ML20042G608 (9)

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A tiro UNITED STATES

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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON -

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101 M AnlETTA ST RE ET, N.W.

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AT LANTAl G1ORGI A 303fr3

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Report Nos.:

50-321/90-11 and 50-366/90-11-i l

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

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P. O.. Box 1295

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Birmingham, AL -35201

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Docket Nos.: -50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facil t ty Name:

Hatch 1.and 2 F

Inspection Conducted:. April 16-20,'1990

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Inspectors:

1 O1k r h_, L 6/3/90 R. Wright

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Date Signed

Q SG S 19D R.'M60re Date Signed

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Accompanying Personnel:

F. Jape (April 19-20,'1990)1

i Approved by:

//Gtt AC l

F. Jape, Section Chief

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Date Signed l

Quality Performance Section

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Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety

l SUMMARY l

Scope:

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This -routine, announced inspection was conducted in -the area of Actions on l

Previous Inspection Findings.:

v Results:

In the areas inspected,. violations or. deviations were not identified.

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Licensee attention to resolution of.SSF1~' identified items has been' generally good.

Evaluations provided. to resolve' issues have been comprehensive and well'

documented.

The remaining' open items- (9 of 27) require, either more extensive -

I analyses or implementation.of' physical _ modifications.

The licensee has developed a schedule, foh completion of the _ remaining items.

Future NRC inspections will monitor ~ the completion progress of the items, g"p5150152 Soosog G!

"OOCK 00000321 PDC

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons' Contacted Licensee Employees

• L. Adams, Supervisor, Nuclear; Security i

J. Branum, Project Engineer, Hatch Project Support, Licensing-

• S. Brunsen,- Senior Plant Engineer I, Nuclear. Safety. and-Compliance

• C. Coggin,. Manager Training-

• W. Drinkard, Manager. Safety, Audit and Engineering ~ Review

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• P. Fornel, Manager Maintenance-

• 0. Fraser, Supervisor, Safety Audit'and Engineering Review

'*G.-Goode, Manager, Engineering Support

• M. Googe, Manager, Outages and Planning

• B. Manning, Nuclear Specialist-

• C. Moore,-Assistant General Manager, Plant Support-

• R. Musgoue,' Acting Manager, Operations

' H. Nix, General Manager -Nuclear Plant-

• J. Payne, Senior Plant Engineer I, Nuclear Safety and Compliance

• D.~ Read, Assistant General Manager, Plant Services

• L. Summer, Assistant General Manager, Plant Operations

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• S. Tipps, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Compliance

.j Other licensee employees ~ contacted during - this inspection included, I

engineers and administrative personnel.

Other Organizations T. Anderson, Manager, Electrial Design Department, Southern Company Services M. Shah, Deputy Supervisor', Electrical Design,-Bechtel l

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NRC Resident Inspectors l

• J. Menning, Senior Resident Inspector

• L. Zerr, Reactor Engineer, Nuclear Reactcr Regulation -

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• Attended exit interview

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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (97702)

(Closed) Violation 50-321,366/89-30-01, Inadequate Design Controls Related to the Use of Commercial Grade Relays The licensee response dated January 2, 1990, was considered acceptable by Region II.

The inspector examined SCS Calculation No. SCN-89-078 transmitted to GPC j

by letter dated February 2, ~1990, (File DCR 85-007, Log DCR-0-2-0096).

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This documented seismic-analyses - verifies' SCSs original engineering judgement, "that the subject installed relays will-maintain their c

structural integrity, during and af ter a design basis seismic' event."

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The engineering evaluation. demonstrated that the Agastat 7022AD and-7022AE time delay. relays _ located in instrument-panels 1H11-P612 and 1H11-P613 satisfy-the Seismic II/I criteria-for'this application.

Telephone conversations with Bechtel's Electrical Deputy Supervisor, and

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cursory examination of. Bechtel Engineering Calculation 87 verified that; the subject circuits' 5 amp fuses coordinate properly with: the 20 amp breakers.

Consequently. any-electrical. failure of -the subject relays will not adversely affect the function,of safety-related equipment.

Bechtel, SCS and GPC corporate nuclear engineering and licensing

personnel which support Plant Hatch have been-made aware of this problem p

and the necessity of having a documented basis for-all statements / conclusions i

made in safety evaluations, j

The inspector concluded that the licensee has determined the full extent -

of the violation,- taken action -to correct current conditions, and developed corrective actions needed to preclude recurrence of similar problems.

Cer ective actions stated in the licensee response-have been implemented.

t This item-is closed.

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ActiononPreviousInspectionFindings(92701)-

(Closed) IFI 50-321,366/89-08-02, Seven Day Fuel Storage Capacity.

This item-addressed the discrepancy between the'FSAR specified seven day diesel fuel storage requirement and the Technical Specification (TS)

requirement.

In the absence of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) loading limits the TS minimum requirement provided adequate capacity for only'

three EDGs for seven days rather than all five of the site EDGs.

Corrective actions were based on providing adequate fuel storage capacity-for four EDGs for seven days. -Design Basis required four of five EDGs

operable for the design base accident..

The following actions were

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implemented to establish and maintain the prescribed seven day-diesel fuel'storagei

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Administrative controls were implemented to maintain a minimum of 175,000 gallons of fuel oil onsite, (161,280 gallons' are

required for seven days operation of four EDGs at 3250KW).

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Administrative controls were implemented to limit diesel loading during accident conditions to 1300 KW, _ (four EDGs at 3250 KW -

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each).

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Technical Specification change request was submitted to require

minimum onsite diesel fuel oil storage at 33,000 gallons per tank or 165,000 gallons.

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3 The inspector reviewed the applicable procedures and TS change request to verify implementation of controls.

Additionally, the. tank levels were-measured and. verified to comply with the stated requirements.

Licensee-resolution of this issue was adequate, therefore_this issue is closed.

(Closed)IFI 50-321,366/89-08-05a, PSW Pump Pit Design

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The valve pit sump pump is capable of pumping 40 gallons per minute whereas the direct pit inflow contributed by the 100-year design rainfall-referenced in the Unit 2 FSAR corresponds to only 0.55 gallons per minute.

GPC reviewed the design and inspected the adequacy of the valve pit curbing and area' grading to assure local runoff would not flow into and flood the valve pit.

The licensee concluded the-existing grading and

, curbing heights were appropriate to direct the local runoff-to the plants:

i existing grated drain system, t

The inspectors walked down the subject valve pit area and although not

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confirmed. it appeared to them that the-licensee has improved the_ pit area grading since-this concern was first identified.

j This item is closed.

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(0 pen) IFI 50-321,366/89-08-08, Seismic Qualification of EDG Low

Lubricating 011 Pressure Switches l

SCS letter to GPC dated April 17, 1990, Pressure Switch Seismic Testing, (File REA HT-9653) states ANCO Engineers,- Inc. testing. for,,the. Allen Bradley 836-C3 and the Detroit 222-10 switches is complete.

Initial reports are that the test results were acceptable for all tests

performed; however, SCS does not have nor have_ they reviewed the actual i

test reports to date.

This item will remain open pending the subject test report reviews for l

acceptablity by both the licensee and the NRC.

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(Closed) IFI 50-321,366/89-08-09, Ventilation Louver Motors in Diesel i

Rooms

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The licensee performed Calculation SCN-89-026, Revision 0, dated May 18,1989, after the start of the SSFI which justified. the seismic i

qualification of the Honeywell louver motor model M445-0001.

Revision 1 to the subject calculation dated January 2,1990, (pages 9 through 11)

performs a seismic ' assessment of Honeywell louver motor model-M-436A and concludes these motors are seismically qualified for their locations in

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the Hatch diesel generator building.

Subsequent to the SSFI, the licensee obtained from the louver vendor

" Construction Specialists" copies of the vendor's seismic calculations

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for both Units (Calculations S70897, S43889) diesel generator building-

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louvers Mark Nos LV-4,5,6,7 and 8.

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Inspector examination ~ of the above motor - and louver' calculations verified the subject equipment.was seismically qualified.

This item.is closed.

(0 pen) IFI 50-321,366/89-08-10, ' Electrothermal Links on Diesel Room.

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Roll-up Doors and Fire Dampers-The inspector examined calculation. SCN-89-030 documenting the seismic capability of the roll-up door and the roll-up door _ electrothermal

.i fusible: link..However, no such qualification documentation was available

for the fire damper electrothermal _ fusible link per its application..

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(Closed)IFI 50-321,366/89-08-11, Diesel-Battery Rack Mounting'-

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The SSFI inspection team concluded from the documentation available that I

the anchoring for the diesel battery racks.: particularly the bolt pattern

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was not the same as used in the vendor seismic qualification reports.

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A licensee comparison of the vendor qualification reports, vendor

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drawings, and as-built field conditions was -performed and documented 'in

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Calculation SCN-90-006. _ 'It was-demonstrated that the qualification reports, the as-built conditions and the drawings are compatible for both Unit I and the Unit 2 diesel' generator battery racks in' every detail

influencing seismic integrity. including anchor bolt location.

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exception to this high correlation.was that concrete expansion anchors were used to anchor the racks in both units whereas the qualification test for Unit I used steel-to-steel bolting and the qualification analysis for Unit 2 assumed cast-in-place anchors.

However, the as-built anchoring

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cystem using expansion anchors was evaluated by the licensee in calculation SCN-90-006 and found to be seismically adequate.

This item is closed.

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(Closed)IFI 50-321,366/89-08-13, Diesel Battery Speci_fication In response to the subject IFI, Bechtel prepared a report (Enclosure A to letter B-GP-16239, dated February 2, 1990) which reconstructed and established the design requirements and QA documentation that were used

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to purchase Hatch Unit l's, Class IE, Emergency Diesel-Generator

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Batteries.

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GPC purchase order No. G-5208 dated May 12, 1981, and Design-Change

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Request No.81-146 dated May 13, 1981, which was transmitted both by telephone and letter to the vendor, C&D Battery, collectively specify

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l applicable ANSI, Federal Specification, IEEE and industrial criteria to be met by the generator batteries.

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Although a specification was not formally written for the batteries, the above combined procurement requirements placed on the batteries' vendor resulted in obtaining batteries that were in conformance 'with industry-recognized standards.

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Based on the results of this review, it appears the Unit ~ 1 diesel generator batteries were purchased to adequate design and-QA requirements.

The batteries are of a quality consistent with their Class IE function, and are adequately sized to support Class IE loads.

This item is closed.

(Closed)IFI 50-321,366/89-08-14, Diesel Battery Overvoltage Bechtel investigated this matter and based on their design review, the

conclusion stated in their report entitled, PEmergency Diesel Generator

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Battery Overvoltage for Edwin HNP Units 1 and 2" is that'all safety-related'

DC components associated with Class IE Emergency Diesel Generator Batteries are acceptable during normal float and equalizing operation.of

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the batteries at elevated ; system - voltages. - The :various DC components a

investigated, their maximum voltage ratings, and reasons for acceptance-

are covered in Appendix A--to the Bechtel report.

This item is closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-321,366/89-08-15:

Transient Load for Unit 1 i

This item addressed the incomplete Unit 1 transient load analysis for i

LOSP/LOCA.

The analysis evaluated the EDG transient: response to l

anticipated loading of Unit 1 EDGs'via sequencer during LOSP/LOCA.

The Unit I transient analysis was completed by Colt-Industries (EDG Vendor) on July 28, 1987 GPC reviewed the analysis and identified

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errors regarding - excessively conservative -initial: loading values.

The transient analysis was resubmitted to Colt Industries, September 6,.1989, i

SCS ' letter dated February 8,1990; (File:

REA HT 9653)' stated the SCS engineering review of the Unit 1 transient analysis determined that the Unit 1 EDGs-were capable of recovering. from the automatic loading associated with-a LOSP/LOCA' event.

Based.on the completion of the Unit I transient analysis and licensee

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.l review of the analysis for impact on Unit 1.EDG operation during the LOSP/LOCA event this item is closed.

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(Closed)IFI 50-321,366/89-08 16:

EDG Electrical Loading Calculations

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This item addressed the EDG electrical loading calculations for Unit 1 and 2 which did not-include MOV loads and incorporated incorrect values for EDG heater loads.

The applicable calculations were revised to include MOV loads and corrected EDG heater loads.

douthern Company Services calculations SEN 89-009, Revision 3 (Unit 1) and SEN 89-015, Revision 3, (Unit 2) were reviewed to verify corrections.

The load changes were reflected as-steady state loads on the 0-10 minute load analyses as 4160/600 volt bus loads.

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i Based on the incorporation of' the corrected load values' in the applicable

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calculations, this-item is closed.

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(Closed)IFI 50-321,366/89-08-17:. Die'sel Fuel Oil. Storage Tank Design

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This item addressed. a concern regarding sludgeL build up-in the diesel.

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fuel oil storage tank.. Tank design did not provide ~an effective..on-line-method to quantify or remove the sludge which accumulates in the. tanks

over long periods-of: time.

Sludge -build-up could impacti fuel transfer _

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pump capacity', clog filters, and result in-fuel starvation of the EDGs'es occurred in November 1986.

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The diesel fuel oil storage tank = sampling ~ method'in use-did not assure thatl

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potentially damaging sludge volume would be identified before impacting EDG operations.

The method of tank sampling was changed inLSeptember 1989.

The current sampling method uses the recommended-sampling technique of ASTM D270-65,

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Standard Method _of Sampling Petroleum and Petroleum Products-1971, for

indication of bottom sludge build-up.

Preventive maintenance now-requires semi-annual tank-sampling and' tank. cleaning at least every ten years.

Based on the improved capability to identify sludge _ build-up.provided by i

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the revised sampling method and periodic tank cleaning requirement 1

incorporated in the preventive maintenance. program, this' item _is closed.

c (Closed)IFI.50-321,366/89-08-19:- Gaitronics Communications'

This item addressed the control room operators reliance. on the Gaitronics public address system during a simulator ~ accident. scenario

which potentially included loss of the _public : address system power i.

supply.

Specifically the simulator.did not accurately reflect the-loss

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of this power supply on a LOSP and the E0Ps did not clearly 1 address the potential communications loss.

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The simulator 'has been updated to accurately. reflect the ' loss.of the-

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L Gaitronics during LOSP, Simulator Change Request 9003004-incorporating this change was completed on March 26, 1990.

Review of the following.

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L procedures verified the potential communications loss was addressed in applicable operator actions:

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34AB-0PS-016-25, Revision 3, Loss of Essential AC Distribution Buses..

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3450-R51-001-25, Revision 1,

Communications Systems Operating j

Procedure.

Based on the completed simulator change and verification of procedure incorporation of the potential communication loss, this item is closed.

(Closed) IFI 321,366/89-08-21:

Emergency Diesel Generator 1B PSW Supply

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• i This item addressed the potential impact on the swing diesel (EDG 1B) if an in-line orifice was not removed prior to supplying cooling water from

an-alternate supply when the normal dedicated standby PSW pump is lost-l The engineering evaluation performed stated that the orifice-require'd I

change-out to reduce flow to.the EDG 1B heat _ exchanger to avoid-errosion.

and impingement damage by the higher capacity Unit-l and 2.PSW systems.,

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Engineering evaluated the potential for. permanently installing the downsized orifice and determined this would.-result in potentially

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-inadequate cooling -flow when utilizing the normal-swing diesel PSW supply.

The evaluation concluded that the orifice replacement wast necessary and operation without the orifice change provided potential

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damage to the.18 EDG, Based on completion of the evaluation this-item is closed.

(0 pen' IFI 50-321,366/89-08-24:

Comparison of Unit 1 and 2 Technical.

Specifications This item addressed the disparity between TS required-surveillances for Unit 1 and 2 EDGs.

Unit 2 TS. incorporated a. commitment to Regulatory

. Guide 1 '108, Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units used :as onsite Electric' Power Systems, Revision.1 which resulted in' more comprehensive surveillance. testing requirements for Unit 2 EDGs.

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This item remains open.

Although the licensee has completed comprehensive evaluations and initiated.a TS change to -address.this disparity, the Unit 1 EDG surveillance activity--has-not yet included the proposed upgrades. The evaluations performed regarding this issue._ include'

a comparison of Regulatory Guide 1.108 line items to Unit 2 TS' and a comparison of Unit 1 and 2 TS.

Document Change Request, DCR 89-23,

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Revision 1 dated November 30,~1989,'was submitted on' January 10, 1990, to

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the NRC to request--TS changes resulting from the.above evaluations. This item-remains open pending. incorporation of the proposed additional Unit 1 EDGs' surveillance requirements into the surveillance program.

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Exit Interview The inspection scope and results. were summarized on April. 20,.1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.. The inspectors described the; areas inspected and discussed in detail the -inspection results listed-below.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

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Acronyms and Initialisms

s AMP Ampere ANSI American National Standards Institute ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials DC Direct Current DCR Document Change Request EDG Emergency Diesel Generator E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

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GPC Georgia Power Company HNP Hatch Nuclear Plant i

IFI Inspection Followup Item i

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

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KW Kilowatts

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LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LOSP Loss of Offsite Power M0V-

-Motor Operated Valve

'NRC-Nuclear Regulatory Commission-PSW-Plant Service Water

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-QA-Quality Assurance SCN Southern Civil Nuclear (calculation).

SCS Southern Company Services SEN Southern Electrical Nuclear (calculation)

-SSFI Safety System' Functional Inspection

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TS Technical Specification t

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