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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20211N404 | | | number = ML20154J989 |
| | issue date = 06/18/1986 | | | issue date = 03/03/1986 |
| | title = Insp Rept 50-412/86-12 on 860510-0613.No Violation or New Safety Problems Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Program Implementation,Rcs Hydro Test Evaluation,Exhaust Hood Insulation Failures & RCS Cleanup | | | title = Advises That Insp Rept 50-413/86-01 Submitted on 860210,for 860106-10 Insp,In Error.Correct Rept Number Should Be 50-412/86-12 |
| | author name = Tripp L | | | author name = Brownlee V |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = Tucker H |
| | addressee affiliation = | | | addressee affiliation = DUKE POWER CO. |
| | docket = 05000412 | | | docket = 05000413, 05000414 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-412-86-12, NUDOCS 8607030090 | | | document report number = NUDOCS 8603110142 |
| | package number = ML20211N384
| | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | | | page count = 1 |
| | page count = 11 | |
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| | I MAR 03 19% |
| U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
| | Dyke Power Company 4TTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen: |
| | SUBJECT: REVISED REPORT NOS. 50-413/86-12 AND 50-414/86-01 On February 10, 1986, this office transmitted Inspection Report Nos. 50-413/86-01 and 50-414/86-01, for the period of January 6-10, 1986. There was an error in the report number designation for Catawba, Unit 1; the correct report number should be 50-413/86-12. The report number designation for Catawba Unit 2 should remain as 50-414/86-0 Cover pages and report text references to Catawba, Unit 1, should be corrected to read "50-413/86-12." We regret the error and apologize for any inconvenienc Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact u |
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| ==REGION I==
| | Sincerely, Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects cc: vR. L. Dick, Vice President Construction |
| Report N /86-12 Occket N Li:ense N CPPR-105 Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Nuclear Construction Division
| | 'J. W. Hampton, Station Manager bcc: State of South Carolina Document Control Desk LNRC Resident Inspector |
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| P. O. Box 328 Shippingport, PA 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 i GaO:s: May 10 - June 13, 1986 i
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| ! Ins ectors: W. M. Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector I
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| L. J. Prividy, Resident Inspector R J. Urban, Reactor Engineer | |
| ! Appoved by: #- ._h E. E. Tript2, Chief, Reactor Plojects Section 3A Ik
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| ' 06te Ircspection Summary: Inspection No. 50-412/86-12 on May 10 - June 13,198 ,
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| Areat Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (158 hourO of
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| , licer see actions on previous inspection findings, preoperational program implemen-
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| tation, reactor coolant system hydro test evaluation and system restoration, EDG exhaust hood insulation failures and RCS cleanu Resul:s: No violations or new safety problems were identified. Reactpr cool. ant systeri cleanup, restoration, and reactor coolant pum elC repairs were proceding
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| satisfactoril <
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| 8607030090 860625 PDR ADOCK 05000412 G PDR w
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| DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted q C. E. Ewing, Manager, Quality Assurance J T. P. Noonan, Station Superintendent E R. J. Swiderski, Startup Manager D. Williams, Chairman, Joint Test Group The inspector also met with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
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| ] 2. Project Status Summary
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| \ Construction activities are currently estimated to be 95% complete, with 364 of 476 subsystems turned over for flushing and proof-testing. For software, 62 out of 119 preoperational (PO) and initial startup tests (IST) have been approve The remainder are in various phases of developmen Approximate dates for the major project milestones, as currently estimated l by the licensee are as follows:
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| Fuel Receipt (Start) September 1, 1986
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| Integrated Hot Functional Test October 20, 1986
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| Loss of Power Test February 2,1987
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| Integrated Leak Rate Test February 23, 1987
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| Fuel Load May 1, 1987
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| Initial Startup May 16, 1987
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| Commercial Operation August 30, 1987 A partial interruption of construction activities occurred during a two day craft strike on June 2 - 3, 1986. Routine work activities resumed thereafte Major activities planned for next month include ESF subsystem turnovers for proof and preoperational tests, replacement of the damaged 21C reactor coolant pump shaft and completion of RCS cleanu . Inspection Program Status Summary Preoperational Test Program Inspection completion status is approximately as follows:
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| AREA % INSPECTION COMPLETE Overall Program 30 Procedure Reviews:
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| Mandatory 35 Primal 15
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| AREA % INSPECTION COMPLETE Test Witness:
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| Mandatory 15 Primal 5 Results Review:
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| Mandatory 15 Primal 5 This inspection status is consistent with the applicant's test program pro- )
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| gress. At the end of this inspection period, there were approximately 82 open NRC inspection items including 6 bulletins, 5 violations, and 18 construction deficiency reports; the remainder are inspector follow or unresolved item . Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item (84-10-04): Program for replacement of equipment with limited qualified lif The original scope of this item dealt with the need to develop the maintenance progro.- to assure that Rosemount transmitters would be replaced within their 10 year qualified life.
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| The scope of this item has since been expanded in Inspection Report 412/85-26 to include the formal de-valopment of a maintenance program to assure that all equipment is replaced within its qualified life, and to define the start of qualified life for each component typ The inspector reviewed SUM 4.2, Scheduled Maintenance /Cali-bration Program, and SUM 4.6, Maintenance Requirements for Environmentally Qualified Equipment, and determined that formalized procedures have been de-veloped and approved in this functional area. However, the start time for all qualified components has not yet been provided by the Engineering Depart-ment. Specific items related to the Rosemount transmitters and MSIV limit switches previously discussed are an issue that will be formally addressed in the NRR Equipment Qualification Audit of Beaver Valley, Unit 2, conducted during the week of June 9, 1986. Following this audit, an SER supplement will be prepared documenting the results of the staff review and evaluation as de-scribed in Section 3.11 of the SER. .This item remains open pending inspector review of: (1) the NRR audit results to determine the need for further station action, (2) the Engineering Department's progress in defining the start of qualified lif (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-02-04): Review control of interface between temporary and safety-related equipuent during system flushes. This item was updated in Inspection Report 412/86-06, wherein the inspector determined that satisfactory work controls had been observed during reassembly operations of the pressurizer manway cover. Subsequent to this pressurizer manway cover work, the inspector observed other activities of the DLC Flush / Hydro group which were acceptable. Examples of these activities observed during perform-ance of the reactor coolant system cold hydrostatic test included: (1) the installation, routing and tagging of several hundred feet of temporary high pressure hose trom the hydrostatic test pumps (hydrolasers) to the connection point of the charging system and (2) installation of precision test gages used _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____
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| for the tes Also, the DLC Flush / Hydro group strengthened their internal controls with such' things as memos of understanding and group meetings with their personnel to emphasize the need for strong interface control where con-struction and testing operations overlap. A change to the Generic Flush Pro-cedure 2T-GFP-601 was also made to formally provide test perscnnel with added precautions in check list form to be observed during proof-testin Based on these actions, this item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-02-03): Flexible Conduit Connection This un-resolved item identified flexible conduits that were disengaged or loose from their couplings.
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| ' Nonconformance and Disposition Reports (N&Ds) 16600 and 16602 were disposi-tioned by Engineering to rework all flexible conduit couplings. The inspector
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| l selected numerous reworked couplings to determine if they were loose or dis- l engaged; no discrepancies were identifie l To prevent further recurrence, the vendor installation instructions for flex-ible conduit were reviewed by Engineering and found acceptabl These in-structions were issued to the field and the electrical contractor trained its craft personnel in the use of these instruction QC Inspection Plans 8.1.9, 8.3.3, and 8.5.2.2 have also been revised to verify fitting tightnes The inspector had no further question (0 pen) Unresolved Item (85-21-02): Inspection of Condulets used on Instru-mentation Devices. This unresolved item identified a loose BLB condulet on a safety related and seismically qualified fluid level instrument that had been QC inspected and accepte Condulets attached to instruments and devices are required to be tight. Ap-parently, the condulet in question became loose when it was partially rotated to align it with a flexible condui RE-52Q " Flex Connection Detail For De-vices With Pigtails" was revised to allow the use of external locknuts for cases in which alignment adjustments loosened condulets. It was also deter-mined that only 3/4" condulets can be installed on instruments and devices; BUB condulets are not acceptabl Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D)
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| 16352 dated October 2, 1985, was issued to rework the installation in accord-ance with RE-52Q. The BUB condulet will be removed and a 2x3x6" splice box will be installed and locked in place. The cause of this occurrence was due to Drawing No. SECO-5-D-69 containing an "etc." (Were the type of condulet to be used was specified; apparently constructk.a interpreted the "etc." to also include BUB condulets. To prevent recurrence, the licensee removed the
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| "etc." from Drawing No. SECO-5-D-69 and reviewed all other drawings to ensure that proper condulet size and type were note QC Inspection Plans 8.5.2.2 and 8.1.9 have been revised to verify the tight-ness of condulet fitting E&DCR 2PQ-2086A has been issued to reinspect and rework all Category 1 Class 1E instruments and devices installed for proper ._ _ . _ _ . _J
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| o condulet tightness, type, and size as specified in RE-52Q and supported in accordance with RE-52R, " Support Details for Junction Box /Condulet Fittings Attached to Device."
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| ) The licensee performed an evaluation to determine the acceptability of other installed condulets to instruments and devices. The licensee determined that R S0Vs and condulets must function as a unit to ensure seismic adequacy of the 50V. The installation of condulets on instruments and devices other than S0Vs has been primarily evaluated by Engineering to be seismically adequate; this initial determination will be evaluated under the SQRT/PVORT progra At the time of this inspection, the licensee had not yet implemented the re-inspection and rework of condulet tightness, type and size. However, paper-work associated with this open item was found to be sufficient to prevent re-currence and to correct previous deficient condition This item will remain open until the licensee completes N&D 16352, the seismic adequacy of condulets on all instruments and devices is confirmed by the SQRT/PVORT program, a suf-ficient amount of condulets have been reworked and the inspector has verified their proper dispositio (0 pen) Violation (85-25-01): Use of Unqualified Terminal Blocks. A commer-cial grade Marathon 1512 terminal block had been installed in the electrical circuitry for feedwater isolation valve 2FWS*HYV157C. This installation was contrary to 2BVS-931, Electrical Installation Specification, which requires the use of Marathon Type 1500 NUC and 142-NUC terminal blocks for this appli-cation. It was noted that this error was not an isolated case and a review was necessary to en'sure that only qualified terminal blocks were used in safety-related application The inspector followed up on the station's actions to correct this erro In response to the violation, Stone and Webster Engineering reviewed all electrical drawings (RE Series) for consistency with Specification 2BVS-93 This review showed that 26 junction boxes had been shown with commercial grade terminal blocks on either the wiring or the conduit d" awing in applications where qualified components were required. Of the 26 Junction boxes, Stone and Webster Engineering visually determined that 20 contain the correct (i.e., qualified, NUC type) installed terminal block and that 6 required re-work to replace the commercial grade blocks with qualified one Stone and Webster Engineering issued Engineering and Design Coordination Re-port No. 2P-4829 (1/21/86) to provide the required changes to constructio The inspector determined that the affected wiring and conduit drawir.gs were properly revised. Also, the rework associated with the 6 junction boxes was completed and inspected by Site Quality Control (SQC) per Inspection Plan IP-8,5.2 (Scheduled Cable Terminal Acceptance).
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| Stone and Webster Engineering conducted other reviews to assess the impact on related areas as follows:
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| | | n PStoddart WCline DCoJ1ns CBgr 2/4/86 2/d/86 2/p 2/M/86 |
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| Field Construction Procedurr FCP-432, Electrical Terminations and SQC Inspection Plan IP-8.5.2 were reviewed. It was determined that these procedures accurately reflect the require,aents of 2BVS-93 A problem report was initiated in January,1986, te identify this issue 3 within Stone and Webster per their Engineering Assurance Procedure 16.1
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| ] and to determine proper corrective action for Beaver Valley, Unit 2, and other potentially affected plant A reportability evaluation was initiated per Stone and Webster Engineer-ing Assurance Procedure (EAP) 16.2 to determine reporting requirements according to 10 CFR 50.55(e).
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| The inspector met with Stone and Webster Engineering and Duquesne Light Com-pany personnel to discuss the status of the problem report and reportability issues. Stone and Webster indicated that the problem report had been distri-buted to other Stone and Webster sites and had been characterized as an " Info Only" problem report as it was judged to be specific to Beaver Valley, Unit 2. The inspector determined that Stone and Webster was still in the midst of their reportability evaluation per EAP 16.2 which consists of a 3-level review. The first review was completed in April, 1986, and classified this item as a significant deficiency and potentially reportable per 10 CFR 50.55(e). The second and third reviews must be conducted per EAP 16.2 before Stone and Webster makes a formal recommendation to Duquesne Light Company concerning reportability per 10 CFR 50.55(e). This item remains open pending completion of this reportability evaluation. Other aspects and corrective l actions pertinent to this item are considered acceptable and close . Diesel Generator Exhaust Hood Insulation Failures (Construction Deficiency Report 86-05)
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| By letter dated May 30, 1986, the licensee issued their final 10 CFR 50.55(e)
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| Report on the subject. As previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 412/
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| 86-07, during proof-testing of the No. 2 EDG, the thermal insulation of the exhaust hood pipe collapsed and construction debris around the general area was ignited, and had to be extinguished by the fire brigade. The licensee performed a review to determine whether the insulation could have blocked the screen outlets to the exhaust hood increasing the diesel exhaust back pressur The station reported that with the temporary removal of the screen and place-ment of several additional heat shields, no permanent damage was expected and retesting was conducted. The inspector walked down the general area, both prior to and after retesting, and identified no problem with the station's actions. The aluminum jacketing used for insulation was replaced with stain-less steel jacketing and subsequent testing of the diesel generators demon-strated that there would be no adverse effect due to the high exhaust tem-perature To provide additional correction for the concrete missle barrier surrounding the exhaust pipe, the station is also reviewing the specifications for the thickness of the Foamglas insulation and the method used to attach it to the concrete surface. Since the refractory cement adhesive is designed l | |
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| for temperatures in excess of those demonstrated during the 110% test runs, these actions should be sufficient. Rework is expected to be completed during July, 1986. No other concerns were identified.
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| ) 6. Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test Results Evaluation and System Restoration The inspector reviewed the completed copy of P0-2.06.01, Cold Hydrostatic Test of the RCS, Test logs and Test changes to verify that they were conducted per the licensee's adrinistrative controls contained in the Startup Manual (SUM).
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| Additionally, it was verified that the test procedure still satisfied all original commitments after those changes were effectiv Test results were properly reviewed by the JTG. Final acceptance is pending system turnover to the station to ensure that no other intervening activities invalidate the test result The inspector walked down the RCS and conducted discussions with test person-nel to determine the status of system restoration. The pressurizer safety
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| } valves remain off until completion of Flush Procedure 10123-25, which will have them reinstalled after completion. The only other components that still need to be returned to normal alignment are three spring weighted check valves; SIS-132, 133 and 95. Work Order Requests have been issued to cover these components upon completion of SIS Pressure Test 6370A. These actions appear satisfactor I 7. 21C Reactor Coolant Pump Problems The RCP was disassembled and shipped to a Westinghouse plant for further in- j spection and testing (see IR 412/86-07, RCS Hydro Test, for background dis-cussions). It was determined that the pump shaft was bent by about 17 mils and would require replacement. Discussions with the Station Superintendent indicated that DLC expected to obtain a new shaft from the NSSS vendor and have the pump reassembled by about mid-August, 1986. Discussions with station personnel indicated that visual inspections of the pump flute area identified no visual damag ,
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| 8. Re-establishment of RCS Cleanliness Requirement The original RCS cleanliness conditions were negated during the RCS hydro after three 1/8" thick stainless steel nozzle dam plates were sucked into the reactor coolant pump impellers, resulting in the introduction of numerous stainless steel shavings throughout the RCS. These small stainless steel metal flakes could introduce future problems with regard to possible reactor coolant pump seal damage and as localized radiological hot spots after the reactor has been operating. To eliminate these concerns, the licensee has opted to completely reflush the RHR system, the CVCS seal injection lines, and the entire reactor coolant system. The inspector has periodically re-viewed these on% going actions. Initial cleaning results indicate that none
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| of the metal filings hEre introduced into the steam generator teSes. Addi-tionally, the various MCS and CVCS system filters functioned to remove some of the filing The startup manager informed the inspector that after extensive interviews
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| with all personnel involved, the station believes that the introduction of the nozzle dam plates was unintentional and that the root cause was due to a weakness in the material control program for established housekeeping zone The scenario presented to the inspector is as follows: After the pipe fitters had established the required claanliness grade of the crossover pipe from the steam generator cold leg nozzle to the reactor coolant pump suction, Quality Control inspectors verified that this work was acceptable. The establishment of the cleanliness zone within the steam generator channel head by the cold leg nozzle was not immediately done. Apparently, craft personnel put the three stainless steel plates over the cold leg nozzle (these would normally be bolted) in a good faith effort to ensure that the cleanliness zone in the crossover pipe would be maintained during the channel head cleaning. This was done without SQC coverage. Then, the' temporary steam generator manway cover was replaced. The station theorizes that with the high humidity within the steam generator, the tape lost its adhesive strength and the three nozzle dam plates which are unbutted, slid down the nozzle lip and fell into the i
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| ' crossway pipe. When the Boilermakers removed the temporary manway cover to clean the steam generator channel head, they found the adhesive remnants of the tape around the nozzle and had to reclean this area to remove the residu No further inspection of the crossover pipe was conducted from this time o The steam generator channel head was subsequently cleaned to the specified requirement and Quality Control inspectors accepted the work. Because no in- l ventory was required, or kept of parts placed within the boundary of this clean zone, there was no record that the nozzle dam plates were introduced into the primary syste The inspectors met with representatives of the Construction Group and Archi-tect/ Engineer and discussed the corrective actions being implemented to pre-vent recurrence of similar system cleanliness violations. These: actions in-cluded an extensive four day cleanup of the reactor containment building to remove much of the temporary construction materials that have accumulated to dat Additionally, it was stated that all safety-related systems that tied a into the RCS would be subject to a minimum of Zone II area cleanliness re-quirements. Therefore, any construction activity that would breach the pri-mary pressure boundary, would require the installation of protective enclo-sures, the logging of personnel, tools and materials entering and exiting the'
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| protected zone, stringent housekeeping practices, and clothing requirements for personnel entering the zone. Additionally, only specified electrical and mechanical craftsmen would be permitted to perform designated construction activities within a Zone II area. These people would be selected based on their on-site experience and familiarity with the control procedures. Field Construction Procedures 5.0, Good Housekeeping, and 5.1, Requirements for Establishing and Maintaining Cleanliness Zones, were revised to reflect the above action .
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| The inspector reviewed the SUM 4.2/4.3 procedures for assembly and disassembl a No programmatic weaknesses were identified for the Startup Group. The in-spector was informed by the Station that other items identified during the RCS disassembly included finding a rag in the upper internals, and other mis-cella.neous material that was not removed as required during the initial in-3 stallation. The inspector judged these planned actions to be sufficient to
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| ] preclude a recurrence and had no further questions at this tim Construction Proof Test Procedures 2T-FNC-20A-2.0.' and 2.04, Rev. 1 -
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| Initial Checkout and Operation of Fuel Pool Cooling Pump The inspector observed DLC test personnel perform portions of Phase I Test Procedure 2T-FNC-20A-2.03 and 2.0 This consisted of initial checkout of both fuel pool cooling pumps, measuring such parameters as pump / motor vibra-tion, pump / motor bearing temperatures, and pump differential pressure vs. flo Personnel conducted flushing of the system in conjunction with the initial operation of the pumps utilizing temporary strainers installed in the flow path.
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| The inspector reviewed the official copies of both test procedures and noted that the following portions of the procedures were properly signed off:
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| A pretest briefing was conducte Precautions and prerequisites to be observed for the test were signed of Valve lineup sheets were properly signe The inspector noted that telephone communications were properly established between the pump and spent fuel pool areas and that test personnel were~
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| knowledgeable with their duties for the tes Also, the inspector noted that test personnel had experienced a questionable and possibly unacceptable con-dition concerning vibration in the suction piping adjacent to the "A" fuel pool cooling pump. This item did not affect the pump itself due to the pre-sence of an expansion joint at the pump suction which isolated the piping vibration from the pump. The "B" fuel pool cooling pump which is only several feet away experienced no vibration problem in its suction pipin The DLC Startup Group personnel issued a Request For Information (R/I SVG-1863, 6/8/86) to Stone and Webster Engineering requesting their assistance and evaluation of the "A" pump suction piping vibratio , The inspector censidered the DLC test personnel's actions acceptable and no concerns were identifie . Preoperational Test Reviews The inspector reviewed P0-2.39.01, Station Battery 2-1 Batteries, Inverters and Charger Test, to ensure that the test procedure is technically adequate and that it is consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commit-
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| ment Proper operation of system components is demonstrated, independence of buses and power supplies proved, automatic load switching functions are demonstrated and actual load conditions are consistent with the design speci-fications. Within the scope of the above, no concerns were identifie ,
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| 11. CVCS Preoperational Test Review The inspector initiated a preliminary review of the Chemical and Volume Con-trol System (CVCS) Preoperational Tests. The inspector walked down several cortions of the CVCS and held discussions with the licensee concerning system status and upcoming test schedule No discrepancies were found between design drawings and walked down portions of the CVC Phase I testing is scheduled for completion in mid-July, but the licensee admits that this schedule is optimistic; an early August comple-tion date is considered by the licensee to be more realistic. However, por-tions of the system may be turned over to Phase II testing during the latter part of June and in July. Several portions of the Boric Acid Transfer System are already scheduled for mid-June preop testing, and other portions of the CVCS may follo The inspector will continue to follow this preop area, especially during August when the majority of the testing will be performe . Housekeeping in Safeguards Building During a daily site tour, the inspector noted several items in the Safeguards Building which required corrective action to ensure that proper in place storage of equipment was being maintained. All items were associated with the Auxiliary Feedwater System and were located at the 735' elevation outside the "A" and "C" recirc spray system cubicles. These items were as follows:
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| The actuator covers were not properly covered for control valves VWE*HCV100A,B,C, RLsty water was setting in the bonnet / cap seal area for check valves FWE*43B, 44B. Evidently, this condition had existed for several months after this piping was pressure teste Plastic dust caps for conduit / wiring connectors had been removed from Rosemount transmitters 2FWE*FT100A and 100A1 which left the transmitters uncovere This equipment is under the jurisdictional control of the DLC Startup Group and the Startup Manual does not require all equipment to be covered since much of it is under test and should not be covered. However, since much construc-tion is still being done, the DLC Startup Group has maintenance personnel who conduct weekly housekeeping surveillances in all safety-related building As items are identified such as noted above, the maintenance personnel are required to take corrective actio _ ___ _ . _ . _ . _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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| The inspector met with maintenance personnel of the DLC Startup Group and presented the above noted item The following corrective actions were taken:
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| The actuator covers for control valves FWE*100 B,C,D were covered with plastic wrap. A cover was not installed for FWE*100A since authorized
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| The rusty water was removed from the bonr.et/ cap seal area for check valves FWE*43B, 448. Maintenance transmitted an Interoffice Correspond-ence memo to the system engineer alerting him to take corrective actions in the future if pressure testing is conducte The conduit / wiring connectors on Rosemount transmitters 2FWE*FT100A and 100A1 were properly covere The DLC Startup Group maintenance personnel indicated that they would alert l their personnel to be sensitive to such items as these in the future as they l conduct their weekly surveillances in other safety related areas. The in- l spector considered this corrective action acceptable and had no other comment '
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| 13. Quality Concerns Resolution Program During the month of May, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) hired an independent contractor to assume the overall administration of their Quality Concerns Program, which had previously been administered by the DLC Quality Assurance Grou This program is now officially known as the Quality Concerns Resolu-tion Program. The inspector met with the independent contractor and discussed the general scope of the program. New employee orientation will include a training film to acquaint them with the program. Terminated employees will be interviewed by the independent contractor prior to leaving the site to de-termine if they have any quality / safety concerns. No concerns were identified by the NRC inspecto . Exit Intervie Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of the findings was further discussed with the licensee at the con-clusion of the report perio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _
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