IR 05000334/1986021

Safety Insp Rept 50-334/86-21 on 860915-19.No Deviations or Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Activities Re Installation of 125-volt Dc safety-related Batteries,Battery Test Programs & Action on Previous Identified Items

ML20215M839
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/14/1986
From:	Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215M834	List: IR 05000334/1986021 ML20215M833
References
50-334-86-21, NUDOCS 8611030352
Download: ML20215M839 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-21 Docket N License N DPR-66 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley, Unit 1 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: _ September 15-19, 1986 Inspectors: b /o f!h F. Faulitz ctod Engineer date Approved by: O /* r!/4 C. Jf Anderson, Chief, PSS, EB, DRS date Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 15-19, 1986 (Report No. 50-334/86-21)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of activities relating to the installation of 125 volt d-c safety-related batteries, the battery test programs, and review of licensee action on previous identified item Results: No deviations or violations were identifie .

t 8611030352 861023 PDR ADOCK 05000334 G PDR

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, DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Duquesne Light Company (DLC)

• R. Druga, Acting Plant Manager

• D. Schmitt, Director Electrical Engineering

• G. Kammerdeiner, Director Materials and Standards Engineering

• L. Freeland, Nuclear Senior Operation Supervisor

• G. Servick, Senior Licensing Supervisor F. Lipchic1, Senior Licensing Supervisor

• B. Sepelak, Licensing Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• W. Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meeting 2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Identified Items 2.1 (0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (IFI) 84-25-01 Resolve Possible Misapplication of P-6 Relay, There were six failures to the neutron source range monitor detectors (SRM). These failures were identified by Westinghouse to be caused by the application of high voltage to the detectors, during full reactor power operations. The P-6 relay removes this SRM high voltage power supply during startup when above 10 percent reactor powe Engineering Memorandum (EM) 61349 was initiated to investigate the K629-P6 source range block contacts. Licensee Instrumentation and Control (I&C) personnel thought there was a misapplication of the Westinghouse type AR relay. The licensee contacted Westinghous Westinghouse stated that there were no reportable problems of this nature and that they did not consider this to be a misapplication of the rela The licensee short term corrective action is electrical power removal to the SRM when the reactor power is above 10 percent. This electrical power removal is achieved by removing the electrical fuses. These fuses are replaced when the reactor power level is decreased to 10 percen This problem is an intermittent. The root cause is difficult to determine. DLC engineering is currently considering the following to resolve this problem:

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• Conduct a survey of utilities through Institution of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Notepad, NPRDS, NOMIS etc. to determine if other utilities have had similar problems or if there are other schemes for blocking the high voltage power supply turn-o * Contract for a Westinghouse representative to assist in determining the cause of the proble This IFI remains open until the cause of the above problem is determined and a long term corrective action plan develope .2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR) 84-33-06 Review Engineering Program To Assure Design Specification Are Correctly Translated to Installation Specification ;

During the fourth refueling outage three steam generator wide range level transmitters, LT-FW-477,487, and 497, were replaced with environmentally qualified models. These replacements were on a one-for-one basis. However, the replacement transmitters high and low sensor ports were reversed. With the instructions given by the Engineering Group, field personnel had no way of knowing that the transmitters were connected incorrectly unless they physically traced the instrumentation tubing back to the steam generators. The operator's observation of the level indicators initiated an investigation which discovered the above incorrect installation. This was an unresolved item until the licensee provided corrective action to precluded this from recurring in the futur The licensee has issued a Temporary Change Notice (TCN) to the Nuclear Construction Department procedure CDN 3.7.1 , revision 3, dated June 13, 1984. The TCN number 51 was dated July 15,1986. This TCN to CDN 3.7.1, paragraph 6.1.3 H, specifies that modifications assigned to CDN involving devices receiving inputs from process sense lines shall require a two party verification and signoff of the proper installation and orientation of the sense lines. One of the two sense line verifications shall be performed by a Level III qualified instrument or Mechanical Test Engineer. A higher tier document NECUMP will be issued to address this corrective actio This item is close No violations were note .3 (Closed) IFI 85-17-07 SKV Motor Cable Splice Insulation The licensee identified a problem concerning SKV motor cable splice installation at Unit 2 that is applicable to Unit 1. The Unit 2 river water and component cooling water pumps cable splices received 4-1/2 wraps of insulation instead of the 17 wraps recommended by Kerite, the vendo .

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m This concern was communicated to Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) by DLC memorandum dated July 18,1985. SWEC issued Engineering & Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) number 2P-4757, dated July 18,1985, for Unit 2. The E&DCR disposition was that all 5KV motors using details G, E-1,and F on drawing 12241-RE 28A-4 be de-energized,rebolted and reinsulated in accordance with the instructions of the E&DC The Kerite Company letter to S&W, noted by S&W July 19, 1985, stated that in their Engineering judgement the Unit I splices would provide adequate performance under normal operating voltage and conditions, including the postulated Beaver Valley Unit 1 mild environmen However, they also recommended that these splices be rebuilt to the correct dimensions to improve reliabilit SWEC letter to DLC recommended that the terminations for safety-related motors for Component Cooling Pumps, IA, IB & IC, River Water Pumps 9A & 98, and Aux. River Water Pumps, IA, IB, & 1C, be inspected at the next refueling outage to ensure that the splices had been replaced with either Raychem termination kits, or with Kerite splices as shown in BVPP-246-1, dated April 21, 1981. If any of these motors have splices made in accordance with sketch SK-113072-SFB, they recommended they be rebuilt in accordance with Kerite's recommendation of July 19,198 DLC memorandum dated July 26, 1985 and letter ND1MsM:0174, dated August 14, 1985 stated the Nuclear Engineering and Construction Unit (NECU) review of SWEC's E&DCR applicable to Unit 1 indicated that the existing splices for the above motors were adequate. However, a

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random check of the SKV motor leads was recommended for the next scheduled outag The inspector requested the licensee to confirm that the above inspection has been conducted. This confirmation was contained in letter ND1MEL, dated August 28, 1985. Motors for the Component Cooling Pumps and Auxiliary River Water Pumps had Raychem splice Motors for the River Water Pumps had Kerite splices. The splices were visually inspected for any signs of deterioration. They are meggered on an eighteen month frequency as part of the normal preventative maintenance program. Based upon the above this item is close .4 (0 pen) IFI 85-24-07 Review Switchgear Ventilation Related Temperature Problems and Planned Modifications The root cause of a reactor trip, discussed in LER 85-18, was attributed by the licensee to high ambient temperatures. These high temperatures caused the vital bus III inverter input fuse failur This fuse failure was the result of the control rectifier misfir Due to previous temperature related problems in this area, a station modification is being considered to improve ventilation in this are . ._ -

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During this inspection, the vital bus III inverter input fuse failed again. The vital bus was supplied power from a 120 volt regulated transformer. The inverter was tested, however the fuse failure could not be repeated. The inspector noted that a temporary fan was being used for cooling. The inspector also observed that the reactor rod driva p wer o cabinet doors were open and a number of temporary fans and blowar were being used. Further, other fans were being used to cool battery charger The licensee engineering staff is evaluating this problem and has indicated a need for the addition of air conditioning. A design package is proposed to be issued mid October. This item remains open pending licensee action to improve ventilation in this are .0 Design Changes - Modifications-Modification Testing-Class IE Electric System This inspection was conducted to ascertain whether design changes, modifications and modification testing are in conformance with detailed design documentation, Final Safety Analysis Report, regulatory requirements, license amendments, Technical Specifications, 10 CFR 50.59, and industry-approved codes and standard The Nuclear Engineering Management Procedure (NEMP) 2.8, revision 3, dated May 22, 1984 was reviewed. This procedure describes the engineering and interface controls established by the Nuclear Engineering Department (NED)

in processing a design change package (DCP). The Safety Evaluation associated with the DCP is controlled by NEMP 2.1 .1 Reactor Trip Breaker Station Modification Request (SMR) No. 831 was initiated 6/21/8 This modification was to address issues identified by the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) at Salem which caused industry to improve the reliability of the reactor trip system breakers. A generic conceptual design was developed as detailed in CP&L letter to NRC,0G-1011 dated June 14, 1983. This SMR was approved 7/5/8 The DCP NO. 622 for this modification was issued 1/30/84 with approval November 27, 1985. This change was to provide an automatic trip signal to the breaker shunt trip coil in addition to the existing undervoltage coil trip. Further, circuit changes were to be made to provide the capability to separately test trip the breakers using the shunt or undervoltage coils. The modification only applied to the main trip breakers, 52/RTA and 52/RTB and not to the reactor trip bypass breakers 52/BYA and 52/BYB. Red and Green, breaker position, indicating lights were also to be added to the main control board for both the main and bypass breakers. Auxiliary relays were to be added to undervoltage trip circuit. These relays provide a redundant trip of the breake _ _ _ ._ _ _ . , _ _

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. 6 Work Requests,865606, 7, 8, & 9, were approved July 30, 1986 for the modification, which required QC coverage. The work was completed August 11, 1986 as indicated in the Cut-In-Notice which was signed September 8,1986 by the Director of Electrical Engineerin The inspector reviewed the documents contained in the DCP for conformance to DLC modification control document NEMP 2.8 & 2.16 ard 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. The completed work of the test panels and indicating lights was observed. The inspector confirmed the following: the semi-automatic test was completed which provides post modification testing. This also assures that the reactor solid state trip output was not damaged during the modification; the required breaker trip response time for a shunt coil trip was met and the Potter & Brumfield MDR relay contact rating was compatible with the shunt trip coi No deficiencies were observe .2 Safety-Related Station Batteries The SMR No. 907 was initiated 7/20/84. This modification was to

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address IE Information Notice 83-11,"Possible Seismic Vulnerability of Old Lead Storage Batteries". The concern was that batteries reaching the end of their operational life may be vulnerable to seismically induced failures. The station batteries at Beaver Valley I were 11 plus years old when the SMR was initiated. the proposed solution was the replacement of the safety-related batteries 1, 2, 3 & 4 and non-safety battery 5 before their 15 year design life was exceeded. A lead-antimony cell battery type was identified in the IE information notice as having a potential for seismic failur Therefore the replacement batteries were to be replaced with lead-calcium battery cell The DCP No. 673 for this modification was issued July 20, 1984 with approval July 25, 1984. The replacement was to be made during the SR refueling outage which was scheduled the middle of 1986. However, when the batteries were load tested using Procedure, No. BVT 1.1-1.39.1,.2,.3,&.4, on November 1984 batteries 1 & 2 failed to pass the load profile for a two hour duration. These two Gould, lead-antimony, batteries were replaced during the 4R refueling outage with Exide, lead-calcium batteries which were previously installed at Beaver Valley Unit 2. This replacement activity was inspected in December 12-21,1986 and documented in Inspection Report No. 50-334/84-3 The number 3 & 4 batteries were Gould, lead-antimony type and were replaced during the SR refueling outage with C&D, lead-calcium typ This replacement included new battery rack _ _ . - _ _ .

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, 7 The inspector reviewed the documents contained in the DCP for conformance to DLC modification control and 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. Battery factory capacity test had been conducte This factory test is used as the base line for future tests which are conducted at five year intervals. The inspector observed the installed replacement batteries and noted the following:

• The battery room ventilation systems were operational

• The electrolyte levels were normal

• There was no indication of cell electrolyte leakage

• There was no indications of inner cell connection or terminal corrosion

• The battery racks had no corrosion and were grounded to station ground

• The pilot cells were identified

• The flame arresters were in place

• The electric cables leaving the battery rooms were fire stopped

• The battery room were properly identified

• The battery rooms doors were closed and secured with a card reader lock The inspector's review of the Exide (battery 1 & 2) and C&D (battery 3 & 4) operation manual revealed that Exides's specific gravity correction for electrolyte level deviations is from the mid span of the cell high and low mark. However C&D's level correction is a deviation from the electrolyte high level mark. The licensee has reflected this difference in the respective surveillance, maintenance, and test procedures. The licensee is proposing a change to the Technical Specification to reduce the Category A surveillance minimum specific gravity from 1.200 to 1.195. Both battery vendors Exide and C&D have agreed to this valu No deficiencies were note .0 Facility Tour The inspector observed installed class IE ac and de electrical systems and reactor / engineered safety features protection system .1 Emergency Diesel Generator Alternator Space Heaters The inspector observed by hand touch that there was no temperature difference between the alternator housing and the ambient air. The

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inspector informed the licensee of the observed condition. The licensee confirmed the inspectors observation by stating that electric space heaters were never installed in the EDG alternators.

j During the SR refueling outage the licensee had installed temporary lights in the alternators to control the environments. This is an unresolved issue pending the licensee review of the vendors requirements with respect to electric space heaters. (334/86-20-01)

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i 4.2 Potential Failures of Safety Systems During a Seismic Event During the facility tour the inspector observed that the following unsecured items were located near Class IE ac & dc electric system components and reactor /ESF protection cabinets which had the potential to cause safety system failures during a seismic event:

55 gallon trash barrels, desks, cabinets, tool cabinet on wheels, load resistor banks on wheels, breaker or battery lifting rigs on wheels. A drawing file cabinet was located within four feet of the emergency shut-down panel. The licensee was informed of the above observation. This issue is unresolved pending the licensee review of this potential safety condition and their corrective actio (344/86-20-02)

5.0 Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation Unresolved items resulting from this inspection are discussed in paragraph .0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 19, 1986 at the sit The inspector summarized the scope and the inspection findings discussed herei No written material was provided to the license .__-__ _-_ --____-_ l