IR 05000412/1986029

Insp Rept 50-412/86-29 on 860929-1003.Violation Noted: Improper Reporting

ML20207J717
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/15/1986
From:	Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J683	List: IR 05000412/1986029 ML20207J678 ML20207J717
References
50-412-86-29, NUDOCS 8701080565
Preceding documents:	ML20215J006 (28 April 1987)
Download: ML20207J717 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

REGION I

Report No. 50-412/86-29 Docket N License No CPPR-105 Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: September 29, 1986 - October 3, 1986 Inspector: , NAh // f g F . P' F/aulitz,' React 6r Engineer ~date'

Approved by: / f ff C. 4. Anderson, Chief, Plant date System Section, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 29, 1986 - October 3,1986 (Inspection Report No. 50-412/86-29)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by one region based inspector of activities pertaining to instrumentation, control and electrical systems and components, including licensee response to previous identified inspection finding Results: One violation was identified concerning improper reportin PDR ADOOK 0S00 O

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Duquesne Light Company (DLC)

• T. Noonan, Superintendent Operation & Maintenance

• R. Coupland, Director, Quality Control (QC)

• C. Majumdar, Assistant Director, QC

• S. Fenner, Director, Operation QC

• E. Horvath, Lead Electrical Engineer

• G. Wargo, Supervisor, SQC Structural

• C. Kirschner, Supervisor, Quality Assurance (QA)

• M. Ziemba, Supervisor, Electrical SUG

• C. Trasada, Supervisor, I&C SVG

• S. Moore, Startup I&C R. Martin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

• R. Wallauer, Lead Compliance Engineer

• L. Rabenau, Compliance Engineer

• C. Schultz, Chairman, PRC

• J. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer SVG R. Swiderski, Manager, Startup 1.2 Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation

• A. Dasenbrook, Senior Manager, Contruction

• P. Bienich, Assistant Superintendent of Engineering

• D. Lamson, Assistant Resident Engineer

• R. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer D. Wilson , Instrumentation & Control Engineer 1.3 Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. Federico, Nuclear Control Engineer J. Zielinski, Nuclear Control Engineer 1.4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector

• A. Asars, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those personnel present at exit meeting.

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l 2.0 Licensee's Action on Previous Inspection Findings 2.1 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) 82-00-04 Undetectable Failure of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) ,

Periodic testing of the SSPS requires actuation of the system master relays and continuity tests of the output relays. During testing, the voltage applied to the output relays is reduced from 120 volts ac to 15 volts dc. A pushbatton test switch actuates the master relays and opens a switch contact shunting a proving lamp which verifies con-tinuity of the output relay coils. Upon completion of the test, 15 volts dc is removed and 120 volts is reapplied to the circuit. If the test pushbutton shunt contact fails to reclose, the proving lamp will be in series with the output relay. This lamp could burn open when 120 volts is applied during an accident, thus causing the failure of the output relay to perform its safety functio Westinghouse notified the NRC of this potential problem in a letter dated August 6, 1982 from E. Rahe to R. DeYoung. On August 30, 1982, DLC notified R. Keimig of Region I office by telephon In-terim reports dated September 29, 1982 and May 19, 1983, provided additional information. A final report, 2NRC-4-113, was submitted by Duquesne Light Company, DLC, to Region I on August 1, 198 The licensee's corrective action was to incorporate the design chan-ges described in the Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-84-01 dated March 20, 1984. A Field Change Notice (FCN) DMWM-10688 dated April 23, 1985 was issued by Westinghouse to detail the wiring and hardware changes required to correct this deficiency. The modifi-cation SDR 82-04 was completed February 28, 1986.

The modification was made by Westinghouse personnel with QC coverage by other Westinghouse personnel. The inspector observed the train A&B

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test panels, which are located in the SSPS panels, for the wiring changes to correct the deficiency. Discussions were held with Westing-house personnel who were responsible for the above modificatio No deficiencies were noted. This CDR 82-00-04 is close .2 (Closed) CDR 83-00-06 Defective Circuit Cards in the Westinghouse 7300 Process Protection System There were two deficiencies associated with the 7300 Process Protect-ion System as follows: Heat sink adhesive failures have been identified to have occur-red in the loop power supply (NLP) cards. This adhesive failure could cause the heat sink to separate from the thermal links and fall off the printed circuit board. The plate is conductive metal and could cause shorting of low level signals if it became

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wedged between cards in the card frame. This signal shorting could either cause damage to the Westinghouse 7300 Process Pro-tection System or specific loop loss of safety functio . During a seismic event the Temperature Channel Test (NTC) card which utilizes a mercury relay could experience a relay contact bounce. This contact bounce could result in signal saturation of the downstream RTD Amplifier (NRA) card in the T hot and T cold circuits of the Westinghouse 7300 Process Protection Syste This saturation of the NRA card could delay initiation of the Overtemperature - Delta T and Overpower - Delta T reactor trip The licensee identified twenty one (21) NLP cards in Inspection Re-port, SPE-74, which had defective heat sinks that required replace-ment. These defective NLP cards were identified by the licensee on July 25, 1984. The cards were defective in that they were subject to the adhesive failure mechanism that resulted in heat sink adhesive failures previously reported by Westinghouse. The defective cards consisted of twelve (12) NLP cards in secondary safety-related pro-cess rack (RK*2SEC-PROC-A) and nine (9) NLP cards in (RK*2SEC-PROC-B). Of the twenty one (21) defective cards, five of these were found by the licensee to have loose heat sinks. The balance of the cards did not have loose heat sinks. A Nonconformance & Disposition Report (N&D) number 4650 was issued July 26, 1984 for the above deficienc The twenty one (21) above identified NLP card heat sinks were re-placed by Westinghouse IED Field Engineers. The correction of this deficiency was completed on May 20, 1985. The N&D was closed June 18, 1985. These deficiencies were reported to the NRC Region I in supple-mental letter dated March 13, 198 The licensee issued N&D number 4563B dated July 21, 1984 for the deficiency of the NTC cards. The modification to the NTC cards in the process protection system was per Westinghouse Field Change Not-ice (FCN) DMWM-10638A dated October 16, 1985. The modification was the addition of a daughter board with a reed relay. The reed relay contacts were connected in parallel with the mercury relay contact This arrangement would provide circuit continuity during a seismic event thus preventing delayed Overtemperature-Delta T and Overpower-Delta T reactor trips. The modification was made by Westinghouse

, personnel and completed March 4, 1986. The N&D was closed April 18, 1986. The inspector verified that assembly drawings were revised to preclude future replacement of these modified NTC with those NTC cards which did not have this modificatio During the course of the inspection, the inspector noted several

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deficiencies with regard to the licensee's reporting of the defective i

circuit cards to the NRC. Background related to the reporting of the defective 7300 cards is described below.

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Westinghouse notified the NRC of this potential problem in a letter dated June 1, 1983, from E. P. Rahe to R. C. DeYoung. The NRC issued

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an Information Notice IN 83-38 on June 13, 1983 to inform licensees and holders of cps of potential problems with the Westinghouse NLP and NTC cards. The licensee provided an interim report dated July 19, 1983 followed by a final deficiency report, dated August 26, 1983 2 NRC-3-068 to Region I. In the final report the licensee stated that the NLP cards were not present in BVPS- This was based on a review by Stone and Webster (S&W) that determined the NLP cards were not shipped to BVPS-2; and an S&W inspection that determined the cards were not present and information from Westinghouse that indicated they had not supplied NLP cards directly to BVPS- On July 25, 1984 (as a result of an inspection by site Quality Cont-rol Personnel) the licensee determined that they did have the defect-ive NLP cards. The licensee replaced the defective NLP cards in May 1985. However, it was twenty (20) months from the time the licensee identified the presence of the NLP cards before they notified the NRC Region I on March 13, 1986 of the presence of the cards at BVPS- With regard to the NTC cards, in their July 19, 1983 report the li-censee indicated that defective NTC cards in safety related Balance-of-Plant applications would be replaced. However, the corrective actions for defective NTC cards in the Process Protection System were not discussed. Furthermore, the licensee ultimately determined that the NTC cards used in safety related Balance-of-Plant applications need not be replaced. They did not notify NRC of this change in plan The late reporting of the presence of the NLP cards and the failure to provide adequate corrective action plans as a part of the deficiency report for the NTC cards is a violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

2.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 84-18-04 Cracked and Broken Piston Rods In Brown Boveri Electric Type SHK Breakers Information Notice No. 83-84 dated December 30,1983 described a po-tentially significant problem pertaining to Brown Boveri Electric (BBE) type 5HK 250/350, 1200/2000 ampere circuit breakers. The breaker puffer piston connecting rods developed cracks and faile Beaver Valley Unit 2 was identified as having the above type breaker N&D No. 12294 was issued June 27,1985 to inspect the puffer pistons in 5HK Brown Boveri breakers. Sixty five(65) pistons with surface cracking were identified. The Information Notice 83-84 indicated that complete failure could reduce the number of operations before

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maintenance would be necessary. BBE indicated that no breakers had failed but that low current interruption may be impaired. BBE indi-cated that minor surface cracks should not be the cause for reject-ion. However, .all pistons which evidenced cracking including tooling marks and minor surface cracks as identified by N&D No. 12294 were replaced by the licensee. The inspection of pistons fabricated from the susceptible material at each maintenance cycle will preclude failure of the pisto SWEC letter, 20LS-227764, dated April 15, 1986 recommended to DLC the

. replacement of all puffer pistons to ensure proper performance of the associated safety functions of these circuit breakers on deman However, DLC-in letter, 2DLC-8893, dated June 18, 1986 to SWEC stated that the maintenance inspection was adequate based upon :

The reported broken (Fractured) puffer pistons were found after long periods of operation during routine maintenance inspectio *

.There were no reported problems of catastrophic failures or failures that prevented the breakers to operate on deman No deficiencies were identified by the inspector. This unresolved item 84-18-04 is close '

2.4 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (IFI) 85-16-07 Station Battery Cell Spacing-To Battery Rack End Support

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The concern was that there was no space between the battery cell and the rack end rails. Previous identified potential cracking problems in battery jars due to expansion of the cells against battery rack end. rails were noted in NRC Unresolved item (85-17-02) for Unit The unit 2 batteries are either Exide 2GN-13 or Exide 2GN-21 type cells mounted 15 cells on each of four racks per battery room. There are two battery cells contained within each battery jar. There are a total of twelve (12) compression spacers distributed between the 30 jars. With at least two spacers per rack, there is adequate room for battery expansion should it occur. Further , Activity Summary Report for BVPS-1, EM 72594, dated June 6, 1986 reported a discussion bet-ween DLC and Exide in which Exide recommended that the batteries be i installed with the end rails lightly snu ,

Based upon the above considerations this unresolved item 85-16-07 is close .5 (0 pen) CDR 86-00-06 Potential Deficiency 480V ITE Circuit Breakers A failure of an ITE/Telemecanique molded case circuit breaker to

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7 reset after a breaker trip was reported by the DLC Maintenance De-partment. The breaker reset mechanism which is held by a slotted clip (latch cam) had moved laterally and come free. This allowed the breaker operating arm to move freely and not reset the breaker. The original design, prior to October 6, 1982, was a rectangular piece of metal with a hole in the center. This was to eliminate movement and maintain tensio The licensee stated that this concern would not adversely affect the safety of plant operations because there are no safety functions that require the breakers to be manually opened. The safety function of the breakers is to provide power to their respective loads and pro-tect the equipment and busses from overload condition The licensee notified Region I( S. Hall to L. Tripp) by telephone on May 5, 1986 of the above problem. A Potentially Significant Defici-ency Report 86-06, 2NRC-6-084, was submitted on August 12, 1986. The licensee corrective action stated in N&D No. 12325 dated March 20, 1986 was to replace the defective latch cam using the vendors ins-tructions. This replacement was to be completed prior to fuel load-in The inspector discussed this modification with the licensee. The inspector determined that sixty percent of the MCCs, have had the defective latch cam replaced. Based upon the above considerations this CDR 86-00-06 remains open pending completion of replacement of the latch cam .6 (Closed) IFI 86-01-04 Missing Jumpers from Westinghouse Reactor Protection System Card for Over-Power Delta T Trip Function Information Notice 85-98 dated December 26, 1985 identified that jumpers were removed during a preoperational test and were not rein-stalled on two of the cards following the test. The licensee ident-ified in the IN 85-98 attributed this error to deficient vendor draw-ings and documents, which did not contain explicit guidance regarding the need for the missing jumpers. Other licensees have had similar problems. The preoperational testing and subsequent surveillance testing at two plants failed to detect the missing jumpers because none of the tests include test signals that simulate conditions of decreasing T-av The licensee review concluded the following :

There was no print straping shown on the lead-lag card of con-trolled drawing 7414D02 & 0 *

The Westinghouse instruction manual,SWEC File No. 2501-410-001-004C was checked for card style 2837A18G01 & G02. This identi-fied the JA jumper on item #106 black jumper on the lead-lag card spike suppressio .?

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Field inspection of Cabinet 1,2,&3 Part frames slot 35 indicated that the jumpers were installed on the three card *

The monthly surveillance procedure (MSP) 2MSP-6.38,39,&40-I were revised to perform a check of the JA jumper installatio The loops have not been calibrated therefore the proof test has not been completed. The inspector reviewed the 2MPS-6.39-I procedure and verified the requirement for the proof test. Based upon the above this IFI 86-01-04 is close .0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on October 3, 1986 at the site. The inspector summarized the scope and the inspection findings discussed herei No written material was provided to the licensee.

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