IR 05000412/1986023
| ML20214S454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1986 |
| From: | Imbro E, Wang H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214S447 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-86-23, NUDOCS 8609290497 | |
| Download: ML20214S454 (14) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and
Technical Training Center Programs Report No:
50-412/86-23 Docket No:
50-412 Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company Facility Name:
Beaver Valley, Unit 2 Inspections At:
(1) Stone and Webster Engineering Corp, Boston, PA (2) Beaver Valley Site, Shippingport, PA Inspections Conducted:
(1) July 28-30, 1986
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(2) August 4-5, 1986 Inspection Team Members:
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Team Leader:
H. Wang, Inspection Specialist, IE Mechanical Systems:
T. DelGaizo, Consultant, WESTEC Services Electrical Power:
S. Athavale, Electrical Engineer, IE Mechanical Components:
B. Gupta, Consultant, Harstead Engineering *
Instrumentation and Control (I&C):
S. Athavale, Electrical Engineer, IE Civil / Structural:
G. Harstead, Consultant, Harstead Engineering **
E. Imbro, Section Chief, QA Branch, IE ***
Prepared by:
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Hai-Bob Wang Team Leader, IE Approved by:
e z v:,4#
9/d/4 Eugene V. Imbrc, Chief Licensing Section
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Quality Assurance Branch
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Site inspection only
Boston inspection only
Attended exit meeting in Boston
8609290497 e60924 PDR ADOCK 05000412 G
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BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 Inspection of Technical Audit Programs July 28-30 and August 4-5, 1986 i
1.
Background In a meeting with the NRC on March 15, 1986, the licensee, Duquesne Light Company (DLC), proposed a two phase program for the completion of the engineering assurance in-depth technical audits of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 (BV-2) project. The first phase provides for completion of four in-depth technical audits, three of which had been previously completed. The fourth and final audit, designated as EA Audit No. 52, will assess the adequacy of the design process by evaluating the design of the safety injection system (SIS) and the adjoining portion of the recirculation spray system (RSS) used to supply water to the core to provide long-term cooling, and associated interfaces. The fourth audit will be performed by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) by qualified engineers who have not worked on the BV-2 project. The scope of this program was limited in recognition of supplemental audits previously performed by SWEC and DLC, particularly SWEC EA Audit No. 50 of the BV-2 hazards analysis program, SWEC EA Audit No. 44 covering the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system plus portions of the fuel building, and DLC's Design Bases Endorsement (DBE) program and resulting confirmation programs.
The second phase provides for an evaluation and assessment of the results of
-
,
the four audits in order to form a conclusion as to the adequacy of the SWEC design process as implemented for BV-2.
2.
Purpose The purpose of the inspections was to review the appropriate audits or programs to verify that design aspects which were supplementary to SWEC EA Audit No. 52 (the fourth audit) were adequately evaluated. Specifically, in a visit to the SWEC offices in Boston from July 28 to July 30, 1986, the following audits were evaluated:
.
Audit Design Aspect SWEC EA No. 50 Hazards Analysis Program SWEC EA No. 44 Fuel Building Review In a visit to the BV-2 site on August 4 and 5, 1986, DLC's DBE program and its confirmation programs were reviewed.
3.
Personnel Contacted A large number of DLC and SWEC personnel were contacted during the course of the two NRC inspections. The following is a listing of key personnel contacted.
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July 28-30 Inspection
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Name Organization Position S. Mukherjee DLC BV-2 Project R. Twigg SWEC Audit Team Leader
D. Shaw SWEC EA Supervisor G. Bushnell SWEC Hazards Coordinator B. Ebbeson SWEC Structural Auditor August 4-5 Inspection Name Organization Position J. Thomas DLC Manager of Engineering R. Martin DLC Manager of Licensing Programs P. Cadena DLC Supervising Engineer J. O'Neil DLC Licensing Engineer 4.
General Conclusions As a result of these two inspections, the NRC team arrived at the following general conclusions:
(1) The Hazards Analysis Program Audit (SWEC EA Audit No. 50) was performed
in sufficient technical depth and scope to provide an evaluation of the design in the hazards protection area. Other than follow-up of corrective action from EA Audit No. 50, and review of specific items which have been carried over for completion into Audit No. 52 (namely the safe-shutdown analyses associated with high-energy-line break, internally generated missile protection, and seismic /nonseismic interactions), no further design review is necessary in the hazards area.
(2) Design review of the fuel building performed in EA Audit No. 44 was performed in sufficient technical depth to evaluate the design process as related to building structures. The combination of this design review and the review of civil / structural design interfaces being conducted in EA Audit No. 52 will be sufficient to evaluate the total civil / structural design and design process.
(3) DLC's DBE program is a detailed and thorough confirmation of the incorporation of design commitments as detailed in the FSAR into project design criteria documents, procedures, and other design guidance. Since the SWEC audits will evaluate the effectiveness of the project in implementing these design documents, the DBE program and its confirmation program are providing a significant link in the overall evaluation of the BV-2 design.
Specific NRC comments associated with each of these two iespections are included in the enclosures to this inspection report.
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ENCLOSURE 1 INSPECTION OF HAZARDS AND FUEL BUILDING DESIGN
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July 28-30, 1986
HAZARDS PROTECTION The NRC team reviewed all aspects of EA Audit No. 50, Hazards Analysis Program, including project responses and action taken to close audit observations. Based upon the review of documents supporting the audit report, the NRC team determined that audit conclusions are based on objective technical evidence and engineering judgements and that the audit was performed in a thorough and comprehensive manner. The NRC team also noted that certain aspects of this audit, specifically safe shutdown analyses associated with high-energy-line break, internally generated missiles, and seismic /nonseismic interactions were not completed due to the state of the design at the time of the audit. These items are being reviewed under the current EA Audit No. 52.
The NRC team reviewed this part of EA Audit No. 52 and concluded that Audit No. 52 will be sufficient to complete the evaluation of the hazards programs.
The following additional comments were provided at the end of the NRC's inspection:
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(1) The draft Licensing Change Request No. 1536, initiated as a result of Audit Observation 221, Items 1 and 2, namely the project positica on design against postulated piping failures, should be clarified with respect to jet impingement and flooding effects associated with arbitrary breaks in exclusion areas and also with respect to the change in pipe class between the containment isolation valves and the first pipe restraints. Specifically, differences between the project position and Standard Review Plan Section 3.6.1 should be identified and justified.
(2) It is noted that the project's hazards protection procedure, 2BVM-165, incorporates provisions of NUREG CR/2913 in the jet impingement and pipe whip protection section. A licensing change request is in preparation to incorporate this document in the plant's licensing basis. The NRC team reviewed this request during the course of this inspection. However, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation must approve the licensing change in order to validate this portion of the hazards program. DLC's processing of the licensing change request should be expedited.
FUEL BUILDING DESIGN As a result of the review of documentation during this inspection, the NRC team determined that the fuel building review (EA Audit No. 44) as supplemented by the current audit of the safety injection system (EA Audit No. 52) provides for a thorough structural audit of the BV-2 projec i
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The following specific comments are provided.
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(1) FSAR Section 3.8.4 applies to Seismic Category 1 concrete structures outside of containment, including the fuel building. Although FSAR Section 3.8.4 does not include load combinations containing "To" and "Ro,"* Strudtural Design Criteria 2BVM-5 does require these load combinationa for the fuel building.
Calculation C38 follows the Structural Design Criteria and includes the appropriate load combinations. The NRC team recommends that FSAR Section 3.8.4 be revised to include load combinations containing "To" and "Ro."
(2) Item 2.4 of EA Audit No. 44 concerns the moment distribution methods and
,
end assumption of a beam at Elevation 752'-3" in the fuel building. The beam extends from the north wall to the south wall with an intermediate support. The north wall contains a pilaster while the south wall does not.
The original i
designer took the north end to be fixed and south end to be pinned. The auditor noted that there were errors in the moment distribution method and judged that the south end of the beam should be considered fixed. A revised calculation was performed during this audit which justified that the beam was adequately rein-forced for the true condition. This item is considered to be closed.
(3) The following concerns were raised regarding the thermal analysis of the fuel building:
(a) The normal operating temperature of the fuel building is 90 degrees F l*
for winter and 70 degrees F for summer. Since the temperature would l
normally be expected to be hotter during summer than winter, this
input was questioned.
(b) The accident the temperatures used in calculation C38.13.1-6 do not correspond to Structural Design Criteria and are apparently based on internal-office-correspondence. The finite element analysis r
of the fuel pool was also performed using temperatures from calculation C38.13.1-6.
SWEC indicated that the thermal conditions are being confirmed, and may require some reanalysis. The NRC team will review the resolution of these items in a subsequent inspection to ensure that there are no adverse effect on the fuel building design.
- "To" = thermal effects and loads during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady state condition.
"Ro" = pipe reactions during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady state condition.
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ENCLOSURE 2 i
INSPECTION OF THE DESIGN BASIS ENDORSEMENT PROGRAM August 4-5, 1986
l MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
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The review of the mechanical systems discipline revealed that the Phase I and Phase II review provided a thorough evaluation of the incorporation of FSAR commitments, ASME Code requirements, regulatory requirements and other basic design documents into project criteria and design process documents. In the Phase III and Phase IV portions of the Design Basis Endorsement Program, it was noted that the mechanical systems area was not reviewed in the same depth or to the same level of detail as in other technical disciplines.
It is understood that this is because fewer problems were uncovered in the mechanical
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systems area than in other disciplines, due to prior audit programs (by DLC,
{
Quadrex Corp., and SWEC) which provided detailed review of the mechanical systems
"
discipline, and because the BV-2 EA program was adequately reviewing the f
mechanical system area. The NRC team considers this approach to be acceptable.
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ELECTRICAL POWER AND I&C
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The NRC team noticed that the program efforts were very extensive in the j
electrical discipline, but did not address I&C attributes such as criteria for
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setpoint calculations, verification of instruments for proper connections, etc.
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The NRC team was informed during exit meeting that the criteria for instruments connection verification was included in the mechanical discipline. The NRC team was subsequently shown criteria 2BVM-10 dated April 1983, criteria 2BVM-32 dated April 1983, and criteria 2BVM-155 dated January 1986. These criteria include technical attributes for instruments process connection verification and are acceptable to the NRC team. DLC also informed the team that the criteria for
,
l setpoint calculations were not included in the original program but will be j
included in the follow-on program. The NRC team considers this resolution i
acceptable.
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MECHANICAL COMPONENTS i
i The NRC team reviewed the DLC's DBE related to pipe support and pipe stress.
j In Phases I and II, the DLC team reviewed the various SWEC design criteria docu-l ments and the implementation of design process and control documents. DLC l
initiated follow-on activities when responses from SWEC were not satisfactory.
In Phase III the DLC team reviewed selected pipe stress and support calculations
>
from the residual heat removal system and auxiliary feed water system. They were i
!
reviewed for proper implementation of design basis documents and other applicable design documents.
In Phase IV, a walkdown was performed and the results were
,
compared to the installed design reviewed in Phase III to ensure compatability.
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Comments prepared in the form of design verification reports were initiated by the DLC team to identify potential inconsistencies between design and installed configurations. As a result of the DLC review, acceptable resolutions were achieved between DLC and SWEC. Documents were either accepted as-is or required revisions of documents or drawings to make them consistent and acceptable.
Based on the NRC team's review of the DLC comments and resolutions in the various phases of the DBE program, the NRC team concludes that DLC has done a thorough and acceptable job in both the DBE program and the follow-up activities.
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J. J. Carey-2-determined by the NRC team during our final inspection of audit results and corrective actions currently scheduled for the week of September 22, 1986.
No reply is necessary.
Please contact me or E. Imbro (301-492-9671) if you have any questions.
Sincerely, Gruilwl si6ned DY Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and Technical Training Center Programs
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Enclosures: As stated cc: see next page Distribution-DCS
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PDR'
LPDR DQAVT Reading QAB Reading JMTaylor, IE RWStarostecki, IE BKGrines, IE HJMiller, IE EVInbro, IE HBWang, IE PSTan, NRR DGMcDonald, NRR LSRubenstein, NRR LETripp, RI PKEapen, RI Team Members i
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fZ QA : AVT:IE QAB:DQAVT:IE DD:DQAVT:IE
T E HBWang EVImbro HJMiller f. s
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09//f/86 09//9 /86 09/,q/86 9/7 86
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and
Technical Training Center Programs Report No:
50-412/86-23 Docket No:
50-412 Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company Facility Name:
Beaver Valley, Unit 2 Inspections At:
(1) Stone and Webster Engineering Corp, Bosten, MA (2) Beaver Valley Site, Shippingport, PA Inspections Conducted:
(1) July 28-30, 1986
'
(2) August 4-5, 1986 Inspection Team Members:
,
Team Leader:
H. Wang, Inspection Specialist, IE Mechanical Systems:
T. DelGaizo, Consultant, WESTEC Services Electrical Power:
S. Athavale, Electrical Engineer, IE Mechanical Components:
B. Gupta, Consultant, Harstead Engineering *
Instrumentation and Control (I&C):
S. Athavale, Electrical Engineer, IE Civil / Structural:
G. Harstead, Consultant, Harstead Engineering **
E. Imbro, Section Chief, QA Branch, IE ***
Prepared by:
&
ll
'
Hai-Bob Wang Team Leader, IE Approved by:
d? T. k),, h
'/
Eugene V. Imbro, Chief Licensing Section
.
Quality Assurance Branch Site inspection only
Boston inspection only
Attended exit meeting in Boston
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BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 Inspection of Technical Audit Programs July 28-30 and August 4-5, 1986
1.
Background In a meeting with the NRC on March 15, 1986, the licensee, Duquesne Light Company (DLC), proposed a two phase program for the completion of the engineering assurance in-depth technical audits of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 (BV-2) project. The first phase provides for completion of four in-depth technical audits, three of which had been previously completed. The fourth and final audit, designated as EA Audit No. 52, will assess the adequacy of the design process by evaluating the design of the safety injection system (SIS) and the adjoining portion of the recirculation spray system (RSS) used to supply water to the core to provide long-term cooling, and associated interfsces. The fourth audit will be performed by Stone and Webster Engineering
. Corporation (SWEC) by qualified engineers who have not worked on the BV-2 project. The scope of this program was limited in recognition of supplemental-audits previously performed by SWEC and DLC, particularly SWEC EA Audit No. 50 dof the BV-2 hazards analysis program, SWEC EA Audit No. 44 covering the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system plus portions of the fuel building, and DLC's aDesign Bases Endorsement (DBE) program and resulting confirmation programs.
The second phase provides for an evaluation and assessment of the results of
,
the four audits in order to form a conclusion as to the adequacy oi the SWEC design process as implemented for BV-2.
2.
Purpose The purpose of the inspections was to review the appropriate audits or programs to verify that design aspects which were supplementary to SWEC EA Audit No. 52 (the fourth audit) were adequately evaluated-Specifically, in a visit to the SWEC offices in Boston from July 28 to July 3u, 1986, the following audits were evaluated:
Audit Design Aspect
'
SWEC EA No. 50 Hazards Aaalysis Program SWEC EA No. 44 Fuei 3 sliding Review In a visit to the BV-2 site.on August 4 and 5, 1986, DLC's DBE program and its
confirmation programs were reviewed.
i 3.
Personnel Contacted A large number of DLC and SWEC personnel were contacted during the course of the two NRC inspections. The following is a listing of key personnel contacted.
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,
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,
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July 28-30 Inspection
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Name Organization Position S. Mukherjee DLC BV-2 Project
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R. Twigg SWEC Audit Team Leader
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D. Shaw SWEC EA Supervisor G. Bushnell SWEC Hazards Coordinator B. Ebbeson SWEC Structural Auditor August 4-5 Inspection Name Organization Position J. Thomas DLC Manager of Engineering R. Martin DLC Manager of Licensing Programs P. Cadena DLC Supervising Engineer
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J. O'Neil DLC Licensing Engineer l
4.
General Conclusions
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As a result of these two inspections, the NRC team arrived at the following general conclusions:
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(1) The Hazards Analysis Program Audit (SWEC EA Audit No. 50) was performed in sufficient technical depth and scope to provide an evaluation of the design in the bazards protection area. Other than follow-up of corrective action from EA Audit No. 50, and review of specific items which have been carried over for completion into Audit No. 52 (namely the safe-shutdown analyses associated with high-energy-line break, internally generated missile protection, and seismic /nonseismic interactions), no further design review is necessary in the hazards area.
(2) Design review of the fuel building performed in EA Audit No. 44 was performed in sufficient technical depth to evaluate the design process as related to building structures. The combination of this design review and the review of civil / structural design interfaces being conducted in EA Audit No. 52 will be sufficient to evaluate the total civil / structural design and design process.
(3) DLC's DBE program is a detailed and thorough confirmation of the incorporation of design commitments as detailed in the FEAR into project design
'
criteria documents, procedures, and other design guidance.
Since the SWEC audits will evaluate the effectiveness of the project in implementing these design documents, the DBE program and its confirmation program are providing a significant link in the overall evaluation of the BV-2 design.
Specific NRC comments associated with each of these two inspections are included in the enclosures to this inspection report.
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ENCLOSURE 1 INSPECTION OF HAZARDS AND FUEL BUILDING DESIGN July 28-30, 1986
HAZARDS PROTECTION O
The NRC team reviewed all aspects of EA Audit No. 50, Hazards Analysis Program, including project responses and action taken to close audit observations. Based upon the review of documents supporting the audit report, the NRC team determined that audit conclusions are based on objective technical evidence and engineering judgements and that the audit was performed in a thorough and comprehensive The NRC team also noted that certain aspects of this audit, manner.
specifically safe shutdown analyses associated with high-energy-line break, internally generated missiles, and seismic /nonseismic interactions were not completed due to the state of the design at the time of the audit. These items are being reviewed under the current EA Audit No. 52.
The NRC team reviewed this part of EA Audit No. 52 and concluded that Audit No. 52 will be sufficient to complete the evaluation of the hazards programs.
The following additional comments were provided at the end of the NRC's inspection:
,
(1) The draft Licensing Change Request No. 1536, initiated as a result of Audit Observation 221, Items 1 and 2, namely the project position on design against postulated piping failures, should be clarified with respect to jet impingement and flooding effects associated with arbitrary breaks in exclusion areas and also with respect to the change in pipe class between the containment isolation valves and the first pipe restraints. Specifically, differences between the project position and Standard Review Plan Section 3.6.1 should be identified and justified.
(2) It is noted that the project's hazards protection procedure, 2BVM-165, incorporates provisions of NUREG CR/2913 in the jet impingement and pipe whip protection section. A licensing change request is in preparation to incorporate this document in the plant's licensing basis. The NRC team reviewed this request during the course of this inspection. However, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation must approve the licensing change in order to validate this portion of the hazards program. DLC's processing of the licensing change request should be expedited.
FUEL BUILDING DESIGN As a result of the review of documentation during this inspection, the NRC team determined that the fuel building review (EA Audit No. 44) as supplemented by the current audit of the safety injection system (EA Audit No. 52) provides for a thorough structural audit of the BV-2 project.
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The following specific comments are provided:
(1) FSAR Section 3.8.4 applies to Seismic Category 1 concrete structures outside of containment, including the fuel building. Although FSAR Section 3.8.4 does not include load combinations containing "To" and
"Ro,"* Structural Design Criteria 2BVM-5 does require these load combinations for the fuel building.
Calculation C38 follows the Structural Design Criteria and includes the appropriate load combinations. The NRC team recommends that FSAR Section 3.8.4 be revised to include load combinations containing "To" and "Ro."
(2) Item 2.4 of EA Audit No. 44 concerns the moment distribution methods and end assumption of a beam at Elevation 752'-3" in the fuel building. The beam extends from the north wall to the south wall with ao intermediate support. The north wall contains a pilaster while the south wall does not. The original designer took the north end to be fixed and south end to be pinned. The auditor noted that there were errors in the moment distribution method and judged that the south end of the beam should be considered fixed. A revised calculation was performed during this audit which justified that the beam was adequately rein-forced for the true condition. This item is considered to be closed.
-
(3) The following concerns were raised regarding the thermal analysis of the fuel building:
I (a) The normal operating temperature of the fuel building is 90 degrees F
'
for winter and 70 degrees F for summer. Since the temperature would normally be expected to be hotter during summer than winter, this input was questioned.
(b) The accident the temperatures used in calculation C38.13.1-6 do not correspond to Structural Design Criteria and are apparently based on internal-office-correspondence. The finite element analysis of the fuel pool was also performed using temperatures from calculation C38.13.1-6.
SWEC indicated that the thermal conditions are being confirmed, and may require some reanalysis. The NRC team will review the resolution of these items in a subsequent inspection to ensure that there are no adverse effect on the fuel building design.
I l
- "To" = thermal effects and loads during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady state condition.
"Ro" = pipe reactions during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady state condition.
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ENCLOSURE 2
INSPECTION OF THE DESIGN BASIS ENDORSEMENT PROGRAM August 4-5, 1986
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MECHANICAL SYSTEMS The review of the mechanical systems discipline revealed that the Phase I and Phase II review provided a thorough evaluation of the incorporation of FSAR commitments, ASME Code requirements, regulatory requirements and other basic design documents into project criteria and design process documents.
In the Phase III and Phase IV portions of the Design Basis Endorsement Program, it was noted that the mechanical systems area was not reviewed'in the same depth or to the same level of detail as in other technical disciplines.
It is understood that this is because fewer problems were uncovered in the mechanical systems area than in other disciplines, due to prior audit programs (by DLC, Quadrex Corp., and SWEC) which provided detailed review of the mechanical systems
'
discipline, and because the BV-2 EA program was adequately reviewing the mechanical system area. The NRC team considers this approach to be acceptable.
l ELECTRICAL POWER AND I&C I'
The NRC team noticed that the program efforts were very extensive in the
,
electrical discipline, but did not address I&C attributes such as criteria for setpoint calculations, verification of instruments for proper connections, etc.
The NRC team was informed during exit meeting that the criteria for instruments connection verification was included in the mechanical discipline. The NRC team was subsequently shown criteria 2BVM-10 dated April 1983, criteria 2BVM-32 dated April 1983, and criteria 2BVM-155 dated January 1986. These criteria include technical attributes for instruments process connection verification and are acceptable to the NRC team. DLC also informed the team that the criteria for
setpoint calculations were not included in the original program but will be
included in the follow-on program. The NRC team considers this resolution acceptable.
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS The NRC team reviewed the DLC's DBE related to pipe support and pipe stress.
In Phases I and II, the DLC team reviewed the various SWEC design criteria docu-ments and the implementation of design process and control documents. DLC initiated follow-on activities when responses from SWEC were not satisfactory.
>
In Phase III the DLC team reviewed selected pipe stress an' support calculations from the residual heat removal system and auxiliary feed water system. They were reviewed for proper implementation of design basis documents and other applicable design documents.
In Phase IV, a walkdown was performed and the results were compared to the installed design reviewed in Phase III to ensure compatability.
,
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Comments prepared in the form of design verification reports were initiated by the DLC team to identify potential inconsistencies between design and installed configurations. As a result of the DLC review, acceptable resolutions were achieved between DLC and SWEC. Documents were either accepted as-is or required revisions of documents or drawings to make them consistent and acedptable.
Based on the NRC team's review of the DLC comments and resolutions in the various phases of the DBE program, the NRC team concludes that DLC has done a thorough and acceptable job in both the DBE program and the follow-up activities.
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