IR 05000412/1986008

Insp Rept 50-412/86-08 on 860414-21.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Rcs Hydrostatic Test,Including Test Procedure,Test Witnessing & Observation of Precautions

ML20198R778
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/30/1986
From:	Eselgroth P, Van Kessel H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198R749	List: IR 05000412/1986008 ML20198R745
References
50-412-86-08, 50-412-86-8, NUDOCS 8606100209
Download: ML20198R778 (11)

Text

.

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N Docket N License N CPPR-105 Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania InspectionConducQd: Apriti 14-21, 1986 Inspectors: R, f- 3 o-b H. F. van Keshel, Reac' tor Engineer date Approved by: _, . N 3O P."W. E'selgroth, Chief, ~ Test Programs / date/

Section, Operations Branch, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 14-21, 1986 (Inspection N /86-08)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the reactor coolant system hydrostatic test, including review of the test procedure, checkout of test pre-parations and test prerequisites, test witnessing, participation of contractor's and licensee's QA/QC organizations in the test, observation of the precautions, as listed in the test procedure, by test personnel, and observation of general performance of test personnel during the test. Independent test measurements were taken of metal surface temperatures during the test. In addition, the status of some previous findings of NRC inspectors were determined and the pro-gress made on these findings was determined and evaluate Results: No items of noncompliance were identified during the reactor coolant system hydrostatic test. For the progress made on previous inspection findings see the attached details of the inspection repor h O

,

l

. ,

DETAILS Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company F. A. Arnold, Staff Engineer, Startup Group R. C. Callaway, Supervisor Systems Tests

• N. J. Dougherty, Director Systems Testing Section J. R. Crevasse, QA Surveillance J. J. Dusenberry, Asst. Supervisor, QA Surveillance

• J. Farris, Test Supervisor

• J. D. Johns, Supervisor, QA Surveillance T. P. Noonan, Station Superintendent Beavery Valley 2

• J. Patterson, Test Engineer (Coordinator RCS Cold Hydro.)

• J. R. Kasunick, Supervisor Maintenance SUG

• R. J. Swiderski, Startup Manager

• L. Williams, Director Startup & Testing D. H. Williams, Startup Engineer R. G. Williams, Supervisor System Test Software Development Westinghouse Electric C *E. L. Morris, Site Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• A. A. Asars, Resident Inspector

• Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector

• L. J. Prividy, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at exit interview on April 21, 198 .0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item 412/85-08-01; " Classification of tests for the Preoperational Test Program" The concern with the classification of preoperational tests revolves around the identification of these tests for performance in the correct time frame relative to the milestones of the startup program. Initial core loading, for instance, was listed as a preoperational test, which it is not and the Steam Generator Hydrostatic Test (secondary side) and the Reactor Vessel Internals Vibration Test, were not listed as preoperational test While the classification of the tests is not very important to safety, the timing of the tests in relation to the milestones of the startup program could be important to safet .

.

1 The classification and listing of preoperational tests had undergone sig-nificant changes since the time of the identification of this unresolved item (April 1985). The inspector will continue his review of the latest preoperational test listing in a future inspectio (Closed) Unresolved Item 412/85-08-02, " Incomplete Qualification records for key test personnel" Six records of key test personnel, including those of inspection 443/85-08, were reviewed to determine their completeness and adequacy in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N18.17 and N45. Training records, qualification certificates, and experience background information were found to be up-to-date and complete in all of the re-viewed records. The inspector has no further questions on this item at this tim (Closed) Unresolved Item 412/85-08-03, " Absence of records for the place-ment of jurisdictional tags after system turnover".

The absence of records for the placement of jurisdictional tags after sys-tem turnover could represent a lack of control over pretest condition These tags often are torn off from the equipment by construction activi-ties in the area cf its location. Without the record of its placement, it could be difficult to determine who has jurisdiction over the equipmen This item was discussed with startup managemen It was their opinion that the absence of jurisdictional tag records would not cause misuse of the equipment (without jurisdictional tags) by construction because:

Construction needs a work order to do anything with equipment which has been turned over to startu *

For normal construction activities construction must use black on green (approved for) construction drawings. Upon turn over, these black on green drawings for the equipment turned over are pulled from all work stations in the plan *

Construction people are not authorized to operate any equipment in whatever statu On the basis of the above information, the inspector agreed that the absence of jurisdictional tag placement records will not cause a major control problem. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved item 412/85-08-04, "FSAR Chapter 14 on Preoperational Test Program not referenced in Startup Manual" l

The absence of any reference to FSAR Chapter 14 caused the Startup Manual to be without a scope of work description for the startup progra Since

.

.

inspection 50-412/85-08 (April 1985), the startup manual has been corrected to include this reference to Chapter 14 in appropriate locations of the Startup Manual. This item is close .0 Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test (Cold Hydro)

3.1 Scope and Objectives The Reactor Coolant System (RCS), including the reactor coolant loop piping, the reactor coolant pump (RCP) housings (3), the primary side of the steam generators (3), the pressurizer, and the welded parts of RCS instrumentation and associated tubing, are subjected to an inte-grity test at 3200 psig and a leak test at maximum operating pressur Some piping, interconnected with the RCS and designed for RCS pressure, is included within the hydrostatic test boundary. The scope of this inspection was to witness the Cold Hydro and to verify that the licen-see performed the test in accordance with their own approved procedure and the test requirements of ASME Code,Section III, Class .2 References (1) PO-2.06.01, " Cold Hydro Test of Reactor Coolant System, Rev. O, Issue 2, approved by JTG on March 31, 1986, including RCS Hydro

-

Boundary drawing (2) PO-2.06.02, " Reactor Coolant Pump Initial Performance Test",

Rev. O, Issue 1, approved by JTG on July 9,198 (3) Memorandum DLC-SQCL-0874-GW-1, D. K. Rohm to R. Coupland,

" Hydrostatic test of the Reactor Coolant System QC/ANI Support", dated April 11, 198 (4) Beaver Valley-2 FSAR, Table 5.2-2, 5.2-3, 5.2-4, 5.2-5 (RCS chemistry Spec.), 5.4-7, Section 3.2.2.4.1, Fig. 5.1-1, 2, and 3, Chapter 14 and other sections and chapters relevant to Cold Hydr (5) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, with applicable code addenda as identified in reference (4).

3.3 Review of Test Procedure Scope References (1) and (2) were reviewed to ensure that the test procedure l is technically adequate and that the test is consistent with regula- I tory requirements, guidance, and licensee commitment i

..

.

Discussion Procedure P0 2.06.01 (ref. 1) was reviewed to determine that it includes the following:

• A detailed identification of the system boundaries with a clear identification of the piping and equipment included in the hydrostatic test (integrity test) and the system leakage tes *

RCS venting instructions during the fill operation *

Specification of water quality requirements at the different temperatures experienced during the tes *

Nil ductility temperatures for the various RCS components, at the pressures above max. operating pressur * The minimum hydrostatic test pressure is 1.25 times the lowest design pressure of any components within the test boundaries protected by the overpressure device *

Overpressure det'ces to prevent overstressing of RCS components duri.ig the integrity tes *

A max. hydrostatic pressure less than the limits specified by the ASME Section III Code (ref. 5).

• The hydrostatic test pressure is maintained for at least 10 minutes before initiation of the examination for leakag *

Definition of allowable heat-up and cooldown rates of the RCS as well as allowable pressurization rates and depressurization rate *

Joints, connections, or regions of high stress are examined for leakage at a pressure equal to the design pressure or 3/4 of the test pressure, which ever is highe In addition, the procedure was reviewed for:

The identification of prerequisites, initial conditions, acceptance criteria, precautions, and references used in the procedur *

Special tools and equipment required to perform the procedur *

The provision / specification of communication equipment for communication between remote control stations involved in the tes . . . .. _ . . - . _ .. . _ _ ..

.

.

The provision of quality control hold point *

The provision of sign off requirements / space for the individual procedural step Findings The review determined that all of the attributes discussed above were

! present in the procedur No violations or deviations were observe .4 Test Organization The operational aspects of the test were handled between Operations and the Startup Group (SUG). Operations, including the manipulation of valves and instruments, were carried out by operators while the general conduct of the test was in the hands of the Startup Group (SUG). The actual performance of the RCS integrity test and the RCS Leak test inspections remained the responsibility of the Construction Contractors including, amongst others, Westinghouse Electric Company (NSSS supplier). Inspection Teams were identified in reference ANI inspectors were made available to these teams. One test engineer i was in charge of the Hydro Laser pump (4) operation. Another test

'

.

engineer was stationed near the penrecorder for the RCS metal surface temperatures located near the personnel hatch of the containment at the 767 ft. elevation in the Auxiliary Building. The organization, as described above, functioned effectively and smoothl .5 Test Witnessing The inspector witnessed the establishment of the various pressure pla-teaux prior to reaching test pressure and verified that the precau-tions, identified in the procedure (ref. 1), especially with regard to RCS pressure and temperature, were observed. Independent tempera-ture measurements were taken by the inspector upon reaching and hold-ing at approximately 2500 psig prior to the Integrity Test (for details See 3.6).

Prior to the heatup phase, the three' Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) were

'

" bumped" in accordance with reference 2, prior to putting them in ser-vice to accomplish the fir.al dynamic venting of the RCS and, subse-quently, to heat the RCS uniformly to the temperature plateaux. The running time of these pumps would be gradually increased. Each time, vibration readings were taken on the shaft and the motor housin RCP-C showed excessive vibration on the short runs (40 mils). The pump was observed to have a " wobble". Westinghouse recommended to discontinue the test of RCP-C and to not use it for the RCS-hydro.

!

>

- __ _ ._,.m._..,-_.-,.-,m...__ . . , , , _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ , _ , . _ _

. . . . . -._.,,_-, __ ___ ____________________ _ _________________ __ _ . _ _ _ _ .

.

.. .

.

.

The other two RCPs tested out OK although shaft vibration was found to be on the high side. RCP A and B performed satisfactorily during the RCS Hydro. Uniform heating of all three RCS loops was accomplish-ed by two pumps, although there were some minor temperature differences (See Table 3-1).

'The Inspector will follow up on the test inspection for RCP-C in a future inspectio The Integrity Test was witnessed by the inspector in the vicinity of the Test and Backup Gage on top of the Pressurizer. Independent RCS pressure - time data were taken by the inspector for comparison with the official data after completion of the tes Following the Integrity Test and the RCP inspection (at test pres-sure), the RCS pressure was brought down to the maximum operating pressure level and held there for the Leak Tes During the pressurization and depressurization of the RCS, particular attention was paid to actual heat up and cooldown rates, pressuriza-tion and depressurization rates as recorded in the control room. As part of the test records, a log sheet was developed to record the RCS water temperature versus elapsed time. Independent temperature read-ings by the inspector were compared with the data on the log sheet The inspector verified that the RCS metal temperatures prior to the test would permit the performance of the test, (expected to last at least 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) without these temperatures falling below the minimum of 150 F (as set by the steam generators and pressurizer) as a re-sult of heat losses from uninsulated RCS metal surface .6 Independent Measurements RCS metal surface temperature measurements were taken by the inspector at the maximum operating pressure plateau (approximately 2350 psig)

prior to the Integrity Test. These readings were taken at the same or similar locations as those of the temporary TCs installed by the licensee to measure RCS metal surface temperatures throughout the test. These locations were as follows:

TC N Location in RCS 1, 30 Steam Generator A (near tube Sheet)

2, 29 Steam Generator B (near tube Sheet)

3, 28 Steam Generator C (near tube Sheet)

4, 27 Pressurizer-To , 26 Pressurizer-Bottom 6, 25 Reactor Vessel-Bottom 7, 24 Reactor Vessel-Head 8, 23 Reactor Vessel-Flange

. . .

.

.

! .

The results of the independent temperature checks were compared with the strip chart readings from the temporary dedicated temperature recorder located in the Leak Test staging area. All of the readings indicated a comfortable margin allowing ample time to perform the Leak Test (See Attachment A). The temperature readings were taken by the inspector with a hand held thermocouple thermometer, DLC Mark No. 2.5206, Alnor Instrument Co., calibrated August 12, 1985, due for re-calibration on August 12, 198 The temperature recorder was identified as DLC Mark No. 2.5206, Alnor Instrument Co., 40-1999 F range, and had been calibrated on August 12, 1985; it was due for re-calibration on August 12, 198 A comparison of the T.C. readings on the recorder and the readings from the hand held thermometer is shown in the table belo Temperatures - F TC N TC Location Recorder Hand Held Ther (HHT)

1/30 Steam Generator A 164.0/16 /29 Steam Generator B 162.9/16 /28 Steam Generator C 166.4/16 /27 Pressurizer-Top 169.6/16 /26 Pressurizer-Bottom 160.8/16 /25 Reactor Vessel-Bottom 169.2/16 N/A 7/24 Reactor Vessel-Head 168.4/16 /23 Reactor Vessel-Flange 171.4/17 The divergence in the data frcm the two sources is the result of time differences between the two readings (TC recorder and HHT*) and the lack of insulation on the HHT and the sensitivity of the HHT to metal surface finish (contact surface would vary). All data, however, show the metal temperatures to be in the desired safe range prior to the integrity tes * Hand Held Thermometer

-

_

.

) .

3.7 Findings The inspector determined by direct observation, test witnessing, re-cords review, and independent measurements, that testing was effec-tively conducted and met acceptance criteria in accordance with ap-proved procedures, code requirements and FSAR commitment No items of noncompliance were identifie .0 QA/QC Interface Scope The Duquesne Light Co. (DLC) QA Surveillance Group had been re-organized recently (August, 1985) to support the Startup Group (SUG) more efficientl This reorganization was discussed with the supervisors of the group to determine the nature and extent of the support provided to SV Discussion The discussions with the DLC QA Surveillance Group revealed that the group establishes witness (hold) points for pre-operational tests (P0s) in close cooperation with the Director of pre-operational testing (P0s). After agreement has been reached, the procedures are stamped in the location of the pertinent procedural step. These witness points normally deal with data which are collected to verify acceptance criteria of the tes There are eight QA Specialists in the group which are available for startup surveillances. The findings of these QA Specialists are recorded in Sur-veillance Deficiency Reports. A number of these reports, as listed in Attachment A, were reviewed to determine the QA coverage of pre-operation-al tests (both P0s and SOVs).

The inspectors also talked with QA specialists on duty for the Cold Hydro test witnessing. Their knowledge of the systems involved and of the pro-cedures used was more than adequate to follow the tests in the required details including the comparison of observed data or information with the design criteri The red stamps for the hold points in the Cold Hydro test procedure were all signed by the QA Specialists on dut Findings The new DLC QA Surveillance Group functions effectively in their support of startup operations. No violations were observe ..

) a

5.0 Exit' Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection on April 21, 1986, an exit inter-view was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (denoted in Section 1). The findings were identified and previous inspection items were discusse At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the li-censee by the inspector. Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during this inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction ..-

u_ ;

ATTACHMENT A TO 412/86-08 REVIEW OF QA SURVEILLANCE DEFICIENCY REPORTS (SDR)

SDR N DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY TEST PROC. N DATE CPT-03-86 Review Generic Test Pro T-GFP-601 2-20-86 Rev. 2 CPT-07-86 Condenser Vac. Test 2T-CNS-22-2.41 3-06-86 Section B CPT-10-86 Removal / Reinstall, of 2T-EGF-363-1.01G 4-09-86 i Duplex Fuel Filters

.