IR 05000334/1986028

Safety Insp Rept 50-334/86-28 on 861028-1201.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Housekeeping, Fire Protection,Radiological Controls,Physical Security, Emergency Preparedness Drill & IE Info Notices & Bulletins

ML20211P940
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/10/1986
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211P854	List: IR 05000334/1986028 ML20211P849
References
50-334-86-28, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, IEIN-86-005, IEIN-86-5, NUDOCS 8612190165
Download: ML20211P940 (12)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-28 Docket N Licensee: Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15279 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 Location: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Dates: October 28 - December 1, 1986 Inspectors: W. M. Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector A. A. Asars, Resident Inspector L. J. Prividy, Resident Inspector, BVPS Unit 2 Approved by: >w /f/f0/88 p.E.Tripp, Chief,ReactorProjectsSection3A date Inspection Summary: Inspection No. 50-334/86-28 on October 28 - December 1, 1986 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (146 hours0.00169 days <br />0.0406 hours <br />2.414021e-4 weeks <br />5.5553e-5 months <br />) of

'lTc'ensee actions on previous inspection findings, plant operations, housekeeping, fire protection, radiological controls, physical security, emergency preparedness drill, Information Notices, IE Bulletins, RCS leak detection systems and LER re-view Results: No violations were identified. Licensee actions to monitor a minor steam generator tube leak (less than 0.5 gal / day) were judged satisfactory (detail 4.b.2).

8612190165 861216 PDR ADOCK 05000334 o PDR

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-TABLE OF CONTENTS

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1.. Persons Contacted..................................................... 1

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1 Plant Status......................................................... 1 Followup on Outstanding Items........................................ . Plant Operations..................................................... 3 Genera 1......................................................... 3 Operations...................................................... 4 Pl ant Securi ty/ Physical Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Radiation Controls.............................................. 7

- Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection.......................... 7 Emergency Preparedness Drill......................................... 8 i

i IN: 86-05, MSSV Ring Setting Adjustments............................. 8 IEB: 86-03, Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps................. 8

' RCS Leak Detection Systems........................................... 9

' Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)..................... 10 1 Exit, Interview....................................................... 10

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted During the report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activitie . Plant Status At the end of the previous inspection period, the plant had been manually shut down (on October 27, 1986) due to a leaking weld on a 3/4" high point vent valve in the C feedwater control valve bypass line. After rewelding all three loop high point vent lines, the reactor was restarted on October 28, 1986, and operated at full power until November 6, 1986. A second steam leak de-veloped from the sockolet weld on the A Loop 3/4" drain valve line. Reactor power was reduced to 30% to put the feedwater system on the bypass lines and allow isolation and repair of all three loop drain lines. The reactor was returned to full power operations the next day. An apparent tube leak of about 0.4 gallons per day developed in the A steam generator. Routine moni-toring has indicated that the leak rate is currently stabl . Followup on Outstanding Items The NRC Outstanding Items (01) List was reviewed with cognizant licensee per-sonnel. Items selected by the inspector were subsequently reviewed through discussions with licensee personnel, documentation reviews and field inspec-tion to determine whether licensee actions specified in the OIs had been satisfactorily complete The overall status of previously identified in-spection findings were reviewed, and planned and completed licensee actions were discussed for those items reported below:

(Closed) Unresolved Item (86-11-01): Resolution of defective undervoltage coil and possible reportability. By letter dated November 5, 1986, (JWJ 86-6),

Westinghouse Corporat'an provided DLC with the results of their review of the problem that occurred with the undervoltage trip coil attachment provided for the DB-50 reactor trip breakers. The complete breaker assembly was sent to Westinghouse for refurbishment and the UVTA received additional testing and measurement It satisfied all design requirements and performed within specifications. A visual inspection identified no anomalies. However, a new UVTA was installed prior to returning the RTBs to BV-1. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-15-03): Review long term corrective action asso-ciated with inoperable filter bank sprinkler nozzles (LER 86-05). This item was last discussed in detail 5 of Inspection Report 334/86-23. Since then, LER 86-05-01 was issued to supplement informaticn in the initial report. The LER supplement identified the root cause of the clogged nozzles as being in-adequate preventive maintenance in that only nozzles that were found to be clogged were cleane As each ESF train was tested on a three year frequency, scale build up from moisture in the piping went undetected rendering addi-

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tional nozzles inoperable. The nozzles have all been cleaned. The A train filter bar.4 was last inspected on September 25, 1986, and the B train is scheduled to be checked in the same manner during the next scheduled fire detection test (February 1987). The station also committed to performing BVT 1.1 - 1.33.1, Main Filter Bank Sprinkler Air Flow Test, during the next re-fueling outage instead of the normal 36-month interval. This action appears satisfactory and the item is close (0 pen) Unresolved Item (86-20-04): Review RCS loop flow measurement calcula-tions to determine instrument accuracy and acceptance criteria. This item was last reviewed in Inspection Report 334/86-24. Since that time, the Plant Performance and Testing group has run two additional tests for BVT 1.3 -

1.6.1, RCS Total Flow Measurement Test. The inspector reviewed the test re-sults report dated October 21, 1986. One test run compared the results ob-tained using resistances measured from the spare narrow range RTD. The RCS hot leg temperature difference decreased to about 2.4 degrees resulting in agreement between the three coolant loops to within 6,000 gpm. A second test was performed using the safety-related narrow range RTDs which decreased the hot leg temperature difference to 0.7 degrees. Agreement between the three loops varied by only 1,400 gpm; each loop had greater than 100,000 gpm which is significantly above the minimum value defined in Technical Specification 4.2.5.2 for total flow, and the 88,500 gpm individual loop thermal design flows. The inspector questioned now the last set of RCS flow measurements compared with the original preoperational test data. Tha licensee is in the process of evaluating that data. This item will remain open pending station definition of instrument accuracy requirements and acceptance criteri (Closed) Violation (84-30-03): Apparent violation of 10 CFR Appendix B Cri-terion V for failure to follow procedures for sign-off of QC inspection re-port This violation was withdrawn by the NRC in a letter dated August 16, 198 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (85-06-01): Licensee to evaluate the need for expanded boric acid blender performance check to include all operational mode This item was initiated because of two separate dilution incidents which appeared to be caused by blender misoperation during outages. After further investigation, the licensee determined that these two events were unrelated, one due to blender operation and the other due to operator error. Furthermore, during outages the blender is frequently unavailable for surveillances. For these reasons, the licensee has determined that it is sufficient to perform blender surveillance checks in Modes 1 through 4 only and not in Modes 5 and 6. This inspector had no further concerns and this item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (85-18-08): Inclusion of FSAR assumptions into the Technical Specifications, Procedures and FSAR Matrix to upgrade the qual-ity of 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. The inspector verified that in the 1985 yearly revision of the matrix that the FSAR Chapter 14 assumptions which correspond with technical specifications were include This item is close ._ ._

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(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (85-24-06): Incorporation of changes to Main-tenance Surveillance Procedures (MSPs) for RCS loop flow transmitter calibra-tions. This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-334/85-24 and LER 85-19. The MSPs in question contained valve identification discrepancies which caused a reactor trip during MSP performance. The licensee has cor-rected the valve identifications in MSP 6.26 through 6.34 and this item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (80-12-03): Licensee to establish log keeping methods for monitoring radioactive waste inventories to identify unplanned releases due to system leakage. This item was previously described in NRC Inspection Reports 50-334/80-12 and 80-16 and LER 80-3 This item remained open pending revision to 0M Chapter 1.54.3 logs to include daily pressure and level readings of gaseous and liquid waste tanks and a weekly inventory balance. The necessity for these logs was brought about by a slow, unplanned release from gaseous waste decay tank 1A during May 1980. The licensee has since initiated OST 1.18,3, Waste Handling Systems 7-Day Running Inventory, that addresses this concer . Plant Operations . General Inspection tours of the plant areas listed below were conducted during both day and night shifts with respect to Technical Specification (TS)

compliance, housekeeping and cleanliness, fire protection, radiation control, physical security and plant protection, operational and main-tenance administrative control Control Rcem

-- Primary Auxiliary Building

-- Turbine Building

-- Service Building

-- Main Intake Structure

-- Main Steam Valve Room

-- Purge Duct Room

-- East / West Cable Vaults

-- Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms

-- Containment Building

-- Penetration Areas

-- Safeguards Areas

-- Various Switchgear Rooms / Cable Spreading Room

-- Protected Areas Acceptance criteria for the above areas included the following:

-- BVPS FSAR

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-- Technical Specifications (TS)

-- BVPS Operating Manual (0M), Chapter 48, Conduct of Operations

-- OM 1.48.5, Section D. Jumpers and Lifted Leads

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-- OM 1.48.6, Clearance Procedures

-- OM 1.48.8, Records

-- OM 1.48.9, Rules of Practice

-- OM Chapter 55A, Periodic Checks, Operating Surveillance Tests

-- BVPS Maintenance Manual (MM), Chapter 1, Conduct of Maintenance

-- BVPS Radcon Manual (RCM)

-- 10 CFR 50.54(k), Control Room Manning Requirements

-- BVPS Site / Station Administrative Procedures (SAP)

-- BVPS Physical Security Plan (PSP)

-- Inspector Judgement b. Operations Inspection tours of all accessible plant areas were conducted. During the course of the inspection, discussions were conducted with operators concerning knowledge of recent changes to procedures, facility configura-tion and plant conditions. The inspector verified adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities observed. Shift turnovers were wit-nessed and staffing requirements confirmed. Except where noted below, the inspector comments or questions resulting from these daily reviews were acceptably resolved by licensee personne (1) At the beginning of this inspection period, the reactor was shut down due to a leak in the "C" feedwater system. Repairs included replacement of the 3/4" schedule 80 vent pipe with a like configura-tion for all three loops as a precautionary measure. The 1_icensee attributed the failure to end-of-life fatigu Other work during the outage included disassembly of the "C" feed reg valve, which identified no apparent reason for this loop's higher vibratio Reactor startup was commenced on October 28, 198 i (2) As a result of gross activity being detected in a routine blowdown sample from the "A" steam generator, the licensee took several ac-tions on October 28, 1986, consistent with A0P-11 " Steam Generator Tube Leakage." This problem appeared as tne plant was being pre-pared for startup after the weld repairs to the feedwater vent line Chemistry personnel began sampling the "A" steam generator blowdown

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every two hours. Initial isotopic analysis showed I-131 at 2.5 E-7

! micro Ci/ml on October 28, 1986. As plant startup progressed the l next day, I-131 values increased for a brief period to 4 E-7 micro

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Ci/ml. However, later in the day while at 90% power and relatively steady state conditions, I-131 could no longer be detecte During the time that I-131 was initially detected, calculations evidenced leak rates of 1 - 2 gal / day which were well within tech-nical specification limits of 500 gal / day (any one steam generator).

With minimum detectable activity in the secondary coolant, Chemistry personnel altered the "A" steam genarator blowdown sample frequency to every four : enrs and then every eight hours. Also, a different and more sensitive radiochemical analysis was utilized to provide

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better confidence at the very low levels of I-131 being detecte Monitoring was conducted accordingly for the remainder of the in-spection with "A" steam generator leak rates ranging from .1 to .5 gal / da In conjunction with the initiation of the 2-hour sampling of the

"A" steam generator blowdown noted above, other actions were imple-mented by Operations and Radcon personnel as follows:

(a) Both Turbine Building sumps were isolated and sampled every four hours before discharge. No identified isotopes were found and then the sumps were discharged and reisolated. This pro-cedure stayed in effect until 1300 on October 29, 1986, when the restrictions were lifte (b) The "A" steam generator blowdown sample drains were directed to liquid wast (c) Even though the air ejector radiation monitor showed no in-crease (stayed at approximately 40 cpm background), grab samples were taken from the air ejector vent every four hours and counted with generally no detectable activit (d) Cperations initiated daily performances of RCS leakage per OST 1.6.2 after reaching 100% power and steady state condition No adverse trends in RCS leakage was noted with unidentified leakage generally less than .1 gp (e) Normal system alignment for providing steam to the auxiliary feed pump turbine calls for MS-15 (from "A" steam generator)

and MS-16 (from "B" steam generator) to be open and MS-17 (from

"C" steam generator) to be closed. This alignment was changed to have MS-15 shut and MS-16 and 17 open. This effectively isolates the "A" steam generator from the auxiliary feed pump turbine if it is called upon for operatio (f) Radiation surveys were performed once a shift at the blowdown tank (BD-TK-1) and blowdown demineralizers (BD-I-1A & 18) in the turbine building with radiation levels no greater than 0.15 mR/h Continuous monitoring of the "A" steam generator activity throughout the inspection period indicated that leakrate was stable. This item will receive continuous inspector attentio (3) After startup from the October 27 - 28, 1986, maintenance outage, the C feedwater control valve vibration decreased noticeably, but the A valve increased substantially. The licensee obtained the services of a local consultant to do an analysis of the feedwater system vibration problem. Prior to being able to obtain or act on

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any information from this analysis, a second steam leak occurred on November 6, 1986, from sockolet weld on the A loop 3/4" drain valve line. Reactor power was reduced to 30% to put the feedwater system on the bypass line and allow for isolation and repair of all three loop drain lines and reinstallation of the hydraulic actuators on the feedwater control valves. After return to full power, vibration of the valve actuators appeared to be substantially re-duce (4) On November 3, 1986, the No. 2 vital bus input fuse blew for no apparent reason. Operators immediately switched the vital bus to auxiliary supply and stabilized the plant. The only anomaly that occurred during this transient was the lifting of one PORV (455 D).

Apparently, the valve did not completely reseat as evidenced by high tail pipe temperatures (greater than 200 F) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the even Inspector discussions with the Shift Supervisor resulted in the block valve for the 455 D line being closed and a redundant one being ope Tail pipe temperatures subsequently dropped down to normal levels and the leaking PORV was cycled. When its block valve was reopened, there was no more evidence of leakage. Two days later the No. 2 vital bus was placed back on normal suppl During this event, the licensee also noted that the wide range RCS pressure transmitter PT-403 failed. This provides one of the inputs to the low temperature overpressure protection system which was de-clared out of service. The pressure transmitter was subsequently recalibrated and returned to servic (5) Review of Unit Off Normal Report (UONR)86-171 identified a problem with the lack of alarm response procedures. Specifically, when a 4-KV breaker was inspected for jumper and lifted leads and the cabinet door closed, a cable bundle attached to the cabinet door inadvertently turned the DC power switch off. This annunciated the

" Bus 10 Blown PT Fuse or Loss of UV Relay" alarm in the Control Roo Power to this undervoltage relay, which supplies a non-failsafe reactor trip for loss of RCP bus voltage, lasted for about 8 minutes before being turned back on. Control room operators identified that

the four annunciators associated with these buses lacked proper re-

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sponse procedures. Discussions with the Procedures Group indicated that the problem was the result of using one alarm response proce-i dure for several annunciators, and failing to supply a copy for each annunciator slot. The inspector was informed that this procedure was being rewritten to make the corrective action steps specific for each alarm. No other concerns were identifie c. Plant Security / Physical Protection Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed in various plant areas with regard to the following:

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Protected area barriers were not degraded;

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Isolation zones were clear;

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Persons and packages were checked prior to allowing entry into the Protected Area;

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Vehicles were properly searched and vehicle access to the Protected Area was in accordance with approved procedures;

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Security access controls to Vital Areas were being maintained and that persons in Vital Areas were properly authorize Security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security per-sonnel were alert and knowledgeable regarding position requirements, and that written procedures were available; and

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Adequate lighting was maintaine During the course of this inspection period, the inspectors noted good control of Unit 1 - 2 interface activities. No concerns were identifie Radiation Controls Radiation controls, including posting of radiation areas, the conditions of step-off pads, disposal of protective clothing, completion of Radi-ation Work Permits, compliance with the conditions of the Radiation Work Permits, personnel monitoring devices being worn, cleanliness of work areas, radiation control job coverage, area monitor operability (portable and permanent), area monitor calibration and personnel frisking proce-dures were observed on a sampling basi No discrepancies were identifie Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection ,

Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness conditions and control of material to prevent fire hazards were observed in various areas during plant tours. Maintenance of fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations, and verification of posted fire watches in these areas were also observe No discrepancies were identifie . Emergency Preparedness Drill On November 19, 1986, the licensee conducted their Annual Emergency Dril Drill participants included representatives of state and county agencies in Ohio, West Virginia and Pennsylvani The inspectors observed activities in

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each emergency facility and supported a Region 1 based inspection team. De-tails of the drill and NRC conclusions are contained in NRC Inspection Report 334/86-27. In general, the licensee's overall performance was judged to be very good and no unacceptable conditions were identifie . Information Notice 86-05 - Main Steam Safety Valve Ring Setting Adjustments This information notice was issued to alert licensees of possible problems with improper ring setting adjustments for main steam safety valves (MSSVs).

The inspector discussed this item with Testing and Plant Performance personnel and observed their review of this matter. The MSSVs for Unit 1 are Model 3700 Series valves made by Dresser Industries. The licensee contacted Dresser and was informed that Dresser had recently performed full-size flow testing of the 3700 Series valves at Wyle Laboratories. Dresser verified that the valves would obtain full flow at all ring settings. Based on this testing, the licensee does not consider this item to be a concern for Unit 1 as the MSSVs are capable of providing full-relief capacity at any ring settin . IE Bulletin 86-03 - Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single F_.ilure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line DLC responded to this Bulletin in a letter dated November 14, 1986. They were required to provide information on whether or not a single failure vulner-ability in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS pump existed that could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train. Should such a situation exist, all operating shifts were required to be informed of the problem and measures to recognize and mitigate the situation. The Station would be re-quired to promptly develop and implement corrective action to bring the facility into compliance with General Design Criterion 35. The DLC response indicated that air operated valves are not used in the ECCS pumps minimum flow recirculation line for the high head safety injection and low head safety injection systems and that the specific concern described in the Bulletin is not applicable to Unit Additionally, all the minimum flow recirculation lines are equipped with M0Vs which do not auto-close and are designed to fail as-is. Normal system alignment for these valves is opened. The inspector independently confirmed the above item The licensee indicated that they are continuing to review the Bulletin with respect to single failure vulnerability during other accident scenarios as-suming various plant configurations, and requested a 30 day extension for providing a followup report on this concern. This was found acceptable and further review will be tracked as Unresolved Item (86-28-01).

, Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection Systems and Operational Leakage The inspector conducted a review of the licensee's activities concerning reactor coolant system leak detection systems and operational leakage to de-termine if surveillance requirements were being performed properly and that

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limiting conditions of operations were being met. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the licensee's implementation of Technical Specification items 3/4.4.6.1 and 3/4.4. (1) The inspector reviewed the following surveillance procedures and con-cluded that they were satisfactorily performed with comments as note In each case, the surveillance procedures were performed to determine that certain acceptance criteria was met. Equipment was left in an acceptable state and returned to normal system alignment upon test com-pletio MSP 43.08, Containment Particulate Monitor (RM-215A) - Calibration:

This calibration was performed in two parts with all steps completed on March 20, 1986, except those related to the air flow switch calibration which was performed on July 22, 1986. The flow switch calibration was postponed until July to coincide with the refueling outage as containment entry is necessary to gain access to the air sample pump which is located in containmen MSP 43.09: Containment Gaseous Activity Monitor (RM-215B) - Cali-bration: This MSP was completed on May 27, 198 MSP 9.05: Containment Sump Flow Measuring System Calibration: This MSP was completed on August 11, 198 OST 1.6.2: Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance: This OST is performed every three days in accordance with Technical Specifica-tions. The inspector reviewed the results of three test runs as follows:

Identifiec Leakage Unidentified Leakage Date (gpm) (gpm)

10/26/86 .1136 .0697 10/31/86 .02319 .12573 11/2/86 .09206 .05857

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OST 1.6.4: Controlled Leakage Measurement: This OST must be per-formed monthly. The inspector reviewed the satisfactory results of the OST conducted on Septenber 27, 1986, and October 25, 198 OST 1.43.01: Area and Process Monitor Functional Test: This OST was '

completed for RM-215A & B on October 18, 198 (2) The inspector reviewed the Control Room logs and determined that the following items were being properly logged to fulfill the surveillance requirement.5:

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Containment particulate activity level

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Containment gaseous activity level

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Containment sump level

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Containment sump integrator

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Reactor vessel head flange leakoff temperature During this review, the inspector noted that two current plant operating con-ditions were being experienced which could be considered abnormal. The first item was the operational leakage being experienced with the primary / secondary leak in the "A" steam generator (see detail 4.b.2). Secondly, throughout the period, the licensee manually controlled the pumpout of the containment sum The level switch which controls the automatic operation of the containment sump pumps malfunctioned and must be repaired. While these two items are operationally undesirable, the inspector concluded from the above review that the licensee was adequately complying with the Technical Specification re-quirements of 3/4.4.6.1 and 3/4.4. . Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector deter-mined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followu The following LERs were reviewed:

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LER 86-05-01, Inoperable Filter Bank Sprinkler Nozzles, Supplement LER 86-10-01, ESF Actuation, Supplement No concerns were identifie . Exit Interview Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of inspection findings was further discussed with the licensee at the conclusion of the report period.