ML20211Q560
| ML20211Q560 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1999 |
| From: | Lanning W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Cross J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211Q563 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-99-07, EA-99-212, NUDOCS 9909150093 | |
| Download: ML20211Q560 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000412/1999007
Text
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September 7, 1999
EA 99-212
Mr. J. E. Cross
Generation Group
Duquesne Light Company
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT:
NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 50-412/99-07
Dear Mr. Cross:
From July 20 - 29,1999, the NRC conducted a special team inspection at Beaver Valley Unit 2
to evaluate a diesel generator failure that occurred on July 16,1999. The circumstances of this
event, and in particular questions regarding the operators' response to the loss of all seal
cooling for two reactor coolant pumps, resulted in this special team inspection. This inspection
also reviewed the macro biological fouling (biofouling) problems which affected the service water
supply to both diesel generators.
The NRC concluded that immediate operator actions to reduce the likelihood of seal failures
during a loss of all seal cooling were not adequately incorporated into plant procedures, operator
training, or the human factoring of control room alarms. The failure of your organization to
provide the foundations for consistent operator respense to this event is of significant concem,
especially because reactor coolant pump seal failures are the predominant risk contributor in
your probabilistic safety assessment. Additionally, we concluded the response of your
organization to the service water biofouling issue was not commensurate with the potential for a
common mode failure of the emergency diesel generators. This event had a significantly higher
risk potential because both diesel generators would have become biofouled if the chemical
treatment procedure had been followed, as planned. Other aspects of the operating crew's
response were appropriate. Effective actions were taken to protect safety related equipment
from the under-voltage condition created when the diesel generator's voltage regulator failed.
The NRC concluded that a careful assessment and good corrective actions were developed by
your Event Response Team for the electrical aspects of the event.
Three apparent violations were identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement
action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement
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Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. The apparent violations involve the failure to
implement corrective actions to prevent biofouling of the service water system, the failure to
provide adequate acceptance criteria for chemical treatment of the service water system, and
the failure to meet Technical Specification requirements for diesel generator operability. The
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circumstances surrounding these apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the
need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with members of your staff during
the special team inspection and at the inspection exit meeting on July 29,1999. The service
water heat exchanger cleaning and inspection efforts completed while the plant was shut down
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were adequate to support a safe restart. An evaluation to assess why the biofouling program
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9909150093 990907
ADOCK 05000412
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Mr. J. E. Cross
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failed to prevent this problem was initiated after a preliminary exit meeting with the special
inspection team. As a result, it may not be necessary to conduct a predecisional enforcement
conference in order to enable the NRC to make an enforcement decision.
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Because you identified the violation, and based on our understanding of your corrective actions,
a civil penalty may not be warranted in accordance with Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement
Policy. The final decision will be based on your confirming on the license docket that the
corrective actions previously described to the staff have been or are being taken.
In addition, the NRC has also determined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC
requirements occurred. These violations are being treated as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs),
consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. These NCVs involved the failure to
develop a procedure for loss of emergency power, the failure of operators to implement an
alarm response procedure, and the failure to follow the procedure for chemical sampling of the
service water system. These NCVs are further described in the subject inspection report.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision conceming the apparent violations, we are
providing you an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violations addressed in this
inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter or (2) request a predecisional
enforcement conference. If a conference is held, it will be open for public observation. Please
be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described in the
enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised
by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be placed in the NRC Public
Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal
privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without
redaction. Please contact Mr. Peter Eselgroth at (610)337-5234 within seven days of the date of
this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response.
Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
BRIAN E. HOLIAN FOR
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Wayne D. Lanning, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 50-412
Enclosure:
NRC Special inspection Report 50-412/99-07
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Mr. J. E. Cross
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cc w/ encl:
Sushil C. Jain, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services Group
Mr. L. W. Myers, Executive Vice President, Generation Group
K. Ostrowski, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Group and Plant Manager
B. Tuite, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit
W. Kline, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department
M. Pearson, Manager, Quality Services Unit
M. Ackerman, Manager, Safety & Licensing Department
J. Macdonald, Manager, System and Performance Engineering
J. A. Hultz, Manager, Projects and Support Services, FirstEnergy
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M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA
(
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
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State of Ohio
State of West Virginia
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Mr. J. E. Cross
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Distribution w/ encl:
Region't Docket Room (with concurrences)
Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC)
PUBLIC
NRC Resident inspector
H. Miller, RA/J. Wiggins, DRA
P. Eselgroth, DRP
N. Perry, DRP
C. O'Daniell, DRP
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W. Kane NRR
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8. Sheron, NRR
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D. Dambly, OGC
D. Holody, EO, RI
T. Walker, ORA, RI
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(OEMAIL)
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Distribution w/enct NIA E-MAIL):
M. Tschiltz, OEDO
E. Adensam, PD1, NRR
S. Bajwa, NRR
D. Collins, NRR
V. Nerses, NRR
R. Correia, NRR
DOCDESK
Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
DOCUMENT NAME: g:\\ director \\bv9907.wpd
T3 receive a copy of this document. Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure
"N" = No copy
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