IR 05000412/1986015
| ML20212B565 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1986 |
| From: | Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212B549 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-86-15, NUDOCS 8608070153 | |
| Download: ML20212B565 (15) | |
Text
D
..
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-412/86-15
,
Docket No.
50-412 License No.
CPPR-105 Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company Nuclear Construction Division P. O. Box 328 Shippingport, PA 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 Dates:
June 14 - July 21, 1986 Inspectors:
W. M. Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector L. J. Prividy, Resident Inspector i
R. J. Urban, Reactor Engineer Approved by:
//tte 7 30 Olo 9 ) L. E.~ Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A
Date Inspection Summary:
Inspection No. 50-412/86-15 on June 14 - July 21,1986.
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (208 hours0.00241 days <br />0.0578 hours <br />3.439153e-4 weeks <br />7.9144e-5 months <br />) of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, preoperational program implemen-tation, Phase 1 testing of auxiliary feedwater pumps, Phase 2 battery testing, progress of electrical separation programs and followup on electrical support allegations.
Results:
No violations or new safety problems were identified.
Resolution of the electrical separation problems is progressing satisfactorily and several allega-tions concerning electrical supports were resolved.
8608070153 860730 PDR ADOCK 05000412 G
PDR-
- - -.
-.- -
- -..
.-.
-
.
.
DETAILS 1.'
Persons Contacted C. E. Ewing, Manager, Quality Assurance T. P. Noonan, Station Superintendent R. J. Swiderski, Startup Manager D. Williams, Chairman, Joint Test Group The inspector also met with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Project Status Summary Construction activities are currently estimated to be 95.5% complete, with 370 of 476 subsystems turned over for flushing and proof-testing.
About 70 out of 119 preoperational (PO) and initial startup tests (IST) have been ap-proved.
The remainder are in various phases of development.
Approximate dates for the major project milestones, as currently estimated by the licensee are as follows:
Fuel Receipt (Start)
September 1, 1986
--
--
Integrated Hot Functional Test October 20, 1986
--
Loss of Power Test February 2, 1987 Integrated Leak Rate Test February 23, 1987
--
Fuel Load May 1, 1987
--
Initial Startup May 16, 1987
--
--
Commercial Operation August 30, 1987 No changes have been made since the last inspection period.
Major activities planned for next month include continued ESF subsystem turn-overs for proof and preoperational tests. The rebuilt reactor coolant pump 21C should be returned to the site.
3.
Inspection Program Status Summary Preoperational Test Program Inspection completion status is approximately as follows:
AREA
% INSPECTION COMPLETE Overall Program 35 (30% last period)
Procedure Reviews:
Mandatory 35 (no change)
Primal 50 (15% last period)
I
.
.
AREA
% INSPECTION COMPLETE Test Witness:
Mandatory 15 (no change)
Primal 5 (no change)
Results Review:
Mandatory 15 (no change)
Primal 5 (no change)
This inspection status is consistent with applicant's test program progress.
At the end of this inspection period, there were approximately 76 open NRC inspection items including 7 bulletins, 7 violations, and 20 construction deficiency reports, which was 6 bulletins, 5 violations, and 13 CDR's last inspection period. The remainder are inspector follow or unresolved items.
4.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (85-07-02): Management support of QA/QC activities.
This unresolved item was opened as a result of an early 1985 concern that the licensee's QA unit might not have sufficient independence from the engineering and construction activities since all managers reported directly to the Nuc-lear Group Vice President.
As noted in the recent SALP Report (50-412/85-98),
the licensee made significant changes in the project organization in December 1985, and this new organizational structure eliminates the prior concern re-garding QA independence.
This item is now closed.
(Closed) Weakness (85-07-01): Organizational changes and their impact on pro-ject management.
This weakness was identified in early 1985 when it was
'
learned that three different individuals handled the duties of the Nuclear Construction Division Project Manager.
Alsc, the Nuclear Construction Divi-sion Procedures Manual needed to be upgraded to reflect recent organizational changes.
In a subsequent inspection (Report No. 50-412/86-02), it was noted that the Manual was being updated properly to reflect those organizational changes.
Also, the recent SALP Report (50-412/85-98) noted that the various
'
management changes which occurred during the period of March 1985 to March 1986, have significantly strengthened overall project control.
Consequently, this item is now considered closed.
i
'
(Closed) Weakness (85-07-13): Engineering / Construction interface in the elec-trical area.
This weakness was identified in early 1985 when it was evident that lingering problems existed in the Engineering / Construction interface for electrical activities. However, the recent SALP Report (50-412/85-98) noted that the licensee established an electrical plan and was in the process of reworking various electrical problems ca a systematic basis.
Implementation of this electrical plan and strengthenirg of management generally have re-solved the Engineering / Construction inh > race pru9.ammdLic concerns and this item is now considered closed.
.
_. - - - - - - -, - - - - - -
,.. - - - -. -. - - -, - -. -
- - -
~,,
,,
,, - -. - - -
--
.-
O
.
5.
Station Battery Test Witnessing and Results Evaluation Portions of P0-2.39.01, 2-1 and 2-2 Battery, Inverter and Charger Test, were witnessed by the inspector on July 14, 1986.
The battery service test was based on the design duty cycle referenced in the FSAR.
During testing, the inspector noted that the meter measuring AC input to the inverter did not ap-pear to be working.
Further examination of Vital Bus 2-1 and 2-2 mimic panel indicated that the identified instrument measurement points were incorrect.
The test engineer issued an SWR to correct this condition.
Review of test deficiencies identified during the August, 1985, performance of P0-2.39.03 on the 2-3 battery noted a similar problem.
At that time, a test deficiency report was initiated which noted that the problem would be applicable to batteries 2-1, 2-2, and 2-4.
This test deficiency appears to have remained open with corrective actions still pending.
The station's handling of test deficiencies was discussed with cognizant startup management.
The inspector was informed that beginning about July 21, 1986, an individual would be assigned responsibility for tracking all open test deficiency reports as they are generated, and identifying those that still remain open.
These efforts should allow the station to manage open TDRs and avoid the buildup of the significant backlog.
During these discussions, the apparent uniqueness of the station battery test deficiency report was noted in that a problem was identified while running one preoperational test (PO) that was applicable to equipment tested under another P0.
Since most of the remaining plant systems are tested on a system-by-system basis, it is reasonable to expect any identified test deficiency to be applicable to only the specific P0.
Should it not be, the test deficiency log would be available to highlight it.
For P0-2.39.03, the inspector noted that only two out of the six sections have been completed to date.
The remaining sections have been authorized for per-formance during April 1987.
Test results for the two completed sections were reviewed and approved by the JTG and Station Superintendent on a section by section basis.
6.
Preoperational Test Conduct (Phase II)
The station plans for preoperational test activities (Phase II) that would span two or more shifts were reviewed by the inspector through discussions with management personnel and observation of shift turnover activities.
Each shift has a Level III qualified lead test coordinator and four to five Level II test engineers.
It is the intent of the startup group to have each ap-proved test procedure written in such a manner that after a proper shift turnover (separate from control room operations staff), the oncoming test engineer can pickup and continue with the test or tests.
This is a deviation from the Phase I test practices whereby a lead test engineer would be assigned one system or systems, and would be responsible for all testing conducted within the system boundaries.
With the relatively low number of systems turned over for Phase II testing to date, the staffing level is adequate.
!
l
._-.
.
.
Additionally, the station intends to supplement the current staff level with new hires and transfer of test procedure writers as software efforts wind down.
These actions appear adequate at this time.
7.
Reactor Protection System Through discussions with cognizant system engineers, the inspector determined that about half of the Phase I proof-testing has been completed.
Test defi-ciencies identified to date were reviewed to determine whether any potentially reportable problems had been identified and that appropriate resolution was being pursued.
No concerns were noted.
Another station filed a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report concerning the misapplication of Potter - Brumfield Type MDR Relays in the Westinghouse Solid State Protec-tion System.
Inspection of the input, master and slave relays used at Beaver Valley Unit 2 indicated that MDR relays were not used in this SSPS.
8.
Quality Assurance Surveillance of Test Activities During the month of June,1986, the QA Surveillance Group conducted about 40 surveillances of ongoing test activities.
These included construction proof
-
i tests, system operation verification (non-safety-related), preoperational tests (safety-related), and temporary operating procedures.
The inspector
,
reviewed a sample of the surveillance packages and noted that each gave a good overview of test conduct, a check of acceptance criteria against FSAR objec-tives, and adherence to the administrative controls contained in the SUM.
Most QA identified deficiencies were resolved in a reasonable amount of time, though several were still outstanding after 60 days. This program is able to identify general program weaknesses such as using test log entries in lieu of test changes and elevate them quickly to the proper level of management.
The station's use of this management tool is considered a strength.
9.
Feedwater Isolation Valve (2FWS-HYV*157A, B, C)
In a previous inspection (412/86-02), it was noted that the DLC Maintenance Group had disassembled the feedwater isolation valve operators per a startup
'
work request to determine the cause of prior erratic valve operation.
Cur-rently, the value operators are still removed and awaiting inspection by the vendor (Borg-Warner).
The inspector was subsequently advised that similar valve operators at another licensee facility had experienced stem failures during stroke testing.
The
stem failures were clean breaks and preliminary reports indicated that they were due to a design problem.
Since these failed operators are associated with 16" gate valves furnished by Borg-Warner and BV2 has chosen a similar arrangement for their feedwater isolation valves, the inspector brought this potential problem to the attention of DLC Director of Maintenance.
DLC subsequently contacted the valve vendor and was advised that the operators for the Unit 2 main feedwater isolation valves were of a different design and not susceptible to this failure mode.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
_ - _. _ _ _ -, __ _, _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _
,
_,__.-.m__
.. _ _ _ -
_ _ _ _ _
__
_
.
.. ~
.
C
.
10.
Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Supports During a daily site tour, it was noted that a potential problem existed with several supports on the A, B and D recirculation spray heat exchangers (RS-E)
that concerned minimum thread engagement at bolted joints.
Specification 2BVS-920, Field Fabrication and Erection of Piping, requires that all bolts should be engaged such that one full thread projects beyond the nut of all tightened connections.
The inspector noted that the minimum thread engagement was not achieved in at least four places on the supports at the 743' elevation for RS-E-A, B and D. These discrepancies were brought to the attention of Site Quality Control personnel for disposition.
The inspector was informed that nonconformance and disposition report 33392 had been issued on May 30, 1986,.
identifying a number of discrepancies on these supports and requesting engi-neering resolution.
The minimum thread engagement concern was. included.
The inspector had no further concerns and concluded that this matter was being properly handled through site procedures.
11.
Electrical Separation Scope:
The purpose of this inspection was to access the adequacy of the various BV-2 Cable Separation Programs in meeting the revised FSAR design commitments.
Both field construction and QC inspection procedures were reviewed for tech-nical adequacy, and a random sample of field work was chosen to verify that those procedures were properly implemented.
Background:
Original PSAR and FSAR submittals describing the design criteria for cable separation were found to be unacceptable by NRR.
As a result of continued difficulty in effectively resolving this issue, NRC concerns were emphasized in SALP Report 412/84-06, dated May 18, 1984.
In response to those concerns, DLC resolved to either (1) meet the criteria contained in IEEE Standard 384-1974 or (2) provide an acceptable analysis based on testing to justify any deviation from this standard.
Logistically, a significant portion of the construction electrical work had been installed and inspected to the old separation criteria that was found unacceptable.
DLC stopped the electrical work and performed a backfit in-spection to identify all deviations from IEEE Standard 384 criteria (base separation).
From there, through testing performed by Wyle Lab, less strin-gent separation but equivalent protection measures such as use of cable tray covers and protective wraps were developed and submitted to NRC for approval through the FSAR amendment review process.
These tests served as the basis for the reduced separation criteria.
Field Construction and Quality Control inspection procedures were then revised to allow the pre-May, 1984 work to be accepted if it did not meet base requirements but did meet the reduced requirements through applicable field modifications.
Anything not able to
-
.
meet the reduced requirements would be reworked.
New electrical work was performed under the revised procedures that incorporated these reduced re-quirements.
References:
FSAR Section 1.8, Conformance to NRC Reg Guide 1.75, Rev. 2 FSAR Section 8.3.1.4, Independent of Redundant Systems FSAR Tables 8.3 - 16 thru 74 IEEE Standard 384 - 1974, Criteria For Separation of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits Reg Guide 1.75, Physical Independence of Electrical Systems, Rev. 2 Program Review:
a.
New Work Controls (post-May, 1984)
The inspector reviewed the following Engineering Construction and In-spection Procedures used to control new electrical installation work after May, 1984, to determine that they were updated to include the lic-ensee's commitment to Reg Guide 1.75, Rev. 2:
(1) 2BVM-41, dated May 31,1984 " Criteria for Design and Identification of Electrical Cable and Raceway Systems."
(2) 2BVS-931, Rev. 4, Addendum 2, dated April 2, 1984 " Electrical In-stallation Specification."
(3) FCP-403, Change No. 20, dated July 31, 1984 " Cable Tray Installa-tirn."
(4) FCP-431, Change No. 14, dated May 3, 1984 " Cable Pulling."
(5)
IP-8.3.3, dated May 15, 1984 " Exposed Scheduled Conduit."
(6)
IP-8.3.4, dated May 15, 1984 " Cable Tray Installation."
(7)
IP-8.4.1, dated May 15, 1984, " Cable Pulling."
(8)
IP-8.5.2, dated May 15, 1984, " Scheduled Cable Termination Accept-ance."
Although these procedures have been revised subsequent to the above re-visions to include newer requirements, the inspector verified that the procedures were properly revised in mid-1984 to be consistent with the licensee's commitment.
The inspector concluded that adequate controls were put inte place to assure that new electrical work performed after May, 1984, met the upgraded FSAR design cocmitment.
b.
Rework Controls:
,
The inspector reviewed FCP 41.1, Sargent Electric Rework Control Program, to determine the potential for violating separation criteria during re-work activities (pre and post system turnover).
These activities are defined as those actions involving a permanent plant raceway, cable or termination after construction and SQC acceptance.
FCP 41.1. requires that SQC review and concur with the rework activities by requiring SQC to complete a portion of the Rework Control Form which establishes re-quired inspection attributes and pertinent hold points.
This requirement intimately involved SQC to minimize subsequent separation violations that could result from the rework activity.
The Rework Control Form is es-pecially important for control of indirect rework - i.e., any activity involving a permanent plant raceway, cable, etc., that is not specific-ally referenced on such documents which authorize construction work ac-tivities such as Nonconformance and Disposition (N&D) Reports.
Such in-direct rework is often necessary to support the electrical rework effort which is initiated by those documents.
The inspector concluded that sufficient controls are in place to maintain proper separation during rework activities, c.
Separation Violation Tracking and Sampling:
The inspector reviewed the licensee's method for tracking and disposi-tioning electrical separation violations.
SQC Procedure 4.6.1, "Elec-trical Color Separation Tracking System", was developed to track elec-trical separation violations found by SQC inspectors.
The key document in the tracking process is the Electrical Color Separation Report (ECSR)
which is controlled by SQC and is basically a specific type of an N&D.
The ECSR has four major steps as follows from the time it is cpened until it is closed:
,
(1) The SQC inspector defines the condition detail of the separation violation and obtains approval of the DLC/SQC Supervisor to issue the ECSR.
(2) The issued ECSR is sent to the Stone and Webster Site Engineering Group (SEG) for disposition.
(3) After disposition the ECSR is sent to SQC for review and approval, i
and then transmitted to the electrical contractor for action and rework.
(4) After rework, SQC reinspects the work and if satisfactory, closes the ECSR.
In discussions neld with SQC personnel, the inspector determined that a computer program existed to track the status of each ECSR as it pro-ceeds through the four major steps mentioned above.
SQC receives the computer printout weekly to manage the outstanding ECSRs.
f
,
-w-
.-
e m -,
.,--,-n-,a n,
w,
- - - -
n-
,., ---- -
-m
- - -, -,,
- -,,
- -...
-
-, - - -
- - - -.
r
-,.,
c-e-
.s
.
.
The inspector sampled apparent separation violations at several locations in the Fuel Building, the Cable Spreading Area, the Service Building, the Auxiliary Building, and the Main Steam and Cable Vault.
These vio-lations in the field are identified by a strip of black and yellow checkered tape which is applied to the cable at the transition point where the violation exists.
The inspector determined that the violations in the field were being tracked.
There were at least 13 separate viola-tions selected from the field by the inspector and each of these were identified in the tracking system by an ECSR number and in the field by the presence of the black / yellow checkered tape.
In addition to the ECSR tracking system, the inspector sampled several N&Ds and CDRs pertinent to color separation which were issued in mid-1984 during the initial stages of developing SQC Procedure 4.6.1.
The in-spector checked these items to ensure that they were properly addressed similar to the ECSRs.
The inspector reviewed N&Ds 23000A, 23002, 23017, 23018, 15753, and CDRs - CS-143, CS-144, CS-222, CS-223, CS-224 and de-termined that these items were satisfactorily closed by SQC.
Implemen-tation in the field was verified by the inspector for N&D 23000A and 15753 and CDR CS-144.
Based on this in plant review of installed electrical equipment, the in-spector concluded that the licensee's method for tracking and disposi-tioning electrical separation violations using SQC Procedure 4.6.1 is working satisfactorily, d.
Cable Trays:
All work involving cable tray installation was delegated to Stone and Webster, the A-E.
The various SQC inspection procedures noted that cable tray separation requirements are to be evaluated by Engineering per the RE-39 Series drawings.
IP - 8.3.4 provides the QC inspection procedure for verifying correct tray identification, tray location per cable tray layout shown on Stone and Webster RE-34 Series drawings, tray clearances and spatial requirements, cable tray - nuclear instrument system con-duit/ box clearances, tray size and material usage, splice connections, general physical condition, and tray supports.
The inspector reviewed the separation acceptance criteria and found it to be at least as con-servative as the criteria referenced in the FSAR.
To determine how the licensee was implementing the use of tray covers, the inspector reviewed some of the cable tray installations and associ-ated drawings.
Currently, tray to tray separation violations are not being identified by Site Quality Control (SQC) since the inspection at-tribute will be verified in the area release inspections conducted per SQC Inspection Procedure 12.1.
These area release inspections should be initiated within the next month.
However, Engineering is defining on the RE-39 Series drawings (Separation Identification Drawings) those cable trays that require top or bottom covers or both.
The RE-39 draw-ings were developed from the RE-34 cable tray identification drawings.
The inspector selected five examples of apparent tray to tray separation
.v
..
violations in the Service Building, Cable Vault and Cable Spreading Area (CSA) and reviewed the appropriate RE-39 drawings to determine if covers were required.
In each case, covers were defined on the applicable RE-39 drawings to achieve the required separation.
For example, CSA. cable tray 2TX443N (a non-safety related tray) is located 12" above cable tray 2TC418P (purple safety related tray). Without covers, these trays vio-late the 3 feet vertical spatial requirement.
Therefore, covers are re-quired.
The inspector noted that a requirement for bottom covers is present for cable tray 2TX443N on Drawing RE-39C and this affords the required separation.
From these observations, the inspector concluded that Engineering is defining the correct requirements to construction.
As a final independent check that all separation problems have been identified and corrected, IP-12.1, Area Release - Inspection For External Color Separation, is performed and includes inspection of protective wraps, barriers and tray covers.
These inspections are done when the area is released for final QC acceptance inspection and all construction activities are essentially complete.
For subsequent modification, design changes or close out of open items, separation is assured through the revised field construction procedures.
It should be noted that the above inspection work and construction acti-vities are accomplished only for internally induced electrical faults and have nothing to do with the application of fire wraps to meet the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Fire Protection Requirements.
Inspection plans for the protective wrap (SILTEMP Blanket 188 CH or WT-65 woven tape) are consistent with the attributes referenced in the FSAR.
12.
Allegation Followup Concerning Electrical Supports in the Service Buildina, RI-86-A-0075 The resident inspector was contacted by electrical QC inspectors on three different occasions to discuss concerns regarding the installation of elec-trical supports in the Service Building.
The details from each of these three contacts are discussed below:
a.
June 17, 1986 Contact - Support No. 33143-S The inspector met with a senior electrical inspector and his union stew-ard to discuss the installation of electrical support No. 33143-S which is located near the ramp area at the 730' elevation in the Service Build-ing.
The senior electrical inspector noted that his concern began on June 4, 1986, when one of his field inspectors verbally reported a potential problem with electrical support No. 33143-S which had been previously accepted.
The senior electrical inspector went to the Service Building to observe the potential problem and he and his field inspector agreed that electrical support No. 33143-S was unacceptable because:
(1) There was no material stamp on the tube steel identifying the mate-rial as required by the inspection procedur s
.
(2) The attachment weld of the tube steel to the embed plate did not have sufficient weld.
The senior electrical inspector requested that the lead inspector on dayshift review their prior work on Support No. 33143-5.
Upon reporting to work for second shift on June 5, 1986, the senior electrical inspector argued with his supervisor concerning this requested reinspection.
Fur-thermore, a meeting was held on June 6, 1986, by the Director of Site Quality Control with all second shift electrical inspectors where this item and other items were discussed.
Even after this meeting, the senior electrical inspector felt that his concerns had not been properly ad-dressed and so he contacted the resident inspector on June 17, 1986.
After discussing these facts with the senior electrical inspector and his union steward, they accompanied the resident inspector to the Service Building to see electrical support No. 33143-S.
At this time the senior electrical inspector agreed that the material identification was now properly stamped on the tube steel; however, he still contended that there was insufficient weld at the tube steel / embed plate joint.
He was advised that this item would be discussed with Region I personnel for further evaluation.
b.
June 18, 1986 Contact - Support 33142-S The inspector met with another electrical inspector to discuss the in-stallation of electrical support No. 33142-S.
This support is located within several feet of the earlier mentioned Support No. 33143-S near the ramp area at the 730' elevation in the Service Building.
The elec-trical inspector noted that his concern began on June 1, 1986, while he was working on second shift and performing an inspection on electrical supports in accordance with SQC Inspection Plans (IP) 8.1.5, Electrical Supports and 9.7, Non-Code Welding.
The fabrication details for the support were defined on drawing SEC0-2-810-C184, Rev. 1.
Upon inspection of the welds of the unistrut to the tube steel support, weld undercut greater than 25% of the base metal was noted in three places.
The elec-trical inspector stated that this was an unsatisfactory condition in accordance with IP-9.7 which was normally resolved by either scrapping the support or obtaining engineering disposition to repair the item via a Nonconformance and Disposition Report.
This item was written up on an inspection report, and he assumed it would be handled by the dayshift lead inspector.
However, upon reporting to work for second shift on June 5, 1986 (Note:
There was a temporary work stoppage at the site on June 2 - 4, 1986), the electrical inspector was told that construction had weld repaired the electrical support without proper engineering disposi-tion and dayshift SQC personnel accepted the support.
The electrical inspector asked the second shift SQC supervisor how this was permissible.
This point was argued on June 5, 1986, and later discussed at a meeting held on June 6, 1986, by the Director of Site Quality Control.
Even
!
I
I s
.
after this meeting, the electrical inspector felt that his concerns re-garding electrical support No. 33142-S had not been properly addressed and so he contacted the resident inspector on June 18, 1986.
Subsequent to this discussion, the inspector obtained a copy of the un-satisfactory inspection report of June 1,1986.
The inspector advised the electrical inspector that he would discuss this matter with Region I personnel for further evaluation.
c.
June 19, 1986, Contact - Support No. 33143-S The inspector was contacted by telephone by an individual who indicated that he was the field inspector who reported a potential problem to his senior electrical inspector on June 4, 1986, concerning electrical sup-port No. 33143-S.
This individual noted that he had the same concerns as the senior electrical inspector, and was advised that this matter was already under evaluation.
Resolution of Concerns on Electrical Support No. 33142-S and 33143-S Subsequent to receiving the above concerns, the inspector conducted the fol-lowup inspection and was advised by the Assistant Director, SQC Electrical, that an evaluation of the various problems encountered with these two supports had been conducted and that ultimately both supports had been replaced.
The inspector received a copy of this evaluation and concluded that both supports had been satisfactorily replaced as verified by the following supportive in-formation.
Support No. 33142-5
-
(1) The unsatisfactory inspection report originally filed on June 1, 1986, was signed off as acceptable after the original unistrut was removed and replaced on June 11, 1986.
New inspection reports were filed for the replacement of this support.
(2) An inspection report was filed on June 10, 1986, documenting the shop fabrication of a new unistrut assembly.
(3) An inspection report was filed on July 11, 1986, documenting base metal repairs to the tube steel where the unsatisfactory unistrut was removed.
Also, an inspection report was filed for the new uni-strut assembly to tube steel installation.
Support No. 33143-S
-
(1) An unsatisfactory condition was recorded on June 4, 1986, concerning lack of material identification "E" stamp on the tube steel support.
This problem was listed on an inspection report dated June 4, 1986, and later accepted on June 12, 1986, when the original unistrut was removed and replaced.
The inspector determined that this support
,
. __
..
--
- _ _ _ _
i
%
l o
was disassembled and the material stamp was found along the mating surfaces of the unistrut and tube steel.
New inspection reports were filed for the replacement of this support.
(2) Three separate inspection reports were filed on June 12, 1986, documenting base metal repairs to the tube steel where the unsatis-factory unistrut was removed, the shop fabrication of the new uni-strut assembly and the installation of the new unistrut assembly to the tube steel.
There is no technical concern now in that both the electrical supports have been properly replaced and no further Region I followup is planned.
However, the inspector discussed these matters with the Director, SQC and Assistant Director, SQC Electrical.
It was concluded that the root cause of these concerns stemmed from a lack of communication within the electrical SQC department which was compounded by the temporary work stoppage from June 2 - 4, 1986.
The inspector noted that the concerns possibly might not have been presented to the inspector on June 18 - 20, 1986, if the electrical inspectors were aware of the extent of the evaluations conducted and the replacements of the supports.
Efforts are being made within SQC to minimize future communication problems.
This item is closed.
12.
Construction Proof Test 2T-FWS-24-2.01 and 2.20, Rev. 2 - Initial Test and Operation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, 2FWE*P23A and P23B.
The inspector observed performance of portions of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Phase I Testing.
This test consisted of initial operation of both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps while measuring such parameters as pump / motor vibration, motor starting and running current, pump / motor bearing temperatures, and pump differential pressure vs. flow.
A flow path was established from the Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank (PPDWST) to the suction of the auxiliary feedwater pump.
The pump was operated on recirculation to the PPDWST taking data at flow rates of approximately 30 gpm and 100 gpm.
The inspector noted that the DLC test personnel established proper communica-tions to conduct the test and that 'rerequisites were properly accomplished.
The official copies of both test procedures were properly signed to indicate that a pretest briefing was conducted and test personnel understood the pro-cedure.
The "A" pump initial test was conducted on June 30, 1986, but portions of this test had to be repeated on July 12, 1986, to clarify an anomaly concerning out of-spec vibration measurements at the pump bearings.
The motor bearing vibration measurements were satisfactory.
It was thought that the out-of-spec vibration measurements at the pump bearings were erroneous readings due to a poor contact surface at the pump bearing / vibration probe interface.
The
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
b
,
retest of the "A" pump on July 12, 1986, proved to be satisfactory as the vibration measurements were within specification.
The "B" pump initial test was conducted satisfactorily on July 3, 1986.
The inspector considered the DLC test personnel's actions acceptable and no concerns were identified.
13.
CVCS Preoperational Test Review The inspector completed a walk down of the Chemical and Volume Control System.
No discrepancies were found between design drawings and as-built conditions.
However, the inspector noted a large area on the number 3 regenerative heat exchanger (2CHS*E23) that was ground fairly deeply into the base metal.
The inspector brought his concern to the attention of the licensee and they pro-duced Nonconformance and Disposition (N&D) Reports 8728 and 8900.
Apparently an arc strike existed on the number 3 heat exchanger and it had to be removed by grinding.
All carbon steel and the heat affected zone were removed and checked by utilizing copper sulfate etchant and nital etchant, respectively.
The repaired area was then penetrant tested and ultrasonically examined to determine if minimum wall thickness was violated.
N&D 8900 was written because the minimum wall thickness found (.878") was less than ac-ceptable (.900").
The licensee consulted the heat exchanger designer (Joseph Oat, Inc.) and based upon minimum wall condition details, the repaired area
'
was found acceptable.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
!
The inspector reviewed P0-2.07.02, " Boric Acid Transfer System Test," Section A, Temperature and Level Alarm Setpoint Verification and Boric Acid Transfer Pump Operation, to ensure that the test procedure is technically adequate and that it is consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
Proper operation of temperature and level alarms, pumps, valves, and shutdown and alternate shutdown panels is tested.
Actual operating conditions are compared to design specifications.
Within the scope of this review, no con-cerns were identified.
As of this report period, part A is nearly complete except for sections deal-ing with auxiliary steam, which is not yet available.
Only minor problems were noted during part A testing, such as wiring problems with annunciators and temperature switches for the boric acid tanks.
Boric acid transfer pump vibration and head problems were noted curing preoperational testing, but they had actually been discovered during Phase I testing.
The licensee is con-tinuing to troubleshoot this area.
Part B testing is scheduled to begin approximately at the end of July and part C testing will then follow the completion of part B.
The inspector will re-view completed test packages when they become available.
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A
.
14.
Exit Interview.
Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
A summary of the findings was further discussed with the licensee at the con-clusion of the report period.
I.s.