IR 05000412/1986001
| ML20137S952 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1986 |
| From: | Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137S939 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1057 50-412-86-01, 50-412-86-1, NUDOCS 8602180148 | |
| Download: ML20137S952 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
-50-412/86-01 l
Docket No.
l50-412
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' License No.
CPPR-105-Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company-One Oxford Center
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301 Grant-Street Pittsburgh, PA 15279 Facility Name: Beaver. Valley Power Station, Unit-2
~ Dates:
-January '6 - 30, 1986
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' Inspector:
W7. Tr skoski, Senior Resident Inspector M
Approved by: Mb-M
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E.;E. Tr'pp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A
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~ Inspection Summary:
Inspection No.~ 50-412/86-01 on January 6 - 30, 1986.
- Areas-Inspected:~1 Routine inspections by the ' senior resident inspector. (54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />)'
of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, initial test program open
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items sp'ecified in BV-2 SER (NUREG-1057), reactor. coolant system hydrostatic test.
procedure ; review, preoperational-program implementation, and reactor protection
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-system"and emergency 3 dies'el' generator testing status.
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Results: - No : violations.were~ identifie'd." This inspection-identified concerns re-
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lated to, verificatio'n ~of systemf restoration-during preoperational testing and use of. temporary operating procedures (5,ection'5).
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J B602180148 860206 PDR ADOCK 05000412 G
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Persons ~ Contacted
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R.- Couplarid, Direc' ton Site' QualisysControl
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C. ' E. Ewirig, Manager.,, Quality' Assurance T. P.'Noonan, Station Superintendent R. J. Swiderski,,Startup Manager-D.yilliams' Chairman,' Joint;TestGroup
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The' inspector also met with o.ther$ licensee and contractor personnel during
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2.
' Project Status Summary
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-Construction activities ~are currently estimated to be 92% complet*, with 248 of 450 subsystems turned over for flushing and proof.-testing.
For software, 46 out of 123 preoperational (P0) and initial startup test procedures (IST)
have been issued.
The remainder are in various phases of development.
Approximate dates for.the major project milestones,_as currently' estimated by the licensee are as follows:
Reactor Coolant System Cold Hydrostatic Test March 17, 1986
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Integrated Hot Functional Test October 20, 1986
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Fuel-Receipt December 1, 1986 Loss of Power Test February 2, 1987
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' February 23, 1987
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Fuel Load May 1, 1987 Initial Criticality May 16, 1987
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Commercial Operation-August 30, 1987
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Major activities planned for next month include CVCS and RCS flushes, shot peening' steam generator tube sheets for stress relief, and initial turnover of the Low Head Safety Injection System. The remaining ESF systems are not scheduled for turnover until after the RCS hydro.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) IFI (85-16-08):
Determine whether BV-2 battery cells are of the same model (E size cells, Type ECH), referenced in the Exide 10 CFR 21 Report, or are subject to a similar failure mechanism.
By letter ND2552:1163, dated August 30, 1985, the inspector was informed that the vendor had been contacted by the station to resolve this concern.
The vendor had changed his manufac-turing process after March, 1983, to eliminate the cracked boss seal defi-ciency for all cell models. A visual examination of the color coded parts (grease) determined that the type GN battery cells at BV-2 had been manufac-tured after that date.
This item is close b.
(0 pen),IFI (85-16-07):
Determine whether or not the BV-2 battery seismic support rack design considered the need for expansion space in the metal sup-port racks as the batteries aged. Through discussions with NECU engineers,
.t e inspector determined that the battery rack design should include an addi-h tional' quarter inch space for the end cells to accommodate thermal expansion.
The Unit 2 Station Superintendent informed the inspector that this information had yet to be routed to him through the plant's internal communications channels.
Prior to the BV-1 battery cell failure, an NRR review addressed this. issue
.in BV-2 FSAR Question 430.33 (Amendment 3, October, 1983). The licensee was informed of recent operating experience that demonstrated the. incompatibility between the battery rack and the battery which could cause cracking.
The licensee was requested to describe the relationship between the plant support bridge and the-battery rack supports and how the seismic qualification test program encompasses the stress-related aging of the' battery case.
The licen-see s. response only addressed stress-related failures during testing and failed to account for age related expansion of the case. The licensee stated that this would be reviewed for int'usion with the next BV-2 FSAR revision.
The IFI remains open pending completiu of the rack modification.
(Closed) IFI (85-16-05):
Determine how the station intends to administratively _
phase in the operations QC program during startup. Through discussions with the Maintenance Section Director, and review of Startup Manual (SUM) Chapter 4, Maintenance, and Chapter 7, Milestone Management, the-inspector determined the jurisdictional controls established to phase in the operational quality control (0QC) for nuclear operations.
Basically, a system comes under one of three jurisdictional controls; construction, startup testing or nuclear operations.
Ninety days prior to fuel load, the licensee intends to implement the operation QA program and hence,.tne 0QC controls.
Prior to that, any rework items performed during the startup testing phase will be conducted under the administrative controls of SUM Section 7 and fall under the juris-diction of Site Quality Contro1~(SQC).
Corrective maintenance activity during testing will be performed under the startup work request system _(SUM Chapter 4.3).
All SWRs are routed to SQC for review and assignment of appropriate hold points.
Preventive maintenance activities during the testing period are conducted par approved procedures that have been routed to SQC for review and assignment of hold points.
Once the nuclear operations QA program is phased in, corrective maintenance will be done under the maintenance work request (MWR). system that will closely parallel the one in existence at BV-1.
The licensee intends to implement _one system for both units.
As with Unit 1, all MWRs will be= routed to 0QC for review and assignment of any desired hold points.
All corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance will be com-pleted by the nuclear group's maintenance section whereas rework activities wil1~be conducted by the construction _ division.
The inspector was satisfied that the licensee has instituted controls to assure a continuity of the qual-ity' control program..This item is closed.
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r (0 pen) Unresolved Item (85-16-04):
Review QA involvement'for independently assuring that preoperational tests adequately. demonstrate the functional cap-ability of safety systems.
The inspector met with the QA Manager and Startup Manager on January 27,-1986,- to discuss ~QA/QC surveillance of preoperational
. test activities conducted by the DLC Startup Group.
The-inspector was in-formed that a separate QA surveillance group would be assigned the respensi-
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'bility.. The organizational structure and charter outlining its responsibili-ties and authorities ~are scheduled to be completed by about April,1986.
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This action is acceptable bas'ed on the total plant status and extensive SQC involvement in.the_ upcoming RCS hydrostatic test scheduled for March 17, 1986.
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Other ESF systemsLare notidue to be turned over until after test completion.
This item remains operi pe~nding inspector review of the effectiveness..of the QA'preoperationalstest' surveil. lance. program.
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(0 pen)' IFI.(85-16-0'6)3 ~ Review resolution of inverter output voltage fluctu-ations. As noted in the. previous. inspection report, a red tag was placed on the' equipment;by SQC to note this condition.
The inspector reviewed the non-
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conformance and disposition report l(12293) issued on June 26, 1985.
It noted that the.uninterruptible power supply vital buses 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, did not conform to purchase specification _ requirements of a plus or minus 3%
voltage regulation' under'all load conditions.
Instead, the licensee found that the units were apparently designed by Elgar Corporation, to. perform
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within plusfor minus 10% under all conditions.
The licensee subsequently had the vendor's representative effect repairs to the static switch control logic boards for 2-1 and 2-2.
However, UPS inverters for 2-3 and 2-4 coul_d not be
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satisfactorily readjusted and it was recommended that they be ' shipped back-to the factory.for repairs on December 17, 1985. This item remains open
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pending (1) repair or replacement of'the inverters and (2) rerun of the ap-prcpriate proof tests.
'4.
Initial Test Program NUREG-1057, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Beaver. Valley Power Station, Unit 2, issued October, 1985, identified a number of open items related to the licensee's initial test program.
The nine items (Section 14 of NUREG-1057) will require NRR concurrence for resolution of the test pro-grams' adequacy.
Verification that these items are subsequently addressed as appropriate and review for possible impact on the test program.is Insp;ctor Follow Item (86-01-01).
5.
Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test Procedure Revfew Purpose The inspector reviewed test procedure P0-2.06.01, Cold Hydrostatic Test of the RCS, Issue 1, Revision 0, approved June 26, 1985, to ensure technical adequacy and consistency with regulatory requirements, guidance and licensee l
commitment _.
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.FSARSection_14.i2;12l8.1,Init.ialTest' Program-ColdHydrostaticTestofthe RCS2
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NUREG-1057,~ Safety Evaluation Report Related to.the Operation of Beaver Valley
. Power Stat 1on,1 Unit 2,-Issued October,~1985
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ASME Boiler 'and Pressure' Vessel Code,Section III,1971 thru Winter Ad-
- denda -'1972.
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Test Review' Technical.
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a IThere were no previous-outstaCing regulatory concerns or open items associ -
ated with this test. The. hydrostatic test pressurizes the'RCS and high pres-sure piping through several pressure temperature plateaus to a test pressure of 3107.psig; 1.25 times ~the lowest design pressure of any system component.
Pressure is required to be held at this level for 10 minutes before a slow depressurization to about 2490 psig, at which time, a detailed inspection of all pipes, flanges, welds and vessels within the system boundary is performed by QC' personnel and Authorized Nuclear Inspectors using as-built isometric
drawings. Test acceptance criteria includes: (1) no-leakage.from welded joints, and (2) minimal leakage from mechanical joints. Mechanicaljoint~
leakage is logged for correction and future verification of leak tightness
'at normal operating pressure.
Through discussions with the Unit 2 Station Superintendent, the inspector was informed that acceptance criteria 2, above, would be verified during the in-
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tegrated hot functional test, scheduled for about October,1986, providing the leakage is minimal so'as not to interfere with the conduct of the test.
This is acceptable'.
Specific items the inspector verified through document review or discussions with test engineers were as follows:
a.
System boundary includes all pressure vessels, piping, pumps, and valves which_are part of, or connected to the RCS up to:
(1) The outermost containment isolation valve in piping that penetrates containment; (2) Second bf two valves normally closed in piping that does not pene-trate containment; and, (3) The RCS safety and relief valves.
The inspector noted that various high pressure lines of the CVCS were to be pressurized during the test, but not inspecced for leakage.
Lic-ensee. representatives stated that these lines were to be tested at a higher pressure at a later date because it was designed for 2735 psig versus 2485 psig for the RCS. The inspector had no further questions.
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The system is vented during the filling operation.
The test procedure referenced a temporary operating procedure (TOP) that is to be furnished at a later date.
The responsible test engineer provided the inspector.
with an unapproved copy for information.
Approval per the administrative controls of the Startup Manual would be required prior to issue.
The inspector noted several human factor concerns. The TOP references several other approved operating manual procedures that have integral-initial conditions and action steps, and directs the operator to perform the procedure while disregarding some of those specific steps. The in-
.spector noted that a stronger practice would require either editing the 0M procedures for incorporation into the TOP, or assuring that pre-marked z
procedures are distributed as a package v'ch the TOP.
Licensee' action will be reviewed as IFI (86-01-02).
The inspector also noted that the TOP lacked sign off spaces for specific action steps as recommended by Startup Manual, Section 3.4.6.G.
Addi-tionally, the various attachments provided to document replacement of blank flanges, plugs or caps, do not require double verification.
This concern is further addressed below.
c.
-Water quality requirements are specified per applicable Westinghouse recommendations for RCS temperatures limited to 180 F.
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Reactor coolant system liquid and metal temperature requirements (165-175 F) are str.ted to ensure primary components are maintained above the
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nil ductility transition temperature (Westinghouse letter DMW-D4634, December U, 1984):
The steam generator tube sheets are the limiting
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Mininium hydrostatic test pressure is 3107 psig, which is 1.25 times the lowest design pressure. Overpressure protection devices will be provided
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for one.of-the SV lines, rated at 100 gpm.
This is sufficient to en-
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L yelope the' hydro test pump -(about 24 gpm) and two hydro laser pumps
.(about 30 gpm each). Additionally, relief devices will be provided at-each hydro laser, pump discharge.
~ Maximum hydrostatic test pressure is 3262 psig.
The steam generator tube f.
sheet is the limiting component per ASME III, subsection NB-3226.
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. Maximum test pressure is required to be maintained for at least 10 minutes.
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A complete examination for leakage (including visual inspection of steam generator tube sheets) is performed at 2490 psig.
Site QC provides in-dependent inspections.
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The test is written in such a manner that the FSAR objectives and acceptance.
criteria are me __
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.TheLinspecdornotedthatsystemrestohationstepslackedadoubleverification F
oficritical' steps such as restoring RCS safety valves, blank flanges, replace-ment' of check' valve ' internals:and re'moval of safety valve gages.
Licensee action to address this concern in the preoperational test program is Unre-solved < Item'(86-01-03).
P0-2:06.01 is. esse'ntially a' complex guide that refers test and operations personnel to numerous other procedures for enlicit instructions 'for perform-ing the ~various functional. activities suc:. as starting / stopping reactor cool-ant pumps, isolating the CVCS; etc. 'In total, these procedures are several hundred pages long.
The prerequisites, initial system lineups.and actual test'
performance will last throughLseveral shifts.
The inspector conducted dis-cussions with key test personnel on how the various evolutions would be tracked by control room personnel to ensure that they are cognizant of the numerous system alignments and multiple functional activities within the RCS hydro test.
The licensee stated that for the more complex and involved tests (RCS hydro, HFT), a level III plan would be used as an aid.
This appears acceptable and the inspector had no further concerns.
Joint Test Group Review The. inspector attended the JTG-meeting of January 24, 1986, at which time RCS cold hydro test review comments were discussed.
Membership was as specified in SUM, Chapter 3.3.
The inspector noted that several members had previous startup experience with Unit 1 and other commercial plants.
This experience was evident by the thorough and rigorous review provided for the hydro test.
The JTG appears to be effectively implementing their responsibilities under the current work load.
6.
Reactor Protection Systen!
The licensee currently plans to use about six different preoperational tests to verify proper operation of reactor trip switchgear, RPS and ESF actuation system time responses, setpoints, safeguards test cabinet actuation, Solid State Protection System (SSPS) cabinet test panel logic, and RPS actuation system logic. These tests are currently scheduled to begin about mid-May, 1986, after initial turnover.
Currently, the licensee has not issued any of the procedures at this point in time.
The inspector was informed that the responsible test engineer slot is currently vacant, but scheduled to be filled shortly.
Additionally, the licensee plans to have Westinghouse, the NSSS vendor, participate more widely in the development of these specific proce-dures.
Information Notice 85-98, Missing Jumper From Westinghouse Reactor Protection System Cards For Overpower Delta Temperature Trip Function, was issued after two plants discovered that their 7300-Series Solid State Protection System Racks were missing ~the.specified jumpers.
The purpose of these jumpers is to limit the lead circuit response so that it will not raise the trip setpoint
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under conditions of decreasing average temperature.
The original preopera-tional tests at these plants and subsequent surveillance testing failed to
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detect the misconfigurations because none of the tests included test signals-that simulate' conditions of decreasing T-avg.
Additionally, it was determined that vendor drawings and documents did not contain explicit guidance regarding the need for the missing jumpers.
Since BV-2 uses the 7300 Series racks for their SSPS, review of followup actions is Inspector Follow Item (86-01-04).
7.
Emergency Diesel Generators The emergency diesel ~ generators and support auxiliary systems have been in-stalled at BV-2 and initial two hour vendor test runs completed. -The licensee currently' intends to provide five preoperational tests ~ encompassing the 4KV station service system and the emergency diesel generators.
Currently, these tests are still in the initial development stages. The site blackout test scheduled to be run as part of the electrical AC independence test, is sched-uled to be conducted during early FebrJary,1987.
The emergency diesel gen-erator test runs are scheduled to be conducted-during July, 1986, preceeded by.the emergency AC power distribution system tests during early May, 1986.
A possible generic ~ problem has been identified concerning Colt emergency diesel generators (Colt-Pielstick Product Line) that power emergency AC gen-erators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems.
The problem relates to the structural integrity of the brush holder arm assembly on the AC generators.
-A fatigue failure occurred in the brushholder assembly after about 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br />
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of preoperational testing at another plant.
The DC field excitation brushes are supported by this holder connected to a shaft that threads into a tacked section in a hexagonfal nut. A threaded extension from the hexagonial nut is then used to bolt the brushholder onto a cross-brace mounted either on the generator frame or on the generator bearing housing.
Apparently, the failure was induced by vibration.
This resulted in a loss of DC field excitation to the generator rendering;it inoperable.
The inspector brought this to the attention of the Maintenance Section Supervisor for review by DLC and appro-pri:Le corrective. actions. 14t the exit meeting, the inspector was provided material addressing this issue.
Review is Inspector Follow Item (86-01-05).
8.
Exit Interview A meeting was held with. senior DLC'startup testing personnel on January 30, 1986, to discuss the inspection ~ scope and findings.
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