IR 05000334/1986027
| ML20214W840 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1986 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214W836 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-86-27, NUDOCS 8612100424 | |
| Download: ML20214W840 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-334/86-27 Docket No.
50-334 License No. DPR-66 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
. Facility Name:
Beaver Valley Atomic Power Station
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Inspection At:
Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
November 19 - 21, 1986 Inspectors:
ANGD.
11 3 !T4, m
C.'Z. @rdon, Regional Team Leader
/ dpe NRC Team Members:
G. Arthur, Battelle, PNL J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector Unit 2 C. Corbit, Battelle, PNL D.-Perrotti, DEPER, IE R. Urban, DRP,' Region I Approved by:
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. [/Lazpf)u, Chief, Emargency date Preparetiness Section Inspection Summ3ry:
Inspection on November 19 - 21,1986 (Report No. 50-334/86-27).
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's full-scale annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on November 19 - 21, 1986. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I, NRC Headquarters, and NRC contractor personnel.
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Results: No violations were identified.
The licensee's response actions for f
this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
8612100424 861205 PDR ADOCK 05000334 G
PDR A
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted
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The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on November 21, 1986:
S. E. Breon, Director, Media Relations R. J. Brooks, Lead Onsite Controller R. K. Brosi, Nuclear Shift Supervisor J. J. Carey, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Group D. M. Evans, Chemistry Trend and Analysis Coordinator L. R. Freeland, Nuclear Station Operations Supervisor D. O. Girdwood, Director, Radiological Operations H. Grove, Control. Room Controller R. L. Hansen, Director of Site Maintenance T. D. Jones, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit J. A. Kosmal, Manager, Radiological Control W. S. Lacey, Plant Manager J. E. Laudenslager,, Manager, Corporate Communications S. F. Lavie, Senior Health Physics Specialist V. J. Linnenbom, Director, Plant Chemistry F. J. Lipchick, Senior Licensing Supervisor W. R. Mahan, Senior Planner, EPP J. R. Marietta, Operations & Maintenance Instructor G. A. McKee, Emergency Planning Specialist W. T. Mercer, Test Supervisor A. L. Middleton, Jr., Security Assistant R. L. Moser, Health Physics Associate F. L. Pavlechko, Director, Emergency Planning J. M. Sasala, Director Nuclear Communications J. D. Sieber, Vice Present, Nuclear Group M. O. Sommerville, Senior Health Physics Specialist B. C. Souder, Security G. S. Sovick, Senior Licensing Supervisor H. Sklinski, Health Physics Specialist P. Udon, Security Force Supervisor R. M. Vento, Director, Radiological Engineering D. K. Yourd, Health Physics Associate
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In addition, the inspectors interviewed and observed the actions of numerous licensee emergency response personnel, i
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2.0 Emergency Exercise The Beaver Valley full-scale exercise was conducted on November 19-20, 1986, from 4:00 p.m. until 12:45 a.m.
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Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Regiot I on August 27, 1986, were reviewed and, following revision, determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On September 23, 1986, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evalua-tion.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the licensee. At that time it appeared the revised scenario would provide for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on November 19, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support, radiological data and contingency messages.
In addition, missing information was pro-vided. These changes were also discussed during the briefing.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and indicated in the scenario that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or l
disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
medical response and transportation to hospital of contaminated /
injured individual
RCS containment leak
Loss of containment integrity Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with fuel failure
Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment Declaration of unusua! event, 41ert, site area emergency, and general emergency classifications
Recovery and reentry The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite emergency response facilitie !
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b.
Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were observed:
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Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; 4.
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; 5.
Assessment and Projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; 6.
Provisions for in plant radiation protection; 7.
Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys; 8.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 9.
Performance of technical support; 10.
Performance of repair and corrective actions; 11.
Performance of first aid and rescue; 12.
Assembly and accountability of personnel; 13.
Provisions for communicating information to the public; and 14.
Management of recovery operations.
3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activations of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were genera 1Iy consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures.
The team also noted the follow-ing actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plan conditions:
Good preplanning was demonstrated on the use of the RHR system for long term cooling.
The necessary line-up changes and modifications were adequately discussed in addition to the need for safety reviews and approvals before implementation.
- Offsite field teams were quickly assembled and positioned to track the release and provide good plume definition.
- The Environmental Assessment & Dose Projection (EA&DP) staff adequately assessed actual conditions, used worse case scenarios during dose assessments, and projected accurate dose rates for use in protective action recommendations.
- Emergency response personnel were knowledgeable in their assignments and demonstrated use of the emergency procedures, and, in general, demonstrated they were competent in performing assigned functions.
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Recordkeeping and official logs were maintained and continuously
updated at all the emergency facilities.
Availability and quantity of equipment, supplies, telephones, and
other dedicated items were notable, particularly in the OSC.
The NRC identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise which also identified some of these areas):
Event Notification Worksheets for providing updated information to
the NRC Operations Center were not always complete and accurate prior to making the notification (50-334/86-27-01).
Posting of the emergency classification was not observed in the
Control Room (50-334/86-27-02).
TSC activation was not in accordance with EPP/IP 1.4 in that the
Emergency Director was not available in the TSC at the time the facility was declared officially activated (50-334/86-27-03).
The procedures, instructions, reference materials, flow diagrams,
associated with operation of the PASS do not consider human factors principles (50-334/86-27-04).
The PASS procedure does not indicate what circumstances are necessary
to initiate a PASS sample nor identify what dilution factor should be used while sampling (50-334/86-27-05).
PASS technicians were observed to have difficulty in locating proper
switches, valves, and other operating devices (50-334/R6-27 ns).
Followup notifications were only issued to offsite authorities when a
significant change in plant status occurred instead of on a regular frequency (50-334/26-27-07).
Although briefings in the EOF were timely and adeauate, in some
cases, the E/RM did not receive the full attentien of key E0F staff members (50-334/86-27-08).
The EOF wall map identifying local evacuation routes does not provide
for the protective action recommendations (PAR) actually implemented by offsite authorities (50-334/86-27$).
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Protective action recommendations (PAR) to offsite authorities are issued via three (3) different methods (gold phone, EOF meeting, notification form) causing uncertainty as to when a final consensus on the PAR is reached between all parties (50-334/86-27-10).
- Clarification of Procedure EPP IP.4.1 "Offsite Protective Actions" is needed in the following areas: Attachment 2 has a series of and/or statements to guide the user through the flowchart yet the " note" states that individual symptoms are not a hazard; the flowchart (attachment 1) does not conform to the guidance of Information Notice 83-28; gold phone protocol is not included in EPP IP 1.1.
" Notifications" (50-334/86-27-11).
- Deescalation from a General Emergency did not appear to be of any benefit either to the onsite emergency organization or offsite authorities and caused confusion among key staff members during recovery phase discussions (50-334/86-27-12).
4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified during the previous emergency exercise (Inspection Report No. 50-334/85-19):
Based upon discussions with licen-see representatives, examination of procedures and records, and obser-vations made by the NRC Team during the exercise, Items 85-19-02 through 85-19-06 were not repeated and are closed:
(Closed) 50-334/85-19-02: Plant data sheets were used in the Control Room instead of obtaining information from the computer which caused some confusion in other locations. All emergency facilities should use the same source for incident data.
(Closed) 50-334/85-19-03: The issuance of emergency dosimetry to personnel in the ERF was slow and inefficient.
(Closed) 50-334/85-19-04: The following health physics practices regarding contaminated and injured individuals contributed to a degraded perfor-mance:
Response team members had untaped openings on protective clothing;
Badges and dosimeters handled by potentially contaminated hands;
Contaminated individual instructed to don coveralls prior to completion of surveys; and
Rad technician was prompted to record personnel survey results.
(Closed) 50-334/85-19-05: Provide habitability survey requirements for each of the Emergency Facilities when they are activated and occupied.
(Closed) 50-334/85-19-06: The Radcon Operations Center (ROC) does not contain adequate space
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5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on November 21, 1986 during which the licensee discussed observations of the exercise. The critique was adequate in that licensee participants highlighted both areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken) and areas in which improvements have been made.
Specific improvement areas which were identified by the licensee related to portable radio communications, the public address system not operable in the ROC area, security access in OSC, and training of security guards in implementation of PAR's.
6.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and that no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demon-strated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action regarding the items identified for corrective action.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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