IR 05000412/1986010

Insp Rept 50-412/86-10 on 860602-06.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Activities Re Installation of Electrical Sys & Components

ML20199K664
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/26/1986
From:	Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199K646	List: IR 05000412/1986010 ML20199K641
References
50-412-86-10, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8607090213
Download: ML20199K664 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-10 Docket N License No. CPPR-105 Priority -- Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company M ~ox 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: June 2-6, 1986 Inspectors: /rM<e W F. Paulitz, Reactor Engineer

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C.J/Anders6n,~ Chief,PlantSystemSection, date Engineering Branch, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 2-6, 1986 (Report No. 50-412/86-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by one region based inspector of activities pertaining to the installation of electrical systems and component Results: No items of noncompliance were identifie ~

8607090213 e60703 PDR ADOCK 05000412 G PDR l

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Duquesne Light Company

• T. Noonan, BV2 Station Superintendent

• R. Swiderski, Startup Manager

• C. Ewing, QA Manager

• A. Crevasse, QA Deputy Manager

• J. Kasunick, Startup-Maintenance Manager

• R. Coupland, QC Director

• D. Denning, QC Asst. Director

• C. Majumdar,QC Asst. Director E. Horvath, Senior Project Engineer R. Wa11 aver, Licensing Coordinater

• R. Fedin, Compliance Engineer

• M. Rabenau, Compliance Engineer

• J. Hultz, Techanical Assistant F. Schuster, Operation Engineer C. O'Neill. Operation Engineer D. Scaifero, Construction Specialist 1.2 Stone & Webster Enginnering Corporation

• R. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer G. Eckert, Principle Electrical Engineer P. Bienick, Asst. Superintendent Engineering D. Wilson, Electrical Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• L. Prividy, Resident Inspector I

• Denotes those present at exit interview on June 6, 1986 2.0 Licensee's Action on Previous Inspection Findings 2.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (82-05-01) Electrical Separation The licensee's design of spatial distance between redundant trays did not meet the FSAR commitment to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75 without additional barrier RG 1.75 endorsed IEEE Standard 384. The licensee was asked to compare the site design specification criteria with IEEE-384-1971 and where the two differ to provide justification for using the less restric-tive separation criteria either by test or analysis.

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3 The licensee has had tests conducted.The results of these test were sub-mitted and accepted by the NRC on August 2, 1985. As a result of these tests the licensee has revised the FSAR to reflect a reduction of spatial distance before barriers are require The FSAR commitments were reviewed, by the inspector, and compared to the licensee's electrical installation specification, 2BV2-931. There was agreement between both document Field Construction Procedures (FCPs)

and Inspection Plans (IPs) were revised to include the 2BV2-931 separation criteri The licensee's QC personnel have walked down all areas, using the latest criteria and have identified where either tray covers are required or where cable in free air requires wraps. The location of cable tray tops and bottoms, identified from the above inspection,had been documented on the applicable RE Series cable tray drawings. Each cable wrap location has been documented and a tag attached to the cable. A total of twelve thou-sand seven hundred thirty one (12,731) Engineering Design Separation Reports (EDSR) have been evaluated by SWEC engineerin The schedule for the installation of cable tray covers or cable wraps was discussed with the licensee. After the above installation for each area has been completed, the area will be walked down again using Inspection Procedure, IP-12.1, Area Release - Inspection for External Color Separa-tion. The last area to be released is scheduled for November 24, 198 The licensee has committed to wrap all 4KV(H) and 480V(L) cables which exit either a tray or conduit. This commitment is in addition to that required for cable separatio The licensee's program for electrical separation is acceptable and this item is close .2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (83-12-03) Unsupported Cables The licensee's electrical specification limited the length of unsupported cables to three(3) feet. This was later changed to four and one half (4 1/2 ) feet. The inspector questioned the licensee regarding the basis for the change and its impact on tray loading and cable bend radius due to cable sa The licensee initiated an Inspection Plan (IP) IP-10.2.3 Backfit Inspection Program-Unsupported Cable Length which limited the vertical unsupported cable in conduit to thirty five (35) feet. The unsupported 4KV(H) or 480V(L) cables in flexible conduit or free air is limited to three (3)

feet. The instrument (X), control (C), and 480V(K) cables distance in flexible conduit or free air are limited to four and one half (4 ) fee This criteria was used during the inspection of four thousand four hundred (4,400) safety related raceways. In addition nine thousand (9,000) non-safety raceways in seismic designed areas were inspecte r

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The above walkdown of the safety related raceways resulted in one thousand three hundred (1,300) Unsupported Cable Reports (UCRs). One thousand one hundred eighty two (1,182) UCRs have been issued for the nonsafety race-ways in seismic designed areas. As of the first quarter of 1986 approxi-mately 3,150 UCRs have been issued. These will be reviewed by SWEC engineering for disposition. This review includes both unsupported cable and the structural effect upon the racewa The inspector reviewed the " accept as is " disposition of the following UCRs:

• U520-0121

• V810-5011

• U810-5115 The electrical basis for acceptance is the National Electric Code (NEC)

1984 Article 300-19 which permits greater unsupported length depending upon the conductor wire size. The structural basic for acceptance is a referenced calculation 12241-SE-34.242, revision 0. This calculation also considers the effect of different conductor wire size. The NEC criteria is designed to protect the cable insulation and the structural calculation criteria is designed to protect the raceway system from excessive struc-tural load The method of cable support in vertical trays is the use of Kellem Grip Raceway to raceway or equipment transitions cable support will require unique solutions to provide the required support. Special designed cable clamps will be used to support vertical cables in conduit The licensee's proposed schedule indicates that all engineering dispost-tion of UCRs will be completed by November 3, 1986 and all supports installed by December 15, 198 The inspector observed that Kellem Grips have been installed on a number of vertical cables in trays located in the reactor buildin The licensee's program for supporting cables is acceptable and this item is close .3 (Closed) IE Bulletin (84-BU-02) Failures of GE Type HFA Relays in use in Class 1E Safety Systems The licensee responded to this bulletin by letter on July 13, 1984. Their response was that no HFA ~ relays are installed or are planned to be instal-led in BVPS-2. Also no similar failures of other relays in Class 1E systems have been identified. If similar failures should occur these will be handled by the problem report system and corrective action, if requir-ed, will be initiate r

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The above response is acceptable and this bulletin is close .0 Facility Tour The facility was inspected to observe installed electrical sy cems and component .1 Acceptable Findings The following were acceptable findings:

• Electrical penetration assemblies were pressurize * Cable trays were identifie * Motor Control Centers (MCC) were identifie * MCCs in the reactor building were protected from ongoing construction activitie * 4KV switchgears were identifie * Cables were identifie * Safety pump motors in the safeguards area were covered and electric space heaters were operationa .2 Unacceptable Findings 3. Emergency Diesel Generator Alternator Space Heaters The electric space heaters on the Number 1 (orange) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) were not operational. These heaters had been deenergized for a three week period. The heaters had been turned off to perf6rm an inspection of the stator winding. This was an inspec-tion for loose parts or damage since EDG No. 2 (purple) had been previously damaged by loose parts. During this time period two operation housekeeping inspection tours had taken place. One of the tour guidelines is to check that space heaters are operable on motor operated valves, motors and electric panels. Maintenance personnel have given verbal instructions that this check of space heaters included the alternator of the EDG. The licensee reenergized the EDG space heaters and will also revise the housekeeping inspection guidelines to include the operability check of the EDG space heater The inspector examined other equipment and verified this to be an isolated instance and had no further questions regarding this matter at this tim The licensee corrective action was acceptabl . Class 1E Electric Equipment Identification The inspector noted that about twenty eight (28) relay panels, had temporary identification in the form of masking tape marked with a magic marker pen. Two (2) load centers had temporary cards attache Two (2) uninteruptable power supplies (UPS) had no identification except that shown on the QC rejection tags. This equipment is safety related and located in the service buildin i

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The IEEE standard 279 requires identification of all safety related equipment down to the channel level. The FSAR commitment is that all safety related electrical equipment be identified with a nameplat This nameplate includes an asterisk as an integral part of the equip-ment identification. This identification mark number is to be phys-ically attached to the equipment in a conspicuous location along with a color coded marker that identifies the assigned emergency train or channe No Class 1E equipment installed in the facility had a color coder marker. A review of various. electrical equipment specifications indicated that some specification did not specify a equipment name-plate be provided by the vendor. Some specifications required the vendor to supply temporary markers (dynamo tags) on components located on the front of the panel Permanent component nameplates were to be furnished where the components are located within or on the rear of the panel. A memorandum SITE 2BVM-948 from SWEC to DLC dated August 7, 1979 indicated that it had not been determined whether permanent nameplates should be provided by construction when not required in equipment specifications or if DLC start-up and operating personnel would prefer to provide them in all cases. The inspection plan, IP-8.1.2, Installation of Electrical Equipment attribute accepts temporary identificatio Discussions with DLC operations personnel indicated that they have the responsibility to replace temporary identification on either equipment or components with permanent nameplate The licensee has replaced the temporary markers on the main control board with permanent nameplates. All other equipment such as indivi-dual switchgear, load center breakers, motor control center starters, and motors nameplates will be verified to agree with control board identification. Also the key documents such as one line diagrams, PI&Ds will be checked for agreement. The licensee has a program to assure that all Class IE equipment will be identified with a per-manent nameplat The licensee has agreed to place temporary identification on the unmarked UPS discussed above. The licensee was reminded of their FSAR commitment that color identification be app-lied to all Class 1E equipment. There was a misunderstanding about this color identification. The licensee will determine how the commitment to color identify equipment for train or channe The licensee's program for identification is acceptabl .

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4.0 Reactor Trip Breaker Position (P-4) ESF Interlock The licensee elected to use the original corrective action proposed by Westinghouse which was the use of a portable voltmeter for the detec-tion of the correct P-4 interlock. NRR was concerned that the use of a portable voltmeter might cause failure during surveillance activitie The licensee had used this method for four (4) years on unit 1 without any problems therefore NRR found it acceptable for Unit The inspector asked to review the procedure for detecting P-4 interloc The procedure was not available for unit 2 therefore the following unit 1 procedures were reviewed and found acceptable:

Maintenance Surveillance Procedure, MSP 1.04, revision 31, Reactor Protection Logic System Train "A" Bi-Monthly Test

Maintenance Surveillance Procedure, MSP 1.05, revision 29, Reactor Protection Logic System Train "B" Bi-Monthly Test

Operating Surveillance Test, OST 1.1.7, revision 57, Manual Reactor Trip Test 5.0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee and architecture engineer personnel (denoted in Details Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 6, 1986. The inspector summarized the scope and the findings of the inspection as described herei At no time during the inspection was written information given to the licensee.