IR 05000334/2020001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2020001 and 05000412/2020001

ML20128J493
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/07/2020
From:	Patrick Finney NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Penfield R Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
Finney P
References
IR 2020001
Download: ML20128J493 (20)

Text

May 7, 2020

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2020001 AND 05000412/2020001

Dear Mr. Penfield:

On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, X /RA/

Signed by: Patrick W. Finney Patrick W. Finney, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000334 and 05000412 License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000334 and 05000412 License Numbers: DPR-66 and NPF-73 Report Numbers: 05000334/2020001 and 05000412/2020001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0027 Licensee: Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, PA Inspection Dates: January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020 Inspectors: S. Elkhiamy, Senior Resident Inspector J. Krafty, Senior Resident Inspector S. Horvitz, Resident Inspector L. Cline, Senior Project Engineer R. Rolph, Health Physicist Approved By: Patrick W. Finney, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.

Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Correct an Adverse Condition Leads to a Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71153 FIN 05000334/2020001-01 Open/Closed A Green self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to correct an adverse condition with the atmospheric steam dump valves as required by NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000334/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for Beaver 71153 Closed Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1, Manual Reactor Trip at 15% Power Due to Lifting of the 1A Main Steam Safety Valve

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On March 4, 2020, the unit began end-of-cycle coastdown operations and remained in coastdown operations for the remainder of the inspection period. Unit 2 was at 85 percent rated thermal power at end of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.

Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 B train of service water following preventive maintenance on the strainer on January 17, 2020

(2) Unit 2 B and C main steam lines during maintenance on an A steam line isolation valve to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump on January 30, 2020

(3) Unit 1 A train of auxiliary river water following surveillance testing on January 31, 2020

(4) Unit 2 A and C charging pumps during B charging pump surveillance testing on

March 4, 2020 Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators on March 4-9, 2020.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 1 charging pump cubicles, fire compartment 1-PA-1G, on January 17, 2020

(2) Unit 2 pipe tunnel, fire compartment 2-PT-1, on February 14, 2020

(3) Unit 1 safeguards building pipe tunnel, fire compartment 1-PT-1, on February 14, 2020

(4) Unit 1 solid waste building and auxiliary building general area, fire compartment 1-PA-1A, 1C, 1E, 1G, on February 19, 2020

(5) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 1-1 room, fire compartment 1-DG-1, on February 28, 2020

(6) Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2-1 room, fire compartment 2-DG-1, on March 19, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Unit 2 control building fan room (CB-5) and instrumentation and relay room (CB-1)during the week of January 20, 2020

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Unit 1 A primary plant component cooling water heat exchanger inspection on January 27, 2020

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during the Unit 1 B reactor plant river water pump test on March 10, 2020, and Unit 1 control rod partial movement test on March 12, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the Unit 2 simulator during an annual operating exam on January 28, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 2 480 volt station service system on January 9, 2020

(2) Unit 2 area ventilation systems - miscellaneous systems on February 3, 2020

(3) Unit 2 main steam system on March 30, 2020

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to unplanned emergency response facility diesel generator maintenance and planned 1-2 emergency diesel generator testing on January 8, 2020

(2) Unit 2 elevated risk due to planned 2-2 emergency diesel generator preventative maintenance on February 11, 2020

(3) Unit 1 planned maintenance on the B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump on February 11, 2020

(4) Unit 1 elevated risk due to B train of reactor protection system testing and B boric acid transfer pump testing on March 5, 2020

(5) Unit 2 elevated risk due to A auxiliary feedwater throttle valve testing, 2-1 battery charger refurbishment, and multiple 480 volts alternating current motor control center relay replacements on March 19, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1 A intake cubicle penetration seal degraded condition on January 8, 2020

(2) Unit 2 stem and disc found detached when opening service water valve, 2SWS-100, on January 21, 2020

(3) Units 1 and 2 previously missed inservice test on steam generator snubbers on February 20, 2020

(4) Unit 2 service water pinhole leak on February 24, 2020

(5) Unit 2 station service air isolation valve automatic closure setpoint not previously tested on March 30, 2020

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change Package 19-0157 - Unit 1 missile barrier upgrade at 1-2 emergency diesel generator exhaust enclosure on February 25, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the post maintenance test activities for the following maintenance to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Unit 1 A charging pump and motor preventative and corrective maintenance on January 24, 2020

(2) Unit 1 C reactor plant component cooling water pump preventive maintenance on January 24, 2020

(3) Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump A steamline isolation valve test following repairs on January 31, 2020

(4) Unit 2 condenser steam dump instrument air supply header piping in service leak test following repairs on February 6, 2020

(5) Unit 2 spent fuel pool cooling pump mechanical seal replacement on March 11, 2020

(6) Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2-2 air start receiver check valve following repairs on March 14, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 1 - 1MSP-6.06-I, reactor coolant flow loop 1 channel II test on January 6, 2020

(2) Unit 1 - 1OST-36.2, 1-2 emergency diesel generator monthly test on March 4, 2020

(3) Unit 1 - 1MSP-1.05-I, 'B' train reactor protection system test on March 5, 2020

(4) Unit 1 - 1OST-30.3, 'B' reactor plant river water pump test on March 10, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 - 2OST-7.5, 'B' centrifugal charging pump test on March 4, 2020

RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 - 1OST-6.2A, Computer Generated Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance on March 17, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine emergency planning focused area drill on February 13, 2020

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Unit 2 simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January 28,

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

(1) Unit 1 Volume Control Tank Room (LHRA)

Unit 1 Solid Waste Area two ladder entrances (LHRA)

(2) Unit 2 Condensate Polishing Building three entrances (LHRA)

Unit 2 Volume Control Tank Room (LHRA)

71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment

Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.

External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to external dosimetry that is used to assign occupational dose.

Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments for actual internal exposures:

(1) There were no actual internal dose assessments during the inspection period. The inspector reviewed Whole body counts for two individuals with some contamination. In all cases reviewed no dose assignment was required.

Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:

(1) Dose assessments for 5 declared pregnant workers from 2018 through 2019.

Skin dose assessment for individual with 30,000 ccpm on left thigh, Log # 19/01.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) ===

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02)

(2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Condition Report 2019-00071, Unit 1 and Unit 2 testing of 120 Vac and 125 Vdc molded case circuit breakers

(2) Condition Report 2019-00075, Unit 2 emergency bus degraded voltage relay dropout voltage below minimum technical specification value

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 2019-002-00, Manual Reactor Trip at 15% Power Due to Lifting of the 1A Main Steam Safety Valve (ADAMS Accession No. ML20003D854)

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues-Condition Report 2019- 71152 00071, Testing of 120 VAC and 125 VDC Molded Case Circuit Breakers The licensee's preventive maintenance template, NORM-ER-3114, Low Voltage (less than 480 Volts) Distribution Panel, recommends that molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) in critical applications be trip tested every eight years and replaced every 25 years. As of January 2019, the licensee had not trip tested any of the 120 Vac or 125 Vdc breakers in critical applications on Units 1 and 2 and had replaced no breakers on Unit 1 and a small percentage of breakers on Unit 2.

The licensee's preventive maintenance program for these breakers only included cycling the breakers on a periodic basis. The licensees justification for not trip testing the breakers was that the failure rate of MCCBs was low (<1%), however, the inspectors concluded that this justification was not adequately supported by the equipment performance history at Units 1 and 2 because the trip function for the majority of the breakers had been rarely challenged.

The inspectors determined that the majority of Unit 1s low voltage MCCBs had been in service for 43 years without periodic verification that the breakers could still perform their safety function to trip when required.

In response to questions raised by the inspectors, between 2019 and 2020, the licensee performed trip testing on fifteen 120 Vac and sixteen 125 Vdc Unit 1 breakers and twenty 120 Vac and nineteen 125 Vdc Unit 2 breakers in critical applications. All MCCBs that were tested passed. The inspectors noted that these initial test results help to support the licensee's conclusion that the low voltage MCCBs in critical applications could reliably perform their safety function without periodic verification of their trip function.

Failure to Correct an Adverse Condition Leads to a Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71153 FIN 05000334/2020001-01 Open/Closed A Green self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to correct an adverse condition with the atmospheric steam dump valves as required by NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program.

Description:

Per LER 05000334/2019-002-00, on November 4, 2019, at 0535, while starting up from a refueling outage, operators manually tripped the Unit 1 reactor from approximately 15% reactor power in response to secondary system perturbations that had caused the B and C steam generator atmospheric dump valves (ADV) to open and the 1A main steam safety valve (MSSV) to lift due to high steam generator pressures. The licensee determined that the 1A MSSV lifted before the A ADV opened, contrary to the plant design, because the open setpoint for the A ADV pressure switch had drifted high out-of-tolerance above the 1A MSSV lift setpoint.

The ADV system design consists of a single valve on each main steam line set to open at a pressure lower than the setpoint for the lowest MSSV. This is intended to reduce the likelihood of an MSSV lifting during a transient because MSSVs can stick open resulting in loss of control of cooling water inventory in the steam generators.

The five MSSVs on each steam generator are designed to pass the steam flow resulting from a complete load rejection without a reactor trip. Their lift setpoints step up in pressure to gradually increase relief capacity with the lowest lift setpoint at 1075 psig.

The A ADV is expected to open at 1060 psig. The ADV opens in response to a pressure switch calibrated to a tolerance of +/- 10 psig. During the previous refueling outage in 2018, the pressure switch as-left open set point for the A ADV was 1068 psig, near the setpoint upper tolerance range of 1050 to 1070 psig. After the reactor trip, the as-found open setpoint for this pressure switch was found to have drifted high out of tolerance to 1074 psig, which was above the 1A MSSV lift setpoint of 1068 psig. As a result during the transient on November 4, before the reactor was manually tripped, steamline pressure reached 1068.3 psig, and the 1A MSSV lifted and did not immediately reseat. The 1A MSSV reseated coincident with or immediately after the reactor trip.

The licensee determined that there was a similar event in 2009 in which the 1A MSSV lifted before the A ADV opened. However, in that case, the MSSV quickly reseated and no reactor trip was initiated. The 2009 investigation identified the overlap in the setpoint tolerances between the 1A MSSV and the ADV, but concluded that there was not a design issue because the MSSV lift setpoint and accumulation were permitted to overlap the ADV open setpoint range, and therefore took no action to correct the adverse condition.

NOP-LP-2001, Revision 21, the revision in effect at the time of the 2009 MSSV lifting, states that effective corrective actions are developed to resolve issues identified in condition reports.

Corrective actions are intended to minimize risk by reducing the chances or consequences of recurrence of identified adverse conditions or their causes. An adverse condition is defined as any event, characteristic, state, or activity that prohibits or detracts from safe, efficient nuclear plant operation. Adverse conditions include conditions adverse to quality, plant reliability issues, and any concern that should be trended, including unexpected plant equipment failures. Further examples in Attachment 1 specify adverse conditions as any unexpected plant equipment failure. The inspectors determined that the overlap in setpoint tolerance between the 1A MSSV and the A ADV was an adverse condition that should have been corrected following the 2009 event to prevent unnecessary operation of MSSVs that could result in loss of control of steam generator cooling water inventory.

Corrective Actions: The licensee recalibrated the pressure switch input to the A ADV in the low end of its tolerance band to eliminate the as-left tolerance overlap. Additionally, planned corrective actions include establishing new setpoints and reset values for all three ADV pressure switches.

Corrective Action References: CR 2019-09324

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to correct an adverse condition, in 2009, with the overlap in the setpoint tolerances between the first steam generator safety valve and the atmospheric steam dump valve as required by NOP-LP-2001, was a performance deficiency because it was within the capability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The ADVs reseated, but the 1A MSSV did not immediately reseat as expected, resulting in decreasing steam generator pressures, increasing reactor power and a brief uncontrolled loss of steam generator inventory.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip coincident with the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a reactor trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On March 31, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Rod Penfield and other members of the licensee staff.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT, AND ABNORMAL Impact of Financial Conditions on Continued Safe Performance On February 27, 2020, the licensees parent company successfully completed its Chapter 11 restructuring process and emerged from bankruptcy as Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. The NRC Region I inspectors used flexibilities in the baseline inspection program to assess the potential impact of the financial conditions on licensee performance. Through February 27, 2020, the inspectors applied additional focus to the following areas:

(1) impact on regulatory required plant staffing,

(2) corrective maintenance backlog,

(3) changes to the planned maintenance schedule,

(4) corrective action program implementation, and

(5) reduction in outage scope, including risk-significant modifications. No concerns were identified.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.07A Miscellaneous Heat Exchanger Inspection Report for 1CC-E-1A

71111.11Q Miscellaneous 2DRLS-ECA- Licensed Operator Training, Licensed Requalification Revision 3

3.1.001 Training

2DRLS-FR- Licensed Operator Training, Licensed Requalification Revision 4

S.1.007 Training

71111.12 Miscellaneous Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation Form, CR 2017-06161

Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation Form, CR 2018-07138

Maintenance Rule (a)(2) Evaluation Form, CR 2017-06161

Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation Form, CR 2018-08427

Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation Form, CR 2018-08427 Revision 1

71111.13 Miscellaneous Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 12/30/2019, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 0

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 12/30/2019, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 1

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 1/6/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 0

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 03/02/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 0

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 03/02/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 1

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 03/02/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 2

Risk Management Plan for Work Order 200664415

Risk Management Plan for WO 200679012

Beaver Valley Unit 2 Week 02/10/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 0

Beaver Valley Unit 2 Week 03/16/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 0

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 2/10/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile Revision 0

71111.15 Corrective Action CR-2019-09972

Documents CR-2020-00074

CR-2020-00285

CR-2020-01061

CR-2020-01101

CR-2020-01436

CR-2020-01494

Miscellaneous EER 601260901

71111.18 Miscellaneous 02.114-0001 Beaver Valley Project Cask Chair and Seismic Restraint Revision B

Calculation

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.19 Corrective Action CR-2020-00141

Documents CR-2020-00453

CR-2020-00680

CR-2020-00859

CR-2020-00923

CR-2020-01683

CR-2020-02695

Miscellaneous ATA-2020-1068

Procedures 2OM-24.4.Y Response To a Failed Open 2MSS*SOV105 Series Valve Revision 2

2OST-34.9 Service Air Header AOV [2SAS-AOV105] Trip Test, And Revision 2

Station Air Compressors [2SAS-C21A, 2SAS-C21B] Auto-

Start Test

Work Orders 200536360

200635759

200700560

200726504

200733375

200807951

200812162

200815820

200817139

71114.06 Miscellaneous 2020 ERO Focused Area Drill - Cycle 1 Blue Revision 0

2DRLS-FR- Licensed Operator Training, Licensed Requalification Revision 4

S.1.007 Training

71124.01 Corrective Action CR-2019-09634 Shielding Package

Documents CR-2019-09638 Elevated Dose Rates

CR-2019-10575 Communication error locks out Operations RWP

Corrective Action CR-2020-00662 Excess Keys in the LHRA Key Locker

Documents CR-2020-00686 Cranes not on the periodic barrier/barricade surveillance

Resulting from CR-2020-00709 LHRA Posting minor PD

Inspection

Procedures 1/2 Radiation Barrier Key Controls Revision 13

HPP_3.08.003

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

NOP-OP-4101 Access Controls for Radiologically Controlled Areas Revision 18

NOP-OP-4102 Radiological Posting and Labeling Revision 14

NOP-OP-4107 Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Revision 18

NOP-OP-4502 Control of Radioactive Material Revision 06

NOP-OP-4601 Contamination Control Program Revision 09

Radiation BV-M-20190517- Unit 2 722' Waste Handling Building May 17,

Surveys 8 2019 at 1710

BV-M-20190802- Unit 2 735' PAB August 2,

2019 at 1258

BV-M-20190813- Unit 2 722' Waste Handling Building August 13,

2019 at 1717

BV-M-20190816- Unit 2 735' Waste Handling Building August 16,

2019 at 1948

BV-M-20190903- Unit 2 755' PAB September

8, 2019 at

1745

BV-M-20190909- Unit 1 735' Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) PCA Shop September

9, 2019 at

1904

BV-M-20190913- Unit 2 773' PAB September

13, 2019 at

1945

BV-M-20191008- Unit 1 735' PAB PCA Shop October 8,

2019 at 1018

BV-M-20191029- Unit 1 752' PAB October 29,

2019 at 1703

BV-M-20191030- Unit 2 735' PAB October 30,

2019 at 1432

BV-M-20191112- Unit 2 735' Waste Handling Building November 7,

2019 at 1840

BV-M-20191120- Unit 1 735' PAB December

17, 2019 at

24

BV-M-20191126- Unit 2 755' PAB November

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

26, 2019 at

1745

BV-M-20191126- Unit 1 752' PAB November

26, 2019 at

2018

BV-M-20191130- Unit 1 768' PAB November

28, 2019 at

1900

BV-M-20191205- Unit 2 773' PAB December 5,

2019 at 1803

BV-M-20191210- Unit 2 735' Truck Bay December 9,

2019 at 1300

BV-M-20191210- Unit 2 735' Truck Bay December

10, 2019 at

249

BV-M-20191210- Unit 1 722' PAB December

10,2019 at

1900

BV-M-20191217- Unit 1 735' PAB December

17, 2019 at

1940

BV-M-20191226- Unit 1 768' PAB December

26, 2019 at

1900

BV-M-20200107- Unit 1 722' PAB January 7,

2020 at 1815

Self-Assessments SA-BN-2019- 2019 Radiation Protection Summary of Program Review December

1758 18, 2019

71124.04 Corrective Action CR-2020-00108 Vendor Lab TLD quality control

Documents CR-2020-00116 Dosimetry Access Program

Procedures NOP-OP-4201 Routine External Exposure Monitoring Revision 04

NOP-OP-4204 Special External Exposure Monitoring Revision 11

NOP-OP-4205 Dose Assessment Revision 09

NOP-OP-4206 Bioassay Program Revision 04

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71152 Corrective Action CR-1999-01850

Documents CR-2000-02622

CR-2001-04551

CR-2001-04653

CR-2002-00844

CR-2019-00071

CR-2019-00074

CR-2019-00075

CR-2019-00988

CR-2019-05287

CR-2020-00580

Procedures 1/2CMP-75-HAB- Testing of Heinemann Branch Circuit Breakers, Series J, Revision 7

1E J/S, CD and 2263

2MSP-37.03-E 2N 480 Volt emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Relays 27- Revision 23

RN200AB and 27-RN200BC

NORM-ER-3114 Low Voltage (less than 480 Volts) Distribution Panel Revision 1

Work Orders 200648470

200695373

200774280

200774281

200780588

71153 Corrective Action CR-2009-59531

Documents

Miscellaneous EER 601245545

EER 601249669

Procedures NOBP-LP-2011 Cause Analysis Revision 27

NOBP-TR-1151 4.0 Crew Critique Revision 11

Work Orders 200669679

200697557

200697558

200723643

200804233

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