IR 05000412/1986009

Technical Audit Preparation Insp Rept 50-412/86-09 on 860428-30.Major Areas Inspected:Final in-depth Technical Audit Preparations,To Ensure Audit Broad Enough to Provide Representative Sample of Design

ML20206E684
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/30/1986
From:	Imbro E, Wang H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206E682	List: IR 05000412/1986009 ML20206E679
References
50-412-86-09, 50-412-86-9, NUDOCS 8606230513
Download: ML20206E684 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and Technical Training Center Programs Report No: 50-412/86-09 Docket No: 50-412 Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Facility Name: Beaver Valley, Unit 2 Inspection At: Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., Boston, MA Inspection Conducted: April 28-30, 1986 Inspection Team Members:

Team Leader: E. Imbro, Section Chief, Quality Assurance Branch Mechanical Systems: T. DelGaizo, Consultant, WESTEC Services Mechanical Components: B. Gupta, Consultant, Harstead Engineering Civil / Structural: H. Wang, Inspection Specialist, IE G. Harstead, Consultant, Harstead Engineering Electric Power /I&C: G. Morris, Consultant, WESTEC Services

'i Prepared by:

t Hal-Boh Wang

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Beaver Valley Unit 2 Technical Audit Preparation Inspection April 28-30, 1986 Background In a meeting with the NRC on March 15, 1986, the licensee, Duquesne Light Company (DLC), proposed a two phase program for the completion of the engineering assurance in-depth technical audits of the BV2 project. The first phase provides for completion of four in-depth technical audits, three of which had been previously completed. The fourth audit will assess the adequacy of the design process by evaluating the design of the Safety Injection System (SIS)

and the adjoining portion of the Recirculation Spray System (RSS), used to supply water to the core to provide long term cooling, and associated interfaces. The fourth audit will be perforced by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)

off-project engineers. The second phase provides for an evaluation and assessment of the results of the four audits in order to form a conclusion as to the adequacy of the design process as implemented for BV . Purpose The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the final in-depth technical audit preparations. Specifically, the review plans for each discipline which implement the program plan were evaluated to ensure (1) that the scope of the audit is broad enough to provide a representative sample of the design and (2)

that they are in sufficient technical depth to achieve program objective . NRC Inspection Team The inspection was conducted by NRC personnel with the support of contractor personnel as follows:

Assignment Name Team Leader E. Imbro, Section Chief, Quality Assurance Branch Mechanical Systems T. DelGaizo, Consultant, WESTEC Services Mechanical Components B. Gupta, Consultant, Harstead Engineering Civil / Structural H. Wang, Inspection Specialist IE G. Harstead, Consultant, Harstead Engineering Electric Power /I&C: G. Morris, Consultant, WESTEC Services

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• Personnel Contacted Numerous of DLC and SWEC personnel were contacted during the course of the inspection. The following is a listing of the key personnel contacted:

Name Organization Position R. Martin DLC Manager, Regulatory Affairs D. King SWEC Deputy Director of Engineering W. Eifert SWEC Chief Engineer, Engineering Assurance R. Twigg SWEC Audit Team Leader C. Miczek SWEC Deputy Director of Engineering General Conclusions The NRC inspection team found that, in most cases, the preparations for the in-depth technical audit were sufficient in scope and technical depth to achieve the objectives of the engineering assurance program. The mechanical components and civil / structural disciplines had not progressed to the point where a con-clusion can be drawn. The NRC inspection team made several observations with regard to the program by means of additions or changes to the scope of the audi These additions or changes are identified on the attached pages. The NRC under-stands that, with licensee concurrence, these additions or changes will be incor-porated in the SWEC EA review plans.

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Attachment Discipline Specific Comments The following observation with regard to changes or additions to the review plans were made by the NRC inspection team. The NRC understands that these changes or additions will be incorporated in the SWEC review plans. At the time of this inspection, the disciplines of mechanical systems (power engineering), electric power, and I&C already had a defined scope and had developed detailed review plan The mechanical components and civil / structural disciplines had not completely detailed their scope of review, i.e. specific components had not been selected for revie Mechanical Systems (Power Engineering) When reviewing FSAR consistency, the review of the design of the RSS sump screen against licensing commitments should be considere . When evaluating single-failure criteria, an evaluation of measures taken to prevent freezing of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) supply line to the safety injection pumps should be considere . In order to evaluate nuclear technology design, verification of the basis for the radiation levels in the RSS cubicle, as established for purposes of RSS equipment qualification, should be considered. These radiation levels should be compared to documents which establish equipment qualification requirements for instrument transmitters and other electrical equipment located in the cubicle to verify design consistenc Electric Power 1. Including in the review of cable ampacities, a review of derating required because of fire barriers and cable wraps should be considere . In addition to the review of 120 volt vital AC distribution providing power supply to SWEC supplied SIS and RSS instruments, the power supply to NSSS Vendor SIS initiation and engineered safety feature actuation logics should be considere The review of the effectiveness of the isolation of non-class IE 120 volt AC power panels from the class 1E inverters should also be considere . The review plan did not provide details of the review of electrical protective devices (such as circuit breakers, protective relays, thermal overload relays).

Large electrical loads of components which are located below the post-accident flood level inside the containment that could be connected to an emergency bus (such as the containment cooling fans) should be considered in this revie . Specification review of NSSS Vendor supplied components such as SIS pump motors and motor operated valves in order to verify the interface with BV2 should be considere . The review plan did not provide the review of technical details of the electrical installation specification such as cable pulling and termination requirement l

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Instruments and Controls 1. The review plan did not provide the review of the NSSS Vendor requirements for the SIS including the NSSS Vendor supplied elementary wiring and functional logic diagrams as they relate to the BV2 safety injection design. These should be considered in the revie . Refueling water storage tank level instrumentation was not provided as part of the control system review, particularly in the review plans for calculations, drawings, and specifications. These should be considered in the revie . While reviewing the instrumentation specifications, a review of a specifica-tion for electronic pressure transmitters should be considere . NSSS Vendor supplied instrument setpoints with respect to their interface with BV2 was not included in the review plan. These should be considered in the revie . The review plan for specifications was written for review of hardware pro-curement specifications. This review plan did not provide a means to review instrumentation installation specifications, including such things as equipment installation details. This should be considered in the revie . Calibration data on instruments and torque switch settings for the motor operated valves should be considered while reviewing vendor document Mechanical Components In addition to Class 2 and 3 large bore and small bore piping stress analysis packages, a stress analysis package for Class 1 piping should be considere . The method of selecting thermal transients in Class 1 analyses and hydrodynamic time history loads in pipe analyses for compliance with FSAR commitments was not included in the review plan. These should be considered in the revie . Stress design group interface with the Power Engineering discipline (such as operating conditions, thermal transients, and hydrodynamic conditions) to verify that thermal and hydrodynamic loads have been correctly incorporated in the stress analysis was not considered in the review pla When reviewing piping calculations, the sources of stress indicies and/or intensification factors at branch points, in straight pipe or fittings, should be verifie . If welded supports to Class 1 piping exist, local stress or discontinuity stress factors should be considere . Inclusion of one of each different type of support, such as a snubber, structural frame support, anchor, spring hanger (constant and variable) and standard catalog support, should be considered in the revie . Interface between the pipe support group and the pipe stress group to verify that the latest load information and/or support type was transmitted for support evaluation, was not included in the review plan. This should be considered in the revie . - - _

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• Vendor seismic qualification information for the RSS pump and the design of supports attached to the pump should be considered.

' The design of the RSS cooler supports, including the welds of supports to the J

cooler shell and the local stresses induced in the shell by the supports should be considere Civil / Structural 1. The review plan did not show that consideration was given in the design to preclude the failure of nonsafety-related structural components leading to an adverse effect on adjacent safety-related equipment, piping, and structure . Review of an analysis and design of a two-way reinforced concrete slab should be considere . The structural design of walls or slabs for support reactions determined from the design of the RSS cooler supports was not included in the revie These should be considered in the revie . The design for supports on a slab, such as the support reactions from the RSS pump and motor, was not included in the review. These should be considered in the revie '

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