IR 05000412/1986025

Insp Rept 50-412/86-25 on 860902-0905.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Program,Including Review of Joint Test Group Approved Procedures for Preoperational Tests & Review of QA Interface Activities

ML20214C915
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/29/1986
From:	Briggs L, Van Kessel H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214C670	List: IR 05000412/1986025 IR 05000412/1986027 IR 05000412/1986028 ML20214C667 ML20214C794
References
50-412-86-25, NUDOCS 8611210282
Download: ML20214C915 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-412/86-25 Docket No. 50-412

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License No. CPPR-105' Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company P.O. Box 4 Shippingport. Pennsylvania 15077

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Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit N ;

i Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania i Inspection Conduct tekber 2-5, 1986 i

Inspectors: N - 9-b j H. F.~vanKessel, Reactor Engineer date '

Approved by: 8R 9 6 j p iggs, Chief, Test Program Section, da'te 08, DRS

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j Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 2-5, 1986 (Inspection No.

50-412/86-25)

4 Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the preoperational test l program, including the review of JTG (Joint Test Group) approved procedures for  !

preoperational tests, the review of JTG approved test results for sections of .

I preoperational tests, the review of activities in the QA interface, and the '

! review of unresolved items identified by the inspector in previous inspection (

l An independent inspection was made of the Main Steam Isolation Valves. The <

unloading of 6 fuel shipping cases was witnessed by the inspecto ,

i l _Resul ts: No violations were identified.

! NOTE: For acronyms not defined, refer to NUREG-0544, " Handbook of Acronyms i i and Initialisms", i i

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i 8611210282 61117

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company (DLC)

A. Brunner, Manager Fuel Operations C. Callaway, Supervisor SVG

• N. J. Daugherty, Director Systems Test J. J. Dusenberry, QA Supervisor

• R. Fedin, Compliance Engineer J. Fernandez, Representative Nuclear Fuel Division (Westinghouse)

• J. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer E. J. Horrath, Senior Project Engineer

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M. Jackson, Valve Vendor Representative (Crosby)

• J. D. Johns, Supervisor QA Surveillance J. W. Matlick, Senior Mechanical Test Specialist T. P. Noonan, Superintendent Operations and Maintenance P. Slifkin, Test Supervisor, Phase-1 J. Stinke, Test Engineer, Phase-1 *

• R. J. Swiderski, Startup Manager S. P. Verma, Assistant Director Startup Proof Testing R. Wa11 aver, Lead Compliance Engineer R. G. Williams, Supervisor System Test Software Development

• L. P. Williams, Director Startup Phase-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. E. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley Unit # * Denotes those present in the exit meeting held on September 5, 198 . Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 412/86-22-01, " Lack of sign off provision on Test Deficiency Form" Scope It had been noted during the test witnessing of procedure PO-2.07.02,

" Boric Acid System Test", that the Test Deficiency Form (from chapter 8.2.1 of the SUM) did not provide for a signature requirement for the On Site Operations Supervisor (0505) to indicate concurrence with the decision to continue the test without corrective actio Reference: Test Deficiency Form, page 42 of Startup Manual, Section 8.2.1, annotated for the Startup Group's (SVG) proposed revision of the form, as received by the inspector during this inspection perio .

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Discussion The shortcoming of the Test Deficiency Form, as described under the scope above, was discussed with SVG managemen It was pointed out that the lack of the OSOS signature requirement would lead to a reduction in the degree of control exercised over the conduct of the tes SVG management (hereafter SVG) agreed to add the requirement for the signature of the OSOS to the Test Deficiency Form. The SUG proposed implementation of this requirement is shown in reference 1 above. Approval of the proposed re-vision of the Test Deficiency Form by the Joint Test Group (JTG) was scheduled for the forthcoming JTG meeting. Licensee action was subsequently verified by the inspecto Findings This unresolved item is close (0 pen) Unresolved Item 412/86-22-02, " Trouble shooting problems caused by design change to Boric Acid System".

Scope Initial trouble shooting conducted to resolve test deficiency No.16 of the Boric Acid System Test (P0.2.07.02) was ineffective because a system change had been made shortly before the test; but, SVG personnel were not aware of this change and its impact on the logic diagram _ References Work Authorization Request (WAR) 5824, dated September 2, 1986 " Lift and Reland cables 2CHS AOC049 and 2CHS BC049 at RK*2 AUX-REL-A and RK*2 AUX-REL-B respectively". Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) No. D-0117-501,

"A new relay has been added by Westinghouse to the auxiliary safe-guards cabinets A and B and the Auto Start signal to 2CHS*P22 A and B on Boric Acid demand is rewired", dated August 13, 198 Discussion A review of the situation existing during the Boric Acid system test with SVG identified the following:

An E&DCR (0-0117-802) had been prepared by Stone and Webster (in Boston) in August to accomplish the wiring change introduced by Westinghouse via a Field Change Notice (FCN)

The wiring change had been executed prior to the test (and turnover of the system) in accordance with E&DCR D-0117-B02

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The official system drawings including the logic diagrams had not been revised at the time of the test to reflect the wiring change Since these drawings were used by the test engineer during the test

, for trouble shooting he checked the wrong relays in the wrong cab-ine *

As a result of the trouble shooting efforts during the test, it was discovered that the system modification did not meet the intent of the designer. The existing E&DCR D-0117-802 was revised to satisfy the design intent via E&DCR-D-0117-S0 *

WAR-5824 (see ref.1 above) was issued to accomplish the correctio Further review of the licensee's design and modification control program will be necessary to determine if the above item is an isolated case or a programmatic proble Findings This unresolved item remains ope' . Preoperational Test (POT) Program 3.1 Test Procedure Review Scope The test procedures listed in Attachment A were reviewed for admin-istrative and, selectively, for technical adequacy and to verify that test planning satisfies regulatory guidance and licensee commitment Discussion The procedures were examined for the attributes listed in Inspection Report 50-412/86-1 For procedures PO 2,07.03, " Chemical and Volume Control System" and P0 2.07.01, " Charging Pumps and Controls", it was found that res-toration of the system after testing appeared to be weak. Another, review of these procedures, with the procedure writer in attendance, will be conducted prior to procedure use to ensure that adequate system restoration will be accomplishe This is Unresolved Item 412/86-25-01 For procedure PO-2.24B.02, " Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump", it was found that there was no attention paid to the potential presence of water hammer in the steam supply piping during the " cold start" of the turbine. Discussion of this item with SVG resulted in an agreement that a note would be added to the procedure

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to ensure that thermal expansion / vibration people would be on hand to evaluate system response to the admission of steam through cold piping. This item was added to the SVG Software Deficiency Tracking Report as OM No.007860. The resident inspector is also following this item under open item 412/86-04-0 The clamp-on ultrasonic flowmeter, used in P0-2.30.01, " Service Water System" was identified as a Controlotron Flowmeter. The inspector noted in discussions with SVG that problems had been experienced with Controlotrons at other nuclear plants. Care must be exercised with the mounting of this instrument on piping of different materials and in different locations on the piping to ensure acceptable result SVG is fully aware of these potential problems with Controlotron flow meter Findings With exception of the Unresolved Item (412/86-25-01) identified above, no unacceptable conditions were noted in the procedures reviewe .2 Test Results Evaluation Scope '

Partial Test Results for preoperational test P0-2.39.01, VII A, B, E, and F, "2-1 and 2-2 Batteries, Inverters and Charger Test",

approved by JTG on August 26, 1986, were reviewe Discussion The test results were reviewed for the attributes listed in Inspec-tion Report 50-412/86-11, Section 3. All applicable acceptance criteria were met with the exception of deficiencies #2 and # Deficiency #2 was resolved. A second test run was made satisfacto-rily. Deficiency #3, however will require further licensee analysis to identify the source of the problem. After identification of the problem and corrective action, a retest will be performed. This is unresolved item 412/86-25-02 pending licensee corrective action and subsequent NRC revie Findings No unacceptable conditions were noted in the review of this partial test repor . Fuel Receipt and Storage Scope The first shipment of new fuel was received onsite and unloaded on September 3, 1986. The inspector witnessed the off loading of the boxes

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into the area within the temporary fence of the fuel handling buildin The procedure (discussed below) was checked for its validity and the use of the prerequisites and instructions pertinent to off loading of the fue Discussion The unloading of the fuel boxes was accomplished without a problem and in accordance with Corrective Maintenance Procedure (CMP) No.2-75-57M, Rev.1,

" Site Receipt and Handling of New Fuel Assemblies and Their Shipping Containers", approved by the Plant Review Conmittee (PRC) on September 2, 1986. This procedure was an adaptation of the Beaver Valley Unit #1 procedure as used for the Unit #1 fuel receipt. Discussions with SUG indicated that this activity of new fuel receipt and storage was the responsibility of permanent plant Operations and Maintenance personne Fuel receipt activities are being followed by the Senior Resident Inspecto Findings No violations were observe . Independent Inspection Effort Scole Due to problems experienced with the operators for the Main Steam Isola-tion Valves (MSIVs) at another nuclear plant, the inspector inspected the MSIV's at this facility. The MSIVs at Beaver Valley are of the same valve type and have similar operators (24 inch ball valves made by Gulf and Western Manufacturing *). The inspector witnessed the first operational test on MSIV's A and C, performed under the guidance of the vendor's re-presentativ The objective was to determine if the same operator prob-lems would be experience References Name plate data of MSIV-A valve:

2 MSS HYV 101A Fluid Systems Division Gulf & Western Manufacturing Co.*

25 Graystone Street Warwick, Rhode Island 1100 psi at 558 F FSD Serial No.6246

• Crosby has assumed responsibility for these valve Future inspections will refer to Crosby as the vendo k

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Class 2, Built 1980 P0 No.2BV-211 Job No.EH-1798N Valve Tag No.2 MSS-HYV 101A Valve Weight: 16,500 lb Actuator Weight: 13,500 lb . Information from Vendor's Instruction Manual:

24" - 900 class Double trunnion Ball Valve with EFC0 600 Actuator and Relay Logic Cabine *

Figure 2-1, " Main Steam Isolation Valve" showing isometric view and partial section of ball valv *

Figure 2-5, " Control Schematic" showing hydraulic circuit for the valve operator, the trip solenoids (3) and the actuator's latc *

Figure 2-7, " Latch Arm and" Solenoid Tower" showing isometric view of solenoid tower, latch arm and clevis drive shaf _

Figure 2-8, No title, showing, in isometric view, the power cylinder and drive mechanism of the valve operator in the open, closed, and intermediate positio Discussion The A and C MSIVs were operated for the first time under the supervision of the vendor representative. These valves are 24 inch ball valves with a hydraulic operator which is tripped by 3 trip solenoids (see ref.2, fig.2-7). The solenoid plungers push the pivot plate, which rotates and thereby releases the latch arm. The hydraulic system then closes the valve by rotating the ball 90 degrees inside the valve body. The 2 outer trip solenoids produce 40 ftib of torque each; the inside trip solenoid produces 80 ft1b of torqu This arrangement of the trip solenoids is different from that at the other nuclear plant where the valve operator has only 2 trip solenoid The problem experienced at the other plant was the failure of the latch arm to release after the trip solenoids were deactivated. This happened only after the latch arm had been in the latched position for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or mor The initial operation of both valves was successful although there were some problems with the limit switch settings. Fine tuning was planned for the limit switch settings. During a subsequent test the latch arm was to be left in the latched position overnight and then the phase-1 test could be started. The inspector established via a telephone conversation with the test engineer on September 11, that the test had been aborted because of other valve problems. Unrelated to the previous problem, the

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licensee has also ' experienced cracking of the bearing that is located on the end of the latch arm and latches the valve in the open position. Re-solution of this problem is ongoing between the licensee and the vendo Both items will be followed during routine inspectio Findings No unacceptable conditions were noted during the initial test of the val *

ve . QA/QC Interface Scope The participation of the Duquesne' Light QA Surveillance Group i , the pre-operational test program was evaluated by the inspector. Samples of the surveillances performed on the most recently performed preoperational tests were obtained for this revie Discussion For continuation of the assessment of QA/QC involvement in the preopera-tional test program, the inspector reviewed the surveillance reports as listed in Attachment B. None of the surveillance reports showed unsatis-factory conditions prevailing during the tes Findings No unacceptable conditions were noted during the above revie . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to determine wether they are acceptable, an item of noncompliance, or a deviation. New unresolved items identified in this report are dis-cussed in paragraphs 3.1 and . Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection, on September 5, 1986, an exit interview was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (denoted in Section 1). The findings were identified and previous in-spection items were discusse At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector. Based on the NRC Region I review of this re-port and discussions held with licensee representatives during this in-spection, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction .

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Attachment A to 50-412/86-25 Procedure Reviews

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Proc. N Procedure Title Rev. No. Approved by JTG P0-2.24B.01 Motor Driven Auxiliary 0 7-31-86 Feedwater Pumps & Controls P0-2.248.02 Turbine Driven Auxiliary 0 10-24-85 Feedwater Pump Test P0-2.30.01 Service Water System Test 0 4-29-86 P0-2.07.01 Charging Pumps & Control 0 7-9-85 Test P0-2.07.03 Chemical and Volume Control' 0 5-17-86 System Test

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Attachment B to 50-412/86-25 Review of QA Surveillance Reports

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Sury. No. Description Activity Source Reg't Date Reviewed SEC-07-86 New Fuel Receipt 10 CFR 73.67 8-29-86 including checks on shipment plan, container integrity, and security pla CPT-24-86 Construction Proof 2T-FNH-66-2.20 6-23-86 Test Fuel Handling Cranes.