ML20198B130
| ML20198B130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1998 |
| From: | Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Cross J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812180066 | |
| Download: ML20198B130 (14) | |
Text
. _ _
l l
December 9,1998 Mr. J. E. Cross l' President Generation Group Duquesne Light Company (DLC)
Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT:
Mid-Year inspection Resource Planning Meeting - BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION
Dear Mr. Cross:
On November 10,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM). The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region I to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in May 1999.
Enclosure 1 contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this IRPM process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and DLC. The IRPM may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the Public Document Room as part of the normalissuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Beaver Valley Power Station IRPM review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (610) 337-5234.
d Sincerely, Original Signed By:
Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief g2 00$ y g 334 PDR Reactor Projects Branch 7 G Division of Reactor Projects I
Docket Nos. 50-334,50-412 i
Enclosures:
- 1) Plant issues Matrix Ok
- 2) Inspection Plan \
[\rd d M Db
.. ., - - . - . . - . .-. . - - ~ ..
I Mr. J. E. Cross 2 cc w/ encl:
Sushil C. Jain, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services Group K. Ostrowski, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Group and Plant Manager R. Brandt, Vice President, Operations Support Group B. Tuite, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit W. Kline, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department M. Pergar, Acting Manager, Quality Services Unit M. Ackerman, Manager, Safety & Licensing Department J.' Macdonald, Manager, System and Performance Engineering J. A. Hultz, Manager, Projects and Support Services, FirstEnergy M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State of Ohio State of West Virginia l
l 1
l' l
,....7 ._. ..._ _ _ _. . . . - . _ . . . _ _ _ . . ~ . _ _ . _ _
_ . ~ . . _ _.__ . . -
l
' Mr. J. E. Crossi 3 1
Distribution w/ encl: '
- Region I Docket Room (with concurrences) I Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) !
PUBLIC - j NRC Resident inspector !
- H. Miller, RA/W. Axelson, DRA
. P. Eselgroth, DRP N. Perry, DRP C. O'Daniell, DRP
. M. Oprendek, DRP DRS Director, Region 1 DRS Deputy Director, Region I
' Distribution w/enci Nld E-MAIL):
B. McCabe, OEDO R. Capra, PD1-2, NRR D. Collins, PDl-2, NRR V. Nerses, PDI-2, NRR R. Correia, NRR -
DOCDESK
' Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS) l i
I 1
I 1
)
' DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ BRANCH 7\PPR\STD-lRPM.BV ~
i
' Ta receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C* = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N"= 1 No copy OFFICE . Rl/DRP [g R,l/DJP . lE / l l NAME NPerry gg* Pg4lgfoh i DATE 12/08/98 12/T/98 12/ /98 12/ /98 12/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY !
1
. . . ~ , , - . . - - _ _ . ,.
BEAVER VALLEY I & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 1-OPS 5A The licensee developed and implemented a Unit 1 Restart Action Plan (RAP) to 387 SC provide assurance that known conditions adverse to quality were corrected and that personnel, processes, and equipment were ready for unit restart. Corrective actions to address weaknesses in Technical Specification compliance were comprehensive. The RAP and its implementation were appropriate to address the root causes for the extended forced unit outage.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 L 1-OPS SA The post trip critique and event response team report identified several important 386 5C causes and corrective actions for the trip. The inspectors identified several information gathering / assessment deficiencies, including the lack of recommended actions to improve steam generator level control during subsequent feedwater regulating valve
'Jansfer evolutions. Plant management took appropriate actions to address these concerns prior to authorizing plant restart. Operating crew seminars, conducted prior to unit restart, effectively focussed on crew awareness and communications.
9/15/98 Negative IR 98-04 S 1-OPS 3A On August 11, Unit 1 tripped from 24% reactor power due to a steam generator (SG) 385 3B level transient experienced while transferring feedwater flow control from the bypass feedwater reguisting valve (FRV) to the main FRV. Prier to the trip, operators did not fully discuss and recognize the effects of placing a failed steam flow instrument in trip, which enabled the reactor to trip at a higher SG water level. Operators responded properly to the reactor trip.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 1-OPS 1A Command and control prior to and during the August 11, Unit 1 reactor startup were 384 3A good. The prestartup containment walkdown as well as the preevolution briefing for startup were comprehensive. Maintenance personnel responded promptly and effectively coordinated with operations persont el to resolve concerns regarding instrument indications.
8/5/98 LER 1R 98-03 L 1-OPS 2A TS 3.0.3 Entry Due to Two Analog Rod Position Indicator (ARPI) Channels inoperable.
370.6 LER 1-97-23 8/5/98 LER 1R 98-03 L 1-CPS 3B Engineered Safety Feature Actuation of the P-12 Interlock Due to Decreasing Water 370.3 LER 1-97-22 Temperature.
1 of 10
BEAVER VALLEY l & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/5/98 NCV 1R 98-03 L 1-OPS SC During review of a previous event, the licensee identified three instances during which 370 Positive NCV 98 TS required shutdown margin determinations were not performed. The identification of LER 03 this issue and subsequent corrective actions were good. Corrective actions for a LER 1 previous violation associated with configuration control for a Unit 1 pressurizer power 12-01,02 operated relief valve (PORV) were properly implemented to preclude recurrence of a similar event. (Noncited Violation of TS 4.1.1.1.1.a; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 8/5/98 Negative IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 1C Implementation of several TS amendments, and communication of approved changes 369 to the UFSAR for use by the station's staff were poor.
8/5/98 NCV IR 98-03 L 1-OPS 3A On April 7,1998, a Unit 2 quench spray (QS) pump experienced a significant water 368 Negative NCV 98 SC hammer event. Several process barriers failed including the corrective actions for 02 similar previous events, system restoration procedures, planning, and scheduling. The final barrier failed when operations personnel did not fully resolve valid safety concerns prior to performing a surveillance test during which the water hammer occurred.
Although the QS system was not damaged, this condition represented a failure of the licensee corrective action program. The event critique and Multi-discipline Analysis Team (MDAT) assessments were excellent. The MDAT recommended comprehensive corrective actions to address this event. (Noncited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 8/5/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 1C The controls instituted for the TS 3.0.6 amendment, including procedure changes and 367 training, were sufficient and in place prior to implementation.
8/5/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 1C The licensee review of alarm response procedures generally identified all Technical 366 SC Specification (TS) related issues and improved operator awareness of TS 3.0.3 entry conditions. The alarm response procedures were adequate for proper operator response.
8/5/98 VIO IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 3A The licensee experienced an increase in the number of personnel performance 365 Negative ViO 98 SC problems. The partial stop work order issued by the plant manager was important to 01 focus workers on proper attention to detail. Although some improvement was noted, human performance errors continued after the stop work order was !ifted. The errors resulted in additional out-of-service time for safety related equipment, and failu:e of operations personnel to be aware of plant conditions including inoperability of safety related equipment. (Violation of TS 6.8.1a) 2 of 10
BEAVER VALLEY I & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 4/25/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 1C Corrective actions to previously identified configuration control deficiencies were 359 3A effective. The number of component misposition events was dramatically reduced.
SC Operator adherence to procedures and identification of procedure deficiencies improved.
4/25/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS SC The licensee developed a comprehensive Restart Action Plan by which the 358 organization could implement corrective actions for known material, process, and performance deficiencies which had led to the current forced outages on both units.
Appropriate independent oversight was established and senior management maintained both units in a safe condition pending plant readiness for transition to the four established plant restart milestones.
4/25/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 1C A two day training course was conducted for over 400 station personnel to improve 357 3B knowledge and understanding of technical specification compliance. The training plan was excellent and provided a wide range of examples which were specifically selected to enhance training effectiveness across the varied background of the attendees. A major strength of the training was the broad scope of people trained. Training effectiveness was evaluated through highly challenging written examinations.
4/25/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 1C Operations personnel performed a thorough and conscientious review of operations 356.5 SA procedures and the procedure change backlog for technical specification (TS) implications. Over thirty procedure deficiencies which had the potential to place the units in a condition not permitted by TS were identified and appropriate corrective action initiated. Noteworthy strengths were the broad scope of procedures reviewed, individual training conducted prior to the reviews, and the involvement of the various station departments.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 2- 3A Maintenance on safety related check valves to correct a motion binding issue was 391 MAINT properly performed and supervised.
9/15/98 VIO IR 98-04 N 2- 3A Human performance errors continued to impact plant operations. Maintenance 389 Negative VIO 98 MAINT personnel failed to adhere to procedures for configuration control and work control 01 when attempting to resolve excessive packing leakage on the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. These actions delayed pump restoration by twenty-two hours. (Violation of TS 6.8.1a) 3 of 10
BEAVER VALLEY l & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 2- 3B A design change to modify the Unit 1480 Volt emergency bus under voltage relay 388 MAINT 4A scheme was implemented correctly. The maintenance personnel performing the work 5A were knowledgeable and appropriately briefed. Missing motor control center panel SC fasteners were identified by the maintenance crew and properly dispositioned by the site staff. The infrequently performed test or evolution briefing was professional, notwithstanding two minor deficiencies.
8/5/98 NCV IR 98-03 L 2- SA Maintenance and engineering personnel identified that high energy line break actuation 374 Positive NCV 98 MAINT 5B system capacitor replacements, performed five years ago, resulted in the system being LER 04 SC non-seismically qualified. Identification of this issue demonstrated a good questioning LER 1-98-12 attitude and corrective actions were properly implemented in a timely manner.
(Noncited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 8/5/98 Negative IR 98-03 N 2- 3A Evaluation, scheduling, and management oversight of Unit 2 periodic inservice test 373 MAINT 4C (IST) program requirements from February through May was poor.
8/5/98 Negative IR 98-03 N 2- 2B Posting and control of equipment deficiency tags continued to be poor.
372 MAINT SA 8/5/98 Negative IR 98-03 N 2- 3A Surveillances were generally conducted safely. In some cases marginal procedure 371 MAINT 3C quality challenged operators and equipment. One example of operator inconsistent use of available indications resulted in a violation of procedure.
4/25/98 NCV IR 98-02 N 2- 5A Licensee identification and corrective actions to address a degraded floor penetration 363 Negative NCV 98 MAINT SC flood seal which caused the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system to be outside its design 02 basis were slow. Subsequent corrective actions including required reports to the NRC were good. However, while the licensee event report was detailed, it did not properly address the issue of AFW system operability. (Noncited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 4/25/98 Negative IR 98-02 N 2- 1C The Quality Services Unit provided thorough and objective evaluations of maintenance 362 MAINT SA performance; however, maintenance self-assessment was weak. A program for periodic maintenance self-assessment was not established, and maintenance self-assessments tended to be reactive to self-evident issues. No program for periodic trending of Condition Reports was established.
4 of 10
D BEAVER VALLEY I & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 4/25/98 NCV IR 98-02 L 2- 1A inadequate procedural instructions resulted in a Unit 2 reactor trip signal during reactor 361 Negative NCV 98 MAINT 3A trip breaker surveillance testing. In addition, technicians demonstrated poor 01 communications when they failed to inform the control room operators that one of the test acceptance criteria was not met. (Noncited Violation of TS 6.8.1.a; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 4/25/98 Weaknes IR 98-02 N 2- 2B Various planning and scheduling weaknesses were identified. Three separate tracking 360 s MAINT mechanisms, which did not fully agree with one another, were usec' to schedule surveillances due to lack of confidence in their individual accurac,. Emergency diesel generator 2-1 restoration was delayed because the post- maintenance testing requirements were not established Emergency Response Facility maintenance was canceled because procedures for equipment clearance were not available. A new work control center was established and six work week manager positions were created to help improve the planning and scheduling process.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 3-ENG 4B System and Performance Engineering Department personnel developed a systematic 393 4C and comprehensive process to evaluate system status and readiness. System engineers were knowledgeable and consistent in their implementation of the required system health reviews, providing appropriate recommendations to station management regarding readiness for Unit 1 restart. Insights gained during the system health reviews were shared with appropriate departments for implementation.
9/15/98 NCV IR 98-04 N 3-ENG 5A The licensee identified binding issues associated with thirty Unit 2 check valves.
392 Positive NCV 98 5B Causal analysis for this issue during the last refueling outage was incomplete, which LER 02 SC contributed to several additional failures occurring during this outage. Although the LER 1 valves affected multiple safety systems, the safety significance was low due to 22-00,-01 redundant, diverse isolation valves for each of the check valves affected. Licensee investigation, root cause analysis, quality contr e and corrective action during this period were comprehensive. (Noncited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 5 of 10
BEAVER VALLEY l & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ,
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/5/98 NCV EA 98-359 L 3-ENG 5A The licensee conducted a comprehensive review of testing of safety related logic 379 Positive IR 98-03 SC circuits for Unit 1, in response to NRC Generic Letter 96-01. Identified deficiencies LER NCV 98 were tested successfully, procedures were revised to include the testing, and the 07 conditions were properly reported. (Noncited Violation of several TS surveillance LERs 1 requirements; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.3 of the Enforcement Policy) 04-00,01, 02,03,04; 1-97-01-00, 01,02,03, 04,05;1 03-00,01;1-97-31 8/5/98 VIO IR 98-03 N 3-ENG 2B The normal practice of venting the high head safety injection pumps prior to 378 Negative VIO 98 4C surveillance testing without the assurance that adverse conditions will be detected and 06 corrected was a violation. Previous corrective actions to address this issue were comprehensive. (Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI) 8/5/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 3-ENG 1C The licensee's staff exhibited an appropriate questioning attitude resulting in the 376 4C identification of many questions regarding interpretation of TS requirements and the adequacy of plant procedures to meet them. Risk insights were generally integrated into the backlog prioritization process as evidenced by about 80 percent of the identified top risk significant backlog items being less than two years old. However, risk insights were not fully utilized for design change requests and pending design change packages. These items constituted the majority of the risk significant backlog items greater than two years old. ,
6 of 10
BEAVER VALLEY l & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/5/98 NCV IR 98-03 L 3-ENG 4C in response to an NRC violation, the licensee identified over twenty additional 375 Positive IR 98-04 5A instances where the station TS were not sufficient to ensure the station would operate eel 98-03-05 5B within the existing UFSAR accident analysis. These discrepancies affected the reactor NCV 98 SC protection system, engineered safety features, and various safety related system 03 requirements. Licensee actions from approximately 1990 to 1997 were inadequate, in that station design was not properly maintained, conditions adverse to quality were not corrected, and TS were not properly maintained. In response to an NRC violation, the licensee performed an extent of condition review which identified numerous design issues for which the TSs were non-conservative. Appropriate corrective actions including interim administrative controls, development of TS amendment requests, and process revisions to ensure the facility is operated within its design basis were established. Interdepartmental coordination and the quality of engineering work to resolve the issues were excellent. The safety significance of the design issues was low and the licensee correctly determined that Unit 1 could restart prior receiving TS amendment approval from the NRC for the subject issues. (Noncited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion ill and Criterion XVI; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 4/25/98 NCV IR 98-02 L 3-ENG 4B Operators demonstrated a good questioning attitude upon noting air blowing though a 364 Positive NCV 98 4C shakespace seat membrane. Engineers provided good support to operations in 03 evaluating and correcting a missing shakespace flood / fire seal which placed the auxiliary feedwater system outside of its design basis. This was the third degraded flood seal issue identified in the past fifteen months and highlighted the need for a station-wide flood barrier inspection program. Corrective actions were appropriate.
(Noncited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill; Enforcement Discretion per Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy) 9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 4-PS 3A Audits of the security program were comprehensive in scope and depth, audit findings 402 were reported to the appropriate level of management, and the program was properly administered. In addition, a review of the documentation applicable to the self-assessment program indicated that the program was effectively implemented to identify and resolve potential weaknesses.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 4-PS 3C Management support was adequate to ensure effective implementation of the security 401 program, and was evidenced by adequate staffing levels and the allocations of resources to support programmatic needs.
7 of 10 i
.e BEAVER VALLEY l & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ,
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 4-PS 2A Security facilities and equipment in the areas of protected area assessment aids, 399 protected area detection aids, personnel search equipment, and illumination and surveillance hardware were well maintained and reliable.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 4-PS 3A Security and safeguards activities were conducted in a manner that protected public 398 health and safety in the areas of access authorization, alarm stations, communications, and protected area access control of personnel and packages.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 4-PS 3C The program for identifying and tracking hot spots, and shielding to reduce 396 occupational exposures was effectively implemented. The Unit 1 refueling outage in 1997 (1R12) was completed with the lowest total dose in unit history.
9/15/98 Positive IR 98-04 N 4-PS 2B The program for the control of contaminated materials and equipment was effective.
395 The licensee appropriately identified and maintained records of spills and other occurrences as required under 10 CFR 50.75(g)(1).
8/5/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 4-PS 3A Radiological controls in the containment were effectively established, implemented, 381 3C and maintained; and radiological work involving the Unit 1 PORV was effectively monitored and controlled.
8/5/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 4-PS 2C The licensee established anti implemented effective radiological protection programs 380 3B with respect tc (1) maintenance and calibration of radiological survey instruments; (2) control and leak testing of instrument calibration sources and inventory maintenance; and, (3) training of radiation protection technicians.
8 of 10 i -
-______a
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN PIM TABLE AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ARPI Analog Rod Position indication BCO Basis for Continued Operation BVPS BeaverValley Power Station CIV Containment Isolation Valve CR Condition Report CREBAPS Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System DLC Duquesne Light Compary EDG Emergency Diesel Generator i EOF Emergency Operat%s Facility EP Emergency Preparedness ESF Engineered Safety Features ESFAS Engineered Safeguard Features Actuation Signal GL Generic Letter HHSI High Head Safety injection ICCM Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor ISEG Independent Safety Evaluation Group NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission FORV Power Operated Relief Valve OSU Quality Services Unit R12 Refueling Outage 12 RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RFO Refueling Outage RHR Residual Heat Removal RMS Radiation Monitoring System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank ,
TS Technical Specification !
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report !
URI Unresolved item l t
9 of 10 ;
~.
C GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE COLUMNS The actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence (mainly LERs), the date the source of the information was issued (such as for EALs), or the last date of the inspection period (for irs).
Type The categorization of the item or 'inding - see the Type / Findings Type Code table, below.
Source The document that describes the findings: LER for Licensee Event Reports, EAL for Enforcement Action Letters, or IR for NRC inspection Rcports.
10 Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
Code Template Code - see table below.
- s f NRC findings on LERs that have safety significance (as stated in irs), findings described in IR Executive Summaries, and amplifying information Item Description conta.ined in EALs.
TYPE / FINDINGS CODES TEMPLATE CODES ED Enforcement Discretion - No Civil Penalty 1 Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - Programs and Processes Stmngth Overall Strong Licensee Performance W;akness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 2 Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes eel
- Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Final NRC Action 3 Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Know! edge, Skills, and Abilities /
Violation Level 1,11, Ill, or IV " "9 ~ " "*"
VIO 4 Engineering / Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes NCV Non-Cited Violation DEV Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC 5 Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C - Resolution Positive Individual Good Inspection Finding NOTES:
Negative Individual Poor inspection Finding Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enfe cement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action'(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues URl ** Unresolved item from inspection Report identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are Licensing Licensing Issue from NRR made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to erther (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP)- predecisional enforcement conference.
Declared Emergeny, Nonconformance issue, etc. The type of all MISC findings are to be put in the item .* URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine Description column. whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
10 of 10
Enclosura 2 BEAVER VALLEY INSPECTION PLAN FOR DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH MAY 1999 Inspection No. Program Area / Title Planned Dates Type ns ctors IP 64704 Fire Protection Program 12/14/1998 1 Core IP 73753 Inservice inspection 3/15/1999 1 Core IP 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure 3/22/1999 1 Core Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and IP 84750 4/19/1999 1 Core Environmental Monitoring - Effluents Legend: ;
IP -
Inspection Procedure Number Tl -
Temporary Instruction Program / Sequence Number Core - Minimum NRC inspection Program (mandatory at all plants)
OA -
Other Inte . tion Activity RI -
Additional ir spection Effort Planned by Region i SI -
Safety initiative inspection
. -_- _ _-_- __ ___ _ _ _ _______ _-__- ___________ ____ _ - -_ __-_ ____ ___ -_ _ . . _ _ _ _ _