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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20207B242 | | | number = ML20214J899 |
| | issue date = 07/02/1986 | | | issue date = 08/11/1986 |
| | title = Insp Rept 50-344/86-20 on 860519-0612.Violation Noted: Corrective Action Not Assigned & Implemented for Nonconformance Rept 86-024 Re Electrical Conduit Support for Hydrogen Combiner Sys Train a | | | title = Ack Receipt of 860801 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-344/86-20 |
| | author name = Burdoin J, Johnson A, Kellund G, Mendonca M, Richards S | | | author name = Kirsch D |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = Withers B |
| | addressee affiliation = | | | addressee affiliation = PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| | docket = 05000344 | | | docket = 05000344 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-344-86-20, NUDOCS 8607170460 | | | document report number = NUDOCS 8608150214 |
| | package number = ML20207B225 | | | package number = ML20214J901 |
| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | page count = 13 | | | page count = 1 |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:- -. . - - .- . - . _ . .,. . - . _ - = ~ . | | {{#Wiki_filter:. w. . |
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| U. S. NUCI.U\R REGULATORY COMMISSION ;
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| ==REGION V==
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| Report No. 50-344/86-20 Docket No. 50-344
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| License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company l 121 S. W. Salmon Street
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| ! Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Troj an InspectionCondufted- May 1 - June 12, 1986 Inspectors: ~ M r , eactor Inspector D' ate Signed e
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| A. D. Joh
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| , Enforcement Officer
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| ? h ITate' Signed S.A[I M S. A. Ric' hards, Senior Resident Inspector 7/z/w, Date Signed
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| 5. A9M G. C. Kellund, Resident Inspector rom ,k/n Date Signed Approved by: #6= -
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| ~1 h /8h M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed Reactor Project Section 1 Summary:
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| Inspection on May 19 - June 12, 1986 (Report 50-344/86-20)
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| Areas Inspected: A special unannounced inspection by two regional based inspectors along with the two Trojan NRC resident inspectors to followup two allegations received in the regional office during April 198 ,
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| Results: One violation and no deviations were identified.
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| $
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| 06071704'60 860702 PDR ADOCK 05000344 0 ~ '
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| DETAILS i
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| ; Persons Contacted.
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| #*W. S. Orser, Plant General Manager
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| #*C, A. Olmstead, Manager, Quality Assurance Department
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| *J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services l *D. L. Bennett, Supervisor, Control and Electrical l R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
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| ! C.11. Brown, Operations Branch Manager, Quality Assurance
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| *H. F. Moomey, Trojan Resident, Oregon Department of Energy
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| *J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance and Construction ,
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| #*D. D. Wheeler, QC Supervisor +
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| R. A. Reinart, I&C Supervisor
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| *G. J. Stein, Hechanical Maintenance Supervisor ,
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| T. A. Swarers,*'QC Leadman
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| '* L. Warnick, Plant Modifications Engineering Supervisor J. E. Purcell, ISC Unit Supervisor
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| C. C. Allen, QC^ Lead Electrical Inspector l W. T. Craft, QC Specialist l A. N. Roller, Nuclear Plant Engineer, Electrical Branch Manager
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| * W.~ Swan, Maintenance Supervisor
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| * Denotes attendance at exit management meeting on May 23, 198 # Denotes attendance at exit management meeting on June 12,198 NOTE: The allegation characterization statements contained in this report are either a paraphrasing of the staff's understanding of the alleger's concern or statements taken from the allegation source document. The characterization statements do not represent a staff assessment, conclusion or positio . Followup of Allegation or Concerns Allegation, ATS No. RV-86-A-0029 (1) Cha racte rization The site quality control (QC) supervision directed QC inspectors not to identify nonconforming conditions except for work to which the inspectors were specifically assigned. Nonconforming conditions which were identified were not processed for corrective action. QC inspectors were required to have all nonconformance reports (NCR)
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| screened by their supervisor, thereby preventing NCRs from being written. A maintenance request (MR) associated with a potential electrical separation criteria violation inside a locked manhole may have been falsifie (2) Implied Significance to Design, Construction or Operation ;
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| Improper supervision of QC inspectors and failure to correct nonconforming conditions may result in known plant
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| . 2 material deficiencies remaining uncorrected, which could have an adverse effect on the operation of the plan (3) Assessment of Safety Significance The Quality Assurance Manager was questioned regarding direction given to QC inspectors to not identify nonconforming conditions except for deficiencies associated with work to which the inspectors were specifically assigne The Quality Assurance Manager confirmed that the above stated direction was provided by
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| first line QC supervision to temporary QC inspectors who had been hired to increase QC activities prior to and during the 1986 refueling outage. When the temporary QC personnel were hired, the Quality Assurance (QA)
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| organization wanted to focus their activities on work in progres In an effort to provide this direction, the i
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| first line QC supervision told QC inspectors not to look
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| for discrepancies with installntions which were old construction. The QA Mtnager stated that when he learned i that this direction was being provided, he took immediate action to ensure that all QC inspectors understood that all nonconforming conditions should be documented and addressed. Discussions with several QC inspectors confirmed that originally they had received instructions to narrow their scope of 2nspection, however, they also confirmed that they now felt free to report any deficiency they might identif The primary method used to document QC inspector observations is the QC Observation Report (QCOR). The j
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| ' QCOR was initiated at the plant as an observation record in January, 1986, when the QA organization started to bring in temporary QC inspectors to augment the full-time '
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| QC staf A sample of these reports were reviewed by the NRC inspectors to determine whether observations by QC
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| inspectors had been evaluated and corrective action
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| initiated where' appropriate. The NRC inspectors found QCORs written during the February-March time frame, had not been' subject to a review pursuant'to an established written procedure'in that one had not been developed at j
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| the time. Repo'rtedly, these items had been screened and ;
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| those appearing to have immediate safety significance were '
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| processed for evaluation and corrective actio !
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| Discussions with the electrical QC coordinator indicated that prior to assuming his position in late March, the procedure to review and disposition the QCORs had not been fully established. Each QCOR also has a signature space
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| to signify review by the QC Supervisor (QCS). None of the first 100 QCORs had been signed by the QCS. QC personnel also stated that they had recognized the lack of a proceduralized review of the early QCORs and they had
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| decided to wait until the plant completed the refueling
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| outage in early June before re-reviewing the early QCORs in a more prescribed manner. The NRC inspectors noted that QCORs written after4 April 1 appear to have been reviewed and acted on in a reasonable manner. The QC organization stated that the older QCOR's would be reviewed and action initiated on all QCORs that had not previously received a prescribed review. This action was completed prior to the inspection conclusion. The NRC inspectors also observed that most of the discrepancies listed in the early QCORs were not safety related and generally dealt with conduit support deficiencies, missing covers and bolts on electric pull and terminal boxes, labeling errors on electrical raceways, and apparent discrepancies concerning raceway separation criteri The NRC inspectors discussed the process of writing NCRs with QC supervisory personnel. These QC personnel stated that QC inspectors had been directed to have their first line supervisors initiate any NCRs and that this direction had been given because the procedure required to be followed to issue an NCR was relatively complex. QC supervision felt that having first line supervisors write NCRs was more efficient administratively than training each temporary QC inspector in the procedure governing NCR The NRC inspectors reviewed the NCR log and observed that !
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| NCRs had been initiated for various apparent nonconforming conditions that were identified by QC inspectors. The NRC inspectors further observed that five recent nanconformance reports (NCR) in the electrical area had Ieen voided after the NCRs were initiated. The procedure governing control of NCRs allows voiding if the apparent nonconformance is determined to be invalid. The procedure further requires the reason for voiding the NCR be stated in the corrective action section. In the case of the above NCRs, the reason stated was per discussions with the Manager, Nuclear plant Engineering Electrical Branch. A technical explanation was not niven and QC personnel were unable to explain why the NCRs were invalid. The QCS stated that a more complete explanation for voiding the NCRs should be included on the NCR and that the matter would be rereviewed and the appropriate reasons for voiding the NCRs would be documented on the NCR. Upon re-review of the voided NCRs, the licensee determined that NCR 86-024 had actually documented a valid nonconformanc This NCR described a conduit support violation associated with the 'A' train hydrogen recombiner panel in the 'A'
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| electrical switchgear room. The licensee redocumented this nonconformance on NCR 86-121. The staff concluded that by incorrectly voiding NCR 86-024, the licensee had failed to take appropriate corrective action for a valid
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| i nonconforming condition. This is an apparent violation of i 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI (344/86-20-01).
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| The NRC inspectors reviewed the QCOR file and the maintenance request (MR) log to determine whether an MR
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| ! had been falsified such that the MR indicated that an electrical separation criteria discrepancy had been identified and documented on the MR prior to the date a QC inspector had observed the apparent discrepancy. The staff review of the MR log and QCOR file did not identify any indication that falsification of an MR had occurre (4) Staff position i
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| First line QC supervisors did direct QC inspectors to
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| limit the types of deficiencies that they should identify, however, the QA Manager corrected the problem when he learned that the direction was being provided. The q deficiencies identified by QC inspectors during the
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| February and March, 1986, timeframe, were not res'ewed and i acted upon in a systematic manner such that neveral of the
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| QCORs reviewed had no documented evidence of corrective l action where. action appeared required. The licensee has
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| ! re-reviewed the early QCORs and initiated corrective
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| , action where appropriate. A procedure is now in place to l ensure QCORs are reviewed in a prescribed manner. The I
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| staff found that NCRs had been written for deficiencies
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| ! identified by QC inspectors when an NCR was the
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| l appropriate corrective action mechanism. The staff found no indications of maintenance requests being falsifie The allegations were found to be partially substantiate The licensee has taken action to resolve each area of
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| i (5) Action Required Followup on licensee action for the identified violation.
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| , One violation and no deviations were identifie i
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| l Allegation, ATS No. RV-86-A-0036 (1) Characterization
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| Multiple assertions concerning lack of quality in the i
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| licensee's instrumentation and control procedures and practices. The specific assertions are described below
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| under the section, Assessment of Safety Significanc ;
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| (2) Implied Significance to Design, Construction and Operation The lack of quality in instrument and control procedure and practices could adversely affect the safety of plant ;
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| operation (3) Assessment of Safety Significance '
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| Specific, allegations are:
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| (a) " Signal wires to indicators in control panels in control room have bare shields at ends which may short out terminals on backs of adjacent indicators."
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| The inspector examined the installation of signal wires in two walk-in type control panels in the control room. .This examination found some signal
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| wires equipped with shrink tubing to insulate the t
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| shield where it had been trimmed back to allow insulation removal for terminating the cable. Also
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| ,.found,were some_ signal wires where shrink t.ubing was not used. However, in all cases the shield had been trimmed back neatly and sufficiently far back from
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| 'the terminal block so as not to pose the problem of shorting out adjacent terminals. The installation standards E-3/E-4 requires the use of shrink tubing only when the shield is tied down to a terminal on the terminal block. The inconsistent use of shrink tubing on signal wires, where the shield is not tied '
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| down, is at.tributed to the individual practice of l installers during the constraction period of the plant, and does not pose a potential to short-out terminals on adjacent indicator .
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| (b) " Total lack of specific procedures for equipment calibration:
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| " Generic procedures necessary for calibration are not listed on work requests /MR' " Method of calibration changes dependent upon technique and other factors, so results may not be consistent.
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| l l " Technicians allowed to become lax in performance of tests - fudge factor."
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| ; The licensee used generic procedures for equipment l calibration. These procedures identified the l equipment vendor's specific procedures to be used in j the calibration of specific equipment. In those cases where the licensee concluded the tendors procedures for calibrating a specific piece of equipment were inadequate, the licensee developed a specific procedure for calibrating that particular piece of equipmen __-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ ._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . -__ _ _ _ _ ___ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ - - . - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ .
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| : The generic procedures necessary for calibrations were identified on the-instrument calibration data
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| (new system). These data cards / sheets are part of
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| maintenance request package (see below for j description of these systems),
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| . Methods of calibration of instrumentation equipment l differed slightly in that input data could be
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| different, i.e., milliamps versus millivolts; but the j output which determined the calibration was measured in.only one parameter.
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| Inspections'on the conduct of I&C tests have not
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| observed any laxness on the part of the technician This allegation was not substantiated.
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| j (c) " proper tests may not always follow maintenance 3 activities."
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| i 1 Administrative order A0-3-9, " Maintenance Requests,"
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| 1 identified the requirements for post-maintenance j testing. Also, this procedure required the cognizant j supervisor (mechanical / electrical) to identify on the i
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| i maintenance request (MR) the requirement for post-maintenance testing. The inspector reviewed this procedure and examined a number of MRs. The
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| ) licensee's procedures and practices acceptably
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| )' specified post-maintenance test requirement, and this allegation was not substantiate (d) " Preconditions, precautions and prerequisites unique to each situation, i.e., loop calibration may not be
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| properly followed up by technicians because they are not known by techniciars."
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| Administrative order A0-3-14 " Safety-related
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| Equipment Outages," described the procedure for j planning equipment outages. It ensured proper
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| scheduling, technical specification surveillances on
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| redundant trains, actification of other groups l (maintenance / operation) before removal of equipment from service; and also ensured proper testing of equipment on return to service. The inspector examined this procedure in detailed and discussed with the licensee the practices followed in removing from service control / instrument systems and equipment '
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| for loop testing and calibratio . At Trojan, the I&C technicians, because of their detailed knowledge of the various control and instrument systems, aid the operators in removing from service for calibration and loop testing certain equipment and instrument systems.
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| The licensee's procedures and practices for the L
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| removal from service for calibration / loop testing appeared to be acceptable and sufficiently detailed to enable the operators and technicians to be aware
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| of applicable preconditions, precautions and prerequisites peculiar to each control / instrument system and piece of equipmen Inspection activities have found that preconditions, g precautions and prerequisites are complied with '
| | Docket No.-50-344 |
| .[ during testing of control / instrument systems and
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| : equipment. This allegation was not substantiated.
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| (c) " Computerized Calibration Cards given to Technicians list too many details which are not necessary for the t | |
| performance of the task and cause the necessary information to be lost or ignored, e.g. ,
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| " Generic procedures required to perform the task are not listed.
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| " Data tables are often on separate pages which a
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| causes confusion, i.e., the table may be broken
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| in the middle and completed on the next pag " Significant information is lost amongst blank l
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| entries and entries which are not needed for the task."
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| Last fall the licensee placed in service a new fully i
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| computerized maintenance scheduling system, referred to as TSS (Trojan Scheduling System). This system was replacing the old Maintenance Scheduling System i
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| ' which was not fully computerized. The TSS is used to schedule control / instrument systems and equipment loop tests and calibrations. The new system produces ,
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| the calibration data sheet which contains/ lists all '
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| the necessary information, such as instrument
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| i identification, location, manufacture, drawings,
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| ! procedures, tools / parts required, special conditions, etc.. - During the present outage, the licensee, to be
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| assured of proper shift-over to the new TSS with no
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| ; loss of valuable instrumentation' calibration and test
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| data,: backed-up the new system by continued use of
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| 'the old "hard-card" system. To this end, the instrument" calibration cards (hard-card) from the old
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| system were attached to the calibration data sheets
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| for all loop tests and calibrations of instrument systems and equi'pment.
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| The inspector examined in detail the calibration data
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| ' sheet from'TSS'and the old "hard-card" and found both i data sheets to be thorough and complete in the information provided for calibration and testing of
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| | PortlandGeneralNiectricCompany i 121 S. W.-Salmon Street- |
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| | Portland, Oregon. 97204 f |
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| instrument loops and equipment. The licensee contended that the calibration data sheet and i hard-card were designed to provide all information ( necessary for I&C technicians to calibrate and test l instrument loops and equipment. The inspector l concurred this allegation was not substantiated.
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| ! (f) " Work is performed on Q class Equipment without a I paper trail."
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| l Twenty. completed maintenance requests were selected
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| ! by number from the QC inspection schedule / record and I
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| seven of ther.e MRs (86-1692, 2233, 2446, 2448, 2450, 2451, and 2662) were examined in detail to determine if records of work accomplished and QC inspections performed were properly documented on maintenance i request forms as required by administrative procedure A0-3- These completed MRs appeared to contain all the required information. From this review / examination of maintenance records, it appeared that records were kept on work performed on
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| Q class equipment in accordance with procedure requirements. This allegation was not substantiated.
| | Attention: Mr. Bart Withers ' |
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| | s Vice President,* Nuclear * |
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| | o.-3 Gentlemen: . |
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| | Thank you for your letter dated August .1,- 1986,' informing us of' the ' steps you have taken to correct the items"which we brought to your attention in our letter dated July 2, 1986. ~Your corrective actions will_be v,erified during a future inspectio , |
| | Your cooperation with us is appreciate , |
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| I (g) " Valve and pipe fittings on pneumatic systems are most often over tightened so that threads are stretched and otherwise damaged and leaks occur."
| | Sincerely, Original'sioned by DennisY'ITIrsch, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects bec w/cpy ltr dtd 8/1/86: |
| | | W. Dixon, DOE RSB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS) |
| This concern was discussed in great detail with the licensee mechanical maintenance grou It has been -
| | Project Inspector Resident Inspector G. Cook B. Faulkenberry J. Martin Regi n p[ |
| l the licensee's practice, when they open the containment for refueling, to walkdown all of the instrument tubing systems to identify all leaks and prepare maintenance requests (MRs) for repair of these leaks'during the plant outage. Most of the ,
| | p DPer tra/ norma MMMendonca AEChaffee DFKirsch |
| Icaks are due to leaking compression fitting ferrules
| | ' 8/// /86 8/s//86 8/// /86 8/h /86 |
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| which result from several causes. Two frequent causes are: (1) Scratches on stainless steel tubing surfaces where ferrule mates with tubing, and (2)
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| surface hardening on heavy wall tubing prevents the ferrule from getting a good " bite" into the tubin The licensee's procedures and practices to reduce to a minimum leaks in stainless steel tube fittings were reviewed and appeared to be acceptable.
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| l The inspector also reviewed with the licensee the practices followed in tightening compression type stainless steel tube fitting The licensee employs the tube fittings manufacturer's reconunendations which limit overtightening the fittings to prevent damage to the threads. These recommendations include use of a manufacturer's special wrench with a small
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| l t lever arm and limiting the number of turns to l
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| tighte The inspector examined instrument lines around twenty transmitters for leakage. No leakage or indication of over tightening was identifie It appeared that damaged threads due to over tightening of fittings is not a major.cause of leaks in stainless steel tube fittings at the Trojan Plan Therefore, this allegation was not substantiate (h) " Questionable materials, i.e., teflon tape, are l widely used in containment."
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| i The present practice at Trojan is not to allow the use of teflon tape on the primary syste However, '
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| it is used on secondary system instrument piping i ,
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| l sizes 1/2" and 3/8" inside containment. The tape is i .used on stainless steel to stainless steel pipe thread fitting It is not used on tube fitting l,
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| threads. It appears from published technical information that some teflon tape begins to decompose at about 400*F and releases high concentrations of halogens, fluorides, chlorides, and others which are *
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| highly corrosive to NSSS materials. The use of teflon at Trojan is restricted to use on systems which do not exceed temperatures of 250'F. The Chemical Assessment Section at the Trojan plant in presently analyzing the particular type of teflon tape used on site to determine an exact assessment of the material and to determine its limitations for usage at Troja It appeared as though the licensee was aware and implemented limitations on the use of teflon tape inside containment and is presently performing his own analysis to determine if additional restrictions on it use inside containment are required. The allegation was substantiated but was acceptably addressed by the licensee.
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| (i) " Equipment modifications may not show up in Technical Manuals and can cause delays and/or mistakes in maintenance."
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| This item was reviewed with the licensee. About a year ago the licensee initiated a program to upgrade all the plant technical manuals; and to this end, the licensee appointed a technical manual task group to accomplish this assigntient. The inspector examined the program with the task group leade Approximately ten people are presently assigned to the task group. The program calls for reviewing all l
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| technical manuals at the plant to verify that they include all the latest as-built changes, modifications and revisions. The manuals are also being reviewed for dividing / indexing the text into more logical divisions; a thorough review process will verify the accuracy of the manuals; the manuals are then to be reprinted, and after final review / checking new copies of the new technical manuals will be issued. The present scheduled completion date for this project is July 198 The licensee's program for completely overhauling the plant technical manuals appeared to be thorough and addressed this allegatio *
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| (j) " Improper wiring of RTD on main coolant pump:
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| Wrong size of lug for screw size
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| 1 Spade lug used instead of round lug
| | 8608150214 860811 PDR ADOCK 05000344 G PDR \ |
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| There was potential for shorting of signals" i The inspectors examined the wiring of the seal water RTDs on the "B" reactor coolant pump (TE 170 and TE 171). These RTDs have no safety related function other than being required to maintain the pressure boundary following a seismic event. The size of the j lugs installed appeared adequate for the screw size and no evidence of l
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| shorting or ir. adequate gaps between adjacent lugs was l
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| found. The minimum distance observed between
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| adjacent lugs was approximately 3/16 inch which does not present any shorting problems due to the low voltages involved.
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| l i The inspectors observed evidence of both ring lugs i
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| and spade lugs installed on the termination bloc l ( The licensee's new electrical installation standard l I
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| calls for ring lugs to be used, however, the old
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| standard in use at the time of installation allowed I
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| the use of spade lugs. The licensee intends to ,
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| conduct any new terminations in accordance with the i new standard and use ring lugs but does not intend to i replace the existing spade lugs in place throughout the plan The inspectors also noted that some of the lugs had been bent upward apparently to facilitate installation due to the small amount of space available in the head of these particular RTDs. The licensen previously identified the issue of insufficient space in the RTD head and initiated a *
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| f Request for Evaluation (RFE) to deter 1mine the t
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| acceptability of the present configuratio The allegation is partially substantiated in that spade lugs were installed on the RTD termination block. However, the installation standard they were 4 installed to allowed this. The remainder of the allegation regarding the use of the wrong size of lug for the screw size and the potential for shorting of signals was not substantiated. The related issue of i inadequate space for installation of lugs on the RTD termination block has been previously identified by the licensee and is currently being addressed. The
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| allegation has minor safety significanc (k) Source range channel N31 is erratic and should not be <
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| relied upon for refueling activitie In addition, l the N31 detector was replaced without' supporting !
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| documentation and the N31 SOLA power supply was ;
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| , installed incorrectl '
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| l The inspector reviewed the past performance and !
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| maintenance history of the N31 source range channe !
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| The channel has behaved somewhat erratically for many 1 years due to a high noise level and sensitivity to !
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| outside influences. The licensee has replaced the {
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| detector preamplifier during the current outage with l a different model that should improve performanc '
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| Refueling records were reviewed and personnel were l interviewed to determine if the licensee took '
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| appropriate actions in response to channel spikes ;
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| during refueling activities. The inspector verified that reactor core alterat. ions were suspended whenever spiking occurred and were not resumed until the cause was determined. The spiking was usually attributed ;
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| to welding, grinding or use of heat guns or portable !
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| radios in the vicinity of the detector cabl l With regard to the contention that the N31 detector !
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| was replaced without supporting documentation, the inspector reviewed the maintenance records for the detector. The detector was replaced in April, 1986 under a maintenance request (MR 86-2200). The maintenance request and supporting documentation appeared to control and document the work performe l The allegation that the N31 S01.A power supply was inntalled incorrectly was also investigated. The inspector found no evidence that a SOLA power supply for the N31 channel was replaced. The inspector did, however, determine that a SOIA power supply for the l
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| nuclear instrumentation cabinets had been installe This power supply had been installed incorrectly, however, the licensee subsequently identified the problem and corrected i The allegation that the source range channel N31 has behaved erratically is partially substantiated in that the channel has been somewhat erratic. Iloweve r, the inspector determined that appropriate actions consistent with procedures and Technical Specifications were taken whenever the channel malfunctioned. The allegations concerning the undocumented replacement of the N31 detector and the ,
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| improper installation of the SOLA power supply were '
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| determined to be not substantiated. The detector replacement was controlled and documented, and the power supply installation error was discovered and corrected by the licensee. The inspector determined that acceptable procedures and programs exist to control work and to identify and resolve problems in this are (4) Staff position The staff concludes that the licensee established procedures and impicmented programs that addressed the '
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| allegers' concerns; and that in the normal process of following prescribed procedures, the cbove identified allegations were acceptably addresse (5) Action Required Non No violations or deviations were identifir Exit. Meeting The inspectors conducted exit meetings on May 23 and June 12, 1986, with the general manager of the plant, members of the plant staff, and other staff personnel. During these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this repor ;
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