IR 05000344/1986019

Insp Rept 50-344/86-19 on 860429-0616.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Corrective Action,Maint,Surveillance,Refueling Activities & Review of QC Activities

ML20211P446
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	07/07/1986
From:	Kellund G, Mendonca M, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211P430	List: IR 05000344/1986019 ML20211P426
References
50-344-86-19, TAC-61405, NUDOCS 8607230235
Download: ML20211P446 (15)

Text

_ . . _-

A g : I U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No.-50-344/86-19

-

Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1

'

Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted: April 29 - June 16, 1986 Inspectors: h s' -G % 7/7/T&

S. A. Richards (/ Date Signed Senior Resident Inspector h W" A y],/g v

. G. C. Kellund g/ Date Signed Resident Inspector Approved By:

- M._Mendonca~,1 Chief

^

[7 Date Signed

Reactor Projects' Section 1 Summary:

,

Inspection on April 29 - June 16, 1986 (Report 50-344/86-19)-

,

' Areas Inspected: Routine _ inspection of operational safety verification, corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activities, review of

,

~ quality control activities, followup on steam generator hydraulic snubber inoperability, and followup of an allegation concerning welding of feedwater pipin Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 60710, 61701, 61720, 61726, 62703, 70313, 71707, 71710, 71711, 72700, 72701, 92700, 92701, 92702, 92703, 93702, and 94702 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspectio Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000344 i G PDR l

.

-,-: . -- r , - - , n -

,7 - - ,-v-- - - -- ,- r -ww ,-,-r,-----n-----vv--- i--v--- ri---e-vwn--+r v--w~=.a--v==--v

___

~

-8 w

• .

. .

DETAILS Persons Contacted

• '

. .

B. D. Withers, Vice-President Nuclear

• W. S. Orser,: Plant General Manager C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Quality Assurance ~

C. P. Yundt, Manager,-Technical Functions

, J. W. Lentsch, Manager, Nuclear Safety & Regulation i R. L..Steele, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering;

, R. P. Schmitt, Manager,' Operations and Maintenance D. R. Keuter, Manager,- Technical Services .

.

J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear.Maint. and Construction J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services

.G. A. Zimmerman, Branch Manager, Nuclear Safety & Regulation R. E. Fowler, Mechanical Engineering Branch Manager, Nuclear Plant Engr .

R. J. Weha~ge, Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Plant Engineering =

'

R. E. Susee, Operations Supervisor D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor '

A. S. Cohlmeyer, Engineering Supervisor G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S. ' B. Nichols, ' Training Supervisor D.~L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor C. H. Brown, Quality. Assurance Operations Branch Manager D. D. Wheeler, Quality Control Supervisor R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other. licensee employees during.the' course of the. inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personne * Denotes those attending the exit intervie . i Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facilit The observations add; examinations of those activities were condected on a daily, weekly, or biyeekly basi Ona'dailyb' asis,theinspectorsobservedcontrolroomactivitiesto verify,the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the fac'lit i technical _ specification Logs, instrumentation', ' recorder traces, and other operational records were e'xamined to' ob't'

a in informatyon on' plant' conditions, trends, and compliance.with regulations.. On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress,.the turnover,of information on plant status was observed to determine that all' pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming

~

,

shif '

, +

%

m E g g

<

I -

,

, 2 During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items: General plant and equipment condition Maintenance requests and repair Fire hazards and fire fighting equipmen Ignition sources and-flammable material contro Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedure Interiors of electrical and control panel Implementation of the licensee's physical security pla Radiation protection control Plant housekeeping and cleanlines Radioactive waste system Proper storage of compressed gas bottle The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance evolution During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involve The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the syste Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection period included 82-33,86-014, 86-023,86-024, 86-025 and 86-02 Additional comments concerning these NCRs are contained in inspection report 344/86-2 Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspector Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and use Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration statu The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety features. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable. ESF systems verified operable during this inspection period included the safety injection system, the residual heat removal system and the high head

injection system. The inspectors also verified that the containment

!

pressure sensing lines inside containment were clear and the containment l

,

.

.

.

-

recirculation sump was clean and secure prior to startup following the outag No violations or deviations were identifie . Corrective Action The inspectors performed a general review of the licensee's problem identification systems to verify that licensee identified quality related deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for resolution. Types of records examined by the inspectors included Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plar.t Review Board meeting minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to correct identified deficiencie No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed maintenance activities associated with the 'B' train containment spray addition flow transmitter orifice and the replacement of pressurizer safety valve PSV-8010A. The inspectors made the following observations regarding the work performed by the maintenance persoanel on the pressurizer safety valve:

-

The maintenance procedure governing the replacement of the valve (MP-5-1) contains a table of torque values used to connect the discharge flange of the valve. The copy used by the valve crew at the work location, however, had a blank table with no values liste When questioned by the inspectors, no members of the maintenance staff could identify where such a copy could have originated and how it could have made its way into the field. The inspectors did note, however, that the valve crew was aware of the proper torque values for the discharge flange connectio MP-5-1 contains four quality control (QC) inspection points related to torquing of the valve inlet flange. The inspectors observed that the maintenance personnel werked through the inspection points although the QC inspector preser.t had not performed the required inspections. The inspectors noted that had the maintenance personnel prompted the QC inspector when the inspection points were reached, this problem could have been avoided. The details surrounding QC involvemer.t in this job are documented in a special inspection report (50-344/86-24).

-

The maintenance personr.el used small bore piping and snubbers as

" stepping stones" when going to and from the workplace. The licensee has identified that many of the failures of small snubbers in the past are apparently the result of people stepping or standing on them. It appears that additional guidance on the use of snubbers or small bore piping as handholds or footholds may be appropriat This concern was discussed with maintenance supervisory personne .

, 4 The inspectors discussed these observations with members of the licensee staff during the conduct of the. inspection and with the plant general

,

manager who noted the inspectors' concern No violations or deviations were identifie ' Surveillance -

The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the

, inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that

~

the system.or component being tested was properly removed from. service if required by the test ' procedure. < Following completion of the surveillance tests,'the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria. . Surveillance tests witnessed during this period were associated with main feedwater. check valve leakage testing, containment spray nozzle flow verification, integrated safeguards actuation testing, main steam safety valve testing and containment spray addition flow testin No violations or deviati6ns were identifie . Refueling Outage Activities The plant remained ina refueling outage for the duration of the inspection period. Major evolutions conducted by the licensee during the outage included:

-

cycle 8/9 refueling

-

containment local and integrated leak rate testing

-

steam generator eddy current testing and tube plugging

>

-

steam generator sludge lancing

' -

inspection and repair of reactor coolant system restraints and supports

-

control room emergency ventilation system modifications

!

-

auxiliary feedwater system modifications

- - safety related snubber surveillance testing

-

replacement of selected feedwater heaters

-

turbine generator inspection

-

technical specification surveillances with refueling outa'ge frequencies The inspectors followed the progress of the outage activities by attending the licensee's daily morning meeting. At this meeting, the status of all major work items was summarized by the supervisors and managers responsible for the work. The inspectors made frequent tours of the plant, including the containment building, and witnessed portions of refueling activities in progres During the outage the following problems were discovered:

-

During containment local leak rate testing, penetration P-57-2, the chilled water return line, failed its local leak rate test. The leakage was in excess of what could be measured by the test

_ ___ , _ _ _ . . _ . _ . , _ , _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _,_ _

__

,

.

.

s .5 0

_

instrumentation. ;The licensee submitted,LER 86-05_ describing this occurrence. The containment isolation valves in this line have had apooroperatinghistoryand,havefailedthejianuallocalleakrate test several times, although gross failures never included.both the inner and outer isolation.' valves as was the case this year. The licensee had planned to replace these valves and the valves in the

~

chilled water supply line penetration during'the 1985 refueling outage. Availability of replacement valves, however, forced the work to be postponed until the present outage ulien the valves .were-replaced with ones of a different seat desig ,

-

The. licensee performed a containment integrated leak. rate test (CILRT), and due to the excessive leakage identified during the local leak rate t'esting mentioned above, the_.CILRT was considered to be failed prior to the commencement of the t.es The CILRT is described in _ detail in inspectiot lrsport 344/86-21. The inspectors assisted the regional based CILRT inspector prior to and during the condact of the test by performinpfaystem walkdowns and ' verifying

'

proper lineups. *' -~ .

'

-

While testing the control room emergency ventilation system following the identification of system. deficiencies during a previous inspection (descr'ibed in inspection report 50-344/86-06)

the licensee identified numerous leakage paths,into the control room envelope. The licensee plugged the leakage paths that were discovered,'but due. to the large amount of makeup air flow that was measured l relocated the:makebp. intake location to place'it farther'

awaytfrom'the release points'during a postulated accident. The licen'see is preparing a revised LER,that descr'ibes th'ese action '

-

During'flushingoftheberdicewaterlines,to_theauxiliary feedwater (AFW)' pumps the 'likensee discovered a buildup of silt in the lines. . These' lines.are/normally dead legs.with no flow and would only be used whenithe normal supply of water to the AFW system was unavailable. .The: amount of silt present_ did not appear to be sufficient to degrade system flow significantly. The-silt was 1 removed from the lines. The licensee has experienced silting

~

"

problems in other portions Mf:thh We vice water system in the past and is considering' actions ti minimize future. silt accumulations,

'

t

--

While performing' maintenance of the steam driven AFW pump turbine, the licensee discovered debris (a nut and piece of stud) on the inlet screen of the turbine trip and throttle valve. The source of i the debris was-a check valve in one of the four steam supply lines

!' to the AFW pump turbine. The stud attaching the disc'to.the hinge i' arm had broken allowing the disc to fall-to the bottom of the valv The cause of the failure was attributed to inadequate design. The L- licensee examined the other three valves in the steam supply lines and valves of similar design in use in other systems. No problems were found with the exception of one of the steam supply check valves that showed a possible indication during non-destructive l examination. The failed valve and the valve with the possible t

indication were repaired with new studs of a modified design that are less prone to this type of failure. The. licensee attempted to

,

!

L

.

- 6 replace all four steam supply valves this outage, however, the lack-of available replacement valves has postponed the replacement until next year's refueling outag The licensee discovered that relays in an emergency diesel generator (EDG) control circuitry were of various voltage ratings between 110 volts and 130 volts. These relays had been supplied by the vendor who, when contacted regarding the situation, could not explain why relays of different ratings were used. The licensee replaced the 110 V and 120 V relays with 130 V relays. The licensee also investigated EDG relay failures in the past and did not identify any that could be attributed to exceeding the relay's voltage ratin An inspection of wiring of numerous Limitorque motor operators was conducted by the licensee. This inspection was prompted by the discovery of environmental qualification problems with wiring in Limitorque operators at other facilities. Approximately six operators required repairs. The inspectors will continue to follow this issu During the previous operating cycle, the plant experienced a continual increase in the primary to secondary leakage rate. The licensee identified the leaking tube during steam generator tube inspections and determined it to be a row 1 tube that had not been plugged. All row 1 tubes in all four steam generators had previously been plugged, however, it appears that this tube was inadvertently omitted during that plugging operation. The tube was subsequently plugge While conducting eddy current testing of steam generator tubes, a piece of wire approximately five inches long was discovered in the U-bend region of a tube. The wire was removed and the licensee performed extensive eddy current testing of the tube to determine if any damage had resulted. No indications were found. The licensee attempted to identify to wire and determine its source, but was unable to do s On May 23, while filling the steam generators (S/G) in preparation for a special plant test tc check for leaking S/G tubes, the operators inadvertently pressurized the 'D' S/G to the point that water was observed issuing from two steam line safety valves. The main apparent cause of the event was that the pressure gauge being used to monitor the S/G pressure was isolated from the S/G. Because

'the S/G was greater than 70 degrees F in temperature, the facility technical specifications were not violated, however, the vendor

. limit for differential pressure between the secondarf and primary sides were exceeded. The licensee performed a thorough review of the event and identified several other contributing errors. The technical concern with-regard to the differential pressure limit being exceeded was resolved through discussions with the S/G vendo The inspectors encouraged the licensee to continue reviews of future events in the same detail as was done for this even No violations or deviations were identifie s

--

. , - , . .

,

. i 7:

i Reactor Cooling System Snubber Inoperability j As discussed in NRC~ inspection reports 85-39, 86-02, and 86-07, the licensee had identified that: failure of the steam generator' hydraulic snubbers to allow' normal ~ thermal expansion of the reactor coolant system (RCS) would explain an unusual movement'seen with thd pressurizer surge'

line since 1982. The snubber failure under the worst case conditions, would also place a large unexpected force on the RCS piping. The licensee had concluded that,'although the piping may have reached the

~

yield stress of the hot leg, the strain limit would not have been exceeded and the fatigue usage factor would remain within limits.

Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-13, supplement I, describes the licensee's q initial assessment'

/

-

On May 6, NRC region V personnel and.the_ resident inspectors met with the licensee to discuss the licensee's understanding of the problem, the historical data. associated with the event, and the licensee's intended actions during the refueling outage to physically investigate and assess the problem; The following observations were made by the NRC personnel'

at the conclusion of the licensee's presentation:

f

-

The licensee did not have an adequate understanding of the root ,

cause of the problem or of.the effects of the problem on the RC The licensee's analysis of'the problem depended heavily on the

.

accuracy of-a contractor's analytical work. The licensee engineering . department's -ability to oversee the contractor was f questioned. "The need for an . independent peer review of the

.

'

M Econtractor's work wa's discusse ~

F

,

~- The licensee's intention to not) physically monitor.the RCS for proper expansion during initial' system heatup following.the outage-was viewed i as inadequ'ats; part'icularly in light of the number'of

-  ! unanswered' ^'questions at that' tim .

.

[ ,

? -

Licensee senior management (did not display an understanding of the potential ma'gnituderof'the problem. The need to ensure the

. ? ' structural integrity of the RCS pressure boundary with a high degree

,

of certainty'was stresse .

The licensee then took the following a'ctions during the 1986 outage to confirm the integrity of the RCS:

-

An extensive program was initiated to physically walk down the RCS to check for proper clearances and to identify any abnormal i

'

-

conditions. The walkdowns included portions of systems attached to the RCS.

l

-

The Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor, Westinghouse, was contracted to assist in resolving the problem.

t' -

RCS restraints and supports were reworked or repaired to return the

'

system to the original configuratio t

<

, , - ., e I, .-w-, . , -.,m- - , , _ , ,, 4 ., . . . - - - , _ _ % -r-

, .8'

-

The Bechtel Corporation was retained to provide an independent peer group review of the analytical work associated with the proble The control valves for all 16 steam generator hydraulic snubbers were replaced with a different design, which appears less susceptible to failure. The old control valves were sent off site to a specialty contractor for analysis to determine the root cause of the proble Non-destructive examination of sections of the RCS hot legs was performed. No indications were note The licensee physically monitored the expansion of the RCS during heatup following the outage to verify normal movement of the syste The monitoring program included remote electronic sensing and manual measurements. Adjustments to hardware were made as necessary to correct deficiencie NRC Region V requested the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

to review the technical adequacy of the licensee's work to resolve the issue. The licensee's submittals to NRR dated May 9, May 21, June 3, June 4, June 6, June 13, and June 16, document in detail the historical background of the issue, the analytical work performed, the system inspections conducted, and the scope and results of the licensee's monitoring program. Region V personnel interacted closely with both NFR and licensee. representatives during consideration of the technical aspects of the problem. By letter dated June 16, 1986, NRR concluded that the licensee's technical review and corrective action was adequate, and that the plant could enter mode 1 operation. NRR further concluded that the ASME piping code had not been violate During the outage, the inspectors and senior personnel from the Region V office, witnessed the conduct of the licensee's inspection and monitoring program. Extensive walkdowns of the RCS were performed at both hot and cold conditions. Various aspects of the licensee's program to resolve the issue were discussed at length with cognizant licensee personne The licensee's activities at the site appeared well controlled. Quality control involvement with the inspection and rework efforts was note Although the RCS was assessed as having retained it's structural integrity, this event points strongly to a need for the licensee to review their engineering capability. Prior to the involvement of Region V personnel, the licensee's effort to understand and resolve the issue appeared to be minimal. It is not clear that the substantial effort eventually dedicated to resolve the issue would have occurred based on licensee management initiative alone. The licensee's initial efforts to determine the root cause of problems was observed to be wea Trotbleshooting efforts. such as the work originally performed on the failed snubbers, lacked adequate management controls to ensure the evidence was preserved and that troubleshooting steps followed well thought-out guidance. The need to determine the root cause of plant problems and to establish clear procedural guidance for troubleshooting efforts was discussed extensively with senior licensee managemen Senior management stated that the company was considering several options to improve their performance in this area, including the formation of a

.

.,___y

--

.

group dedicated to root cause determination and an independent review of the company's conduct of engineering work by a consultant firm. Senior management committed to inform the NRC by letter of their actions when the decision was finalize By letter dated June 20, 1986, the licensee informed Region V that a root cause analysis group would be formed and that several other measures would be implemented to improve their performance in this are ~

At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspectors were reviewing the licensee's actions to report the failure of the S/G snubbers via the NRC emergency notification system. This item will be further reviewed by the inspectors and dacumented in a future repor No violations or deviations were identifie . Quality Control Program In response to an NRC Notice of Violation associated with inadequate quality control (QC) inspections, the licensee has significantly increased the number of_QC personnel on site during the refueling outag These personnel consist of four groups; full time plant QC staff, QC inspection qualified company employees who are temporarily assigned to the site from other company facilities, temporary hire employees, and contract QC inspectors. At the peak of the outage, the total QC staff amounted to approximately 60 employees. The inspectors reviewed records associated'with QC inspections recently performed and witnessed QC inspectors at work in the field. The following observations about the program were mad Overall QC involvement in maintenance and modification activities has increased significantly during the present outage, relative to previous outage Indoctrination of contract QC personnel was weak. Although all these personnel were certified by the contractor as qualified QC inspectors, detailed training was not provided by the site to train them in site procedures, codes and standards applicable to the site, and site work practices. The QC Supervisor did discuss general topics with the contract personnel and introduce them to work group foremen and supervisors. Reportedly, the contract inspectors were given the procedures for review and sufficient time for adequate study and familiarization of company policies and practices. A more comprehensive and detailed training program for the certified QC inspectors may have minimized confusion regarding the various standards under which the plant was constructed and modifie The procedure controlling the preparation of NCRs allows a maintenance request to be initiated as corrective action documentation in place of an NCR if a nonconformance can be reworked to conform to specification. The maintenance request does not receive the level of review that an NCR does and is, therefore, inappropriate for significant deficiencies. The QCS stated that his organization realized clarification of the procedure is needed to ensure that all significant deficiencies are documented on NCRs or

.

- 10 l

l event reports and that action to clarify the procedure has been initiate QC Surveillance Report #445, dated May 7,1986, stated that drawings being used by QC inspectors to document partial inspections of terminations for modifications to the plant preferred instrument buses was removed from the work package by personnel from Plant Modifications without the knowledge or consent of the QC organization. When the inspectors questioned the QCS on May 22 about the report, he was unaware of the problem. Plant Modifications personnel stated that the documentation was removed to prevent confusion with their craft workers over what inspections were required. They further stated that removal of the documentation without QC knowledge was in error and replaced the documentation into the package. The inspectors verified that QC personnel had no undocumented problems with the jo The inspectors discussed with licensee management, the importance of ensuring that all nuclear division personnel fully understand the independence of the quality organization. Licensee representatives stated that measures had been taken to ensure this understanding. The inspectors concluded that a significant increase in the level of QC activity has occurred since January,1986, when the QA organization was reorganized. The licensee is continuing to modify their QC program in response to deficiencies and weaknesses. Further recent observations concerning QC activities are documented in inspection reports 344/86-20 and 344/86-2 f No violations or deviations were identifie . Complex Surveillance Testing The inspectors witnessed complex surveillance testing of safety-related systems that is norm' ally conducted during refueling outage Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test prerequisites were met, test equipment was properly calibrated, the system was properly removed from service and returned to service and that qualified individuals were performing the tes Following completion of the tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria. Tests witnessed during this outage consisted of containment spray nozzle flow verification, integrated engineered safety features actuation tests, main steam safety valve testing and containment spray addition flow testin No violations or deviations were identifie . Sodium Hydroxide Tank Flow Testing In accordance with the licensee's Technical Specifications, a surveillance test is conducted every five years which verifies that the specified sodium hydroxide (NaOH) flow to the containment spray system is obtained when the system is automatically actuated. Since the last surveillance conducted in 1981, the licensee requested to amend the Technical Specifications surveillance method such that the flow was

_ _ ___ _

g -

n..- - -. -- - - - - . . . . .- -- . . .- -- .-

.

. 11 Lverified'by draining NaOH through the normal flow path to a. drain valve j' and into a collection bottle. -The previous method required the NaOH to

. -be removed from its storage tank, replaced with water, and the flow of j , water into the' containment spray system measured with the containment

.

spray pumps running on recirculation flow. The licensee request to amend.

c the surveillance. requirement was approved.

, ?During the refueling outage,.the licensee attempted to conduct the surveillance test, however, only 16 GPM flow was obtained through both trains, while'the surveillance requires a flow of 28 GPM. Further 1

--testing by the licensee in conjunction with calculational considerations of the flow path configuration, led the licensee to conclude:that 16 GPM was the maximum flow that could physically be obtained'due to the size of i

b the drain valve. The' licensee's submittal to change the surveillance

-

method had apparently been in error.

'

-

After discussions with the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

!- -

(NRR), on June 7, the licensee was granted temporary relief fr performing the surveillance. On June 9, NRR amended the technical

, specifications to require the surveillance to be performed in the

'

original method. On June 11, the licensee attempted to again conduct the

surveillance. The initial test resulted in 22 GPM in the 'A' train and 0 GPM in the 'B': train with 37 + 3 GPM being the acceptance criteria.

'

Following more testing of the' system, the licensee concluded that the valve being used to throttle the flow was extremely sensitive to position

'and that the use of the particular valve design was a misapplicatio Subsequently, the licensee resized the flow instrument orifice in the a' flow path such that the orifice set the proper flow. Repeated testing of-the system with the orifices controlling flow consistently yielded flow rates in specification with the regairement.

Early on in this event, the inspectors discussed with licensee management the need to ensure the root cause of the problem with the Na0H flowrate was determined. Subsequent licensee actions identified several problems

. in attempting to resolve the issue, that had a lesser degree of effort l~ been' dedicated to review and testing of the system, those additional

problems may have,gone: undetected. The event serves to further reinforce t

.

the need to do,a thorough root cause determination, when significant problems became eviden ,

.

f At the close of the., inspection, the licensee was still.considering what-e significance the event had concerning past operability of the system and i' whether the event is reportable as a Licensee Event Report (LER). -The

-

inspectors will follow this event as an unresolved item pending the completion of the'lic'ensee's review (344/86-19-01).

~

j i

>

No . violations ?'or deviations. were ' identifie ,

,

.

n

1 Safety Injection-Throttle Valves.

l Due in parbto tihe irobl' ems'exlerienced i with the throttle valves in the containment spray; system, the licensee reviewed the application of throttle valves in the safety. injection system. There are eight throttle

valves, fou'r 'to balance flows for cold leg injection and four to balance i

i* 4 , ,

. . - - . _ , _ , ., _ _ . _ _ _ , ,, _ _ _ _ -. _ . _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _ ,,,_ ,-, ,._ _ _

. 12 flows for hot leg injection. The valve used was a packless metal diaphram type valv Licensee discussion with the valve manufacturer indicated that the type of valve in use was inappropriate because the valve diaphram may fail after several hours of a high differential flow throttled across the valve. Based on this information, the licensee replaced the valve internals with a mechanism more suitable for the intended use of the valves. Following the replacement of the internals, the licensee rebalanced the flows to both the hot and cold leg injection path Although the licensee had no operational history of problems with these valves, the-item is being considered for reportability to the NRC. This item will remain unresolved pending further NRC review of the circumstances associated with the item (344/86-19-02).

No violations or deviations were identifie . 125 VDC Battery Racks The inspectors physically inspected the structural integrity of the 125 VDC battery racks and compared the installations to the vendor technical manual drawing requirement While no deviations from the drawing requirements were noted, the inspector did observe that several pieces of the rack steel hardware appeared to be slightly cracked and there were gaps between the end battery cells and the tack shelf cnd support pieces of up to one inch. The inspectors informed licensee engineering personnel of these observations and corrective action was initiated. A visual inspection of the battery cells showed no sign of deterioration of the battery plates. Minimal debris was observed in the bottom of the cells and all electricalsconnections on the batteries appeared soun No violationsoor deviations were identifie . Task: Allegation or Concern ATS No.: RV-86-A-0035 Characterization Welders working on the replacement of feedwater heaters and piping during the 1986 refueling outage are not stamping their identification number by the weld af ter doing their work, thereby losing traceability. The alleger had no concern with the physical quality of the weld Implied Significance to Design, Construction or Operation Failure to properly document weld activities brings into question the overall quality of the wor Assessment of Safety Significance The inspector determined that the work being performed on the feedwater system was not safety related and therefore, that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, are not required to be

. . , _

.

.

applied. The licensee had been informed of the concern via internal channels. The licensee conducted a special quality control inspection of the control of welding associated with the job. The inspection identified deficiencies with rod issue slips, documentation of welder qualifications, proper prefix with welder identification numbers, and one instance where the incorrect welder identification number was stenciled on a pipe. The licensee took action to correct the deficiencies. The inspector discussed the inspection report findings with licensee management and concluded that the identified deficiencies were-minor in nature and had minimal effect on the quality of the work. With regard to stenciling of welder ID numbers, the licensee audit concluded that traceability of work had been maintained. The licensee stated that the ID numbers are not required to be stenciled on the pipe until the weld is complete, such that welders might observe weld passes added to welds without ids being added to the pipe. The licensee stated that all welder ids would be stenciled by each weld when the work was complete. Further, the licensee audited welding performed on three safety related jobs. No deficiencies were identified with the wor Conclusion and Staff Position The allegation was substantiated in that welds could be worked on without welder ids being stenciled to the work at the time the work was done, however, this practice was not in violation of the licensee procedure Action Required None 14. Followup on Previously Identified Items Violation 85-34-01 (Closed): Attachment of gas bottles to seismic category I components. The licensee has installed tags on gas bottles that prohibit attaching them to seismic category I components. In addition, the inspectors noted that licensee personnel have become more sensitive to the issue of attaching any items to seismic category I component Violation 85-16-02 (Closed): Failure to clear a danger tag on the containment spray system. At the completion of the 1986 refueling outage, the licensee implemented a new program to increase significantly the independent verification of safety-related activities, including valve lineups performed for recovery from the outage. This action should considerably reduce the potential for undetected errors in system alignment Followup Item 85-39-01 (Closed): Availability of Fire Brigade personne The licensee has provided guidance to personnel that fire brigade members shall not routinely enter containment except to respond to a fire ther . - . _ . - -_

. . . . _ __ _ . - -- __

. . . , a '14

, 1 Unresolved Items 1 -Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in

~ order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or

, deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 10 and 11.

i

-

1 Exit Interview -

i .

The inspectors met with the plant general manager at the conclusion of the inspection period. During this meeting,~the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

4

%

i

.

>

,

r

. a d ,. A P'

,

"

s

'

f

.

! ,

<

!

.

4 i

a a

p- --r-- e,~s ---,-~~w- e s -- wmmv v-v --n - e e mn,.moe,wew--mm,-----~rm--n- + wanw~.-w,vn.mn---m,----me m= y e wy -v mm e r -ew--nnw~-g-s-ve> ws, s ,w~s w m~ ww