IR 05000344/1986025

Insp Rept 50-344/86-25 on 860617-0804.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Corrective Action,Maint,Surveillance,Review of Startup Physics Testing & Insp of Piping Sys Supports

ML20206R579
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	08/20/1986
From:	Kellund G, Mendonca M, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206R576	List: IR 05000344/1986025 ML20206R570
References
50-344-86-25, NUDOCS 8609050470
Download: ML20206R579 (7)

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S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No. 50-344/86-25  ;

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Docket No. 50-344- LiceEsk'No.:NPF-1 J'

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Licensee: _P$rtland; General' Ele ~ctric Company; 121-S. W. Salmon Street

. Portland, Oregon9_7204; '  !

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Facility Name: ~Trojait ~ - *

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Inspection at: RainierfOregon *

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' Inspection conducted: :Junef 1/ - August =4, 1986

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IInspectors:  % Ye C-S. A. Richards M 6N [<f6 Date Signed

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Senior Resident Inspector

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.G. C. Kellund l . dltefy Ce Date Signed

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Resident Inspector /

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Approved By:

_M.- Mendonca, Chief // . Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1

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Summary:

Inspection on June 17.- August 4, 1986 (Report 50-344/86-25)

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Areas ' Inspected: . Routine inspection 'of operational safety verification, corrective action, maintenance,' surveillance, review of startup physics testing, and: inspection of piping system supports. . Inspection procedures (25580,c30702, 37702, 40700, 61702, 61705, 61707, 61708, 61709, 61710,.61726, 62703,'70370, 71707, 71710, 71711, 92701 and 93702 vere used_as guidance during the conduct of the inspectio Results: No violations or deviations were identifie ,n e

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8609050470 860820 PDR ADOCK 05000344 G PDR ,

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-DETAILS Persons Contacted

• W.S.'Orser, Plant General Manager R.P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance D.R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services J.K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint..and Construction

- J.D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R.E. Susee, Operations Supervisor-D.W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor P.A. Morton, Engineering Supervisor G.L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T.O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S.B. Nichols, Training Supervisor D.L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor C.H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager D.D. Wheeler, Quality Control Supervisor

.R.W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H.E. Rosenbach,' Material Control Supervisor

, The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians

.and engineers, and quality assurance personne . * Denotes those attending the exit intervie * Operational Safety Verification

'During this inspection period, the inspectors -observed and examined

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activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's' facilit ,

, The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily,cweekly, or biweekly basi ,

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On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to

. verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as

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prescribed in the facility technical specifications. . Log's ,

instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational 1 records were '

examined. to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in

. progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to '

determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shif During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items: General plart and equipment condition Maintenance requests and repair Fire hazards and fire fighting equipmen . -

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s ,I _b e t . ' d .' -Ignition' sources and flammable material. contro .

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' Conduct'of activities in'accordance with the licensee's "

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I 7 administrative controls and approved l procedure ,'

Ec' , . Interiors of electrical and control panels ~.

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, we' . ' Implementation of the licensee's physical ~ security plan.

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, Radiation protection control a

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• Plant housekeeping and cleanlines > '

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. - Radioactive waste systems.

, Proper. storage of compressed gas bottle

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Thellicensee's equipment clearance contro) was examined weekly'by'the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied.with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure that their issuance was consistent.with plant status and maintenance evolution .During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room,;and with other plant personnel. _ The discussions centered on p pertinent topics relating to' general plant conditions, procedures, security,. training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involve The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to

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confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.

l Identified nonconformances~were being tracked and followed to the

completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection period included 86-019,86-131,.and 86-135.

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Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspectors. Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that

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prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and use Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration status.

! The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety l- features. This was'done by-direct visual verification of the correct

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position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system

' integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable. ESF systems

. verified operable during this inspection period included,the resi, dual heat removal system, the containment spray system, and various mechanical penetration ~

No violations or deviations were identifie f J ~ Corrective Action L .,

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The inspectors performed a general review of the licensee's problem

identification systems to verify'that licensee identified quality related

' deficiencies are.being tracked and reported to cognizant management for s ) resolution. Types of records examined by the inspectors included "

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' Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting

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f ^Tainutes,'and' Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. Th ' inspectors concluded;that the licensee's systems were being utilized to~

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. correct identified deficiencies. -The Plant Review Board meetings were 7 i attended by'the inspectors on June 18,' July 2, and July 30. The

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inspectors verified that the appropriate committee' members were present at the meetings and that the meetings were conducted in accordance with the requirements-of section 6.5.1 of the facility technical e ,

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No violations or deviations were. identifie '

42 Maintenance-

During this' reporting period the inspectors witnessed preventative 1 maintenance performed on the 'A' service water booster. pump (SWBP). The-

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1 preventative maintenance consisted of relubrication of the motor-to pump-coupling and replacement of the pump oil. ^The inspectors. verified.the-following: 4 ' ; ;

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-I The pump was properly tagged out prior to. conducting the maintenanc The technical specification requirements associated.with

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the service water system were complied with.' ', '

'The workers performing the job possessed the~ appropriate documentation at the work sit .

- The workers cleaned the area surrounding the. pump'and removed all work

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materials at the donclu'sion of"the inspectio >. During.the performance of the' work, the inspectors discussed various aspects of the ' job withithei craft personn'e No violations or deviations ^were identifie ' Surveillance *

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The surveillance . testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the

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-inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test' instrumentation was calibrated and that

.the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if

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required by the test procedure. .Following completion of the surveillance

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tests, the; inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria. Surveillance tests witnessed ~during this period were associated with a full core flux map, startup physics testing, and-

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surveillance testing of the 12.47 KV bus undervoltage and underfrequency relays?

No violations or deviations were identifie . .Startup Physics Testing The inspectors examined the startup testing program as implemented by the following ~ procedures:

PET-13-1, Reload Cycle 9 Startup Low Power Physics Tests PET-13-2, Reload Cycle 9 No Load and at Power Tests

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g . 4 The examination consisted of a review of the above procedures for j technical adequacy and. completeness, observation of cycle 9 initial {

criticality and selected portions of the startup testing, and review of the startup test dat The scope of the licensee's testing program was reduced as compared to previous years due to the final issuance of ANSI /ANS Standard 19.6.1 -

1985. The cycle 9 program eliminated measurement of the power coefficient of reactivity and reduced the extent of control rod worth

. measurements. A number of discrepancies with nuclear design predictions were identified during the zero power testing activities. All of the discrepancies were resolved after taking additional data with the following exception: The measured worth of control bank B was significantly below the predicted value. As a result of this, the testing program was expanded to include rod worth measurements down to the all rods in minus one (ARI-1) configuration. Rod worth measurements were taken using both a reactivity computer and boron endpoint measurements. As a result of the measurements, the licensee determined that the extrapolated end of life (EOL) shutdown margin based on reactivity computer measurements was 1554 pcm which is 46 pcm below the Technical Specification limit of 1600 pcm. The extrapolated E0L shutdown margin based on boron endpoint measurements was well above the Technical Specification limi In addition, the boron samples were independently verified by a Westinghouse chemist using the licensee's laboratory and were in good agreement with the licensee's measurement Westinghouse and the licensee concluded that the boron endpoint measurements are more accurate than the reactivity computer measurements and should be the basis for determining actual rod worth. The licensee felt that a skewed flux distribution during rod worth measurements in addition to new delayed neutron fraction and decay constant values used in the reactivity computer resulted in the reactivity computer data being less reliable. The licensee stated that the discrepancy between the measured rod worths and the Westinghouse predicted rod worths is consistent with other physics test data; namely, the interior flux is greater than Westinghouse prediction and the perimeter flux is lower than Westinghouse prediction. This is consistent with the rod worth measurements which show control bank B (located near the perimeter) to be worth less than predicted and control bank A (located near the center) to be worth more than predicted.

l The inspectors discussed the validity of extrapolating beginning of life l (BOL) data to EOL conditions with the licensee and"with the Office of

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Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The licensee stated that the acceptability of the shutdown margin at EOL is unclear and that additional rod worth measurements to be conducted between the middle of life and FOL are being considere NRR has been in contact with the licensee concerning the issue. The inspectors will continue to follow l this issue as the' cycle progresse No violations or deviations were identifie . Piping Support and Restraint Systems

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The inspectors examined a sample of approximately 20 pipe supports and restraints on the residual heat removal (RHR), component cooling water, containment spray, service water and auxiliary feedwater systems. Th '

supports and restraints were examined to ensure:

- Deterioration and corrosion were not evident-

- Equipment was not deformed or loose

- The as-built configuration conformed to the. drawings

- Spring cans and snubbers were in the appropriate position

- Thermal expansion of the system was not restricted by the supports

- All nuts, bolts and locking devices were installed and were secure All supports and restraints were found to be satisfactory with the following two exceptions:

- Seismic restraint SR-47 on the 'B' RER pump suction line was missing nuts on a bolt on the riser clamp for the restraint such that the bolt was hanging loos On hanger H-223,.the service water supply for the 'B' RHR pump room cooler, one of the two rods supporting the trapeze was-disconnecte The inspectors notified appropriate licensce personnel who initiated a maintenance request to repair the components and a nonconformance report to evaluate the condition. The licensee's evaluation subsequently determined that both the seismic restraint and the hanger would still have been capable of performing their design function while in the degraded conditio No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Previously Identified Items Followup Item 85-21-01 (Closed): Reporting Defects and Equipment Failures. The licensee has revised the procedure for reporting defects under 10 CFR 21 to be less restrictive in determining that an item is reportable. In addition, the inspectors have observed a marked increase in the number of Part 21 reports submitted in the past year and an increased awareness of reportability under Part 21 by the licensee staf Part 21 Report 85-19-P (Closed): Speed changer gear drive. This item concerned the potential for the key to back out of the keyway on the coupling of the speed changer lube oil pump, thereby disabling the speed changer. The licensee identified this problem on a centrifugs1 charging pump (CCP) and determined the problem may also exist on the other CCP and on the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The licensee's corrective action consisted of staking the keys in place on these components. No subsequent problems of this nature have been experience Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-12 (Closed): Reactor trip due to loss of a main feedwater pump. The inspectors verified that all safety equipment functioned as expected following the trip and that a proper post trip review was conducted by the licensee prior to restarting the plant. The

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licensee has . taken action to upgrade personnel knowledge concerning the

' operation of the condensate demineralizer syste LER 85-13 (Closed): Snubber failures during surveillance testing. 'As discussed in paragraph 7 of Inspection-Report 344/86-19, the licensee conducted an extensive assessment of the failure of steam generator hydraulic snubbers. prior to recovering from the 1986 refueling outag The' control valves of the' snubbers.were replaced to lessen.the probability of additional future- failures. The lateral support rings of the steam generators are being electronically monitored.during heatups to provide early indication of snubber failures due to locku LER 86-01-(Closed): Reactor trip due to trip of a circulating water pump

'(CWP). The licensee review'of this trip indicated that the trip may have been avoided had personnel been more sensitive to indications of a problem with the CWP. 'The licensee has taken steps to encourage a more questioning attitude by nuclear division personnel. With regard to the auxiliary feedwater valve which failed after the trip, the licensee returned the valve and seven identical valves to the manufacturer for rework during the 1986 outag . Plant Recovery From Refueling Prior to the plant restarting, the inspectors performed a general review of restart preparations. This review included the status'of technical specification surveillances and valve lineup requirements; tours of containment and various safety related areas of the plant including the mechanical and electrical penetration areas;. control board walkdowns; position checks of selected manual valves in' safety systems; and attendance at licensee meeting which addressed restart of the plant'.

Initial criticality, physics testing, and power ascension were witnesse by the' inspectors. The plant restart proceeded uneventfully with the exception of a plant trip on June 19 due to personnel error. The licensee reported this event in LER 86-07. The inspectors will follow up this event as part of the LER review progra No violations or deviations were identifie ;

1 Exit Interview

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The' inspectors met with the plant general manager at the conclusion of the inspection period. During this' meeting, the inspectors summarized

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'the scope and findings of the inspection.

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