IR 05000344/1986044

Insp Rept 50-344/86-44 on 861026-1206.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Corrective Action,Maint,Surveillance & Followup on Previously Identified Items

ML20212E115
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	12/16/1986
From:	Kellund G, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212E087	List: IR 05000344/1986044 ML20212E083
References
50-344-86-44, IEIN-85-045, IEIN-85-45, NUDOCS 8701050249
Download: ML20212E115 (9)

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. U. ,S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

REGION V

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~ Report.No. 50-344/86-44 '

Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon: ,

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Inspection conducted: October 26 - December 6, 1986 Inspector: Ph N= - -In /2.//e/5(e; ,,

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G. C. Kellund Resident Inspector y- Date Signed Approved By:

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/ '!'* N M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed.-

Reactor Projects Section 1 - y, ,

Summary: *

Inspection ~on October 26 - December 6, 1986 (Report 50-344/86-44)

Areas Inspected: ' Routine inspection of operational safety verification, corrective-action, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously

~ identified items. Inspection procedures 25015, 30702, 30703, 40700, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 92700, 92701, 92702 and 93702 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspectio Results: No violations or deviations were identifie a 8701050249 DR 861217 g ADOCK 05000344 PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• W.S. Orser, Plant General Manager R.P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance D.R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services J.K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction J.D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R.E. Susee, Operations Supervisor D.W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor P.A. Morton, Engineering Supervisor G.L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T.O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S.B. Nichols, Training Supervisor D.L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor C.H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager D.D. Wheeler, Quality Control Supervisor R.W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H.E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor

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The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personne * Denotes those attending the exit intervie . Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspector observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facilit The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily,-weekly, or biweekly basi On a daily basis, the inspector observed control room activities to -

verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility technical specification Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and otherfoperational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shif During each week, the inspector toured the accessible areas of the

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facility to observe the following items:

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' General plant and equipment condition Maintenance requests and repair Fire hazards and fire fighting equipmen .

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. i Ignition sources and flammable material control, Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedure Interiors of electrical and control panel Implementation of the licensee's physical security pla ' Radiation protection control Plant housekeeping and cleanlines Radioactive waste system Proper storage of compressed gas bottle The licensee's equipment clearance control wds examined weekly by the inspector to determine that the licensee complied'with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance evolution During each week, the inspector conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involve The inspector examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the syste Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection period included 86-183,86-191, 86-20 Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspector. Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and use Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration statu The inspector verified the operability of selected engineered safety features. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable. ESF systems verified operable during this inspection period included the containment spray chemical addition system and the 'B' train 125 VDC distribution syste No violations or deviations were identifie . Corrective Action The inspector performed a general review of the licensee's problem identification systems to verify that licensee identified quality related deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for resolution. Types of records examined by the inspector included Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting minutes, and

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Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. A Plant Review Board meeting was attended by the inspector on November 5. The inspector concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to correct identified deficiencie ,

No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance The inspector witnessed corrective maintenance performed on multiplexer unit FY-532D for steam flow and feedwater flow mismatch. The square root extractor was recalibrated in accordance with the calibration data sheet pursuant to MR 86-574 The channel was subsequently tested and found to be within specification ~

No violations or deviations were identifie e 5. Surveillance s The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors. Observations by the inspectors-included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria. Any necessary corrective maintenance was completed during the conduct of the tests in accordance with approved maintenance request (s). Surveillance tests witnessed during this period included:

PICT-3-1, " Steam Flow - Feedwater Flow, Steam Line Pressure and Turbine First-Stage Pressure, Protection Set-1".

No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Turbine Building High Energy Line Break Analysis In response to questions regarding the turbine building high energy line break re-analysis (discussed in Inspection Report 344/86-37), the '

licensee documented responses to these questions in a letter to NRC Region V dated October 29, 1986. The inspector verified the licensee's response to the questions as follows: Safety-related equipment located in the turbine building consists of the steam driven and diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and their associated room exhaust fans, both emergency diesel generators ~, the 'A' train switchgear, the high pressure turbine impulse chamber pressure transmitters, main steam line pressure transmitters, main feedwater control and bypass valves, the remote shutdown panel and various cables for the above equipmen . Safety-related equipment located in separate rooms consists of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and its exhaust fan, the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump, both emergency diesel generators, the 'A' train switchgear, the remote shutdown panel and a portion of the cables associated with the above equipment. The

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inspector verified that these rooms have separate heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems to protect the components from low temperature . Safety-related equipment not located in separate rooms consists of the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump room exhaust fan, the high pressure turbine impulse chamber pressure transmitters, main steam line pressure transmitters, main feedwater control and bypass valves and various cables associated with the above equipment. This equipment is protected from cold by heavy duty tarps providing weather protection where building siding was removed, by local heaters if necessary and by plastic sheathing where necessary. In addition, the licensee has modified the shift routines to include regular tours in these areas if the outside ambient temperature drops to the freezing point. Local thermometers have been provided in these areas for operators to monitor temperature . The erection of scaffolding in the plant where safety-related equipment may be affected is controlled by Plant Modifications Procedure 9, " Seismic Category II/I Scaffolding". This procedure gives guidelines to ensure that scaffciding built in accordance with it is structurally adequate to withstand seismic event . The Updated Safety Analysis Report states that the turbine building will withstand the safe shutdown earthquake and that enclosures for safety-related equipment were designed and constructed as Seismic Category . The inspector reviewed a sample of records of plant operation to determine instances where safety-related equipment froze due to cold weather. Two instances of freezing were identified, both involving steam pressure transmitter sensing lines in the main steam support structure. The inspector could find no evidence of freezing of safety-related equipment within the turbine buildin . The licensee decided to open portions of two sides of the turbine building after review of a high energy line break analysis for the turbine building indicated that pressures, temperatures and humidity inside the building may exceed those assumed in the original analysis following a hypothetical main steam line break. The building siding was removed and other interim modifications were performed by the licensee to ensure that the operability of safety-related equipment would not be compromised following a high energy line brea . The Trojan plant has been in commercial operation since 1976. The licensee became aware of the design problems in the turbine building in October 198 . The licensee indicated to the inspector that removal of the turbine building siding and other modifications is sufficient to ensure operability of safety-related equipment. The licensee factored the additional ventilation paths provided by the siding removal into the

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computer model for the turbine building, however, the inspector did not review the adequacy of the mode The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's actions for long term resolution of this matter under Followup Item 86-37-0 No violations or deviations were identifie . Equipment Lubrication The inspector observed that plant equipment was being lubricated pursuant to Administrative Order A0-3-10, " Routine Lubrication". The procedure states that the Operations Section has the responsibility to check operating equipment per P0T-24-1 (Shift Operating Routines) for proper lubrication and to add ~ oil when necessary. Maintenance Procedure MP-3-4,

" Lubrication Schedule", states that plant operators will check plant equipment and. add oil when necessary in accordance with P0T-24-1. Any anomalies are to be reported immediately to the maintenance superviso Maintenance personnel inspect, analyze, and change lubricants as necessary at service intervals prescribed by the computerized lubrication schedule. The type of oil to be added is shown on a bakelite tag attached to the equipment. Oil stcrage lockers for operator usage have been conveniently located about the plant. Records of oil addition to equipment such as oilers were not being maintained for trending information, however, any oil additions to pump reservoirs or sumps are documented under a maintenance request. The licensee should consider the possible benefits of maintaining records of all oil additions to equipment for trending purpose No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Operations The plant operated routinely from the outset of the inspection period until November 5 when the 'B' train of the control room emergency ventilation system (CB-1) failed its surveillance test differential pressure criterion. The licensee conservatively assumed that this failure affected both trains of CB-1 and declared both trains inoperabl Investigation subsequently discovered an air damper that had not seated properly. The licensee closed the damper and retested the 'B' train of CB-1 which then passed the surveillance test. The licensee then tested the 'A' train of CB-1 and determined that it failed the test differential pressure criterio It was subsequently determined that a faulty instrument was responsible for the apparent failure of the 'A' trai The licensee is currently preparing a design change that will add a redundant damper to decrease the probability of this type of failure occurring in the futur On November 7, while excavating to provide recoating of underground service water lines, workers discovered a bore hole containing Primachord (fuse) and blasting cap lead wires. The hole was located outdoors near the east wall of the Fuel Building, in the vicinity of the service water strainer vault. The licensee contacted the Army Explosive Ordnance Detachment (E00) who removed a blasting cap and approximately one pound

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of blasting agent.- The material had apparently been in place since original construction of the plan On November 10, workers discovered another hole with Primachord and lead wires. The E0D determined the hole contained only the lead wires and the Primachord. The licensee subsequently conducted a preliminary evaluation of the potential for detonation of charges of this type and of the possible effects if detonation did occur. The licensee concluded that it was' extremely',

unlikely for these charges to detonate and that if they did, no significant damage to safety related components would occu The licensee retained a consultant to further evaluate this issue. The consultant found that it was highly unlikely that the material would explode, or if it were to explode, it would be highly unlikely to cause any damag On November 14, the reactor tripped from 100% power due to a turbine

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tri The turbine trip was caused by a spurious high vibration signal on the number one bearin Due to scoring on the turbine shaft, the vibration detector had worn sufficiently to ride on an oil film and

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produce a spurious high vibration indication. All plant systems responded normally with the exception of the intermediate range nuclear instruments. Channel N-35 went to mid scale and channel N-36 went lo It was subsequently determined that N-35 had a. failed detector.and N-36 was overcompensated. The licensee adjusted the compensating voltage on N-36 and replaced the detector on N-35 and tested the instruments satisfactorily. The licensee also plugged a number of leaking or degraded condenser tubes during the outage. The plant returned to power approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> after the trip and operated uneventful.ly for the remainder of the inspection perio No violations or deviations were identified.

, Followup on IE Bulletins and Notices Temporary Instruction 2500/16 (Closed): Potential Seismic Interaction Involving the Movable In-Core Flux Mapping System used in Westinghouse Design Plants. IE Notice 85-45 had been received and appropriately dispositioned by the licensee. The licensee had received the Westinghouse bulletin and had initiated a design change (RDC No. 84-118M)

to incorporate Westinghouse's recommendations in conjunction with the

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modifications being made to the seals for incore flux tubes. These modifications were completed during the May - June 1985 refueling outag Specifically, anchor. brackets were installed to preclude inadvertent movement of the movable fram In addition, bolted horizontal and vertical braces have been attached to the overhead and side walls. The modifications were examined by the inspector during the last refueling outag The design change documentation was examined during the current inspection perio No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Previously Identified Items

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Licensee Event Report (LER) 86-05 (Closed): Containment isolation valves fail local leak rate testin The chilled water return line valves were

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determined to have failed as a result of the rubber valve seats separating from the valve body. One of the valves had failed the leak-test in previous years from the same cause. The licensee replaced these valves with new valves of a proven design and investigated other containment isolation valves with a history of leakage problems. One other valve, in the gaseous radioactive waste system, had experienced leakage problems in the past and was also replaced. This LER was reviewed for event description, root cause, corrective actions taken, generic applicability and timeliness of reportin Followup Item 86-37-01 (0 pen): Turbine building high energy line break '

analysis and cold weather protection of turbine building component This item is discussed in detail in paragraph 6 of this repor Violation 85-33-04 (Closed): Absence of QC verification of maintenance work. The licensee's program for QC inspection of maintenance activities and its implementation were examined for compliance to the licensee's response dated April 1, 1986. The inspection included a review of applicable Administrative Orders, Administrative Procedures (3), Quality Control Procedures (17), Maintenance Procedures (16), and QC Inspector Qualification and Training Records (7). Discussions on program development and implementation were held with cognizant supervisors, engineers, schedulers and QC inspectors. Also examined were completed

, safety-related maintenance work requests (15) and QC Observation Reports for the past 3 months. The past 2 months MRs were specifically checked

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for evidence of maintenance requesting QC observation'of work.- Specific findings were as follows:

' A QC observation program has implemente'd consistent with'QCP-2 QC inspectors have been appropriately qualified in accordance with A0-13-2 and QCP-2 QA/QC personnel were involved in maintenance planning on a daily basis, Hold and observation points were being established both by QC and Maintenanc The electrical QC program has been implemented consistent with QCP-19 through 2 Maintenance procedures were being revised to include permanent QC hold points. This work was expected to be completed by December 198 While Periodic Instrument and Control Tests (PICTs) had not been revised to include specific hold points, they were being revised to include double verification on return to service and QC had initiated a QC observation program for PICTs. The argument was made that PICTs do not lend themseives to QC hold points as they do not require lifted leads, therefore, double verification will be used on return of equipment to service. In addition, PICTs are generally annunciated in the control room during testin . - , . _ . _ .-

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~ The maintenance requests examined provided positive evidence of QC inspection activitie No violations or'eviations d were identifie . Exit Interview The inspector met with the plant general manager at the conclusion of the inspection period. During this meeting, the inspector summarized the

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