IR 05000344/1986037
| ML20213H009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1986 |
| From: | Bosted C, Kellund G, Mendonca M, Suh G, Wagner W, Willett D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213H002 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-86-37, NUDOCS 8611190023 | |
| Download: ML20213H009 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No. 50-344/86-37
Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 f
Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204
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Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:
September 7 - October 25, 1986 MF/#9
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Inspector:
A G. Kellund Date Signed Resident Inspector
&O-k roGL n14 /e4.
G. Suh, Reactor Inspector Date Signed
% - M A-lm st/v /1? u C. Bosted, Resident Inspector V
Date Signed
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///+A:?x W. g n~er, Reas(6r Inspect r Date ' Signed f,rntu h
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w 1V Willett, Reactor Inspector Date Signed g
Approved By:
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N/W#G M. Mendonca, Chief (,/
Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
Inspection on September 7 - October 25, 1986 (Report 50-344/86-37)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of operational safety verification, corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identified items, fire protection program, inservice inspection data evaluation, allegation followup and followup of turbine building high energy i.
line break analysis.
Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 41400, 61726, 62703, 64704, 71707, 73755, 90712, 92701 and 93702 were used as guidance during the ccnduct of the inspection.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8611190023 861104 PDR ADOCK 05000344 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- W. S. Orser, Plant General Manager C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Quality Assurance
- R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
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D. R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R. E. Susee, Operations Supervisor D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor P. A. Morton, Engineering Supervisor G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S. B. Nichols, Training Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor C. H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager D. D. Wheeler, Quality Control Supervisor R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspector observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspector observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift.
During each week, the inspector toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
a.
General plant and equipment conditions.
b.
Maintenance requests and repair.
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c.
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
e.
Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
f.
Interiors of electrical and control panels.
g.
Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
h.
Radiation protection controls.
i.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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Radioactive waste systems.
k.
Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.
The iicensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspector to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service.
Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance evolutions.
During each week, the inspector conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved.
The inspector examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action.
NCRs reviewed during this inspection period included 86-192,86-196, 86-204 and 86-215.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspector.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration status.
The inspector verified the operability of selected engineered safety features.
This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable.
ESF systems verified operable during this inspection period included the component cooling water system and the ' A' train auxiliary feedwater system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Corrective Action The inspector performed a general review of the licensee's problem identification systems to verify that licensee identified quality related deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for resolution.
Types of records examined by the inspector included Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting minutes, and t
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Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to correct identified deficiencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance During the reporting period the inspector witnessed replacement of the lube oil cooler on the 'A' centrifugal charging pump.
The inspector verified the following:
- The pump was properly tagged out prior to conducting the maintenance.
- The workers performing the job maintained the work area in a clean and orderly fashion and segregated parts appropriately.
- Sufficient radiation protection coverage was provided.
- Quality control coverage was provided.
- Documentation was adequate.
In addition, the inspector discussed various aspects of the job with the craft personnel, radiation protection technicians and quality control personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspector.
Observations by the iaspector included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure.
Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspector verified that the test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria.
Surveillance tests witnessed during this period were associated with an incore flux map.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Re-analysis of High Energy Line Break in Turbine Building
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During re-evaluation of the assumptions and results for the original analysis of a feedline or steamline break inside the turbine building, the licensee identified a potential problem.
The licensee's current analysis, with more accurate assumptions, determined that the temperature l
and pressure transient which would occur during a high energy line break l
(HELB) may exceed the equipment qualification requirements for the emergency diesel generators and auxiliary feedwater pumps and controls.
At the close of the inspection period, the licensee's analysis was continuing.
The licensee made a preliminary evaluation of the operability of the subject components and determined that their operability was not compromised.
In addition, the licensee removed siding from portions of the turbine building to allow additional vent paths and assure equipment qualification.
The licensee was also making
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preparations for modifications to improve ventilation systems for areas containing the auxiliary feedwater pumps and the remote shutdown panel.
The inspector questioned what effect the removal of the turbine building siding would have on cold weather protection of various components.
At the close of the inspection period, the licensee was evaluating this situation and preparing to inplement modifications to address the situation.
The inspector will continue to follow this item during subsequent inspections (344/86-37-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup on Previously Identified Items
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Unresolved Item 86-31-01 (0 pen):
PORV stroke time for low temperature overpressure protection.
The licensee has evaluated the actual stroke time of the PORVs as compared with that assumed in the analysis and determined that the valves would not open as quickly as assumed in the analysis.
The licensee subsequently declared the overpressure mitigation system (OMS) inoperable. The system is not required to be operable when the plant is at power, but is required only when the reactor coolant system is below 290 degrees F and is not vented. The licensee's re-analysis is ongoing and the inspector will continue to follow this item.
Open Item 86-32-01 (Closed):
Environmental qualification of eleven ECCS valves.
This item had been identified as a potential violation and in an enforcement conference (Inspection Report 344/86-35) the licensee had been requested to provide their position in writing on the subject.
By letter dated September 11, 1986, the licensee presented their position on compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 of the eleven ECCS valves.
The licensee had also discussed environmental qualification (EQ) of these valves in LER
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86-03 Revision 1.
The licensee's position was discussed with the EQ personnel in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and it was concluded that the licensee's approach seemed reasonable given:
1)
The licensee classified as EQ, electrical equipment assumed to be used in che Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 15 accident
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analysis; and I
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The EQ classified equipment was evaluated for potential harsh
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environmental conditions in the accident scenario.
Region V staff concluded that the licensee appears to have considered
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appropriate electrical equipment and environmental conditions for the
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j eleven ECCS valves under accident analysis assumptions and conditions.
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Based on the above, this item is closed.
f No violations or deviations were identified.
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Fire Protection The_ inspector reviewed the overall adequacy and implementation of the licensee's Fire Protection Program. The review consisted of an evaluation of the technical adequacy of the licensee's implementing procedures, walkdowns of the fire suppression water system and several sprinkler _and Halon systems, s' tour of the plant to inspect fire protection measures, review of surveillance test records, a review of the licensee's fire brigade training program, and a review of the quality assurance program for fire protection.
The inspector verified that the licensee has developed procedures to implement the fire protection program. The implementing procedures consisted primarily of plant safety procedures but also included administrative orders, periodic operating test procedures, and emergency fire procedures. The procedural guidance provided for combustible material control, housekeeping, fire control capabilities, and reduction of fire risk from maintenance activities.
The inspector performed a walkdown of the fire suppression water system, j
the sprinkler systems in the A and B emergency diesel generator rooms and j
the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room, the Halon 1301 system i
in the computer room, and the deluge systems in the cable spreading room.
In the walkdown and tour of the plant, the inspector verified the integrity of spray headers, inspected the condition of the fire barriers, and inspected safety-related cable trays. Portable fire extinguishers were provided at designated places in each fire zone. Access to fire i
suppression devices was found to be unobstructed by any materials or equipment. Hose and nozzle integrity was verified for hose stations US-3 and HS-5 in the turbine building and HS-26 in the control building.
Visual inspection of the fire detection equipment in the turbine driven i
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auxiliary feedwater pump room and in the emergency diesel generator rooms
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identified thermal detectors instead of ionization smoke detectors as listed in Table 3.3-10 of the Technical Specifications. The licensee noted that the smoke detectors in the emergency diesel generator rooms and auxiliary feedwater pump (turbine driven and diesel driven) rooms were replaced with thermal detectors. A licensee telephone call with the NRR Licensing Project Manager on this topic, made prior to commencing replacement of the detector, concluded that a technical specification revision was not required prior to changing the detectors but that the design change should be incorporated into a future technical
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j specification revision. The inspector verified this position with the
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NRR Project Manager. The licensee has conducted a safety evaluation I
which concluded.that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety
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question, made a determination that the change involves no significant hazards considerations, and prepared License Change Request LCR 84-24 which includes the change to thermal detectors in the above mentioned i
rooms.
l The procedures for.and records for a sampling of the surveillance tests performed during the past' year were reviewed to verify that the fire i
I detection and suppression systems currently meet the Technical Specifications (T.S.). operability testing requirements and that the
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operability.for these systems has been satisfactorily demonstrated at the
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d required frequencies.following the appropriate procedures. The inspector
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reviewed the procedures and records for T.S. 4.7.8.1.1.a. 4.7.8.1.1.b,
.4.7.8.1.2.a.1, 4.7.8.1.2.a.2, and 4.7.8.1.2.b. which specify the surveillance requirements for the motor driven and diesel driven fire pumps, valve' positions in the fire main flow path, and the fire pump diesel engine. The inspector identified problema related to Data Sheet POT-10-3-DD of Periodic Operating Test POT-10-3 used in performing monthly surveillance of the valve lineup in the fire suppression water system flow path (as required by T.S. 4.7.8.1.1.b).
The data sheet lists the valve number, location, label, and correct position and provides a space for operator sign-off upon verification of correct valve position.
The data sheet does not outline and require documentation of the necessary actions required to resolve those cases in which the valve is in an incorrect or indeterminable nosition. In addition, the data sheet has several misnumbered valves, and possibly incorrect labels and locations for some valves. The operators have identified the errors on several occasions on the data sheet (at least since November, 1985). The data sheet was revised at least once without correcting all the identified errors. The low priority apparently assigned to ensuring that the surveillance data sheets are correct caused the inspector to question the level of management involvement in this area. This was discussed with plant management at the exit interview.
The inspector identified two monthly surveillances in which a valve was not verified to be in its correct position.
In the first case, the operator did not verify the correct position of the valve labeled " Loop DIV PIV No. 7 (Southeast of Security Building)" on Data Sheet POT-10-3-DD
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in the performance of the monthly surveillance (PDT-10-3) on February 9, 1986. In the subsequent monthly surveillance performed on March 9, 1986, DIV PIV No. 7 was found to be locked shut. The correct position is locked open. The operator opened and locked the valve. Event Report ER
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No.86-022 (an internal licensee document), dated March 14, 1986, I
reported the discovery of DIV PIV No. 7 in an incorrect position. The subsequent evaluation identified the failure of the. operator on February 9, 1986, to verify the correct position of DIV P1V No. 7.
The licensee's
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corrective action was to inform the operators of the need to verify that
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indicated valve positions are correct. The licensee characterized this
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failure as a violation of the technical specifications surveillance I
requirement (T.S. 4.7.8.1.1.b) in its minutes of the Plant Review Board meeting of April 16, 1986. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy l
(10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C Section V.A.), a notice of violation will not be issued.
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The evaluation of ER 86-022 also concluded that (1) an operable flow path (with DIV PIV No. 7 shut) to supply suppression systems and hose stations existed at all times based on a search of operations records, (2) the root cause of the mispositioning of DIV PIV No. 7 could not be determined
but it may have been mispositioned the last time the valve was cycled on January 17, 1986, in the performance of Periodic Operating Test POT-10-1,
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and (3) Data Sheet POT-10-3-DD needed to be clarified on the meaning of j
asterisks that appear next to some valve numbers. The evaluation did not
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mention the need for improved documentation on finding a valve that is not in its correct position.
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In[the second case, the operator did not properly document the verification of the correct position of the valve labeled "FP 214 Common isolation-for CCW and SWBP Deluge System" on Data Sheet POT-10-3-DD in the performance of the monthly surveillance (POT-10-3) on May 4, 1986.
The operator'noted'on the data sheet that the valve was mis-numbered but failed to' sign'off for the valve position. The valve was properly.
verified to be in its correct position in the previous and subsequent
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monthly surveillances; thus, this failure to properly complete the surveillance.has only minor safety significance.
In both instances, the shift supervisor and engineering supervisor
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approved the improperly completed data sheets. The failure of the
operator to prope.rly complete the surveillance test and the failure of the supervisors to note that a valve was not verified to be in the
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correct position indicate the need to improve the data sheet documentation. The use of a data sheet which has operator-identified errors, as previously discussed, may also be a contributing factor.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's fire. brigade training program. The
- j licensee maintains a fire brigade of five members (3 operators and 2 security personnel) for each shift. Fire brigade training and
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qualification is administered by the on-site corporate safety
coordinator. A review of the training records for fire brigade members indicated timely and frequent' drill participation for the security
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personnel and improved drill participation for the operators. The
l improved operator drill participation has been attributed to the l
addition of a sixth operating crew which facilitates scheduling of training and the use of a tracking system for scheduled fire drills.
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These improvements were made in response to the annual licensec fire
protection audit conducted in December, 1985, which identified weaknesses in the fire brigade training program. During the cource of the inspection, the inspector observed an announced fire brigade drill conducted in the control rod drive motor-generator set room in the control building. The fire brigade responded to the simulated fire alarm in a timely fashion and exhibited good knowledge of fire protection r
l procedures and effective use of equipment.
l The licensee's quality assurance program for fire protection was verified
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with respect to the following: management inspections of the plant for
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fire hazards, housekeeping practices, and availability of fire protection equipment; licensee fire protection audits required annually, every 2 years, and every 3 years by the Technical Specifications; review of tests and surveillances; reviews of industry fire events for generic applicability; and review of plant modifications for impact on fire
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protection requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup of Allegation or Concern a.
Allegation, ATS No. RV-86-A-0061 (1) Characterization l'
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Corporate Quality Assurance (QA) engineers are precluded from performing their duties in an acceptable manner.
(2) Implied Significance to Design, Construction or Operation Inadequate QA engineer involvement and verification.would provide unacceptablefassurance of design engineering and associated safety functions.
-(3) Assessment of Safety Significance
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The inspector reviewed selected. portions of two QA audit reports-(CAO-358-86 and CAO-235-86). The reports appeared.to be complete and timely. The. reports also appropriately identified Non-Conforming Activity Reports (NCAR) to identify problem areas. The inspector verified that selected NCARs were dispositioned in a timely manner and followed up by QA engineers.
The inspector then reviewed selected portions of the audit plan.
and checklists for these audit reports. This review showed that the plan and checklist were consistent with the QA program and that the audit reports reflected the results of the checklist's verification.
-The inspector then discussed selected aspects of the audits with responsible QA engineers. The' audits conducted included pre-and post-audit meetings as required, as well as regular dialogue with the audited organization. The QA engineers indicated that they felt they received management support, as evidenced by organization followup on NCARs and the application of resources to the QA program. The QA engineers felt that they were performing their duties in an acceptable manner.
(4) Conclusion and Staff Position
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Based on the review of records and interviews with QA engineers, QA engineers have conducted the two reviewed audits and associated corrective actions in accordance with the QA i
program. Based on this, the allegation is not substantiated.-
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(5) Action Required None
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Allegation, ATS No. RV-86-A-0062 (1) Characterization QC inspections for plant modification during the 1986 outage were not done in accordance with ANSI N-18.7, i.e.,
"similar...to that associated with construction phase activities..."
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(2) Implied Significance to Design, Construction or Operation
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Inadequate QC inspection would provide unacceptable assurance
'of plant modifications and associated safety functions.
(3)_ Assessment of Safety Significance The inspector reviewed selected Maintenance Requests (MR) and Request for Design Change (RDC) applicable to the outage. The
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inspector verified-that inspection points were specified and.
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signed off as complete.
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The inspector then reviewed Nuclear Division Procedure 200-1 which required that a design input record be established which included applicable codes, standards and requirements. The codes, standards and requirements are established from Updated
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Final Safety Analysis Report, Engineering Drawings, and Installation Standards. These codes, standards and requirements are required to be the same as established for construction or if a later version is to be used it must be more conservative than the original. Based on this specification a Detailed Construction Package is required by i
Nuclear Plant Engineering Procedure 200-14 and Plant Modifications Procedure 1.
These procedures include requirements for QC inspection and holdpoints that are consistent with the codes, standards and requirements.
(4) Conclusions and Staff Position QC inspection points were established similarly with those required for original construction. Inspection points were acceptably verified. The allegation is not substantiated based
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on the inspected items and procedures.
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(5) Action Required None No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Inservice Inspection (ISI) Data Review and Evaluation The licensee submitted their 1986 Inservice Inspection Report to NRC
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i Region V on October 3, 1986. The ISI report covers the scope of l.
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examination required during the current inspection period, the third f
40-month period of the first 10-year inspection interval.
Examination l
data was previously reviewed by the inspector and documented in NRC Report No..50-344/86-16. The information provided in the ISl report meets the reporting requirements of ASME Section XI Article IWA-6000.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Non-Licensed Staff Training
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The inspector observed general employee training for new employees
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onsite. The training was.in accordance witn the licensee program and procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the Plant General Manager and the Operations and Maintenance Manager at the conclusion of the inspection period.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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