IR 05000344/1986038

Safety Insp Rept 50-344/86-38 on 860929-1003.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Environ Qualification for Limitorque motor-operated Valves.Unresolved Item Re Eight Valves W/Unqualified Wire Discussed

ML20197C924
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	10/23/1986
From:	Richards S, Willett D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197C923	List: IR 05000344/1986038 ML20197C919
References
50-344-86-38, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, TAC-42502, NUDOCS 8611070131
Download: ML20197C924 (4)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-344/86-38 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection Conducted: September 29 to October 3, 1986-Inspector: m/j/ M

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/c/gr5/Bg lllett, actorIngector Dat4 Sifned Approved by: d$d dff M /oM3/gg S. K a~rds, Chief, gfneering[ection Dafe Sfgned Summary:

Inspection During the Period of September 29 to October 3, 1986 (Report N /86-38)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of environmental qualification for Limitorque motor operated valves.

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Results: One unresclved item was identified.

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DETAILS Personnel contacted

• C. P. Yundt, General Manager S. Orser, Plant Manager

• # G. Zimmerman, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulation Division

• J. Lentsch, Mar.ager

• # A. N. Roller, Manager Electrical Engineering

• R. Steele, Manager Nuclear Plant Engineering

1. R. P. Schmitt, Manager Operations and Maintenance

1. C. A. Olmstead, Manager Quality Assurance

1. J. Aldersebaes, Manager Plant Modifications

1. D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor

1. S. Bauer, Regulatory Engineer

1. J. Reid, Manager Plant Services

1. P. Morton, Branch Manager Engineering

1. D. R. Keuter, Manager Technical Services

1. C. H. Brown, Quality Assurance Branch Manager

• # Swanson, Engineer Nuclear Safety Branch

• B. Ducamp, Electrical Engineer

• J. Duke, Engineer, NSRD

• # L. Day 1.s, Supervising Electrical Engineer

• D. Glivinski, Quality Assurance Engineer

• M. Shubin, Electrical Engineer

• B. Dilodave, Bechtel

• J. Whitney, Bechtel

• Denotes those present during entrance interview at PGE corporate on September 30, 198 # Denotes those present during exit interview at Trojan Plant on October 3, 198 The inspector also talked with other licensee personnel during the inspection. These included plant staff engineers, technicians, administrative assistants, and document control personne . Follow-up of Limitorque valve operators internal wire inspection In response to NRC I&E Information Notice 86-03, " Potential Deficiencies in Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operators" (January 14, 1986),

PGE contacted Limitorque to determine the manufacturer and type of internal wire for those valves that were supplied to PGE. Limitorque responded (February 27, 1986) that most in-containment qualified motor operators manufactured.before 1978 did not have records positively identifying the type of wire use PGE conducted an inspection during the 1986 refueling outage of Limitorque valves required to be environmentally qualified inside of the containment. The licensee found that eight valves contained wire that had not been qualified. The wire was replaced at the time of this

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. 2 inspectio In addition, during the inspection, nine other valves were discovered to still have their heaters connected and energized. A total of 16 valves either had wire that had not been qualified or heaters that were connected. The space heaters were rated at 25 watts and were for the purpose of moisture control during storag The licensee had previously assumed that the internal Limitorque wire ha been qualified with the operator. The licensee's representative indicated that since the valve had been cycled during the qualification test (# 600198) that Franklin Institute performed for Limitorque, the control power and wiring had been tested and qualifie With regard to the heaters, in October 1983 the licensee became aware that the space heaters for Limitorque motor operators had not been

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qualified as part of the environmental qualification test. Licensee

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telecons with the Cleveland Electric Company and Philadelphia Electric Company identified that some plants had experienced deterioration (brittle, cracked and prematurely aged)_of internal wiring which was attributed to heat generated by having the heaters on continuousl One facility experienced a separation of the oil in the crankcase grease j after a period of heater use. The oil then seeped out of the crankcase because the seals were rated for grease only and not oil. The report noted that the voltage applied was half of the heater's rated voltag I Based on this information, Cleveland Electric and Philadelphia Electric followed Limitorque's recommendation and disconnected all heaters in use at their nuclear power plant In correspondence with Limitorque, the vendor would not guarantee the integrity of the heaters in the harsh environment the valve would experience during and after a high-energy line break accident. The ,

vendor postulated that a failure of the heaters under these conditions l could result in a loss of control power to the valves because the heaters are connected to the motor operator control powe The licensee implemented RDC (Request for Design Change)83-039 to remove vendor-supplied space heaters and for those valves where space heaters were desired, to connect the heaters to a separate non-class IE power source. . Of the approximately sixty Limitorque valves required to be environmentally qualified inside of containment, 45 were included in this RDC. A review of the May 1983 10 CFR 50.49 environmental qualified i equipment list confirmed that the nine valves with the heaters still connected in 1986 were on the list. The licensee had not been able to determine the reason why these valves in the component cooling water system supplying the containment air coolers were omitted from the RD Only the "A" train valves had the heaters connected. The licensee stated that having the heaters connected would not necessarily invalidate the qualification of the valves. They further noted that no visible signs of wire deterioration were observed during the inspection. The licensee is continuing to review this concern. This is an unresolved item (86-38-01).

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The inspector question the licensee concerning their efforts to determine the effects of the heaters and internal wiring that apparently had not been qualified in regard to valve operability and reportabilit For the heaters, the licensee plant review board concluded (June 25, 1986) ..."since only one train was affected. The event is not a Technical Specification violation and should not be reported."

The inspector questioned the reportability of the condition of the internal wirin Staff personnel responsible for generating reportable events were not aware of the internal wiring that had been replace Neither were the cognizant EQ engineer and his supervisor aware of this wire. The licensee is now evaluating the significance and reportability aspects of the wire. Licensee action to replace the wire is further discusse(. in inspection report 50-344/86-32. Concerns with regard to the wire will be tracked as an open item through report 86-3 . Follow-up of Environmental Qualification for Limitorque motor operators in the RHR system The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation and conclusions in regard to those Limitorque valves used in the RHR system to reposition between i hot leg and cold leg injection. The licensee concluded that these valves need not be environmentally qualified for the system to preform its function reliably. Currently the licensee has generated operating procedures that have the RHR hot leg injection path disabled but use the Safety Injection pumps in a simultaneous hot and cold leg recirculation (hot leg via SI pumps and cold leg via RHR pumps). The licensee intends to environmentally qualify these eleven valves to enhance operational flexibility. The licensee's detailed position regarding this issue has been forwarded to NRC Region V in response to a previous NRC reques . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

on October 3, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection, which were discussed during the exit interview, are set forth in paragraphs 2 through 3 of this report.