IR 05000344/1986024

Insp Rept 50-344/86-24 on 860513-0612.Violation Noted:Qc Inspector Signed Signature Block Certifying Witnessing Bolt Torquing When Inspector Had Not

ML20202G869
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	06/30/1986
From:	Andrea Johnson, Kellund G, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202G867	List: IR 05000344/1986024 ML20202G862
References
50-344-86-24, NUDOCS 8607160133
Download: ML20202G869 (4)

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f U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l REGION V

] Report No. 50-344/86-24 Docket No. 50-344

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License No. NPF-1

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Licensee: Portland General Electric Company

. 121 S. W. Salmon Street 1 Portland, Oregon 97204

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Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon j Inspection conducted: May 13 - June 12, 1986 a

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Inspectors: ,

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A. D. Johnson Date Mgned  ;

Enforcement f-icer [

i  % .% . . c/N r ~ - 6 fJUk(/

G. C. Kellund Date Signed i

Resident Inspector i

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Approved By:

M. Mendonca, Chief 8M# N

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Reactor Projects Section 1 '

Summary:

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j Inspection on May 13 - June 12, 1986 (Report 50-344/86-24)

Areas Inspected: Special inspection of quality control activitie P_esults : One violation was identified.- l

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• W.S. Orser, Plant' General Manager

• C.A. Olmstead, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manager

• D.D. Wheeler, Quality Control Supervisor C.H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager D'.W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included maintenance personnel, quality assurance personnel, and quality control personne * Denotes those attending the exit intervie . Quality Control Inspection of Valve Replacement On May 13, 1986, during a tour of the containment building, the inspector observed the replacement of pressurizer safety valve PSV-8010A. The inspector arrived at the workplace with the work in progress and the valve already fitted up to the pressurizer flange. A contract quality control (QC) inspector was present at !.he workplace. The NRC inspector questioned the QC inspector about documentation for the work. The QC inspector produced one page. from Maintenance Procedure MP.-5-1,

" Pressurizer Safety Valve Inservice Test," that described the torquing process for the bolts on the discharge flange of the valve. The NRC inspector then asked the QC inspector if he had to witness the torquing of the bolts. The QC inspector stated that he only had to perform a cleanliness and closecut inspection and was not required to witness the torquing of the bolts. The NRC inspector then observed the valve crew slugging the nuts on the inlet flange of the valve to obtain the proper torque on the bolts and noted that the QC inspector was not witnessing this process. The NRC inspector then left the workplac The NRC inspector subsequently reviewed MP-5-1 and noted that on the page of the procedure following the page that the QC inspector had available at the workplace were four inspection hold points relating to torquing the inlet flange of the valve. The NRC inspector then discussed these inspection points with the QC inspecto He stated that he had performed the first two inspections, and that the second two inspections (which require all stretch and reference marks on the nuts and flange to be in place prior to slugging and to be in alignment af ter the nuts are slugged) were to ensure that the valve is properly mated up with its i flange He stated that because he had seen the valve set into place he !

had essentially completed the second two inspection points although he I had not specifically witnessed the bolt torquing or that the stretch and reference marks were aligned. The NRC inspector discussed these two inspection points with licensee mechanical maintenance personnel who I stated that the purpose of the inspection points was to verify that the l bolts were properly torqued and not to ensure that the valve was properly fitted u m

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The NRC inspector obtained a copy of the maintenance request (MR) that documented the. work performed (MR 86-2120). Step 7 of the work instructions contained a QC inspection point with the statement "QC to witness bolt torquing per QCP 3 and MP 5-1" and a signature block beneath. Quality Control Procedure (QCP) 3, " Verification / Witnessing Inspections" defines witnessing as, "An independent confirmation, by means of actual physical observation, that a condition or process complies with specified requirements." The QC inspector had signed the signature block certifying that he had witnessed the bolt torquing when in fact he had not. The inspector concluded that failure to perform the inspections required by MP-5-1 and MR 86-2120 is an apparent violation of.10CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (344/86-24-01).

One violation and no deviations were identifie . Licensee Corrective Action Licensee QC supervision became . aware of. the situation from another QC inspector who had overheard the discussion between the NRC inspector and the subject QC-inspector. The plant QC supervisor subsequently initiated Nonconforming Activity Report (NCAR) P86-043 and discussed the issue with the NRC inspector. The NCAR recommended that the valve be' disassembled and reinstalled utilizing correct QC inspections, that all inspections

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performed by the subject QC inspector be reviewed and that appropriate disciplinary action be take In addition, the inspector was prohibited from performing any further QC inspection The licensee initiated an investigation of the incident and implemented the recommendations of the NCAR as follows:

- A maintenance request to reinspect cleanliness and bolt torques on the pressurizer safety valve was initiated on May 1 The inspections were completed on May 3 The licensee determined that the QC inspector had been involved in approximately 32 maintenance activities. Each of these inspections was discussed with him by a lead QC inspector. Additionally, each inspection he performed was either reinspected or was discussed with maintenance or engineering personnel who were present during the inspection. No further evidence was found to question the adequacy of the other inspections with which the inspector was involve Through interviews with the QC inspector, 'the licensee verified that the torque inspections required by MP-5-1 and MR 86-2120 were not properly witnessed in accordance with QCP- The inspector was terminated on May 1 The licensee's investigation concluded that the incident was an isolated case resulting from carelessness by the QC inspecto No violations or deviations were identified involving the licensee's corrective actio ,

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! QC Organization Performance i

The inspectors discussed the performance of the QC organization during

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the 1986 refueling outage with'6 maintenance mechanics and 5 QC

' inspectors. ~The inspectors also questioned QC supervision regarding the qualification and training of QC inspectors who were hired or contracted j for the outage only. The following observations were made:

- Maintenance personnel stated that QC inspectors were diligent in the i

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performance of inspections during the outag QC inspectors understood their responsibility to perform inspections in accordance with procedural requirement All contract inspectors were certified to be qualified _ inspectors by the company through which the inspectors were obtaine While no structured site indoctrination was provided to the contract inspectors, they were reportedly given approximately one week to study plant specific procedures. They also reportedly accompanied inspectors with more experience at Trojan on inspections prior to performing inspections independentl Based on the above, the inspectors concluded that there was no indication of a widespread failure of the QC organization to perform appropriate inspections of maintenance and modification activities. The NRC resident inspectors had observed the conduct of several other QC inspections during the course of the outage. None of these inspections were performed in an unappropriate manner. The qualification and training of the inspectors appeared adequate to ensure inspections were conducted as required by plant procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspectors met with those denoted ~in paragraph I at the conclusion of

.the inspection. During this meeting the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspectors also observed that ideally, maintenance and modification personnel share the responsibility with the QC organization for ensuring required inspections are accurately performed. Licensee management representatives acknowledged that action on the part of the maintenance personnel involved with the replacement of the pressurizer safety valve could have easily ensured that the required inspections were performed as stated in the procedure.