IR 05000344/1986022

Insp Rept 50-344/86-22 on 860609-13 & 0623-27.No Noncompliance or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Nonroutine Reporting Program,Ie Bulletins 85-001,85-002 & 82-02,generic Ltr Followup & Nonlicensed Staff Training

ML20207J265
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	07/09/1986
From:	Mendonca M, Pereira D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J262	List: IR 05000344/1986022 ML20207J257
References
50-344-86-22, IEB-82-02, IEB-82-2, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-002, IEB-85-1, IEB-85-2, NUDOCS 8607280199
Download: ML20207J265 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

. Report-No. 50-344/86-22 '

Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street

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Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection Condu e: Ju e 9-13 and June 23-27, 1986 Inspector: de/ #f/At [/ [4 D. B. Pereira, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved by: *%- **^ MMM M. M. Mendonca, Reactor Project Section 1 Date Signed Summary:

Inspection During the Period of June 9-13 and June 23-27, 1986 (Report N /86-22)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the Non-Routine Reporting Program, IE Bulletin, Generic Letter followup, onsite followup of written reports on Non-Routine Events, and Non-Licensed Staff Training. The

inspection modules followed were

90714, 92703, 92700, 4140 Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

! Persons Contacted e

i W. S. Orser, General Manager

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• C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Quality Assurance Departmen *J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services D. W. Swan, Supervisor,- Maintenance

• M. R. Snook, Specialist, Quality Assurance Department

. C. H. Brown, Manager, Quality Assurance Operations Departmen *S . Bauer, Engineer,. Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department R. Reinart, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Control l *D. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services i- *S. Richards, Senior Resident Inspector, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory

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Commission .

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j; *G. C. Kellund, Resident Inspector, U. S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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• H. Mooney,. Senior Resident . Inspector, Oregon Department of Energy A. S. Cohlmeyer; Engineering Supervisor

• Denotes attendance at exit interviews were conducted at Trojan Nuclear j

Plant on June 13,and June 27, 198 i Follow-up'on Previous' Inspection Findings

, (Closed) Follow-up Item IE Bulletin No. 85-01 - Steam Binding of c Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps - Temporary Instruction (TI)-15-69 IE Bulletin 85-01, issued on October 29, 1985, informed licensees of a potential safety problem involving the inoperability of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps due to steam binding. The bulletin indicated

that more than 22 AFW steam binding events have occurred since 1981 and identified action to be taken by operating PWR licensee The licensee's letter of February 28, 1986, provided complete-answers to IE Bulletin 85-01 requests. The licensee's response was timely and addressed the procedures as requested in the bulleti Their response was technically acceptable.

I The Trojan Plant AFW design includes one common and two individual discharge check valves per safety-related AFW pump. Under normal F conditions, a differential pressure of approximately 1,000 psid is present to close the check valves when the pumps are stoppe In j addition, the 6-inch discharge check valves for each safety-related j pump are vertically mounted to provide additional assurance of positive seating'during conditions of low differential pressure.

The following actions have been accomplished by the licensee in response to IE Bulletin 85-01:

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, (1) On June 29, 1985, the operating procedure for the AFW System, OI-8-2, was revised to require that the safety-related AFW pump discharge piping be checked for elevated temperatures approximately 5 minutes after each time a pump is stopped. The inspector verified that 0I-8-2, Revision 19, requires checking the AJW pump discharge piping for elevated temperatures.

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(2) Operations personnel were trained on possible causes and symptoms of back leakage through the AFW pumps. The inspector verified that a retraining course was given in October and November 1985 on OI-8-2, Revision 1 (3) A routine operating test procedure (POT 24-1) was revised in December 1985 to provide for monitoring AFW pump discharge piping temperatures at least once per shift. The inspector verified that POT 24-1 is implemented and provides the required monitorin (4) The 18-month test procedure for the AFW System (POT 5-3) has been revised to require performance of a full-system pressure leak test for the second-off AFW pump discharge check valve POT 5-3, Revision 10, provides the full-system pressure leak tes (5) Contact surface thermometers are installed on the AFW pump discharge piping. The thermometers provide a means of identifying and recording the piping temperature on a once per-shift basis. The inspector verified that the thermometers are installe Since the items above are considered complete, IE Bulletin 85-01 and TI-15-69 are considered close (Closed) Follow-up Item IE Bulletin No. 85-02 - Undervoltage Trip Attachments (UVTA) of Westinghouse DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers (RTB) - Temporary Instruction (TI)-15-72 IE Bulletin 85-02, issued on November 5,1985, informed licensees of (1) continuing problems with RTB reliability; (2) required certain actions by plants which have not installed the automatic shunt trip; and (3) clarified operability requirements related to reactor trip breakers. The bulletin was issued in response of the failure of one of the RTBs to automatically open during a reactor trip at the Cook plant. As stated, failure of the breaker was attributed to a faulty UVTA which did not provide enough lifting force to the l

breaker trip bar. An automatic shunt trip was not installed at Cook

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Unit 2 at the time, and as a result, the RTB failed to open.

! The inspection activities specified in IE Bulletin 85-02 are not j applicable for Trojan since automatic shunt trip devices are installed. Nevertheless, Trojan inspected the RTBs for possible discrepancies such as weld beads, notches, or grooves which might impede movement of the trip lever spring. No weld beads were

discovered.

In addition, force margin testing of the UVTAs is performed annually

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l at Trojan per Westinghouse recommendations. No problems have been observed to date, with either force margin testing or dropout voltage per MP 1- IE Bulletin 85-02 and TI-15-72 are considered closed.

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C. (Closed) Follow-up Item 84-30-01 - Fire Brigade Training Records The follow-up item reviewed the fire brigade training records and found that the records were incomplete, in that no record of annual physical examinations for the security personnel on the fire brigade had been entered. The inspector reviewed the Safety Supervisor's training records and the inspection revealed that the medical examinations were in the security and operations personnel record Furthermore, the records were reviewed and seemed to be complet Follow-up item 84-30-01 is considered close D. (Closed) Follow-up Item 84-30-02 - Fire Brigade Training Drills This follow-up item reviewed the fire brigade training drills and discovered that several members had not performed the two annual drills as specified in Administrative Order (AO)-9-5, Fire Brigade Trainin The inspector reviewed 6 security and 7 operations personnel records and the inspection indicated a performance of at least two drills annually or mor Item 84-30-02 is considered close E. (Closed) Follow-up Item 84-30-03 - Fire Brigade Drill Critiques This follow-up item indicated that the fire brigade drill critique form used by the licensee is very general, and by reviewing the critique form it is unclear if the drill assessments required by A0-9-5 were being performe In addition, it also appeared that the drills were being monitored, performed, and assessed by the Safety Supervisor with no other input from licensee management or fire protection engineer The inspector reviewed several drill critique forms from 1985 and 1986 drills and they indicated that the monitoring, performance, and assessment were being performed by more than the Safety Superviso However, A0-9-5 requires that evaluations of fire drills shall be made by the Trojan Safety Coordinator. The fire brigade drills appeared to be monitored effectively and are being evaluated in accordance with A0-9-5.

l Item 84-30-03 is considered close F. (Closed) Unresolved Item 84-11-02 - Two-Year Calibration Check Due on Fire Protection Equipment This unresolved item concerned the two-year calibration check for sprinkler system "J" and the deluge system "17" activation, namely equipment numbers pressure switches PS 5989 A and B and PS 5974 had not yet been completed. The monthly Test and Instrument Calibration Schedule did not show these calibrations to be outstanding,

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indicating an anomaly in the computer printout system. The licensee

_at that time was conducting required _ technical specification

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sdrveillances.manuallygrather'than relying on the computerized program, which was being< update The inspectorJreviewed the present technical specification computer schedule and the pressure switches are on the schedule and are being

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Item.84-11-02 is considered close j ,

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, (Closed) Unresolved Item'84-30-04 "QA Audit Report 84-05

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This unresolved itein concerned'the apparent lack of communications and cooperation!between the site'and corporate Quality Assurance (QA)' organizations which appeared to have resulted in the refusal of ,

the corporate QA manager to perform a critical assessment of QA program deficiencies as identified on QA Audit 84-0 The inspector reviewed the QA organizations' presently in place and the apparent lack of. communications and cooperation between the site and corporate IQA organizations appeared to have been resolved. A new QA manager was appointed in July 1985 and a reorganization of corporate and site QA personnel placed them under the QA manage The site QA staff have been augmented by approximately 6-7 inspectors from the corporate QA personne .The unresolved item 84-30-04 is considered close (Closed) Temporary Instruction TI-15-71 - IE Bulletin 82-02 Threaded Fasteners in Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) of Pressurized-Water Reactors (PWRs)

This temporary instruction was issued to ensure that the requirements of IE Bulletin 82-02'are met with regard to the development and implementation of maintenance procedures for threaded fastener practices and in the establishment of quality I

assurance measures for use of lubricants and sealants for l connections with threaded fasteners.

l The licensee provided information regarding Action Item 1, and j completed Action Items 3 and 5, in a letter dated August 10, 1982,

to the Commission. Additional information was provided in a letter l dated September 8, 1983, regarding completed Action Item 2 and'

l completed Action Item 4. In the September 8, 1983, letter, the licensee considered the submittal to complete all required licensee actions pertaining to IE Bulletin 82-0 The TI-15-71 required only selected sites to conduct a three part l inspection program, and Trojan Nuclear Plant was excluded from this I inspection program. No further action is deemed necessary.

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TI-15-71 is conside.-d closed.

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s - 4 (Closed) Follow-up Item 85-33-01 - Inconsistency in Procedure ECA 0.0. " Loss of All'AC Power" '

'During a December 1985 inspection, the NRC identified alternate

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cooling to the diesel auxiliary feedwater pump (AFP) as a concern, which was due to,the necessity of unbolting three flanges and an inspection cover. .The NRC felt the time ~ required to hook up the alternate cooling wo'ld u be excessiv The licensee examined'this concern in a memorandum from R. E. Susee

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to G. A. Zimmerman, dated February 28, 1986,:and stated that the NRC s inspection item incorrectly stated that the long time required to establish cooling water to the diesel AFP may be a procedure deficiency since cooling may not be established until after " power to the lube oil' pump for the turbine AFP becomes unavailable."

Since the turbine AFP lube oil pump is shaft driven, it has no external power-requirements and should operate indefinitely during a loss of AC power. The alignment of emergency cooling to the diesel AFP is merely a. contingency action which is not specifically required by any regulation or procedure. The licensee further recognizes that the current method of aligning emergency cooling to the diesel AFP is complicated and time consuming, but they do not feel-that this extra time 'equired r to connect emergency cooling warrants,a design change. No further action is planned by the license Item 85-33-01 is considered close (Closed) Follow-up Item 85-33-05 - Inconsistencies in the Application of Temporary Modification Procedures This follow-up item identified that temporary modifications controlled per A0-6-2 shall be tagged with a blue temporary modification _ tag, and specifically four field examined temporary modifications did not have a blue temporary modification tag attached as require This inspector researched the four temporary modifications mentioned and found that three were closed and one remaining open, namely TM-85-83-installed fire protection system to lunch room in turbine building. This temporary modification had the blue temporary modification tag installe Item 85-33-05 is considered close (Closed) Enforcement Item 85-33-06 - Violation of NRC Requirements in the Proper Identification Tagging of Components This enforcement item identified that instrument identification numbers, as shown on metal tags attached to the instruments, for flow indicating switches FIS-3004-A1, FIS-3004-A2, FIS-3004-B1, FIS-3004-B2, FIS-3004-C1, FIS-3004-C2, FIS-3004-D1, and FIS-3004-D2

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T are not in accordance with the tag numbers shown on piping and instrumentation drawing (P&ID) M-213, Sheet 2, Revision 6, which depicts the required installation locations of these device The licensee's response was~via letter dated April 1, 1986, in which

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they stated the reason for this violation is the result of personnel error. Upon the receipt'of the flow indicating switches,'the tag numbers were not verified on each of the switches, work instructions E were not written to require the worker to verify which switch was to be installed in which location, and, when the work was performed, the worker did not verify the installation of each switch in its proper location. 'The immediate corrective action performed was to-remove the tags from the flow indicating switches and replace them

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with accurate tags, consistent with P&ID M-213, Sheet 2, Revision *

In addition,'the appropriate supervisors held discussions and

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meetings with the individuals. preparing work packages and the workers installingLequipment and/or-instrumentation and emphasized the need-to verify equipment,is installed in its proper locatio This' irisp~

e ctor. verified that' the flow ' indicating switches were installed in the correct location per P&ID M-213, Sheet 2,

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Enforcement Item 85-33-06 is' considered close L. < "(Closed) Follow-up' Item 85-22-02 - SRO Review of Maintenance j

' Requests for Adequate Post-Maintenance Testing-Procedure Change A0-3-9 i .

This follow-up item identified a licensee's commitment to revise Administrative Order (AO)-3-9 titled " Maintenance Requests" to provide for a senior reactor operator (SRO) to review Maintenance i Requests;(MRs) and discuss the work performed with the maintenance j personnel to ensure that required testing is adequately specified on

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the MR. "The change was in process and was to be inspected after the l change was issued.

i The inspector verified that A0-3-9 has the paragraph IV.A.3

!_ detailing the SRO to review the MRs and to ensure that all l safety-related equipment is restored to operational status, l

Follow-up item 85-22-02 is closed.

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! (Closed) Follow-up Item 85-22-01 - Review of Post-Maintenance

Testing Procedures for RTBs and SSPS Due by December 31, 1985 i

This follow-up item identified a licensee's commitment to review and

! verify that testing procedures adequately test the capability of all safety-related components in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and reactor trip breakers (RTBs).

The licensee in a memorandum from R. L. Steele to W. S. Orser, dated December 27, 1985, reported the results of a review of existing reactor trip system test procedures which verify that the procedures

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adequately ensure. system operability and meet the Technical Specification requirements of 3/4.3.1.- The results indicated that-all components of the reactor trip system are verified operable by the_ procedures. Their review concluded that post-maintenance operability testing of< safety-related components in the reactor trip system is conducted and that the testing demonstrates that the equipment is capable of performing its safety function Follow-up item 85-22-01 is close (Closed) Part 21 Report 86-13-P This Part 21 Report identified 150 lb and 300 lb Anchor Darling swing check valves which have lock weld missing on several valve Most 150 lb and 300 lb pressure class Anchor Darling swing check valves utilize a set screw in the hinge support for the purpose of keeping the hinge pin from rotating. On some designs, this set screw also prevents the hinge pin from sliding out of the hinge-support. The set screw is' required to be locked welded to prevent it from backing out in service. The absence of this lock weld is a safety concern since the set screw could conceivably back out in service allowing the hinge pin to slide out of the hinge support, thus causing a loss of valve operabilit The licensee conducted an evaluation per Operational Assessment Review (OAR)85-101, which indicated that the subject valves are not installed or in stock at Trojan. The licensee's investigation indicated that generic implications for potential check valve failures are considered adequately controlled by existing installation testing practices, maintenance procedures, ISI and IST programs. In addition, check valve internals inspections on material receiving instructions is not warranted as new check valve purchases are minima The Part 21 Report 86-13-P was evaluated as required by Part 21 and the licensee's reporting procedures. Their evaluation of the event included assessment of generic implications and notification within the evaluating organization in accordance with approved procedures.

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The data used in the evaluation appeared to be factual and complet The licensee's corrective action stated in their OAR was appropriate j to correct the defect.

[ Part 21 Report 86-13-P is closed. . (Closed) Part 21 Report 85-18-P - Maintenance Program for Anker-Holth Equipment Snubbers This Part 21 Report identifies a potential defect with respect to

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the Spherical Bearing Housing Design on Anker-Holth/McDowell-Wellman

' snubbers now owned by Paul-Munroe. The Paul-Munroe investigation

revealed that the Blind End Cover and/or Piston Rod Eye experience

stresses above the yield point of their respective materials. This yielding is experienced below specified rated load conditions of the snubber. This condition causes plastic deformation through l

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localized yielding of the Blind End Cover and/or Piston Rod Eye material in the immediate area of the spherical bearings located in their members. The plastic deformation could cause failure of the spherical bearing and/or the surrounding housing material itself at or below the rated load leve The licensee conducted on evaluation per OAR 84-128, and the evaluation requested Bechtel to visit Paul-Munroe's headquarters and examine the McDowell-Wellman and Paul-Munroe calculations to attempt to find a basis for continued Trojan operation until the next outage with a duration long enough to permit inspection and, if necessary, repair.the snubber Bechtel's conclusion was that the design for the Trojan snubbers was adequate. Although the margin of safety between the calculated stress at rated load and the yield stress was significantly reduced, Bechtel ascertained that the Trojan snubbers would not have undergone localized yielding and should satisfactorily perform their design function. This conclusion was attained after a check of the mill test reports for the. material used in the Trojan snubber Part 21 Report 85-18-P is close . Non-licensed Staff Training The inspector observed General Employee Training in the areas of plant safety, fire protection, quality assurance, security and radiation protection. The inspector observed that a general plant orientation was performed which included instructions on prenatal radiation exposure and emergency response. The training in the specific areas mentioned above provided an acceptable level of detailed information. By direct questioning of one new, one experience and one temporary non-licensed employee the inspector verified the employee's understanding of the specific areas covere The licensee's status on accreditation by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations was reviewed by the inspector. The licensee's operator training program was accredited in December 1985 and a self-evaluation report is scheduled for August 1986. The licensee's schedule would have training accreditation complete in the areas of chemistry, radiation protection, technical staff and shift technical advisors by August of 1986. The maintenance areas, mechanical, electrical and instrumentation and control, are in progress and will be completed af ter August 198 . Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on June 13 and June 27, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie _ _ - . - . . - . . ,