IR 05000344/1986010
| ML20198H775 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1986 |
| From: | Kellund G, Mendonca M, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198H748 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 50-344-86-10, NUDOCS 8605300550 | |
| Preceding documents: |
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| Download: ML20198H775 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ~V Report No. 50-344/86-10 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Troj an Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted: March 18 - April 28, 1986 Inspectors:
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O S. A. Richards Date Signed Senior Resident Inspector K
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4, f//tt /86 G. C. Kellund Date Signed Resident Inspector
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Approved By:
M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
Inspection on March 18 - April 28, 1986 (Report 50-3'44/86-10)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification, corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activities, review of licensee response to system biological fouling, review of control of heavy loads, and review of preventative maintenance practices with the service water system.
Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 40700, 61720, 61726, 62702, 62703, 71707,^92700, 92701~, 93702, and 94703 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
B605300550 860516
PDR ADOCK 05000344 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- W.
S. Orser, Plant General Manager
- R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance.
- D. R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services
- J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction
- J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R. E. Susee, Operations Supervisor D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor A. S. Cohlmeyer, Engineering Supervisor G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S. B. Nichols, Training Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor C. H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined
activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
j The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility technical specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain ir. formation on plant conditions, trends,.and compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift.
t During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
a.
General plant and equipment conditions.
b.
Maintenance requests and repairs.
c.
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
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Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
f.
Interiors of electrical and control panels.
g.
Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
h.
Radiation protection controls.
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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Radioactive waste systems.
k.
Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance evolutions.
During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved.
The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection period included 86-009 and 86-013.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspectors.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration status.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety features.
This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable'. ESF systems verified operable during this inspection period included the component cooling water system, the service water system, and the diesel fuel oil system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Corrective Action The inspectors performed a general review of the licensee's problem identification systems-to verify that licensee identified quality related deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for resolution. Types of records examined by the inspectors included Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. The i
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inspectors concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to correct identified deficiencies'. A Plant Review Board meeting was attended by the inspectors on April 9.
The inspectors verified that the appropriate committee members were present at the meeting and that the meeting was conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 6.5.1 of the facility technical specifications.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed maintenance activities associated with inspection of the D23 battery charger and retermination of the power cables to the 'B'
safety injection pump.
In both cases, the inspectors verified that appropriate facility procedures were being followed, that calibrated equipment was used when required, and that personnel involved'were familiar with the various requirements for properly performing the work. With regard to the battery charger maintenance, the inspectors determined through discussions with Instrumentation and Control personnel that.the shunt device used to accurately measure the charger output had been calibrated just prior to the maintenance activity. The inspectors also noted the direct involvement of electrical quality control inspectors in the retermination work performed on the safety injection pump.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria. Surveillance tests witnessed during this period were associated with incore flux mapping and quadrant power tilt ratio determination, local leak rate testing of the containment purge exhaust penetration, and operational testing of the 'A' emergency diesel generator and the associated fuel oil system. The inspectors also
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witnessed a special inspection of the
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reactor coolant system loop.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Preventative Maintenance Activities the inspectors reviewed the licensee!s maintenance program to ascertain the degree to which the licensee performs preventative maintenance to ensure reliable operation of plant safety systems. -For this review, the inspectors selected the service water system (SWS) for'a specific examination of preventative maintenance activities.- The SWS is a safety-related system and serves as the ultimate heat' sink for the operation of the majority-of plant safety systems. The SWS consists
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primarily of three service water. pumps.'(SWP), which take a suction from
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the Columbia River at the intake structure, two service water strainers, four service water booster pumps (SWBP), and various instrumentation, valves, piping, and heat exchangers. A portion of the system serves the secondary plant and is not safety related. This part of the system was not reviewed.
In accordance with the facility technical specifications, the licensee is required to perform inservice testing (IST) of the-SWS pumps and valves and inservice inspection (ISI) of the system, as required by section XI of the ASME code. Under normal conditions, the pumps and remotely operated valves are generally tested quarterly by the IST program. The l
ISI program requires the system to be pressure tested for leakage every 40 months and hydrostatically tested once every 10 years. A general visual examination of-the system structural supports is also performed under the ISI program.
Through reviews of procedures and discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined that the following maintenance activities, which are not required by the technical specifications, are being performed on the SWS.
- Service water pumps are overhauled every 3 years.
- Service water booster pump motor bearings are lubricated quarterly.
- Service water booster pumps have oil changes and coupling lubrications semi-annually.
- Service water strainers are visually inspected and lubricated semi-annually.
- Service water strainer tubes and shear keys are inspected annually.
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- Valve motor operators are cleaned, lubricated and inspected every 3 years.
- Valve air actuators are inspected every 2 years.
- Selected valves are repacked every 5 years.
- All system instrumentation is calibrated at various scheduled intervals.
- The intake structure is inspected and dredged, if necessary, annually.
- Soundings are taken of the intake structure channel annually.
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- The system is chlorinated weekly to prevent fouling from marine growth.
- The component cooling water heat exchangers are inspected every 2
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years.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee has in place a program for
performing preventative maintenance on various components of the system, i
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Two items of concern were identified by the inspectors. First, the licensee does not periodically cycle all manual valves.that may be used under abnormal crerating conditions.
The code exempts the majority of manual valves from this cycling requirement, however, valves which are required to reposition to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident are required to be cycled periodically. The service water system does contain several manual valves which the licensee agrees appear prudent to periodically cycle, such as SW 031, 032, 041, 042, 043, 044, 045, 046, however it was not clear whether they are covered by the code requirements. The licensee was considering this concern at the close of the inspection and the inspectors will follow this Unresolved Item under Open Item No. 86-10-01.
The second concern regards IST of relief valves. The licensee is not testing approximately 20-25 relief valves which are designated as therraal reliefs. The licensee has stated that the ASME code does not require testing of thermal reliefs, however, at the close of the inspection, licensee representatives had not yet located the section of the code which exempts thermal reliefs from testing. This Unresolved Item will be followed as Open Item 344/86-10-02.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Biological Fouling of Cooling Water Systems The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the issue of fouling of open cooling water systems by aquatic organisms. This fouling can degrade system flows and heat exchanger performance. The major susceptible systems at the site are the service water system and the fire water system. This problem has occurred at several plants and is described in IE Bulletin 81-03, IE Information Notices 81-21 and 83-46 and INP0 SOER 84-1.
The inspectors examined the licensee's in place and proposed measures to address this issue, including use of portable flow instruments to monitor flows when degradation is suspected, since permanent flow instrumentation is not generally installed in the service water system. The licensee presently performs chlorination of water systems and periodic inspections of potentially affected heat exchangers.
The inspectors also noted that the plant has experienced very few problems of this nature over the past 10 years. The inspectors will continue to monitor this area in the future.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Residual Heat Removal System Operability On March 31, with the plant operating at full power, the inspectors observed that residual heat removal (RHR) system valve MO-8809A was tagged as under test. When questioned, the operators stated that the valve was shut for maintenance purposes. This valve'is the RHR discharge
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to the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops 1 and 2.
.The licensee had declared the 'A' train of RHR inoperable due to this valve being shut and considered the plant to be in compliance with the action statement of the technical specifications by maintaining the 'B'
train operable. The inspectors questioned whether the 'B' train of RHR was operable with MO-8809A shut. Although the injection path to RCS loops 3 and 4 was
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available via valve MO-8809B, the inspectors question whether all four injection paths were required for either train to be operable. The licensee took prcmpt action to reopen M0-8809A. After a review of the operational requirements of the RHR system, the licensee determined that all four injection paths are required for either train of RHR to be operable and subsequently issued LER 86-03 on this event. The valve was shut for a period of one hour and ten minutes.
Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent subsystems consisting, in part, of an "0PERABLE" flow path. The flow path for the RHR system is not clearly defined in plant Technical Specifications.
Therefore, clarification from NRR will be requested and this issue will be followed as Unresolved Item No. 344/86-10-03.
The apparent cause of this occurrence according to the licensee was a misunderstanding by the licensee concerning the operation of the RHR system. Licensee perscnnel at the plant regarded the RHR injection paths as segregated by train and therefore, they had allowed the valve to be closed as proceduralized by maintenance procedure 12-5, " Valve Motor Operators." Further, review of the procedure by the onsite review committee during issuance failed to identify this discrepancy. The inspectors were concerned that this occurrence was similar to recently identified problems with the control room emergency ventilation system and auxiliary feedwater system in that personnel knowledge of the proper operation of the system was deficient.
No violation or deviation was identified.
9.
Plant Calorimetric Measurement The inspectors examined procedure POT-22-1, " Plant Heat Balance Calibration" which is used to conduct a periodic plant calorimetric measurement, and procedure PET-13-3, "Recalibration of Feedwater Flow Venturis" which is used to correct the venturi flow constants used in the calorimetric calculation. During operation, the venturi flow constants change due to fouling of the venturis. The result of this change is a reduction of the plant electrical output.
PET-13-3 was subsequently written to recover the lost output by correcting the flow constants over the course of an operating cycle. The procedure assumes that the ratio of p'rimary power to secondary power remains constant throughout the
-"f cycle, and that a ratio of the heat rates measured at some point in the cycle to baseline value heat rates measured when the venturis are known to be clean will allow the new venturi constants to be determined, i
The inspectors reviewed the technical content of the procedures and the j
error analysis associated with PET-13-3.
The inspectors noted that no account is taken for charging and letdown flows and the effect of pressurizer heaters on the calorimetric measurement. Subsequent calculations by the inspectors and by the licensee demonstrated that these effects were negligible. Additionally, the inspectors identified some minor discrepancies in PET-13-3.
The licensee noted these and stated that they would be corrected. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's calorimetric measurement procedures were acceptable.
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No violations or deviaticns were identified.
10.
Plant Operations The plant continued full power operation from the outset of the inspection period until early April when power was reduced to 73% due to excess hydroelectric capacity in the region. On April 11, at 10:45 p.m.,
the Ming Winter, a grain freighter in the Columbia River lost control of steering and veered into the shore in the vicinity of the plant intake structure. The ship contacted the plant 36 inch outfall pipe resulting
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in significant damage to approximately 30 feet of the pipe. The event did not interrupt service water flow and the service water system continued to operate normally. The outfall pipe is not safety related.
With regard to presenting a hazard to the intake structure, the FSAR notes that a ship would not normally be capable of coming inshore to the point that contact with the intake structure would be made due to the depth of the water.
In the unlikely event that service water flow is interrupted, the cooling tower can be lined up with the service water system to allow the plant to cool down.
On April 16, the plant shutdown for its annual refueling outage. The inspectors witnessed the plant shutdown and noted that it proceeded without incident. Major work planned for the outage includes feedwater heater replacement, steam generator sludge lance and eddy current testing, main turbine inspection, repair of the damaged outfall pipe and containment integrated leak rate. testing. At the end of the inspection period, the plant was in Mode 6 with core unloading in progress. The licensee's current schedule calls for a return to operation on June 10.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Control of Heavy Loads During Refueling The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative controls which ensure that lifting of heavy loads in containment is conducted in a safe, controlled manner. A major portion of the program is based on the guidelines contained in NUREG 0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," and on correspondence between the licensee and NRR concerning the content of their program. The inspectors verified that the following areas are addressed by the licensee in controlling heavy loads:
- Control of safe load paths inside containment.
- Procedures for load handling.
- Requirements for operator training and qualification.
- Control of special lifting devices (SLD).
- Maintenance requirements and procedures for cranes and lifting equipment.
With regard to lifting of large components during refueling operations, the inspectors determined that the licensee's procedures were acceptable.
For attachment of the lifting device to the reactor upper internals, the licensee requires that the number of turns needed to connect each arm of the lifting device to the internals be recorded and checked against an l
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acceptance criteria. The axial displacement of each arm is also recorded. Specific requirements for attachment of the vessel head lifting device and the missile shield lifting device are not stated in the refueling procedures, however, the attachment points for these lifts are easily accessible and the method for making the attachment is relatively simple. For lifting of the vessel head, the expected weight is listed in the procedure and the head is checked for levelness after two inches of vertical movement." The procedure also requires that
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personnel verify that the lift is clear of interfereace during the initial portion of the lift.
The inspectors identified one concern. The lifting device for removal of the missile shields, which are normally located over the vessel, is not classified as a SLD. From a review of NUREG 0612, the inspectors were unable to ascertain whether the device should be categorized as a SLD and thereby receive more extensive periodic inspections by the licensee than a normal lifting device receives. This item will be followed up by the
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inspectors as Open Item No. 344/86-10-04.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Miscellaneous Observations During a routine control room tour, the inspectors observed the discharge pipe of the electric auxiliary feedwater pump at a pressure of approximately 1825 psig. The pump and the piping are not safety-related.
The design pressure of the pipe is 1700 psig. The control room operators took immediate action to depressurize the pipe. The excessive pressure apparently resulted from the thermal expansion of water trapped in the line. The licensee is reviewing the piping design and considering modifications to prevent recurrence of this problem.
The inspectors also observed a deficiency with one leg of a support associated with the platform for a control room emergency ventilation fan and with two supports associated with service water supply to a cable spreading ronm area cooler. The licensee was informed of these observations and initiated action to correct them. At the completion of the inspection period, the inspectors were still considering whether the deficiencies were of significance to the system operation. The inspectors will follow this Unresolved Item as Open Item 344/86-10-05.
The inspectors discussed the status of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) with various site personnel and found the system to be substantially more reliable now then when the system was first placed in operation in July, 1985. The operators find it useful for monitoring i
such parameters as core exit thermocouples, cooldown parameters, and effluent radiation monitors. The system also has proven useful for providing information to the Technical Support Center during emergency drills. Not all operations personnel are totally familiar with the system, however the licensee is working towards improving this area.
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No violations or deviations were identified, i
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13.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
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order to ascertain whether.they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 12.
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Exit Interview
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The inspectors met with the plant general manager and the manager of operations and maintenance at the conclusion of the inspection period.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of
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