IR 05000344/1986048
| ML20213A376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1987 |
| From: | Kellund G, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213A351 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-86-48, NUDOCS 8702030242 | |
| Download: ML20213A376 (10) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . . U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No. 50-344/86-48 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street { Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted: December 7 986 - January 17, 1987 { Z 3/M Inspector: [[ '/.. ( G.M. Kellund~ "
Date Signed ReYident Inspector Approved By: h M D , M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary: Inspection on December 7, 1986 - January 17, 1987 (Report 50-344/86-48) Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification, corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, follow-up on previously identified items.
Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 40700, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 73051, 92701, and 93702 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
I 8702030242 870127 PDR ADOCK 05000344 O PDR
. . DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- C.A. Olmstead, Plant General Manager C.P. Yundt, General Manager, Technical Functions R.P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance D.R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services-J.K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction J.D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R.E. Susee, Operations Supervisor D.W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor P.A. Morton, Engineering Supervisor G.L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T.0. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S.B. Nichols, Training Supervisor D.L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor C.H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager D.D. Wheeler, Quality Control Supervisor R.W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H.E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspector observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspector observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility technical specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift.
During each week, the inspector toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items: a.
General plant and equipment conditions.
b.
Maintenance requests and repairs. _
-. c.
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
- d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
e.
Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
f.
Interiors of electrical and control panels.
g.
Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
h.
Radiation protection controls.
i.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
-j. Radioactive waste systems'. , k.
Proper storage of compressed gas' bottles.
, The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspector to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service.
Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure-that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance ' evolutions.
During each week, the inspector conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on-pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures,- security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved.
The inspector examined the licensee's nonconformance. reports (NCR) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed~to the completion of corrective action.
NCRs re' viewed during this inspection period included 86-206, 86-226, 86-232.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspector.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys _being performed,.when possible, and by examining radiation work permits. currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration status.
The inspector verified the operability of selected engineered safety features.
This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable.
ESF systems , verified operable during this inspection period included the 'B' train auxiliary feedwater system, the containment hydrogen vent system and the - emergency diesel generator air start system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Corrective Action The inspector performed a general review of the licensee's problem identification systems to verify that licensee identified quality related deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for
resolution.
Types of records examined by the inspector included Requests ! ,
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, . 'for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports.
A Plant Review Board meeting was attended by the inspector on January 7.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to correct identified deficiencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Maintenance During this reporting period the inspector witnessed an oil change on the 'A' containment spray pump motor.
The inspector verified the following: - The pump was properly tagged out prior to conducting the maintenance.
- The technical specification requirements associated with the containment spray system were complied with.
- The workers performing the job possessed the appropriate skills and knowledge.
- The workers cleaned the area surrounding the pump and removed all work materials at the conclusion of the work.
During the performance of tne work, the inspectors discussed various aspects of the job with the craft personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors.
Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation'was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly' removed from service if required by the test procedure.
Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the, test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria. Any necessary corrective maintenance was completed ~ ., during the conduct of the tests in accordance with approved maintenance request (s).
Surveillance tests. witnessed'during this period included: PET-1-4, " Moderator Temperature Coefficient" and a temporary plant test (TPT-178) of the 'B service water pump.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
System Engineer Program In early 1986 the _ licensee initiated the implementation of a System Engineer program within the Technical Services department at the Trojan site.
During the current inspection period, the scope and implementation of this program were examined. Applicable procedures and records were examined and discussions were held with licensee personnel involved in the development and implementation of the program - from which the following information and findings resulted.
' In the development phase of the program, licensee personnel held ' discussions with and visited other nuclear utility representatives who ,
'
. had extensive experience in the implementation of similar programs.
INP0 guidance, Good Practice OP-209, "Use of System Engineers" was also utilized in the development of the program.
During 1986, staffing of the program was approved by licensee management.
The current staffing includes approximately 20 engineers.
It is anticipated that 3 additional positions will be authorized during 1987.
Procedures have been issued covering the scope of the program as well as the duties and responsibilities of system engineers.
Specific plant systems have been assigned to the individual system engineers.
In general, the responsibilities and duties of system engineers include the following for those systems to which they are assigned.
a.
Support of Plant Operations and Maintenance b.
Monitor and Evaluate System Performance c.
Review and Revise Documents Associated with Assigned Systems (such documents include operating, maintenance and test procedures; technical manuals; proposed design changes; NPROS reports; design basis; equipment history files; and procurement specifications) Licensee management has selected 12 " Critical Safety Systems" of the Trojan plant for particular emphasis by the system engineering staff during the period from approximately mid-1986 through 1987.
These systems (which include the ESF actuation / reactor protection, ECCS and support systems, auxiliary feedwater, and the control room H&V system) are to undergo detailed reviews by the assigned system engineers.
In some instances, contract engineers with special expertise are to be utilized under the direction of licensee system engineers.
The reviews to be conducted for each of the systems selected are to include a detailed system walkdown (a part of the purpose of which is to insure system engineer familiarity with system configuration and components), a system design basis review, and a detailed system reliability improvement review.
The latter review is to include an examination of the system operating and maintenance history as well as interviews with operations, maintenance, system design, and licensing personnel to identify recurring problems or issues relating to the system.
In preparation for and during the conduct of the reviews discussed above, the assigned system engineers are to compile an information system file for each system.
This file is to contain documentation of the reviews conducted, including materials reviewed or reference thereto, as well as the corrective actions initiated during the course of the reviews.
Records of the ongoing reviews of the Auxiliary Feedwater System were examined, and discussions were held with the responsible system engineer.
The records revealed that a need for substantive changes and/or additions to system operation and test procedures, maintenance practices and procedures, and system technical manuals had been identified during the course of the reviews to date.
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. Based upon the records examined and discussions relating'thereto, the inspector observed that the system engineer appeared to have a high ' degree of knowledge and understanding of the system for which he was responsible.
The findings of the reviews of this system, to date, ' appeared to reflect a thorough and knowledgeable effort in the conduct of the reviews as well.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Nuclear Plant Engineering Activities
i During the current inspection period the following activities / projects of the Nuclear Plant Engineering department were examined.
Licensee records were examined and discussions were held with licensee representatives responsible for the activities examined.
A.
System Design Basis Development By letter to Region V dated May 22, 1986, the licensee committed to the development of design basis documents (DBD) for selected safety-related systems of the Trojan plant.
The purpose of this project is to bring together into an accessible and controlled format design basis information for plant safety systems.
A review of licensee records and discussions with licensee representatives revealed the following status of this project.
- The licensee has contracted with its Architect / Engineer (Bechtel)
and NSS supplier (Westinghouse) to develop DBD for the following plant systems.
, 1.
Auxiliary Feedwater (Bechtel) 2.
120V Preferred Instrument AC (Bechtel) ' 3.
125V DC (Bechtel) i 4.
Service Water (Bechtel) 5.
Containment Spray (Bechtel) 6.
Containment Air Coolers (Bechtel) 7.
Control Building HVAC (Bechtel) 8.
Component Cooling Water (Bechtel) 9.
Emergency Diesel Generators (Bechtel)
' 10.
Containment Penetrations (Bechtel) 11.
Residual Heat Removal (Westinghouse) 12.
Safety Injection (Westinghouse) 13.
Reactor Protection (Westinghouse) The schedule for completion of project currently calls for final
draft DBDs to be completed by the contractor during the period . mid-December 1986 through mid-May 1987.
Licensee reviews and ' comments are expected to be completed such that DBDs in final form for all the selected systems are expected to be complete by
September 1987.
The final draft of the DBD for the Auxiliary Feedwater System had recently been completed by the contractor (Bechtel) and was under f ~ --,,-. - ,-r-?--r' -m--r-- er. - -e - - ---, w-- , -~e.w-, - -..
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. . review by the licensee's staff at the time of the current inspection. The records revealed that extensive comments had been generated by the licensee regarding the draft DBD, including comments by the Trojan plant system engineering staff.
To give increased management attention to this project, the licensee has contracted with an independent contractor to provide full time project management assistance.
Discussions with licensee management revealed that numerous meetings and discussions had been necessary to insure an adequate product by their contractor in terms of the scope and level of detail required.
This, in turn, has resulted in some delay in the initial schedule for completion of the project.
A review of the DBD for the Auxiliary Feedwater System by the inspector revealed that the document included an appropriate reference to the calculations supporting recent design changes to the system, e.g., establishment of the minimum condensate tank level to insure adequate net suction pressure for the AFW pumps during pump start.
No discrepancies or significant concerns resulted from the inspector's examination of this project activity.
B.
Independent Review of Corporate Engineering By letter dated June 20, 1986, the licensee committed to engage an outside firm to conduct an independent review of the technical adequacy of the corporate engineering organization in its support of the Trojan plant.
The licensee records included the report of such a study recently completed by the General Electric Company.
A review of the report revealed that several issues had been identified for further evaluation by the licensee.
Of the approximately 30 issues identified, essentially all related to the administrative and management aspects of engineering activities.
The report concluded that the licensee had a technically competent engineering staff.
Licensee management stated that firm plans had not been developed to follow up and address the specific issues raised by the review, although plans were to be developed to address the more important issues over the next several months.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Review of Surry Pipe Rupture Event In response to the feedwater line break at the Surry plant in Decemter 1986, the inspector evaluated the licensee's actions to address the problems identified at Surry.
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. . The licensee has experienced erosion / corrosion problems in the past similar to those identified at Surry. -In 1982, an extraction steam line to a feedwater heater failed and in 1985 a heater drain pump discharge line.. failed following a plant trip.
After the-1982 event,-the licensee began a program to-inspect high pressure piping subject to two phase conditions and replaced eroded carbon steel piping with stainless steel.
After the 1985 event, the licensee expanded the program to include certain portions of single phase systems.
Following the Surry event, the licensee performed ultrasonic testing on the feedwater pump suction lines.
The lines have a nominal thickness of 0.688 inch.
The testing indicated a wall thickness in the thinnest spot of 0.600 inch.
The minimum allowable thickness for these lines ~is 0.476 inch.
A contributing factor to the Surry event was the failure of a check valve in the feedwater line to prevent backflow out the break.
The lice ~nsee at ' Trojan includes the feedline check valves in the.in-service test program and exercises them periodically.
A consequence of the Surry pipe rupture event was that Halon and Cardox fire suppression systems were actuated due to water short circuiting their control systems.
In evaluating these occurrences the inspector verified that Trojan does not use Cardox fire suppression systems and that the only Halon systems employed are in the remote shutdown panel room and in the computer room.
Both rooms are isolated from the turbine building atmosphere during a line break event.
In addition, during the two previous line break events at. Trojan neither Halon system was actuated.
, , No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Plant Operations The plant operated routinely from the outset of the inspection period until December 11, when both trains of the control room emergency ventilation system (CB-1A and CB-1B) were declared inoperable.
CB-1A was out of service for replacement of a fire damper and had blank flanges installed on the supply and exhaust ducts for isolation purposes.
CB-1B was then tested to demonstrate the integrity of the control room-envelope.
However, simultaneous testing of non-safety related ventilation systems produced a positive pressure across a fire damper inspection port in CB-1A which, apparently because it was not securely latched, caused it to open resulting in a breach of the control room envelope.
As a result of this leak path, CB-1B was not able to provide the required control room positive pressure and was declared inoperable.
The port was subsequently shut and CB-1B was tested and declared operable.
The licensee is taking action to replace the older inspection ports in the system with a newer design that has more secure latches.
On January 6 a reactor trip occurred.
The trip was caused by an instrument and control technician who was working on a control oil pressure instrument on the south main feedwater pump.
The technician mistakenly disconnected a connector that resulted in the control power breaker tripping which produced a pump trip.
The turbine generator .. . . . ... I
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. - \\ commenced a runback as designed but the reactor subsequently tripped on low steam generator level coincident with a steam flow / feed flow mismatch. The steam flow / feed flow mismatch signal was the result of a . surveillance test of the circuitry that was in progress at the time of the trip. All systems responded as designed following the trip. The plant was restarted later that evening and continued operation for the remainder of the inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Follow-up on Previously Identified Items 10 CFR 21 Report 86-29-P (0 pen): ITT Air Operated Diaphragm Valves Potential Vibratory Problems. The inspector verified that the licensee-has received the subject Part 21 and initiated a follow-up, 0AR 86-102.
The licensee's preliminary evaluation found that the subject valves were span guidance supported, and therefore, would probably not have the Part 21 vibratory problem. The licensee is doing a pipe support as-built on these valves. This as-built will be sent to Bechtel and an evaluation will be performed by Bechtel. The licensee plans to complete their Part 21 follow-up in April 1987 and a follow-up inspection is, planned after that.
. No violations or deviations were identified.
- 11. Miscellaneous Observations During a walkdown of containment penetrations, the inspector questioned the need for local leak rate testing (LLRT) of penetration P-10.
Penetration P-10 consists of a line from the discharge of various emergency core cooling system relief valves outside containment through.a single inboard check valve to the pressurizer relief tank inside containment. The USAR defines the penetration as a Type I penetration, i.e., a fluid line that is open to the atmosphere outside the containment and is connected to the reactor coolant system or is open to the containment atmosphere. The USAR does not specify any leak rate testing for this penetration. The inspector questioned whether conducting LLRT of this penetration would be appropriate and discussed the matter with the licensee. After review of the issue, the licensee concluded that the penetration should be redefined in the USAR as a Type II penetration, i.e., a fluid line that is connecteri to a closed system outside the containment and is connected to the reactor coolant system or is open to the containment atmosphere.
In addition, the licensee determined that LLRT of the check valve was appropriate and will include it in the LLRT program. The licensee will also revise the USAR to reflect the reclassification of the penetration and its testing requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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' . -12.+ Exit Interview . ' ~ The inspector met with the plant general manager at the conclusion of the inspection period. During this meeting, the inspector sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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