IR 05000344/1986036
| ML20210Q937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1986 |
| From: | Kirsch D, Mendonca M, Pereira D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210Q905 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-86-36-EC, TAC-42502, TAC-61523, NUDOCS 8610070073 | |
| Download: ML20210Q937 (4) | |
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t U. S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION
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m Report No. 50-344/86-36-
Docket No. 50-344-License No. NPF-1 Licensee: 'P'ortland-General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street
~ Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: TEojan Meeting at: Region V Offices, Walnut Creek, California Meeting conducted: September 5,1986 Inspectors:
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Pereira, Project Inspector
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e w M. Mendonca, Chief, Reactor Projec,ts' Section 1 Date Signed Approved by:
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D. Kirsch, Director Division of Reactor Safety Projects Summary:
An Enforcement Conference was held on September 5, 1986. The following topics were discussed:
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An apparent violation identified during inspection of the Trojan Nuclear Plant concerning the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system and the system's associated flow path; 2.
An apparent violation of Equipment Qualification (EQ) requirements for safety related valves; and 3.
Other matters of concern to the NRC.
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8610070073 860r70 S PDR ADOCK 05000344 a
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DETAILS-1~1.
Enforcement Conference Participants
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NRC Participants J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator J. L. Crews, Senior Reactor Engineer D. F. Kirsch, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects A. E. Chaffee, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects M.~M. Mendonca, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1 S. A. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section A. D. Johnson,- Enforcement Officer
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D. B. Pereira, Trojan Project Inspector
PGE Participants'
B. D. Withers,'Vice President Nuclear:
C. A. Olmstead,-Manager, Nuclear Quality _ Assurance -
W. S. Orser, Plant' General Manager.
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C. P. Yundt, General Manager, Technical Functions D. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services C. Dieterle,' Supervisori Mechanical Engineer D. Swanson, Manager, Nuclear Safety Branch
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2.
- Enforcement Conference On September'5, 1986, an enforcement conference was held at the Region V office in" Walnut Creek, California with the individuals listed in paragraph 1.
The conference was held to discuss an apparent inoperable Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system flowpath and the failure to environmentally; qualify certain safety related valves.
Mr. Martin's opening remarks informed the licensee that the purpose of the conference was to discuss the apparent violations of the regulatory requirements identified'during the recent inspections of the RHR system flowpath and the failure to environmentally ' qualify eleven safety-related valves. He further stressed that this meeting was intended to be a discussion with the aim of open communication and to. ensure that the facts were presented.
Mr. Richards proceeded to describe the nature of the potential violations. First, on March 31, 1986 while in Mode 1, for a period of one hour and ten minutes, the flow path for both trains of the RHR cold i
leg injection were inoperable in that valve M0-8809A was closed which would have prevented RHR flow to two of the four reactor coolant system cold legs.
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'The second potential violation concerns motor operators on eleven safety-related valves which had not been environmentally ^ qualified, and-l an' extension of the environmental qualification deadline had neither been
requested nor granted by NRC.
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Mr..Orser then discussed the reason why there was a divergence between the four cold leg injections paths as originally. designed and the
. assumptions of operations and maintenance procedures that there were two
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, independent flow trains.
It seemed from initial operating procedure issuance in April,.1973 that two independent flow trains were thought of cas the. flow paths.
Mr. Keuter informed the meeting that the training personnel taught that two independent flow trains were the flow path.
Mr. Orser concluded that the root' cause was failure to clearly understand and implement the system design basis. The corrective actions being-implemented were that system design basis documents were being generated, system engineers were being hired, a QA/QC vertical system of audits would be conducted, and a third party review of technical work would be
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conducted.
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Mr. Martin requested a description of the design change process, specifically, what personnel reviewed' design changes.
Mr. Swanson stated
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that independent review of design changes and calculations were conducted by engineering personnel.
-As detailed in LER 86-03, Rev. 1, Mr. Swanson indicated that the RHR
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pumps would'have had a~ run-out situation in the cold leg recirculation phase with a single RHR pump-failure. This problem has been addressed by'
' procedure. revision. The licensee's efforts leading to the discovery of:
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this problem were discussed. The. licensee was encouraged to continue to
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aggressively seek _out problem areas and take meaningful action to correct
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problems-identified.
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Mr. Swanson presented the facts' concerning the Environmental
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-Qualification of the eleven safety-related valves detailed in LER 86-03, ~
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. During the licensee's review, the eleven valves were ' '
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discovered to potentially not be environmentally qualified. These valves-
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-had all been-evaluated'under the environmental qualification program and
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it.hidTheen determined they did not need to be environmentally qualified.
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because they either perform their safety function prior-to receiving
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excessive dose, or their failure still allowed for acceptable results in
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the accident analysis. With the exception of'M0-8809 A/B and MO-8716
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A&B,.there'are no planned actuations of these valves in the accident scenario subsequent to'the initiation of cold leg recirculation. All of.
the valves,-however, may be required to operate'to isolate a passive
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-failure and, therefore, the licensee had reconsidered whether the valves
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should be qualified. The licensee concluded however that the valves were
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not required to be environmentally qualified in that the isolation of a passive failure was not encompassed in the environmental qualification i
requirements or valve design. requirements.
.At this point in the discussion, Mr. Johnson requested PGE to explain in
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writing what the company's position was regarding these eleven safety related valves.
Mr. Withers replied that they would explain in detail p
the company's position for-the safety-related valves.
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s For closing remarks, Mr. Martin stressed the need for PGE to clarify its
position in writing concerning the eleven safety-related valves,
determine the plant's design basis, check systems to ensure they meet
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A their design basis, and for PGE to continue to pursue finding problems in a rigorous. manner during followup evaluations.
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