IR 05000261/1980029

IE Insp Rept 50-261/80-29 on 801014-17.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ie Bulletins & Reactor Operations

ML14175B230
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	11/10/1980
From:	Hardin A, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14175B228	List: IR 05000261/1980029
References
50-261-80-29, NUDOCS 8012180039
Download: ML14175B230 (4)

Text

0

-

UNITED STATES 0,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/80-29 Licensee: Carolina Power & LIght Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raliegh, NC 27602 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson 2 Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Inspection at H. B. Ro inson site near Hartsville, South Carolina Inspector:

(

/

/C/'

K. Har Date Signed Approved by:, RONS Branch D'a e'Shned SUMMARY

.

Inspection on October 14-17, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 31 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins and reactor operation Results Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were iden tifie O

DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• C. W. Crawford, Manager, O&M

• H. S. Zimmerman, Manager, T&A

• R. Connerly, Director, Nuclear Safety & QA

• J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor

• F. Lowery, Operations Supervisor

• B. W. Garrison, QA Supervisor

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 17, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspection findings were discussed. The licensee was informed there were no items of noncompliance or deviation.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection Followup on IE Bulletins (IEB)

The following IEB's were reviewed by the inspector through record review and interviews with licensee representative The licensee response and actions met the requirements of the bulletins and the bulletins are close IEB 80-19

"Failure of Mercury-Wetted Relays in Reactor Protection Systems of Operating Power Plants Designed by Combustion Engineering" IEB 80-20

"Failure of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches" IEB 80-06

"Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Reset Controls" IEB 80-16

"Potential Misapplication of Rosemont Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with either "A" or "D" Output Codes"

-2 Reactor Operations Tour of Containment The inspector accompanied by a licensee escort toured containment on the evening of October 14, 198 As of that time the licensee intended to dilute to critical (following a refueling outage) on the evening of October 19, 198 For this reason the inspector observed the housekeeping conditions with particular reference to the physical conditions of screens on the ECCS pump inlets and the presence of plastic material or other debris which might plug ECCS screen The lower level of the containment and the second level contained large quantities of materials which would need to be removed prior to startu In addition, the screens through the secondary shield wall in many areas had been removed to allow fire modification penetration The screens, inside the missile barrier wall, for the ECCS sump inlet appeared to be in good condition. Prior to and at the exit interview the inspector discussed the condition of containment with the licensee. Licensee management stated the containment would be cleaned, inspected and approved by plant management prior to reactor startu Observation of Operations The inspector observed control room operations during a period when the reactor coolant system was being heate Discussions with operators on the use of recently installed instrumentation were held. Control room manning was verified to meet regulatory requirement No items of noncompliance or deviations were observe Small fire in Containment Just prior to the inspectors arrival on site, a small fire in a cable tray had occurred. The fire was caused by ignition of combustibles by welding spark The inspector, accompanied by the Maintenance Supervisor, observed the fire area. Repair work had been completed at the time of the inspection. The licensee reported, and the inspector verified by visual inspection, that little if any observable damage had occurre Some cables had been wrapped for a distance of six inches to one foot with tape. The licensee stated the wires had been wrapped more for a precautionary measure rather than repair of damage to the cables. The licensee reported that there are seven cables in the tray and all are 120 vac control powe Four cables power solenoid valves inside containment on the purge outlet valv Two cables power solenoid valves inside containment on the pressure relief valve The remaining cable provides control power to dampers at the refueling canal pool. Power failure to the solenoids results in the valve going to the closed position. Based on the inspector observations and the licensees review of the event no further action was considered necessary

by the inspecto Failure of Containment Personnel Hatch Door There have been frequent cases in which the licensee has experienced a problem with failure of the containment personnel hatch door The failure are such that the inner door cannot be readily opene The events, in addition to representing delays to accomplishing refueling work, could also increase employee risk in any occurrance where rapid exit from the containment was importan The licensee stated they have retained Chicago Bridge and Iron Works to review the containment doors and to support CP&L in resolution of the proble The activity in this area will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection, (261/80-29-01).