ML14191B015
| ML14191B015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1988 |
| From: | Garner L, Latta R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14191B014 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-88-23, NUDOCS 8810250457 | |
| Download: ML14191B015 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1988023
Text
-
'UNITED
STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Qb
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
.Report No.:
50-261/88-23
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.: DPR-23
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson
Inspection Conducted: August 11 -
September 10, 1988
- 120
______________
/
~
g
. W. Garner, Senior Wid
In spector
Date Signed
R. M. Latta, Residenflns
4tor
[ate Signed
Approved by:
P. E. Fredrickson, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 1A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced inspection was conducted in the areas of
operational safety verification, physical protection,
surveillance
observation,
maintenance observation,
ESF system walkdown,
onsite
followup of events at operating power reactors,
and onsite review
committee.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8810250457 881013
PDR ADOCK 05000261
G
PNU
REPORT DETAILS
1. Licensee Employees Contacted
R. Barnett, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical
R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Performance
D. Crocker, Supervisor, Radiation Control
J. Curley, Director., Regulatory Compliance
- C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project Department
J. Eaddy, Supervisor, Environmental and Chemistry
W. Farmer, Senior Engineer, System Engineering
R. Femal, Shift Foreman, Operations
- W. Flanagan, Manager, Design Engineering
W. Gainey, Support Supervisor, Operations
P. Harding, Project Specialist, Radiation Control
E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- D. Ingram,,Project Engineer, Industrial Engineering
R. Johnson, Manager, Control and Administration
D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations
E. Lee, Shift Foreman, Operations
A. Lewis, Senior Engineer, NED
D. McCaskill, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Miller, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical
J. Moon, Senior Engineer, System Engineer
R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Morgan, Plant General Manager
D. Myers, Shift Foreman, Operations
D. Nelson, Operating Supervisor, Operations
M.. Page, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Systems
- D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
- D. Sayre, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations
J. Sheppard, Manager, Operations
R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations
H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
Other licensee employees
contacted included technicians,
operators,
mechanics, security force member.s, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
L. Garner
- R. Latta
- Attended exit interview-on September 13, 1988
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
This area was not inspected.
3. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed licensee activities to confirm that the facility
was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements,
and- that
licensee
management
was
effectively
discharging
its
responsibilities for continued safe operation.
These activities were
confirmed by direct observations, tours of the facility,, interviews and
discussions
with
licensee
management
and personnel,
independent
verifications of safety system
status and limiting conditions for
operation, and reviews of facility records.
Periodically, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, operations records, data
sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions to verify
operability of safety related equipment and compliance with TS.
Specific
items reviewed include control room logs, maintenance work requests,
auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, and equipment tagout
records.
Through periodic observations of work in progress
and
discussions with operations staff members,
the inspectors verified that
the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions; responding properly to
-alarm
conditions; adhering to procedures and applicable administrative
controls; and aware of equipment out of service, surveillance testing, and
maintenance activities in progress.
The inspectors routinely observed
shift changes to verify that continuity of system status was maintained
and that proper control
room staffing existed.
The inspectors also
observed that access to the control room was controlled and operations
personnel were carrying out their assigned duties in an attentive and
professional
manner..
The control
room was
observed to be free of
unnecessary distractions.
The inspectors performed channel checks,
reviewed component status and safety related parameters, including SPDS
information, to verify conformance with the TS.
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with
selected LCOs. This verification was accomplished by direct observation
of monitoring instrumentation,
valve positions, switch positions, and
review of completed logs and records. The inspectors verified the axial
flux difference was within the values required by the TS.
Plant tours were routinely conducted to verify the operability of standby
equipment; assess the general condition of plant equipment; and verify
that radiological controls, fire protection controls and equipment tag out
procedures were being properly implemented.
These tours verified .the
absence of unusual fluid leaks; the lack of visual degradation of pipe,
conduit and seismic supports; the proper positions and indications of
important valves and circuit breakers; the lack of conditions of which
3
could invalidate EQ; the operability of. safety related instrumentation;
the calibration of safety related and control instrumentation including
area radiation monitors, friskers and portal monitors; the operability of
fire suppression and fire fighting equipment; and the operability of
emergency lighting equipment.
The
inspectors also verified that
housekeeping was adequate and areas were free of unnecessary fire hazards
and combustible materials.
While the inspectors were in the control room at 6:09 a.m. on August 30,
1988,
they witnessed the response of the fire brigade to an unannounced
fire drill. The simulated fire was located in the component cooling water
pump
room in the auxiliary building.
The inspectors witnessed the
response of the fire brigade team leader (senior reactor operator on duty)
as well as the actions of other plant personnel who were utilizing Fire
Protection Procedure FP-001 (revision 11) titled "Fire Emergency", OMM-003
(revision 9) titled "Fire Protection Pre-Plans, Unit No. 2," and PEP-101
(revision 5) titled "Initial Emergency Actions." The inspectors observed
the donning of full turn-out gear and self-contained breathing apparatus
by
fire brigade members, as well
as the access control
of the
radiologically controlled area
by security personnel.
The inspectors
noted that the fire brigade personnel responded quickly to the alarm and
exhibited good fire fighting techniques throughout the drill. Additional
details regarding this unannounced fire drill are contained in Inspection
Report 50-261/88-25.
On August 26, 1988, the inspectors participated in an augmented emergency
preparedness drill.
The primary purpose of this exercise, which was
initiated at approximately 4:00 a.m., was to determine staff mobilization
capabilities for licensee personnel who would normally be required to
fulfill emergency preparedness core staffing positions during a site
emergency event.
The inspectors were notified at 4:12 a.m.
and were
onsite at approximately 4:45 a.m. The inspectors toured the TSC following
the security search and observed that the emergency preparedness supplies,
equipment and communications
systems were properly stationed
and
functional.
The inspectors also observed the reporting of specific
management and staff personnel in the TSC. Subsequent to the termination
of the drill, at approximately 6:30 a.m., the inspectors reviewed specific
personnel
response time records.
This review indicated that the
objectives of the drill were not totally satisfied in that all required
personnel did not respond within the stipulated time frame.
This
condition has been documented by the licensee on NCR 88/109 and will be
evaluated during future inspections. Additional details concerning this
augmented emergency preparedness drill are contained in Inspection Report
50-261/88-22.
No violations or deviations were identified.within the areas inspected.
4
4.
Physical Protection (71707)
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review
of the licensee's physical security program. The inspectors verified by
general observation, perimeter walkdowns and interviews that measures
taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current
requirements.
The performance of various shifts of the security, force was observed to
verify that daily activities were conducted in accordance with the
requirements of the
security plan.
Activities inspected included
protected and vital areas, access controls,
searching of personnel,
packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, patrols, escorting of
visitors, and compensatory measures.
In addition,
the
inspectors
routinely observed protected and vital area lighting and barrier
integrity.
On September 6, 1988, while the inspectors were in the operations and
maintenance building located inside the protected area, they observed an
individual displaying a visitors badge who was not accompanied by his
escort. The individual was questioned by the inspectors and was unable to
immediately determine the location of his escort.
While the inspectors
were questioning the visitor, the assigned escort approached the area from
another section of the building.
The inspectors noted the names and
badge numbers of the individuals involved and notified security of the
event. Subsequently,
the inspectors were informed that the escorting
individual has been temporarily removed from escort responsibilities and
that the licensee has initiated an investigation of the incident.
The
inspectors also reviewed the corrective actions specified in Field Report
88/083 and examined security incident reports maintained by the licensee.
This review indicated that this occurrence appeared to be an isolated
incident which will be evaluated during future routine inspections
conducted in the area of physical security.
This is an IFI:
Review of
Escort Responsibilities Within the Protected Area (261/88-23-01).
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain surveillance related activities of safety
related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were
conducted in accordance with license requirements.
For the surveillance
test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions
and LCOs were met; the tests were completed at the required frequency; the
tests conformed to TS requirements; the required administrative approvals
and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the tests; the testing was
accomplished by qualified personnel *in accordance with an approved test
procedure; and the required test instrumentation was properly 'calibrated.
Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded
test data was accurate, complete,
and met TS requirements,
and test
discrepancies were properly rectified.
The inspectors independently
verified that
the
systems were properly
returned
to
service.
Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following
test activities:
a. OST-405 (revision 4) TSC/EOF/PAP Diesel Generator (Semiannual)
The inspectors witnessed all aspects of this surveillance test which
is designed to verify the mechanical and electrical performance of
the security diesel generator and to assess the operational readiness
of the related.components to fulfill their required support function
during emergency conditions. Specifically, the inspectors witnessed
the preoperational checks on the
PAP diesel including engine oil
.level, coolant quantity, visual inspection of the engine and the
recording of fuel
oil storage tank level.
The inspectors also
observed the completion-of required breaker lineups, the verification
of control power, and the recording of local control panel readings.
During
the pretest breaker lineups the inspectors did
note a
component labeling discrepancy in that the breaker identified in the
procedure as "Generator Disc (TSC/PAP
BLDG)"
was physically labeled
"Emergency Generator,
400 A CB".
The inspectors observed that the
operations personnel involved in the test functionally verified the
breaker by reference to appropriate logic diagrams and initiated
action to correct the labeling discrepancy.
b. EST-008 (revision 2) Service Water Booster Pump Bearing Temperature
Test
EST-008 reflects the licensees implementation of subsection IWP of
Section XI, ASME Code pertaining to the operational measurement of
the service water booster pump bearing temperature. This test was
completed only on the "A" service water booster pump,
subsequent to
its replacement due to increasing vibrational amplitude.
The
inspectors determined that the stabilized bearing temperatures were
within the acceptable range and that the contact pyrometer utilized
was properly calibrated.
c. MST-020 (revision 4) Reactor Protection Logic Train "A" at Power
The inspectors witnessed the performance of this surveillance test
which ensures that the reactor protection. logic train "A" functions
properly. In particular the inspectors witnessed the racking in of
the "A" bypass breaker and the tripping of the "A" reactor trip
breaker during the initial phase of the test.
The inspectors also
witnessed selected portions of the logic combination testing of the
reactor
trip breaker
and
determined
that each
combination.
de-energized the undervoltage coil for the trip breaker as required.
6
The inspectors determined that all stated acceptance criteria were
satisfied and that the system was properly returned to service
subsequent to testing.
d. MST-022 (revision 1) Safeguard Relay Rack Train "A"
The inspectors also witnessed the performance of MST-022 which
verifies the operability of the safeguard logic for train "A",
including
operability
of
the associated test and status lights
required for proper indication.
The inspectors confirmed that the
required annunciators
on the
responded properly, that the
stipulated relay logic switch combinations were satisfactorily tested
and that the status light voltage checks were
acceptable.
No
deficiencies were identified during the conduct of this surveillance
test.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
6. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors
observed several maintenance related activities of
safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities
were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS, and appropriate
industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that these
activities were not violating LCOs and that redundant components were
The
inspectors
also determined
that
activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures,
QC hold
points were established where required, required administrative approvals
and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation, proper radiological
controls were adhered to,
appropriate ignition and fire prevention
controls were
implemented,
replacement parts and materials used were
properly certified, and the effected equipment was properly tested before
being returned to service.
In particular, the inspectors observed/
reviewed the following maintenance activities:
a. WR/JO 88-AHMK1 Replace "A" SWBP motor and align pump to motor
b. WR/JO 88-AIMW1 Adjust packing on V2-16A, AFW header discharge to S/G,
"A".
c. WR/JO 88-BOM361 Perform "F" delta "I" calibration.
d. WR/JO 88-AIIW1 Disassemble and reassemble "B" SWBP,
set impeller
clearances, and align pump to motor.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
7
7. ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a
walkdown of the major components and flow paths of the AFW system.
The
inspectors confirmed that the system lineup procedures matched plant
drawings and the as-built condition.
The inspectors examined piping and
component configurations in the turbine building, auxiliary feedwater pump
room, condensate storage tank area, component cooling water pump room, and
in the control room.
Observed conditions were determined to be in
agreement with the flow diagram, G-190197, titled "Feedwater, Condensate,
and Air Evacuation System",
sheet 1 (revision 38)
and sheet 4 (revision
15).
The inspectors examined the general condition of valves in the
system and verified that they were installed correctly, that they did not
exhibit excessive packing leakage, and that other adverse conditions were
not evident.
The inspectors also verified that valves were. locked as
required,
system pumps were lubricated, valves required for automatic
operation were energized,
and both local and remote indications agi'eed.
with actual valve stem positions.
On August
13; 1988,
the inspectors found snubber #30,
located on the
steamline to the SDAFW pump turbine adjacent to valve V1-8B, loose. When
the inspectors checked the snubber for freedom of movement, the snubber
rotated onto its side, uncovering the oil surge line port. The inspectors
returned the snubber to its as-found position and notified the shift
foreman. The inspectors demonstrated for an auxiliary operator how little
movement was required to allow the snubber to freely rotate to an
uncovered port position. The licensee determined that the jam nut had
come loose. No specific cause for the loose nut could be determined. The
licensee functionally tested the snubber satisfactorily and returned it to
service.
Snubbers of similar size (1.5
kip) were randomly inspected
by the licensee to ensure that they were properly installed and tight. No
similar condition was found during this inspection.
The inspectors also identified a pipe support in the auxiliary feedwater
pump room which was improperly made up, as well as a wall mounted pressure
gage which was loose in its bracket. Additionally, the component label
plates on the MDAFW flow control valves did not agree with the valve
numbers specified on the flow diagram on the AFW system valve checklist.
These items were identified to the licensee and corrective action work
requests were initiated.
On August 29, 1988, the inspectors witnessed the operability testing of
the SDAFW pump, conducted in accordance with OST-202 (revision 13), titled
"Steam
Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Component Test". It is noted
that the frequency .of this surveillance test had been increased in
accordance with the provisions of the subject procedure as -a result of
high vibrational amplitude (alert range)
detected in the horizontal
direction on August
17,
1988.
During the conduct of the test on
8
August 21,
1988,
the SDAW
pump went into the alert range in both the
horizontal the SDAFW pump went into the alert range in both the horizontal
and vertical direction. The inspectors determined that the licensee had
performed additional diagnostic testing on the vibrational frequencies for
pump operation in the recirculation mode and with the system lined up to
feed the steam generators.
Augmented testing of the SDAFW pump has been
scheduled when plant conditions allowed.
The inspectors will continue
to follow this activity during future inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
8. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
a.
Fire Barrier Penetration Degradation
On August 26,
1988, with the Unit operating at 100% reactor power,
the licensee determined that a fire barrier penetration (No. EP49-70)
with 3 trays was inoperable. Upon examination it was determined that
the area under the cable tray covers for this penetration, located in
the cable spreading room, was not completely filled with fire barrier
sealant. Subsequently, on September 1, 1988, the licensee determined
that a similar condition existed in two adjacent block-out fire
barrier penetrations. These penetrations were declared inoperable
and repair activities were initiated in accordance with WR/JO
88-AJBK1. Concurrent with this activity, the licensee examined all
remaining cable trays and bus ducts for adequacy of fire barrier
sealant. This activity resulted in repair to and/or repair and
evaluation
of
38
total
All
repairs were completed within seven days of the discovery of inoperable
status in accordance with TS Section 3.14.7.2.c.
b. Containment Fan Cooler Degradation Conditions
As stated in CP&L correspondence. to the NRC, Serial: RNPD/88-3170,
dated July 22, 1988, the licensee has committed to repair or replace
portions of the service water piping inside containment,
where
internal pipe pressure is less than the containment pressure during a
design basis accident (42 psig), during the upcoming refueling outage
scheduled to start on November 14, 1988. The scope of the SW piping
replacement inside containment as stipulated in Plant Modification
M-858 was based on test results obtained in the 1981 performance of
SP-291. However, the 4-20 psig current operating pressures-of the SW
system in the return piping from the HVH coolers, measured in the
charging pump room, did not correlate with the 1981 test data of
41-59 psig.
In order to provide additional information for service water piping
replacement inside containment, the licensee conducted
on'
August 22, 1988. Test results from this procedure indicated that two
9
of the containment fan coolers (HVH-3
and 4) exhibited negative
discharge pressures at the locally mounted gage on the service water
return line manifold. HVH-4, which demonstrated a discharge pressure
of -7.8 ps.ia, was the limiting worst case.
Subsequent to the conduct of SP-811, the licensee performed an evaluation
.to determine the synergetic effects of the indicated changes in the SW
system within the eight year period between 1981 and 1988.
This .
evaluation, which included input from Westinghouse, considered: (1) cooler
fouling; (2) air entrainment in the cooling units; (3) the siphoning
effects resulting from the rerouting of the SW return piping (M-686) in
1984; and (4) the replacement of the original copper U-tube design cooling
coils in 1983 (M-769) with AL6X three pass straight tube cooling coil
units.
In order to validate the observed SW system pressures and flows the
licensee initiated development of an additional test (SP-812) to verify
that the subject HVH coolers were not airbound. On August 24, 1988, the
inspectors attended a special PNSC (see paragraph 9 of this report) in
which operability issues concerning the containment fan coolers, as well
as containment integrity relative to MIC were discussed. Several action
items were initiated as a result of plant management concern regarding SW
issues. These included the preparation of a JCO supporting containment
fan cooler operability, the evaluation of potential two phase flow in the
containment coolers, a.nd the questionable accuracy of test pressure data
obtained from SP-811. During this period of time, the HVH supplier
(Westinghouse) was directed by the licensee to evaluate the differential
pressure across coolers HVH-3 and 4,
the impact on heat transfer
coefficient, fouling factor effects, and required flow rates.
On August 29, 1988, Westinghouse advised the licensee that under the
existing operating conditions, assuming the test pressures obtained in
SP-811, approximately one half of the heat removal capability of HVH-4 and
about one sixth that of HVH-3 would be lost under worst case conditions.
Based on the preliminary results of the above mentioned Westinghouse
analysis, which indicated potential two-phase flow on the outlet side of
HVH-4 due to negative pressure and the resultant decrease in the heat
removal capability, the subject containment fan cooler-was declared
inoperable at 2:30 p.m. on the same day.
With
HVH-4 containment
fan
cooler declared inoperable
and
Westinghouse continuing their analysis of HVH-4,
the licensee
conducted SP-812 on cooler HVH-4. The purpose of this procedure was
to determine if the discharge pressure at the cooler outlet could be
raised by throttling down on the SW discharge valve associated with
HVH-4. This was predicated on the Westinghouse determination that a
positive pressure reading, if achieved during SP-812, would provide a
basis for declaring HVH-4 operable. Review of the test data obtained
10
during
the
conduct of SP-812, indicated a positive pressure
(approximately 10 psi) at the top of the HVH-4 cooler, and it
was
declared operable at 5:00 a.m.
on August 30,
1988. However, the
discharge pressure from the "B" SW booster pump was determined to be
below the pump curve and the pump was taken out of service to adjust
the clearances per WR/JO 88-AIIW1.
On August 30, 1988, subsequent to returning the "B" SW booster pump to
service, HVH-4 was again declared inoperable in order to further test the
SW system pressure characteristics associated with this containment fan
cooler. Because of the cumulative effects of system test restrictions
(entering and exiting LCOs)
at power, limited testing configuration
conditions, inconclusive test data, and questionable parameters for
operation, the licensee decided to take the Unit to cold shutdown.
Subsequent problems and repairs of the HVH coolers will be addressed
in a subsequent inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
9. Onsite Review Committee (40700)
The inspectors evaluated certain activities of the -PNSC to determine
whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS
and other regulatory requirements. In particular, the inspectors attended
the special PNSC
meeting which was convened on August 24,
1988,
to
evaluate the service water system/HVH containment fan cooler issue.
The
inspection ascertained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership,
review process, frequency, and qualifications were satisfied.
Previous
meeting minutes were
reviewed
to
confirm that decisions
and
recommendations were accurately reflected in the minutes. The inspectors
also followed up on selected previously identified PNSC activities to
independently
confirm that
corrective
actions
were
progressing
satisfactorily.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 13,
1988,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee. Proprietary information is
not contained in this report.
No written material was given to the
licensee by the resident inspectors during this report period.
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
88-23-01
Open
IFI -
Review of Escort
Responsibilities Within the Protected
Area (paragraph 4).
11.
List of Abbreviations
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BLDG
Building
CB
Circuit Breaker
Carolina Power & Light
Emergency Operation Facilities
Environmental Qualifications
Engineered Safety Feature
EST
Engineering Surveillance Test
DISC
Disconnect
Fire Protection
HVH
Heating Ventilation Handling
IFI
Inspector Followup Item
IWP
Inservice Inspection Pump Testing
JCO
Justification for Continued Operation
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water
Microbiologically Induced Corrosion
Maintenance Surveillance Test
Nonconformance Report
NED
Nuclear Engineering Department
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OMM
Operations Management Manual
0ST
Operations Surveillance Test
Personnel Access Portal
PEP
Plant Emergency Procedure
PNSC
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Quality Control
RNPD
Robinson Nuclear Project Department
Reactor Turbine Generator Board
Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (Pump)
S/G
Safety Parameter Display System
SWBP
Service Water Booster Pump
TS
Technical Specification
WR/JO
Work Request/Job Order