IR 05000261/1980021
| ML14175B203 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1980 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Mcdonald J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14175B199 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-80-21, NUDOCS 8011050268 | |
| Download: ML14175B203 (5) | |
Text
o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/80-21 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street
--.Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility:
H. B. Robinson Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Inspection at Robins n Fa lity near Hartsville, SC Inspector:
, A
/
6 alDa e Signed Approved by:
/
P io Chief, RONS Branch ate igned SUMMARY Inspection on August 18-22, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 40 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of IE Bulletin followup and plant tou Results Three apparent items of noncompliance were found in the two areas; (Infraction failure to review procedure change, Paragraph 5.a; Infraction
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failure to establish or implement maintenance procedures Paragraph 6.a; and Deficiency failure to complete operator required reading, Paragraph 6.b).
DETAILS 1. *Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Starkey, Plant Manager
- R. Connolly, Director Nuclear Safety and QA
- C. Crawford, Manager Operations and Maintenance
- J. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
- B. Garrison, QA Supervisor
- F. Lowery, Operations Supervisor #2 C. Wright, Assistant Operations Supervisor #2
- S. Zimmerman, Manager, Technical and Administration
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 22, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The licensee commented that the nonconforming conditions of the freeze protection system discussed in Paragraph 6a would probably have been identified when the licensee routinely looks at the system in the fal The backup nitrogen regulator PCV-1049 was directed to be returned to service; however, it was undergoing an anti cipated two or three hours of maintenance before being lined up to satisfy the immediate corrective action to the item of noncompliance discussed in Paragraph.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
IE Bulletin Followup The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter, Serial No.80-832 to IE Bulletin 80-05, Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS)
Holdup Tanks (HUT).
Vent paths were visually verified for the Refueling Water Storage Tank, Auxiliary Building Sump Tank "A", and the Chemical Drain Tank in conjunction with the Laundry and Hot Shower drain tank The operation of the vent header which provides cover gas for the three CVCS HUT was reviewe Findings were acceptable except as follows: During normal operation of the vent header, cover gas was supplied from the Waste Gas Decay tanks via a pressure regulator and this was to be backed up by a pressure regulator with lower setpoint which provides clean nitroge The nitrogen backup regulator was shown to
-2 have a normally open inlet isolation valve (1661)
on FSAR Figure 11.1-2, Waste Disposal Syste 'This was further amplified in the Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints document which stated that for proper operation for the vent header, the nitrogen backup regulator as well as the other regulators affecting vent header pressure must be set within specified operating band At the time of the inspection, the nitrogen regulator was removed from service. From discussion with-operating personnel, this practice had been routine for at least the last two years, with a primary consideration being the minimization of the volume of waste ga The Operations Supervisor was not aware of the practice and no formal review had been conducted to determine the appropriateness of this actio This failure to review a change to the facility constitutes an item of noncompliance (50-261/80-21-01). The licensee's original review of the bulletin did not apparently address:
(1) The design operation of PCV-104 (2) CVCS HUT withdrawal rate for two evaporator operatio (3) The absence of a calibration program for PCV-1027, 1049, 1050, and 1051 which would assure satisfaction of the Precautions, limitations, and setpoints documen (4) The potential for maloperation of PCV-1027 based on downstream piping configuratio (5)- the variables of gas decay tank pressure and CVCS HUT level on the rate of HUT depressurization during a withdrawal, with and without failure of PCV-1027 and/or PCV-104 The plant manager committed to the submission of a supplemental response to the Bulletin prior to the conclusion of the current refueling outage (early October).
This supplemental response will address the further review of the Bulletin concerns and proposed implemented administrative controls and/or system modifications to protect the CVCS HUT against vacuum conditions. Until the appropriate review of IE Bulletin 80-05 and resultant corrective actions are completed, this item is open (50-261/80-21-02). Plant Tour The inspector toured the control room, the area of the main steam isolation valves and the associated steam lines to the auxiliary feed pump and pressure transmitters for the steam break protection system. Findings were acceptable except as follows: The following nonconforming conditions existed either as a result of inadequately established or implemented maintenance procedures:
-3 (1)
The electrical junction box containing safety-related control circuits for MS-V1-3B had holes in the box and its inspection plate loos (2)
Freeze protection wiring for the steam break protection system pressure transmitters were missing three conduit body cover Freeze protection wiring for the PT-486 condensing pot was mis sing insulation and appeared to be grounded to the condui (3)
Five bolts in the seismic support structure for the "A" main steam line were loos (4)
The cable conduit for auxiliary feed pump steam supply valve MS-V1-8B was not fastened either to its support or its junction bo This failure to control maintenance activities constitutes an item of noncompliance (50-261/80-21-03). The required reading material in the control room was approximately sixteen inches thic The requirements of 10 CFR 55, Appendix A, for operator cognizance of changes to plant procedures and design was implemented by Instruction 303, Dissemination of Informatio This instruction required that the reading material be identified and routed to the licensed operations; however, it did not stipulate any requirements for timeliness of review and the inspector noted the following review status for a sample of reading items:
Date Issued Subject Not Reviewed 4/29/80 AP-24 Loss of Instrument Bus
4/9/80 AP-18 Loss of Component Cooling
Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps 9/19/79 GP-2 Cold Solid to Hot
Subcritical at 540F 12/27/79 M-501 Core Subcooling Monitor
Modification 12/27/79 M-498-2, -3, -4 Emergency Plan
Alarm Modifications 12/7/79 EI-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant
This failure to assure operators were currently cognizant of facility design and procedure changes constitutes an item of noncompliance (50-261/80-21-04). Some degradation of equipment in the MSIV area was observed including:
(1)
The armor was broken on armored cables providing control for MS-Vl-3B and the auxiliary feed pump steam supplies MS-V1-8A and-8 e-4 (2)
MS-25A and MS-34C had no handwheel (3) Insulation did not completely cover the PT-485 condensing pot as designe Plant Management agreed that inspection for these types of nonconforming conditions should be incorporated into the current housekeeping progra Until the licensee establishes measures to identify nonconforming con ditions which have been caused by continued operations or operations activities, this item is open (50-261/80-21-05).