ML14176A844
| ML14176A844 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1990 |
| From: | Dance H, Garner L, Jury K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A842 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-90-02, 50-261-90-2, NUDOCS 9003220141 | |
| Download: ML14176A844 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1990002
Text
t REG& 4UNITED
STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-261/90-02
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.: DPR-23
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson
Inspection Conducted: J nuary 11 -
February 10, 1990
Inspectors:
,8
6
arL.W.ni r Resident Inspector
Date 'gd
R. ury R sident Inspector
Date igned
Approved by:
14,4---
H. C. Dance, Section Chief
Date igne
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational
safety verification, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, and
onsite followup of events at operating power reactors.
Results:
One violation was identified for failure to follow surveillance procedure
OST-007. This personnel error resulted in a reactor trip.
The capability to obtain accurate and repeatable data during IST pump test. is
questionable.
When a CCW pump entered the required action range, it
was not promptly
reported to the control room.
Diesel generator exhaust smoke initiated fire alarms.
Fire brigrade members
arrived on the scene within three minutes.
V
1
~)
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
C. Baucom, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
C. Bethea, Manager Training
- J. Benjamin, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support
R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Performance
0. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
J. Curley, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project
R. Femal,.Shift Foreman, Operations
W. Gainey, Supervisor, Operations Support
- S. Griggs, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- J.
Kloosterman Director, Regulatory Compliance
D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations
A. McCauley, Principal Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Safety
R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
- R-. Morgan, Plant General Manager
D. Myers, Shift Foreman, Operations
M. Page, Manager, Technical Support
- R. Powell, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support
- S. Pruitt, Senior Specialist, Technical Support
0
D. Quick,' Manager, Plant Support
- J. Russ, Senior Specialist, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations
- J. Sheppard, Manager, Operations
R. Smith, Manager, Maintenance
R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations
- R. Weber, Senior Specialist, Technical Support
H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview on February 23, 1990.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph of the inspection report.
2. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility
was being operated safely and in conformance *with regulatory
requirements.
These activities were confirmed by direct observation,
facility tours, intervie 'ws and discussions with licensee personnel and
management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility
records.
0W
2
To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors
reviewed shift logs, operations' records, data sheets, instrument traces,
and records of equipment malfunctions.
Through work observations and
discussions with Operations Staff members,
the inspectors verified the
staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions,
responded properly to
alarms,
adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls,
cognizant of in-process surveillance and maintenance activities, and
aware of inoperable equipment status.
The inspectors performed channel
verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters
to verify conformance with TS.
Shift changes were routinely observed,
verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper
control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was controlled
and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an
effective manner.
Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment
operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment,
and to
verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical
protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly
implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities on
systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted
in accordance with license requirements.
For the surveillance test
procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and
LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and tagouts
were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by
qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test
instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at the
required frequency,
and that the tests conformed to TS requirements.
Upon test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data was
complete, accurate, (except as noted below),
met TS requirements,
and
that the systems were properly returned to service.
Specifically, the
inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
OST 202 (revision 21)
SDAFW System Component Test
OST 401 (revision 24)
Emergency Diesels
OST-908 (revision 17)
Component Cooling System Component Test
OST-401
On February 5, 1990, after starting B EDG in accordance with OST-401,
fire alarms were received from parts of the auxiliary building.
Both the
A and B trains of fire zone 12 and one train in zone 10 actuated causing
3
the fire header deluge valve to open.
No water was sprayed since no
sprinkler heads actuated.
Fire brigade members were on the scene within
three minutes of the first alarm. Smoke was observed in sections of the.
first floor auxiliary building but no fire was detected.
The smoke had
the characteristic smell of diesel exhaust.
Based on observations of
personnel outside the auxiliary building, smoke from the EDG muffler had
apparently blown around the side of the building into the HVS-1 supply fan
intake. The fan had distributed the smoke back into the building via the
normal ventilation system. There are no known previous occurrences of
this phenomena.
The inspectors observed the site manager and operations
manager in the control room during the event.
OST-908
OST-908 is utilized to verify mechanical performance and to assess
operational readiness of CCW pumps and valves.
During performance of
this test and subsequent data review on February 7, 1990, several test
anomalies were identified. The first anomaly occurred during the testing
of B CCW pump when the pump flow was such that it placed the pump in the
alert range in accordance with ASME Section XI,
Subsection IWP.
The
pump's flow was determined to be only 84 gallons above the minimum
required action flow by the technician performing the test.
The
inspectors questioned the accuracy of the flow readings as the pump flow
measured by the flow instrumentation was varying by approximately 600 gpm
and appeared to be at a flow at least 100 gpm below the minimum required
action range flow during the majority of the test.
The inspectors were
subsequently informed that there was a more accurate measurement
technique available which would measure average flow over a period of
time.
Due to the subjectivity of the methodology utilized during the
test, the licensee is planning to review whether the more accurate and
consistent methodology for determining flow should be procedurally
mandated. The location utilized for flow measurement was questioned due
to the flow variations (approximately 15% of nominal).
The inspectors
were informed that due to ALARA considerations, the current location is
the most practical for access; however, apparently it is not the most
desirable for flow measurement accuracy.
The licensee is currently
evaluating a more accurate location as well as permanently installed
hard-wired instrumentation to address the ALARA considerations.
- The B
CCW pump is currently scheduled to be tested on an increased frequency
per Section XI requirements.
The second anomaly occurred during review of the test data, when it was
identified that C CCW pump's differential pressure had entered the
required action range.
Upon identification of this situation by the
shift foreman,
he declared the pump inoperable.
The pump's pressure
indicators were recalibrated and the applicable portion of test performed
again, and acceptable differential pressure was obtained. This situation
was a concern as the high differential pressure was not identified as
4II
4
making the pump inoperable until 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after the high differential
pressure was recorded. The individual performing the test was informed of
the necessity to promptly recognize test discrepancies as well as timely
notification of the control room.
Evidently the individual did not
recognize the differential pressure had reached the required action range.
This was considered to be an isolated occurrence.
Additionally, the inspectors expressed concern with the necessity to
recalibrate the pressure indicators, which were within their required
calibration interval.
Installed pressure instrument accuracy has been
previously questioned by the inspectors during flow testing of RHR system
(identified as an URI in report 89-17).
As a result of the instrument
accuracy concerns, coupled with the concern with procedural control of
test methodology and of flow measurement locations, the capability to
obtain accurate and repeatable data is questionable.
Accuracy and
repeatability is essential in determining degraded pump/system
performance.
The previous URI (89-17-02) is considered closed.
All
these issues will now be considered as a URI:
Determine if IST Program
is Capable of Determining Pump Operability and Degradation: 90-02-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems
and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in
accordance with TS,
approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes
and standards.
The inspectors determined that these activities did not
violate LCOs and that required redundant components were operable. The
inspectors verified that required administrative, material,
testing,
radiological, and fire prevention controls were adhered to.
In
particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance
activities:
WR/JO 90-AATT1
Repair SDAFW Pump Oil Leak
WR/JO 90-AAWR1
Inspect/Repair SDAFW Pump Recirculation Check
Valve, AFW-9A
WR/JO 90-AAWS1
Inspect/Repair SDAFW Pump Recirculation Isolation
Valve, AFW-17
During performance of OST-202,
SDAFW System Component Test, revison 21,
on January 18,
1990, a leak was identified on the SDAFW pump shaft oil
seal.
Work request 90-AATT1 was initiated and the oil return lines were
visually examined for blockage.
No blockage was observed, and the oil
pressure to the bearings was reduced to 3 psig, per the vendor.
The pump
was restarted; however, oil leakage was still present. The turbine end of
5
the pump was disassembled.
Upon removal of the bearing cover, it was
determined that heat shrink tubing around the thermocouple wires to the
bearings was blocking the oil return ports. The heat shrink material was
removed, additional visual inspection performed, and the pump and piping
were reassembled.
When the pump was run again,
leakage was still
present. After an unsuccessful attempt to stop the leak by adjusting the
oil pressure, the pump's turbine end was disassembled again.
This
disassembly revealed the oil return port was filled with Copatite (used
to seal the bearing cover) and that the bearing cover was not sealing
securely.
The return port was cleared and the pump and piping were
reassembled.
These maintenance activities were performed per CM-008,
SDAFW Pump Overhaul, revision 6. The pump was subsequently run with no
oil leakage evident.
During the maintenance evolutions described above,
an anomaly in the
amount of recirculation flow was identified, in that, recirculation flow
was identified to be less than half of its nominal value.
To determine
the root cause, the SDAFW pump recirculation check valve, AFW-9A,
was
disassembled and inspected per WR 90-AAWR1 for possible binding.
The
valve internals were inspected and no problems were found. When the pump
was run without the check valve internals installed, recirculation flow
was less than expected.
The check valve internals were cleaned and
reinstalled and further cause determinations were made.
Work request
90-AAWS1 was subsequently initiated to disassemble and inspect the
manually operated SDAFW pump recirculation isolation valve, AFW-17. Upon
valve disassembly and boroscopic inspection of the piping,
it
was
identified that the valve disc had separated from the stem and that the
wafer that the valve stem pivots on had become dislodged. The dislodged
wafer
had partially blocked the flow orifice, thus restricting
recirculation flow.
The valve disc was tack welded back to the union and
the valve was reassembled and returned to service. On January 23, 1990,
OST-202 was satisfactorily performed, and the SDAFW pump was returned to
service.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
On January 17,
1990, at 8:26 p.m. the unit experienced an OT delta T trip
from 100% of power.
Plant systems responded as anticipated. The unit
was placed in hot shutdown in accordance with emergency procedure PATH-1.
Subsequent to the transient review and root cause determination, the unit
was returned to service on January 18, 1990. The transient had resulted
from a personnel error during the performance of OST-007,
Nuclear
Instrumentation Comparator Channel, revision 4. The operator had tripped
protection channel I bistables for OT delta T and OP delta T, as required
by step 7.1.6.1. However, he believed that two additional bistables had
to be tripped, e.g., the rod stop bistables for this channel also had to
6
be tripped.
Without recognizing that the next step specified two
bistables associated with protection channel II,
he tripped the OT delta
T bistable listed in step 7.1.6.2. This action completed the two out of
three logic for the OT delta T reactor trip protection function.
However, step 7.1.6 had instructed him to place the OP delta T and OT
delta T trip bistables "associated only with the power range channel
being tested, in the tripped mode."
Failure to perform step 7.1.6
correctly was a violation:
Failure To Follow Procedure OST-007 Resulted
In Reactor Trip, 90-02-02.
One violation was identified.
6. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 23, 1990,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings
listed below and in the summary. . Dissenting comments were not received
from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in this
report.
Item Number
Description/Reference Paragraph
90-02-01
URI - Determine If IST Program Is Capable Of
Determining Pump Operability And Degradation
90-02-02
VIO - Failure To Follow Procedure OST-007
7. List of Acronyms and Initialisms
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Component Cooling Water
Corrective Maintenance
gpm
Gallons per minute
HVS
Heating Ventilation Supply
Inservice Testing
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
Maintenance Surveillance. Test
OST
Operations Surveillance Test
OP Delta T
Overpower Delta Temperature
OT Delta T
Overtemperature Delta Temperature
psig
Pounds per square inch -
gage
System Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
7
TS
Technical Specification
Unresolved Item*
W/R
Work Request
WR/JO
Work Request/Job Order
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations.