IR 05000261/1989013
| ML14176A763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1989 |
| From: | Dance H, Garner L, Jury K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A762 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-89-13, NUDOCS 8909150121 | |
| Download: ML14176A763 (8) | |
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-261/89-13 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: July 11 -
August 10, 1989 Inspector:
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Garner, Senior sident Inspector Dte Signed
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_C/3 If K. R.1Jury, siden Inspector D t Sigd Approved by:
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H. C. Dance, Section Chief D te Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, followup or corrective action for violations, and actionon previous inspections finding Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie The unit exceeded its previous continuous run record of 102 day Three of the six ESF room coolers are removed from service due to tube leakag Erosion is the major cause of cooler unit deterioration. Upgrade of the coolers to reduce the frequency of erosion induced failures is an IF REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted
- C Baucom, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance C. Bethea, Manager, Training
- D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- W. Gainey, Supervisor, Operations Support E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safet R. Johnson, Manager, Control and Administration
- R. Morgan, Plant General Manager D. Nelson, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance
- D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
- R. Smith, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne *Attended exi.t inteview on August 17, 198 Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph of the inspection repor. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility record To verify equipment operability and compliancewith TS, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, operations' records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunction Through work observations and discussions with Operations Staff members, the inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms, adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of in-process surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of inoperable equipment statu The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters to verify conformance with T Shift changes were routinely observed, verifying that system status centinuity was maintained and that proper control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an attentive and professional manne eq0mn tts h npcospefre hne eiiain n
Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that radiological. controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly implemente On July 28, 1989, the licensee exceeded their previous continuous run record of 102 day HVH Room Cooler Failures During the past few months, the licensee has experienced tube leaks in HVH pump area cooling units for both the MDAFW pump room and the RHR pump pit, HVH 7A, 7B, and 8B, respectivel The inspectors reviewed EE 89-018 addressing the effects on MDAFW pump room equipment due to postulated loss of the cooling unit This EE describes the need for operator action to open the doors to the MDAFW pump room within ten minutes to prevent the room temperature from exceeding 200' This EE justifies that MDAFW pump-room equipment will not be adversely affected by this temperature, and that opening of the room doors will maintain temperature below this value. An EE exists concerning loss of the RHR pit room coolers and has been previously reviewed by the inspector No apparent significant operability concerns result from the failures of these unit However, these cooling units are relatively new equipment (approxi mately three years old),
and the failures caused by errosion were unexpecte Due to the relatively rapid failures of these units, the licensee is currently evaluating alternatives to preclude recurrenc Corrective actions (i.e. improved units) are to be implemented and installed during the 1990 refueling outag These corrective actions are being tracked as an IFI:
Review Corrective Actions to Ensure Improved HVH Unit Reliability, 89-13-0 No violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with. license requirement For the surveillance test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at the required frequency, and that the tests conformed to TS requirement Upon test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data was
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complete, accurate, and met TS requirements, test discrepancies were properly documented and rectified, and that the systems were properly returned to servic. Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
o MST-003 (revision 15)
TAVG And Delta-T Protective Channel Testing a
MST-013 (revision 11)
Steam Generator Water Level Protective Channel Testing o
OST-252 (revision 7)
RHR Component Test o
OST-401 (revision 23)
Emergency Diesels o
OST-551 (revision 11)
Turbine Valve and Trip Functional Test o
OST-910 (revision 11)
Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator During the performance of OST-551 in July 1989, the inspectors noted the conscientious effort on the part of the operating crew in preparing for any abnormalities that could have occurred during the tes When this test was performed in June 1989, there was a valve limiter malfunction which caused the turbine governor valves to close; however, no. root cause was identifie In preparation for this event to reoccur, the operating crew was well prepared, communicated efficiently, and professionally performed the test. No problems were encountered during test performanc No violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes and standard The inspectors determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that required redundant components were operabl The inspectors verified that required administrative, material, testing, radiological, and fire prevention controls were adhered t In particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:
o CM-610 (revision 2)
Emergency Diesel Piston Ring, Injection Nozzle and Crankshaft Overhaul
WR/JO 89-AHDX1 Repair of A EDG Output Breaker o
WR/JO 89-AGMB1 Replacement of OP Trip Channel II Signal Summator, TM-422G o
WR/JO 89-AGHT1
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Troubleshooting/Correction of High Cylinder Temperatures of EDG A WR/JO 89-AGHT1 was written as a result of the licensee's inability to identify and correct high temperature problems on the A EDG cylinders as described in IR 89-1 Inspection Report 89-12 delineates the troubleshooting/corrective action that was taken in attempt to correct the problem Subsequent to that time, the EDG vendor (Fairbanks-Morse)
technical representative was consulted and oversaw the work performed on this WR. This work began on July 24, 1989 and encompassed a five day span during which time extensive checks and tests were performed on the EDG and associated parts and component The EDG's fuel and air systems were inspected and tested intensivel As a result of this troubleshooting it appears that the high cylinder temperatures were due to injection nozzle problem These problems ranged from a nozzle(s) lifting and injecting prematurely (i.e. low cylinder pressure), streaming (vs. vaporization), to sticking. The vendor representative also identified a nozzle discrepancy during troubleshooting, in that, eight of the twenty-four nozzles had 10 degree injection angles as compared to the vendor recommended 15 degree injection angle The discrepancy concerning the injection angles is being evaluated through the licensee's corrective action program; the A EDG nozzles were replaced with 15 degree nozzles during the troubleshootin During the 1990 refueling outage the licensee will evaluate whether 10 or 15 degree nozzles, or a combination of both are currently installed in the B ED No similar temperature problems have been encountered on the B ED No violations or deviations were identifie. Followup On Corrective Action For Violations (92702)
(Closed)
VIO 261/88-04-01, Failure to Properly Control Work Activities Associated With Reinstallation of Pipe Suppor The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response *to the NOV dated May 26, 198 The inspectors visually confirmed that the missing anchor bolt was installed on spring hanger 339 as committe In addition, the inspectors verified that CM-403, Removal and Reinstallation of Pressurizer Cubicle Cover, revision 0, issued May 24, 1988, contains appropriate acceptance criteria for the disassembly and reassembly of the PZR cubicle spring hanger (CLOSED)
VIO 261/87-15-01, M-ispositioning of Valve No NOV was issued with IR 87-1 This item was combined with item 261/87-15-02 and issued as a severity level III violation in IR 87-2 See VIO, 261/87-23-01 inspection documented belo (CLOSED)
VIO 261/87-15-02, Failure to Follow Procedure No NOV was issued with IR 87-1 This item was combined with item 261/87-15-01 and issued as a severity level III violation in IR 87-2 See VIO 261/87-23-01 inspection documented belo (CLOSED)
VIO 261/87-23-01, Inadequate Control of Valve Operation The inspectors reviewed the licensee's "Reply To Notice of Violation, EA 87-112" dated October 16, 198 The inspectors verified that OMM-001, Operations - Conduct of Operations, revision 23, section 5.8.2 entitled Independent Verification, GP-002 Cold Solid To Hot Subcritical At No Load T-AVG, revision 37, step 5.4.6., and GP-007, Plant Cooldown From Shutdown
To Cold Shutdown, revision 17, step 5.2.20.3, were revised as committed in the response to the NO The inspectors also verified that Training Department lesson plans were appropriately revised to incorporate independent verification requirements as detailed in OMM-00 Specific lesson plans reviewed were AOP-LP-11, Conduct of Operation, revision 10, and AOP-HO-1, Conduct of Operation, revision. Onsite Followup of Wflitten Reports of Nonroutine Events (92700)
(CLOSED)
LER 87-026, Potential For Residual Heat Removal Pump Failure Due to an Inadequacy in Design. This issue was addressed by IEN 87-59. The LER and its 'supplement, issued February 29, 1988, discusses the applicability of IEN 87-59 to HB The licensee and their NSSS contractor, Westinghouse, has determined that a RHR pump can operate dead-headed for up to 9.3 minutes before the. pump begins to cavitate. In their supplemental LER, the licensee committed to incorporate a 9 minute limit for operator action to preclude RHR pump damage from zero flow operatio The inspectors verified that the current revision of the EPP Foldouts contains a RHR pump criteria which requires one RHR pump to be shutdown if reactor pressure is above the pump shutoff hea This criteria meets the LER commitmen (CLOSED) LER 88-017, Inadvertent Maintenance Requiring LCO for Post-Maintenance Testin The event involves Operation's personnel authorizing valve packing adjustment of the CS tank outlet valve SI-845 B without consideration that post-maintenance stroke timing would require the plant to be placed in an eight hour to shutdown LC The inspectors reviewed implementation of the corrective actions addressed in the LE The inspectors verified that OMM-005, Clearance and Test Request, revision 17, requires per Attachment 7.1 that post-maintenance testing be specified prior to any work/troubleshooting initiation. The LER indicated that a list of valves requiring a special' plant configuration for testing would be provided to the maintenance planners. The licensee has replaced the list by modifying EDBS to reflect cold shutdown test requirement EDBS is used by the maintenance planners while planning both corrective and preventive maintenance activitie These actions should be sufficient to prevent a future re-occurrence of this even (Closed)
LER 87-24, Discovery of Reactor Protection and Control Anolog Instrument Rack Inadequate Anchorage Due to Installation Discrepanc This discrepancy is discussed in IR 87-3 The inspectors reviewed DCN 917-3 which installed additional bracing for the above referenced instrument rack The inspectors visually inspected the installed added support members and determined that they 'have not been degrade No violations or deviations were identifie. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(CLOSED) IFI 261/87-05-02, Station Vital Battery Racks Tilted. This item involved both the A and B vital batteries not being installed leve The inspectors verified that until the tilt was corrected, the licensee adjusted the low specific gravity limit to 1.210 during performance of surveillance test The applicable procedures are MST-902, Battery Test Daily, 5 Days Per Week, and MST-903, Station Battery Charge - Monthl The battery racks were leveled during the 1988 refuel outage as part of the implementation of plant modification M-940, Battery Charger Additio The inspectors visually verified that the adjusted battery racks are level and were installed in accordance with M-940. The inspectors also verified that the current revisions of MST-902 and MST-903, 12 and 13, respectively, contain the non-tilted low specific gravity limit of 1.20 No violations or deviations were identifie. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 17, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below and in the summar Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph 89-13-01 IFI
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Review Corrective Actions to Ensure Imprbved HVH Unit Reliability (paragraph 2)
9. List of Acronyms and Initialisms CM Corrective Maintenanc CS Containment Spray DCN Design Change Notice EA Enforcement Action EDBS Equipment Data Base System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EE Engineering Evaluation EPP End Path Procedures ESF Engineered Safety Feature EQ Environmental Qualifications F
Fahrenheit GP General Procedure HBR H. B. Robinson HVH Heating Ventilation Handling IEN Inspection Enforcement Notice IFI Inspector'Followup Item IR
Inspection Report
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
Licensee Event Report
M
Modification
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water
Maintenance Surveillance Test
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Steam System Supplier
OMM
Operations Management Manual
OP
Over Power
OST
Operations Surveillance Test
PZR
Pressurizer
System Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Safety Injection
T
Temperature
TAVG
Temperature -
Average
TS
Technical Specification
Violation
WR/JO
Work Request/Job Order
0II