IR 05000261/1980015
| ML14175B177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1980 |
| From: | Quick D, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14175B176 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-80-15, NUDOCS 8009300063 | |
| Download: ML14175B177 (3) | |
Text
p.t REGU S
REUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/80-15 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility:
H. B. Robinson 2 Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Inspection at H. B. Robinson site near Hartsville, South Carolina Inspector:
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H. L. Whitener Date Si ned Approved by:
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D. R. Quick /
Da/te Signed SUMMARY Inspection on June 24 - July 2, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 83 inspector-hours on site in the areas of witnessing general plant operations, followup inspection of outstanding items, review of plant safety committee meeting minutes, and review of containment purge valve isolation syste Results Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie (D093 00-
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees 6"R. B. Starkey, General Manager
- C. W. Crawford, Manager O&M
- H. S. Zimmerman, Manager T&A
- R. Connolley, Director, Nuclear Safety and QA
- J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
- R. H. Chambers, Maintenance Supervisor
- J. Benjamin, Plant Engineer R. A. Dayton, Engineer R. S. McGirt, Generation Specialist D. H. Baur, QA Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included shift supervisors, reactor operators, auxiliary operators and records personne *Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 2, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. No items of noncompliance or
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deviations were foun.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Infraction (261/78-08-01): Failure to develop and use a procedure for functional testinq hydraulic suppressor The licensee has revised CPL-PT-31.0 to include a procedure for functional testing the hydraulic snubber The procedure incorporates temperature corrections and lockup and bleed rate ranges provided by the architect-enginee This item is considered close.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Areas Inspected In the period June 24 to July 2, 1980, the inspector acted in the capacity of the NRC Resident Inspecto Areas inspected are discussed in the following paragraph.
General Operations The inspector witnessed reactor operations and reviewed operational documenta tion on a sampling basi The type of activities performed included the following:
Carolina Power and Light Company-2 Observation of control room activities and discussions with operating personne Review of shift supervisor, operator, auxiliary operator and equipment out-of-service log Review status of alarm Review status of ECCS alignment on control boar Observe shift mannin Tour auxiliary buildin No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the above inspection.
Onsite Review Committee The inspector examined the minutes of the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meetings for the period June 1, 1979 to June 1, 1980, to verify conformance with appropriate sections of Technical Specification This review included:
frequency of meetings; quorum of membership at the meetings; and, committee review activities including review of proposed Technical Specification changes, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility and procedure changes and reactor operation events. The inspector concluded that the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee is performing the reviews required by the Technical Specification.
Containment Purge Isolation The inspector reviewed the containment purge valve isolation circuit logic to determine if any system bypasses, resets or overrides could result in a failure to isolate or cause the purge valves to reope Isolation signals to the purge valves are the safety injection condition or high radiation level in containmen The review showed that (1)
the purge valves will isolate when either of the above signals is present; (2) valves cannot be reopened manually as long as the isolation signal is present; (3).there are no "designed in" bypasses, resets or overrides which will allow the valves to be opened when an isolation signal is present; and (4) valves require deliberate operator action to be reopened after an isolation signal is removed. The inspector concluded that the purge isolation system should function properly unless intentionally defeated by blocking or removing the isolation signal input to the circuit and then manually opening the purge valve Administrative controls to prevent improper defeat of the isolation signals and manual opening of the purge valves will be examined during a subsequent inspection (IFI, 80-15-01).
At this time the licensee has elected not to purge the containment except when the plant is in cold shutdow The air supply to the, air-to-open, purge valves has been isolated to prevent inadvertent operation of these valves.