IR 05000261/1988020
| ML14191A987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1988 |
| From: | Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14191A986 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-88-20, NUDOCS 8809130160 | |
| Download: ML14191A987 (18) | |
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 SEP 0 2 1988 Report No.:
50-261/88-20 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.:
DPR-23 Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Inspection Conducted: A gust 1-3, 1988 Inspector: 1,
,
c
&
W. M. Sartor, J Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: M E. tein (Battelle)
Approved by: b /
/
?' ///AS T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date 'igned Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of key emergency and organizational functions and locations during a partial-participation exercise (offsite participation for communications only).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified. Based upon the scenario used and the team's observation of selected aspects of the licensee's response, it appeared there is reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency, appropriate actions can and will be take This exercise did not demonstrate protective action recommendations or assessment capabilities because of the limited scope of the scenari ::09130160 880902 PDR ADOCK 05000261 PDC
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Baldwin, Senior Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- E. Bean, Director of New Programs, Corporate Communications
- G. Beatty, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Power Department
- R. Black, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- G. Bowen, Training Assistant, Nuclear Training Section
- R. Crook, Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- C. Dietz, Project Manager, Robinson Nuclear Power Department
- J. Eaddy, Jr., Environmental and Chemistry Supervisor
- W. Flanagan, Manager, Modification Implementation
- S. Griggs, Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- E. Harris, Jr., Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- J. Harrison, Environmental and Chemistry Project Specialist
- R. Indelicato, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- D. Ingram, Industrial Engineer
- R. Johnson, Manager, Compliance and Auditing
- B. McFeaters, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Unit 2 Operations
- M. Morrow, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- T. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
- E. Roper, Operations, Fire Protection
- J. Sheppard, Manager, Unit 2 Operations
- R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Nuclear Unit 2 Operations
- S. Wallace, Technical Aide, Emergency Preparedness
- G. Walters, Project Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- L. Williams, Supervisor, Security
- H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- L. W. Garner, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2. Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-065 The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in advance of the exercis No major scenario problems were identified. No major inconsistencies or last-minute changes to data or exercise message packets were revealed during the licensee's controller/evaluator meeting held on August 1, 198. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-065 The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organizations, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergenc The inspector observed the activation., staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
No violations or deviations were identifie. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's offsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section I of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of interactions between onsite and offsite support organization *
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization. The on-duty Shift Foreman assumed the duties of Site Emergency Coordinator upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant General Manager. Required interactions (involving communications only)
between the licensee'.s emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures provided for requesting and using assistance resource This capability was not demonstrated during this off-year exercis No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-2 An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to identify and properly classify an emergency, and escalate it to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progresse Licensee actions in this area were timely and effectiv Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. The system was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequence The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigation actions during the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie *
7. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations'was established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-065 The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations,. and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations, if require No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6);
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that the communications links available to the emergency response organizations proved to be adequate throughout the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.H. of NUREG-065 The inspector observed portions of the activation, staffing, and operation-of the emergency response facilities, and evaluated the equipment provided for emergency use during the exercis a. Control Room - The inspector observed that Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available,
routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation response Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational dutie The Shift Foreman and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authoritie Control Room personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classificatio b. Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Site Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classificatio The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilitie Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manne This facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staf TSC security was promptly established and radiological habitability was routinely monitored during the exercis c. Operations Support Center - The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the Emergency Plan by the Site Emergency Coordinato Although the inspector observed that the OSC appeared to be organized and personnel were being kept informed of the status of events, some command and control/coordination problems existed. Log book entries from the Control Room (CR), TSC, and OSC attest to the problem. For example, the CR dispatched an AO to the OSC at 1020 hours0.0118 days <br />0.283 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.8811e-4 months <br /> to make entry to inspect the charging pump room from which Radiation Alarm RMS-4 alarmed at 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br />. At 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br />, the CR reported leakage identified at B charging pump. At 1042 hours0.0121 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.96481e-4 months <br />, the TSC log indicated a team going in to determine if the pump could be isolate At 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, the OSC logged the dispatch of two operators to the charging pump room to investigate the lea At 1118 hours0.0129 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.25399e-4 months <br />, the Emergency Repair Director in the TSC stated that the OSC had two teams ready to dispatch (one of them to tighten a flange in the charging pump room),
and indicated the dress to be anti-C's and regular dosimetry, with permission given changing dress to include Scott Air Packs and wet suits. At 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br />, the OSC logged that entry to the charging pump room is awaiting delivery of Scott Air Packs, which had been dispatched to the scene. At 1150 hours0.0133 days <br />0.319 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.37575e-4 months <br />, the TSC logged that the leak was in the process of being isolated and at 1156 hours0.0134 days <br />0.321 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.39858e-4 months <br /> the pump leak was reported stopped. At 1159 hours0.0134 days <br />0.322 hours <br />0.00192 weeks <br />4.409995e-4 months <br />, the OSC reported a maintenance team dispatched to the charging pump room and that operations had isolated the leak on the charging pump. [Note: The maximum reading obtained from RMS-4 was 60 mr/hr at 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />.]
This failure to provide properly dressed accident assessment teams on a timely basis was identified as an open item 261/88-20-0 The licensee also identified this issue as a deficiency for follow-u *)
d. Emergency Operations Facility -
Consistent with the exercise objectives, the EOF was staffed and activate The Emergency Response Manager demonstrated management and control of the facilit After declaring the EOF staffed and operational, communications between the EOF and TSC were maintaine Exchange of technical information and frequent consultation with the TSC were implemented by the staf Status boards were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the EOF staf Status boards were updated as required to chronicle changes in plant status, accident assessment, and mitigation throughout the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The.licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed t determine that deficiencies and improvements identified during the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Paragraph IV.F of
- Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section I of NUREG-065 The licensee conducted a post-exercise critique on August 2, 1988, and presented the results to licensee management the following da The management critique was attended by exercise controllers and observers and the NRC representative Findings identified during the exercise were discussed. Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspection The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies and indicated improvement item The conduct of the critique was consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited abov.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a. (Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-261/87-31-03, Failure to Establish and Maintain EOF Securit The inspector observed that security was promptly established to control access to the EOF and was maintained throughout the exercis b. (Closed) IFI 50-261/87-31-05, Knowledge and Familiarity with Emergency Work Permits and Exposure Control Procedur A licensee representative stated that corrective action had consisted of emphasizing the procedural requirements during trainin No problems were noted in this area during the emergency exercis *.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 3, 1988, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection result Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Number Description and Reference 261/88-20-01 IFI - Accident assessment team was neither promptly dispatched nor properly dressed-out (Paragraph 9.c).
Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and Scenario 0)
ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY 1988 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 88-03 ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES/GUIDELINES SCN:88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 2.0-0
1988 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT 1. Demonstrate the Control Room staff's ability to recognize operational symptoms and parameters indicative of degrading plant condition. Demonstrate the ability to properly classify emergency conditions in accordance with the emergency pla. Demonstrate the ability to properly escalate the emergency response based upon event classificatio. Demonstrate the adequacy of the RNPD Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures applicable to the scenari COMMUNICATIONS 1. Demonstrate that appropriate communication systems exist to accomplish notification of offsite agencies in accordance with emergency plans and procedure. Demonstrate the ability to adequately notify and activate emergency response organization personne. Demonstrate the ability to effectively communicate with plant emergency teams and company environmental monitoring teams located offsit. Demonstrate proper record keeping at emergency response facilitie. Demonstrate that accurate messages concerning the emergency are transmitted in accordance with established procedure. Demonstrate that status boards are accurately maintained and updated in accordance with emergency response plans and procedure. Demonstrate that appropriate briefings are held and incoming personnel are briefed and update. Demonstrate the capability to make timely and accurate notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Actual participation of the NRC Operations Center may be simulate SCN:88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 2.0-1 RADIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate plant conditions and offsite radiological dose projections, to arrive at appropriate protective action recommendation. Demonstrate the activation, operation, and reporting of the field monitoring teams within and beyond the site boundar. Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessment. Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological assessment process while maintaining personnel radiation exposure ALAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES 1. Demonstrate that sufficient and adequate emergency equipment exists to effectively perform necessary emergency action. Demonstrate that adequate security of facilities can be maintaine. Demonstrate that emergency response facilities (TSC, OSC, and EOF)
can be activated in accordance with the emergency plan and procedure E. PUBLIC INFORMATION 1. Demonstrate the ability to appropriately develop and disseminate news releases in accordance with established emergency procedure. Demonstrate that briefings concerning plant events are provided to the media during the emergenc EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION Demonstrate that sufficient emergency response organization personnel are available to support the emergency response on a round-the-clock coverage schedul. Exhibit proper response of emergency personnel to activate emergency response facilities and carry out assigned roles and responsibilities in accordance with emergency response procedure. Demonstrate the ability to transfer command and control responsibilities between the Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facilit SCN:88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 2.0-2 PERSONNEL PROTECTION 1. Demonstrate that the accountability process within the Protected Area can be accomplished in accordance with emergency response procedure. Demonstrate the ability to conduct area surveys under emergency condition. Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate radiation protection services such as Oosimetry and personnel monitorin. Demonstrate the ability to adequately control the spread of contamination and the radiological exposure of onsite emergency worker. Demonstrate proper radiation exposure record keeping for emergency personne GENERAL 1. Demonstrate the ability to conduct a controller/evaluator meeting the day before the exercise which addresses final concerns about the conduct of the exercis. Demonstrate the ability to self-critique and to identify areas needing improvemen. Demonstrate that previously identified NRC deficiencies, exercise weaknesses or inspector follow-up items (IFI's) from the 1987 annual Emergency Preparedness exercise have been resolved (where the scenario will permit).
SCN:88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 2.0-3
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(CON MSG.) SHUT OFF "B" CHARGING PUMP 10:17...
"B" CHARGING PUMP IS SHUT OFF 10:15.. A.O. GOES INTO CHARGING PUMP ROOM; SE LEAK IN "B" CHARGING PUMP 10:12... A.O. IN AREA SEES SUMP PUMP LEVELS RISING 10:10... R-4 RED ALARM LIGHT COMES ON IN CONTROL ROOM 09:55... AFW-45 VALVE DID NOT OPEN AT 09:53 PUMP WILL NOT TRIP 09:50...
REACTOR TRIP C)
1988 RNPD DETAILED EXERCISE TIME LINE (Part 2) Meteorological Conditions
All meteorological data will be actual informatio Extent of Participant Actions
The RNPD TSC, OSC, EOF, and CMC Emergency response facilities will be activated. The Technical Support Center (TSC) will be incorporated into the Protection Area of the Plan *
Plant personnel from the TSC and OSC will not be prepositioned at their emergency response facilities. Personnel responding to the EOF and the PMC from the Harris.Energy and Environmental Center (HE&EC)
near New Hill, NC or the Corporate Office in Raleigh, NC will be simulated as if they are in transit, but will not arrive before the end of the exercis *
RNPD control room personnel who will "play" during the exercise will be positioned in the control room before the beginning of the exercise and will play from an area behind the main control roo Play for the exercise will not be in the main control room so as to potentially affect the routine operation of the operating plan *
Exercise will commence with simulated Plant condition requiring declaration on an "UNUSUAL EVENT," escalating to a "Site Emergency."
- Accident conditions will not result in a simulated radiological release, however considerations of protective actions recommendations for the plume Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) should be observed during the exercis *
Radiological monitoring teams should be dispatched onsite and offsite to perform monitoring and sampling procedures. Plant offsite environmental monitorings teams will be dispatched in accordance with Plant procedure *
RNPD Emergency Alarms and announcements will be demonstrate *
Initial and continuous RNPD Accountability procedures will be implemente *
Emergency Assembly of non-essential personnel will be conducted in accordance with Plant procedure Evacuation of non-essential personnel of offsite locations will be simulate *
RNPD Emergency Call-Out procedures, beepers, and/or manual system will.be utilized as appropriat *
Activities initiated or performed by offsite governmental emergency response agencies with the state and counties will be simulate SCN:88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 2.0-6
CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT 1988 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE SCENARIO SCN-88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 3.0-0
NARRATIVE SUMMARY This exercise scenario involves two separate unrelated events, a fire in the protected area lasting more than ten minutes and loss of all annunciators for more than five minutes coincident with a plant transien The exercise commences with annunciator system DC ground alarm together with an annunciator inverter failure alarm requiring maintenance to be performed. An unrelated fire in the Janitorial Supplies Storage Building lasting approximately 40 minutes initiates-the emergency response. The annunciator inverter problem escalates when an arcing problem results in loss of all plant annunciator Later in the scenario a reactor trip/turbine trip occurs due to "C" Steam Generator Low Water Level coincident with steam flow greater than feed flow caused by "C" feedwater regulating valve going close Initial conditions establish that the plant has returned to 100% power from a valve test the night before at 65% power. The plant has been on line for the last 88 days at middle of core lif Peak power demands are expected in the late afternoon and system generation is tigh The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump has been declared inoperable due to failing OST-202 but the pump is still aligned for service. "A" Charging Pump is inoperable due to high vibration and is under clearance for maintenance. Additionally, as a precursor to the initiating events an annunciator system DC ground alarm and annunciator inverter failure alarm are present at turnove The fire in the Janitorial Supplies Storage Building is caused by spontaneous combustion of chemicals in the building. The fire duration is approximately forty minutes which should result in an Unusual Event declaration and initiation of the search of the TSC by securit Upon notification of the fire being extinguished the scenario shifts to the annunciator DC ground and inverter problems. All the RTCB annunciators come in flashin An arc in the annunciator inverter is observed by I&C personnel troubleshooting the original problems and almost immediately all annunciators go
"black."
I&C personnel observed damaged wiring in both annunciator inverter Troubleshooting and repair work continue. After 5 minutes the loss of annunciators should result in an Alert condition being declared and the ERO should be activate Approximately an hour after the annunciators are lost, feed flow to "C" Steam Generator is lost due to closure of "C" Feedwater Regulating Valve. All three level channels indicate rapid level decrease and feed flow on both channels is zero. This results in reactor trip due to "C" steam generator low water level coincident with feedwater flow versus steam flow mismatch. No "first-out" or any other annunciators are received due to annunciator problems. "A" and "B" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) Pumps receive a start signal; however, "A" MDAFW pump discharge valve fails to ope These conditions should result in declaration of a Site Emergency due to loss of annunciators for greater than five minutes, coincident with a plant transien Shortly after the reactor trip, RMS-4 alarm light (no RTGB annunciator) is receive This is caused by an approximate 15 gpm leak in the relief valve inlet flange off "B" Charging Pump. This should result in stopping of "B" Charging Pump and require entry into theroom to isolate the lea SCN-88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 3.0-1
Repair teams should be assembled to:
1) continue troubleshooting and repairs on the annunciator inverters, and 2) repair the leak on "B" Charging Pump. As options, repairs to the steam driven AFW pumps and "A" MDAFW pump discharge may be performed. Once the plant is stabilized, from the reactor trip transient and the "B" Charging Pump leak is isolated, downgrade of the emergency to an Alert condition is acceptable. Completion of repairs to the annunciators allows termination of emergency classifications. Completion of charging pump relief valve repairs will terminate the exercis SCN-88-2708 RNPD-88-03-RO 3.0-2