IR 05000261/1980007

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IE Insp Rept 50-261/80-07 on 800331-0403.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Lers & IE Bulletin 79-01B
ML14175B160
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1980
From: Kellogg P, Sauer R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14175B159 List:
References
50-261-80-07, 50-261-80-7, IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8006130391
Download: ML14175B160 (5)


Text

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UNITED STATES A 0NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/80-07 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name:

H. B. Robinson 2 Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Inspection at Robinson s near Hartsville, South Carolina Inspector:

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4 2-P 8o R. C. Sa r Date SIgned Approved by A f le____

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Kellogg, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on March 31 - April 3, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 34 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Operations, Licensee Event Reports and Bulletin Results Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. B. Starkey, Jr., General Manager
  • H. S. Zimmerman, Manager, Technical and Administration B. W. Garrison, QA Supervisor J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
  • F. Lowrey, Operations Supervisor M. F. Page, Senior Engineer R. McGirt, Senior Generation Specialist
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 3, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspection activities presented in the following details were discusse. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.

Review of IE Bulletin (IEB)79-01B, Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment In order to adequately appraise the licensee's response to this IEB, the inspector prepared an independent list tabulating all electrical equipment that he considered met the following two conditions: Equipment that will be required to function-under a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and/or high energy line break (HELB) environment or to an environment where fluids are circulated from'inside the containment to accomplish long-term cooling following a LOCA, and Equipment that is referenced in the stations Emergency Instructions, Technical Specifications and FSAR for mitigating a LOCA and/or HELB acciden Further, the inspector determined whether the equipment he identified meeting the two conditions was either essential or non-essential for mitigating the LOCA and/or HELB accident. The data was then compiled

-2 by system and location of the equipment with respect to the harsh environment and compared to the licensee's response. The problem areas encountered were:

(1) Electrical equipment and components which are exposed to radio active fluids being recirculated from inside containment to accomplish long-term cooling following a LOCA and which are required to function under these postulated conditions were not addressed. These items include:

the containment sump valves (SI-860A,B and 861A,B), the RHR to SI/RWST piggy-back valves (SI-863A,B), the SI hot leg injection valve (SI-869) and the SI pump flow and.discharge pressure transmitters (FT-940, 943 and PT-940, 943) to assure adequate core cooling is being achieved by verifying indicators of SI discharge piping integrit (2) Not all of the electrical equipment and components associated with systems that normally circulate radioactive fluids from inside containment and which are isolated under postulated acci dent conditions were addressed. Environmental qualification of these isolation valves must be addressed to ensure that they are capable of functioning under the environment expected. Pertinent items include the reactor coolant pump seal water return line isolation valve (CVC-381) and the letdown orifice isolation valves (CVC-200 A,B,C).

The licensee representative committed to address the environmental qualifi cations of the RUR to SI/RWST valves, the SI hot leg injection valve and the SI pump flow and discharge pressure transmitters in its 90 day response package submittal requested by NRC in IEB 79-01B. In addition, the licensee representative stated that the need to environmentally qualify the containment sump valves would be evaluate Information detailing the environmental qualification of CVC-381 was inadver tently left out of the 45 day response. Similarly, the system summary to the letdown orifice isolation valves was inadvertently left out. The licensee will also include this information in the 90 day respons This item will be left open pending the licensee's 90 day response submittal and containment sump valve evaluation (261/80-07-01). Review of Plant Operations The inspector reviewed the following areas of plant 6peration to ascertain whether facility operations were in conformance with applicable regulatory requirements and licensee commitments: Operating Logs and Records The inspector reviewed the following operating logs and records for the period March-24 - April 1, 1980 to ascertain whether plant oper ations were in conformance with technical specifications and administra tive licensee requirements:

(1) Shift Foremen logbook

-3 (2) Control Room Operator logbook (3) Auxiliary Operator - Outside Data log (4) Auxiliary Operator -

Inside Data log (5) Equipment Inoperable Reports The inspector reviewed operating logs to ensure that logged data was recorded in sufficient detail to communicate equipment status and was properly reviewed by supervisory personnel. In addition, logs were reviewed to insure that logged information did not conflict with technical specification requirements. The inspector reviewed plant Trouble Tickets and Equipment Inoperable Report Forms to insure that applicable technical specifications, including reporting requirements, were adhered to for inoperable equipmen No problems were identified in this are Facility Tour The inspector toured portions of the Unit 2 reactor auxiliary building, turbine structure and control bays. Inspection activities in this area included observation to ensure that:

instrumentation was operating and calibrated as required, radiation controls were established and properly adhered to, fire protection equipment was located as specified and appeared operabl In addition, selected valves, circuit breakers and control switches were verified to be properly aligned as required by technical specifications and plant procedures. Plant familiariza tion and identification of various systems and system components were also pursued during the tou No problems were identified within this are Control Room Operations Control room operations were observed and discussed with control room personnel to assure compliance with technical specifications and plant administrative requirements. Inspection activities in the control room included:

observation of selected instrumentation.to assure plant operation was within required limits and verfication that control room manning was in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and (m).

No problems in this area were identifie.

Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER)

The inspector reviewed the following LER for consistency with the require ments of Techncial Specification Section The inspector examined the licensee's analysis of the event, corrective action taken, and discussed

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the LER with licensee representative LER 80-03 -

Breech of CVCS Holdup Tank Inlet Piping During Seismic Restraint Installation

-4 During attachment of a seismic restraint re-enforcement pad to the "C" CVCS holdup tank inlet piping, a small pinhole leak developed in the line. The leak was the result of the bare metal (inlet piping) melting due to the heat of the welding process and from the slight positive internal pressure being present in the pipe which caused a small hole to blow open through the pipe in the heated are The licensee's response for corrective action identified construction personnel would be informed in a formal meeting to adhere to modifica tion instructions which require notifying the shift foreman of the work to be done and what it entails (i.e., system status changes).

The inspector found no documentation of the meeting nor indication that followup training of the construction workers was performed. The licensee representative indicated that this action would be completed by the end of April, 1980. This item is considered open pending further inspection by the Regional Office (261/80-07-02).

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