ML14176A755
| ML14176A755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1989 |
| From: | Imbro E, Jeffrey Jacobson, Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A754 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-89-200, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEC-79-14, IEIN-79-03, IEIN-79-3, IEIN-79-36, IEIN-84-13, IEIN-86-002, IEIN-86-029, IEIN-86-2, IEIN-86-29, IEIN-88-084, IEIN-88-84, NUDOCS 8908250262 | |
| Download: ML14176A755 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1989200
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards
Report No.:
50-261/89-200
Docket No.:
50-261
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L)
Facility:
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2
Inspection Conducted: May 22-26, 1989
Inspection Team Members:
Team Leader:
J. B. Jacobson, RSIB, NRR
Regional Support
S. Tingen, Region II
A. Szczepaniec, Region II
Electrical Power:
S. V. Athavale, RSIB, NRR
Mechanical Systems: M. C. Singla, Consultant
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Reviewed By:
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Date Signed
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cion Development, Section B
Approved By:
Da e ,
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Inspections Branch, NRR
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1. Introduction, Summary and Licensee Commitments
1.1
Introduction
As a result of the numerous findings involving motor-operated valves (MOVs) that
were identified during the performance of other NRC team inspections, a team
inspection specific to the area of MOVs was developed. The purpose of this
Motor Operated Valve Inspection (MOVI) was to determine whether the MOVs in the
H. B. Robinson plant are designed, installed, and being maintained In a manner
that would ensure their capability to perform their intended safety-related func
tions. During the inspection, programmatic reviews were conducted of engineering,
maintenance, training, and operations as applicable to the assessment of the MOVs.
1.2 Summary
As a result of this inspection, two potential enforcement findings and two open
items were identified. The first potential enforcement finding concerned the
inadequate documentation and/or evaluation of equipment failures. Three examples
of this finding were noted during the inspection, including the failure to docu
ment and evaluate a thermal overload to a MOV that had tripped during the last
three unit startups. The second potential enforcement finding concerned four
examples of inadequate, improperly engineered design modifications to the plant.
The examples noted included a case in which the licensee replaced valves with
those of a different type without performing the calculations necessary to ensure
adequate motor actuator sizing. As a result, several safety-related motor
actuators installed in the plant are now undersized and require replacement.
The two open items identified during the inspection pertained to the lack of a
basis for motor actuator torque switch settings and for thermal overload sizing.
In addition to these weaknesses, the team identified several strengths within the
h. B. Robinson MOV program. Specifically, the training of maintenance personnel,
the quality of applicable maintenance procedures, and the review of MOV generic
communication were identified as strengths by the inspection team.
1.3 Licensee Commitments
On June 6, 1989, a conference call was held between Carolina Power and Light
(CP&L,) NRR, and Region 1I staff concerning the two open items identified during
the inspection. During the call, CP&L committed to performing the following
actions:
(1) Within 90 days, a review will be performed of the adequacy of torque
switch settings for all safety-related MOVs installed at the H. B.
Robinson plant.
(2) Within 90 days, a review will be performed of the thermal overload
sizing relative to all safety-related MOVs where either the valve,
the rotor actuator, or the overload protective device has been modified
since original plant construction.
-1-
2. Inspection Areas
2.1 Actuator Sizing
In order to assess the sizing of the motor actuators installed in the Robinson
plant, the team requested data for eight specific MOVs from a list of all
safety-related MOVs. The data requested included the valve type, size, stem
diameter, stem pitch, stem lead, and seat diameter, as well as the motor
actuator overall gear ratio, type, motor size, motor speed, and spring pack
type. In addition, data were requested pertaining to the applicable line
pressures, the maximum differential pressures, and the motor or motor control
center voltages. The line pressures, the differential pressures, and the
voltages given to the team were then evaluated by the appropriate mechanical
or electrical specialist team members. From these data, calculations were
generated for each MOV selected for valve-required thrust, torque, and for
maximum operator-available thrust or torque. From the calculations, it was
determined that all eight motor actuators could deliver enough torque or thrust
to stroke the selected valves under all design-basis conditions.
In addition to the eight selected valves, a review was performed of the licensee's
sizing calculations relative to the 11 MOVs subject to NRC Bulletin No. 85-03.
Of the 11 bulletin valves, the licensee had determined that 6 actuators might
not be sized sufficiently to complete valve stroking under all design-basis
conditions. As a result, the licensee had prepared a justification for continued
operation (JCO) for the six steam-driven auxiliary feedwater punip valves affected.
The JCO, Engineering Evaluation ENG-87191, was reviewed in detail by the team
during this inspection. The JCO was based upon licensee calculations that showed
that the subject valves would open but might not close under all design-basis
conditions. Specifically, it was calculated that valves V1-8A, B, and C on the
steam admission lines to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbines would not be
able to be remotely closed as a result of the motor actuator undersizing.
These valves would have to be closed following a steam-generator tube rupture
in order to prevent an unmonitored release to the environment through the steam
driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam exhaust line. Although the valves are not
capable of being remotely closed (from the control room), the team verified that
these valves could be manually closed because of their close proximity and acces
sibility to the control room. The V2-14A, B, and C steam-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump discharge isolation valves were also calculated to be undersized;
however, the postulated accident scenarios for these valves would not require
closing at maximum differential pressure.
During review of this JCO, the team determined that the licensee had used normal
bus voltages in lieu of actual postulated degraded voltages in their sizing
calculations. For instance, on the V2-14A, B, and C valves the licensee had
used 208 volts instead of the actual 180 volts calculated to exist at the motor
actuator during accident conditions. As a result, the licensee recalculated the
thrusts available at the motor actuators and determined that although less than
previously calculated, the actuators could still open but not close the valves
under design-basis conditions. In addition, the V2-16A, B, and C valves, not
subject to the original JCO, are now calculated to be marginally sized. The
licensee has committed to replacing the nine motor actuators for valves V1-8A,
B, and C; V2-14A, B, and C and V2-16A, B, and C during its next refueling outage
currently scheduled for March 1990.
-2-
2.2 Torque Switch Settings
During the inspection, it was determined that CP&L did not have calculations
to support the torque switch settings of safety-related MOVs except for the
11 valves subject to NRC Bulletin No. 85-03. Additionally, CP&L did not have
information relative to the original torque switch settings as determined by
either Limitorque or the valve vendor. Although the actual torque switch
settings on the valves are known, it is not known whether or not these settings
are correct. Except for the 11 MOVs subject to NRC Bulletin No. 85-03 and the
particular MOVs that may have been tested under design-basis differential pres
sure, no assurance exists that the torque switch settings on the remaining MOVs
correspond to those necessary to ensure operability. If the settings were too
low, power to the NOV would be interrupted before the MOV could complete its
intended function.
Using the data supplied by CP&L for the eight selected MOVs, calculations were
generated to determine the acceptability of the present torque switch settings.
Of the eight MOVs selected, one had its torque switch bypassed in the closed
direction. Of the remaining seven MOVs, calculations.showed that five had
adequate torque switch settings. The other two had settings that calculationally
appeared to be marginal. The licensee was able to demonstrate that one of these
MOVs had indeed been tested at full differential pressure. For the other valve,
the V6-12B auxiliary feedwater discharge cross-connect, the licensee could not
demonstrate that testing at full differential pressure had been performed.
In addition to the team's sample inspection, it was noted that the licensee had
to increase the torque switch settings on the majority of its 11 bulletin valves.
As a result of these findings, the licensee was asked to expeditiously evaluate
the current torque switch settings on those MOVs on which full differential
pressure testing had not been performed. During a conference call on June 6,
1989, with NRR and Region II,
CP&L committed to performing this review within
90 days. This item is identified as Open Item 50-261/89-200-01.
2.3 Voltage Study
In order to ensure that the installed MOVs will function under design-basis
conditions, the team reviewed the voltage calculations used as inputs into the
MOV sizing calculations. As the available MOV motor torque decreases with the
square of the ac voltage, the ability of an MOV to operate under less than
nominal voltage requires specific analysis. During the inspection, the team
determined that CP&L does not currently have calculations that delineate the
motor terminal voltage at any specific MOV under design-basis conditions.
Although the team did review CP&L calculations RNP-E.0002 concerning a recently
performed voltage study, it was determined that this study did not address bus
voltages that were supplied from the plant's emergency diesel generators. In
addition, the study did not analyze what effects short-term transients such as
motor startups might have on the voltage being supplied to the MOVs. Until a
thorough electrical voltage study is completed, the actual voltage expected to
be delivered to a specific MOV under design basis-conditions cannot be deter
mined, however, due to the large margins identified during the teams review
of motor actuator sizing, no immediate safety concern was identified in this
area.
-3-
2.4 Thermal Overloads
During the inspection, a review was conducted of CP&L's program for sizing and
testing thermal overloads to MOV circuits at the H. B. Robinson plant. The
team determined that at Robinson, overload protection devices to safety-related
MOVs are installed and are not bypassed during the actuation of the emergency
core cooling systems. These thermal overload devices are also not periodically
tested. In addition, no direct indication exists in the controTl oom if a ther
mal overload trips and interrupts power to a safety-related MOV. As a result
of the above findings, arid in lieu of the two inadequate design modifications
pertaining to thermal overloads cited in Section 2.6 of this report, CP&L was
asked to expeditiously review the sizing of thermal overload devices in applica
tions in which either the actuator, valve, motor, or overload device itself may
have been changed since original plant design. During a conference call on
June 6, 1989, with NRR and Region II, CP&L conitted to completing such a
review within 90 days. This item is identified as Open Item 50-261/89-200-02.
2.5 Maintenance History Review and Evaluation
The licensee utilizes work request (WRs) to administratively control corrective
maintenance associated with MOVs. The inspectors reviewed WRs processed in 1988
and 1989 that required safety-related MOV maintenance. The purpose of this
review was to verify that adequate corrective action was being performed when
MOV problems were identified. The results of this review indicated that in
several instances valves repeatedly failed to operate because of insufficient
corrective action.
The first example concerned valve V2-16A, the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge
valve. On two occasions, May 14 and September 2, 1988, the valve could not be
shut electrically. For both failures the corrective action involved cleaning
the torque switch contacts and cycling the valve to verify operation. The cor
rective action did not address how the torque switch contacts got dirty or why
two failures for the same reason occurred in such a short interval.
During
the subsequent refueling outage, as a result of a 10 CFR Part 21 notification
received from Limitorque, CP&L performed inspections for crackeo nelamine torque
switches on several MOVs. Although exact records of the inspection were not
kept, a severely damaged torque switch was said to have been removed from either
valve V2-16A or B. It is therefore thought that this cracked torque switch was
the likely cause of failure for valve V2-16A and that had a thorough inspection
been performed when the valve originally failed to stroke, this deficiency might
have been discovered.
The second example concerned valve CC-730, the reactor coolant pump bearing,
component cooling water return, isolation valve. On January 10, 1989, the valve
could not be fully opened electrically. Corrective action involved lubricating
the stem and cycling the valve several times to achieve proper operation. On
April 6, 1989, valve CC-730 again failed, but this time the valve could not be
shut electrically. Corrective action involved cleaning the torque switch
contacts and cycling the valve to verify proper operation. Review of periodic
maintenance records revealed that on November 28 and 29, 1988, the CC-730 valve
stem had been lubricated and the torque switch contacts cleaned. The corrective
action for the valve CC-730 failures did not address why the stem had to be
relubricated and the torque switch contacts reclearied at such short intervals.
The failures associated with valve CC-730 are similar to the failures described
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in the 10 CFR Part 21 Limitorque notification previously discussed. CC-730 has
been identified by the licensee as possibly containing a melamine torque switch;
however, an inspection of this torque switch has not yet been performed.
As a
result, it appears that the true problems associated with this valve have neither
been identified nor corrected.
The third example of inadequate corrective action was associated with valve
V2-6A, a main feedwater isolation valve. On October 28, 1988, WR 88-ALCC1 was
written which stated that during the last three unit startups the valve would
not stroke.
Upon investigation it was determined that the thermal overload
device for this valve had tripped.
No evaluation of this problem was performed and
corrective action consisted of merely resetting the thermal overload device and
restroking the valve. During the inspection, discussions with operations
revealed that the thermal overload trips had occurred when transferring from
the startup to the normal mode of steam generator feeding. Under these
conditions, a higher than normal differential pressure existed across the valve,
resulting in more current being required by the motor actuator. In addition,
it was determined that the motor for the V2-6A actuator had previously been
replaced with a motor that drew more current. During the modifications, no
review of thermal overload sizing was performed.
As a result of the team's
review of this one work request, three separate deficiencies were identified.
First, the thermal overload trips were not documented until the third occur
rence.
The team informed CP&L that all thermal overload trips must be
documented and evaluated and that the CP&L practice of only documenting
repetitive thermal overload trips was unacceptable. Second, when the thermal
overload trip was finally documented, no engineering evaluation was performed.
Third, the motor for the V2-6A actuator was replaced without performing an
evaluation on thermal overload sizing. All three of these practices led to
the repetitive failure of valve V2-6A.
These examples of MOV failures illustrate that licensee corrective action was
inadequate to preclude additional similar failures and that valve failures were
sometimes :not documented to initiate corrective action. Failure to take
adequate corrective action in response to YOV failures and to properly document
MOV failures so that corrective action could be initiated is identified as
Potential Enforcement Item 50-261/89-200-03.
2.6 Modifications
In order to ensure that properly designed original equipment is not being
adversely altered a review was conducted of several modifications to the plant
that involved MOVs. From this review, it was apparent that, although equipment
may have originally been properly designed, CP&L made changes that may have
compromised equipment performance and operability.
The following examples
involve modifications performed to the plant in which the modification's effect
on overall system performance was either overlooked or improperly evaluated.
Yodificaticn 551 - This modification performed during 1980-81 replaced valves
V2-16A, B, and C and valves V2-14A, B, and C, which are on the discharge side
of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the steam-driven auxiliary
feedwater pumps, respectively.
The original valves were replaced with 4-inch
gate valves with flange ratings of 900 psi from the Anchor/Darling Valve Co.
During review of this modification package, it was noted that no sizing or
-5-
thrust calculations had been performed for these valves and that the modifica
tion indicated that the old valve actuators were to be used. No justification
for assuming the old actuators were still adequate was found.
During the testing and calculations required by NRC Bulletin No. 85-03, CP&L
determined that the V2-14A, B and C valve actuators were undersized. Addi
tionally, the V2-16A, B, and C valve actuators were calculated as being only
marginally large enough.
As a result of these findings, CP&L is to replace
all six valve actuators during the next refueling outage.
Had proper sizing
calculations been performed during the modification, this problem probably
would have not occurred.
Modification 939 - This modification was performed as a result of an inspection
conducted by CP&L Corporate Nuclear Safety that revealed a number of cases of
improperly coordinated protective devices. Modification 939 was initiated in
August 1988 to upgrade circuit breakers and overload devices in motor control
centers 5, 6, 9, and 10 and to ensure that protective devices could clear
system faults in a safe and efficient manner.
The overload devices and
circuit breakers for approximately 10 safety-related MOVs were replaced.
After the installation of Modification 939, spurious trips of motors started
to occur, including trips of MOVs.
The spurious trips were attributed to
inadequately sized thermal overloads and circuit breakers installed by the
modification. Corrective action involved the replacement or adjustment of
the newly installed circuit breakers, the reinstallation of the original
thermal overload devices, or the installation of re-sized thermal overload
devices. The apparent cause for the miscalculations was that the actual
locked-rotor currents for the motors were unavailable and estimated values
were used as inputs for thermal overload sizing calculations during prepara
tion of the modification.
The locked rotor currents were underestimated by
CP&L.
Modification 638 - This modification performed during June 1982 involved the
replacement of the V1-3A, B, and C main steam isolation bypass valves.
The
replacement valves were 2-inch, 900 psi rated gate valves with Limitorque
SMB-000-02 motor actuators. No thrust calculations or actuator sizing calcu
lations were found in the modification package.
Valve Specification L2-M-011,
Revision 1, included in the modification package delineated a motor actuator
voltage of 120/2000 volts. Later this was changed in Design Change Notice
638-1 to 208/416 volts.
The actual voltage that will be supplied to these
MOVs was calculated by CP&L during the inspection to be as low as 180 volts.
Motors rated at 208 volts may not be able to deliver the torque required under
postulated degraded voltage conditions.
Work Requests 87-AFBRI and 87-AFWSI - These work requests authorized the
replacement of the motor on valve actuator V2-6A.
The motor on this valve was
replaced because it had a magnesium rotor that had been identified as being
susceptible to degradation.
Although the new motor was said to have the same
torque output ratings, it required more current to achieve its rated value.
No
thermal overload sizing calculation was performed in the work request.
Sub
- sequently, the thermal overload device to this valve tripped upon valve actuation
at least three times as reported by Work Request 88-ALCC1.
Had a thermal
overload device calculation been performed before the replacement, the problem
with the overload device prematurely tripping would probably not have occurred.
-6-
CP&L's failure to properly consider the effects of the modifications on overall
system functionality is identified as Potential Enforcement Item 50-261/89-200-04.
2.7 Training
The training and qualification program at H. B. Robinson specifically includes
a subprogram for MOVs. The qualification requirements are only applicable to
the shop personnel. Under the guidance of the foreman and supervisors, an
initial qualification is obtained and documented on a qualification card. After
initial qualification, each qualified individual must be requalified at regular
intervals. Currently, the MOV requalification period is 2 years.
MOV qualification is specialized for either a power plant mechanic or a power
plant electrician. In both cases, a basic MOV course must be successfully com
pleted at the Harris Energy and Environmental Center.
The mechanics take Valve
Operator Repair Course ME 400G and then obtain further on-the-job training at
H. B. Robinson. The electricians take Motorized Valve Operator Course EL S37G,
followed by an advanced course, Motorized Valve Operator Course EL 537R, at
H. B. Robinson. On-the-job training is also provided.for both mechanics and
electricians. Shop foremen then approve completion of the MOV qualification
cards.
Requalification for all shop personnel is at the discretion and approval of the
responsible foreman.
This decision is based on the training, job performance,
and experience of the personnel being requalified. For power plant mechanics,
this approval includes satisfactory performance by the individual of the
following: explanation of the fundamentals of MOVs, troubleshooting of an MOV,
and repair of an MOV. Power plant electricians must demonstrate satisfactory
performance by explaining the functions and operations of MOVs and components,
verifying valve travel positions and indications, operating a valve operator in
the manual mode, and cycling the valve operator in the electrical mode. Each
foreman tracks the requalification requirements for his assigned personnel.
There is no in-house training program for MOV diagnostic testing.
The licensee,
however, has sent personnel, including a foreman and two electricians, to a
MAC Testing Course provided by Limitorque.
No further training of this type is
currently planned. In summary, the training and qualification program at
H. B. Robinson was identified as a strength in that it provides adequate initial
training and required demonstration of satisfactory performance to maintain
qualifications for those personnel assigned to work on MOVs.
2.8 Maintenance Procedures
Three preventive maintenance procedures were reviewed. These were PM-112,
"Limitorque Inspection No. 1," Revision 6, dated July 15, 1987; PM-113,
"Limitorque Inspection No. 2," Revision 3, dated June 7, 1988; and PM-423,
"Limitorque Inspection No. 3," Revision 5, dated July 2, 1987.
The main purposes of the procedures are to provide guidelines for lubrication
of the main gearbox (PM-112), lubrication of the geared limit switch (PM-113),
and maintenance of the valve switches and controls (PM-423). The procedures
.
automatically schedule the maintenance at specified intervals.
-7-
The three procedures had been properly approved, were very detailed and easy to
follow, and provided space for reporting findings and collecting maintenance
data. Specifically, the control of the grease and lubricants, the inspection
of grease and switches, and the verification of torque switch settings, were
well defined in the procedures. In general, all three procedures appeared to
be adequate for the provision of the proper preventive maintenance for MOVs.
Additionally, the maintenance data sheets for each of the three procedures were
reviewed for eight different MOVs. The sheets and the maintenance data were
found to be properly complete and acceptable in each case.
Although most Limitorque preventive maintenance recommendations were followed
strictly, the licensee did not do so in one case. Limitorque recommends an
initial interval of 18 months for inspection and cleaning of MOV switches,
recognizing that the interval could be changed, based on plant experience and
judgment. The licensee established this maintenance interval as 36 months.
When questioned concerning the extended interval, the licensee cited the
allowance by Limitorque and the maintenance history record of the MOVs.
No specific documentation discussing or justifying the change was available.
In light of some of the current operational problems discussed elsewhere in
this report, and with new programs regarding problem trending and root cause
analysis being implemented, proper documentation of any changes to
recommended maintenance intervals would be appropriate and expected.
No
action is required of, or anticipated by, the licensee at this time; however,
it is expected that based on the developing maintenance histories, changes
to the preventive maintenance intervals will be made as appropriate. In
general, the quality of the maintenance procedures was seen as a strength
within the licensee's MOV program.
2.9 Evaluation of Generic Communication
During the inspection, a review was conducted of CP&L's evaluations of MOV
related generic communication.
Evaluations of the following NRC information
notices, NRC bulletins, and 10 CFR Part 21 reports were reviewed by the inspec
tion team.
IE Notice No. 79-03, dated February 9, 1979, "Limitorque Valve Geared Limit
Switch Lubricant" - The licensee's response was reviewed and found acceptable.
By procedure, the licensee does not use Beacon 325 lubricant in the geared
IE Circular No. 79-04, dated June 7, 1979, "Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque
Valve Operators" - In accordance with the licensee's trouble ticket ENG-090,
all Limitorque-type SMB valve operators were inspected and the locknuts were
properly staked. No mention of SMC-type valves was made in the licensee's
internal response, but licensee personnel have stated that none of these
type valves were installed in the plant at that time.
The response was
satisfactory.
TE Notice No. 84-36, Supplement 1, dated September 11, 1984, "Loosening of
Locking Nut of Limitorque Operator" - The supplement corrected information
- provided in IE Notice No. 84-36.
The supplement identified that the bearing
locknut on the actuator worm shaft was backed out as a result of the loosening
of a set screw, which subsequently led to inoperability of a safety-related
valve.
The problem occurred because the design incorporated a left-handed
-8-
thread which is unusual in these types of valves.
The licensee evaluation stated
that the licensee valves did not have this particular design and, therefore, the
notice was not applicable. It appears that the response was properly evaluated
at the time and that the response is satisfactory.
IE Notice No. 84-13 dated February 28, 1984, "Potential Deficiency in Motor
Operated Valve Control Circuits and Annunciation" - The licensee's evaluation
determined that the thermal overload devices installed in Robinson MOV circuits
are not bypassed during actuation of the safety systems.
The problem of not
knowing whether an overload device has tripped is applicable to the Robinson
plant, however, because the control room valve position lights are not extin
guished nor are thermal overload alarm circuits installed at the Robinson
plant.
The licensee is aware of this potential problem and plans on taking no
specific action at the current tie.
NRC Information Notice No. 88-84, dated October 20, 1988, "Defective Motor Shaft
Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators" - This information notice, which concerned
nonconforming shaft key materials, had been received by CP&L but had not yet
been evaluated because of a backlog of work. During the inspection, Action
Item No.89-027 was assigned by CP&L for completion of this evaluation.
IE Information Notice No. 86-02, dated January 6, 1989, "Failure of Valve
Operator Motor During Environmental Qualification Testing" - The licensee's
evaluation of this information notice, which concerned failure of magnesium
rotor motors in harsh environments, was found to be very thorough.
During this
evaluation, CP&L determined that not only is the problem with magnesium rotor
motors apparent in a harsh environment, but also that these types of motors can
also exhibit failures in relatively mild environments.
As a result, CP&L is
replacing all magnesium rotor motors at the Brunswick plant.
Limitorque 10 CFR Part 21 Modification, dated November 3, 1988 - CP&L's evaluation
of this Part 21 notification concerning melamine torque switch failures was
reviewed during the inspection.
The licensee has identified 36 safety-related
and 24 nonsafety-related Limitorque actuators that will require torque switch
inspections to verify whether melamine torque switches are installed.
The licen
see has scheduled to complete the inspection and replacement of all affected
torque switches by March 16, 1990.
IE Notice No. 86-29, dated April 28, 1986, "Effects of Changing Valve Motor Operator
Switch Settings" - This information notice was provided to alert recipients to
the consequences of changing switch settings without adequate prior evaluation.
The inspectors' review of the licensee's internal response to IE Notice No. 86-29
indicated that the contents of the IE notice were incorporated into the licensee
MOV program. Review of the licensee's program indicated that switch settings were
controlled and maintained, and changes to switch settings were adequately evaluated.
0II
3.0 Exit Meeting
Upon completion of the inspection an exit meeting was held on May 26, 1989. The
following individuals attended:
S. G. Tingen
NRC -
Region 11
A. J. Szczepaniec
NRC -
Region 11
M. C. Singla
NRC -
Consultant
T. G. Scarbrough
NRC -
J. B. Jacobson
NRC - NRR
Russell F. Powell
CP&L - Engineering Supervisor
Keith R. Jury
NRC -
Resident Inspector
Ronnie Lo
NRC -
NRR -
Project Manager
L. W. Garner
NRC -
Sr. Resident Inspector
R. D. Crook
Sr. Specialist - Regulatory Compliance
E. M. Harris, Jr.
Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety
John F. Benjamin
Engineering Supervisor -
Plant Systems
(Technical Support)
C. R. Dietz
Manager -
RNPD
Gary D. Shartzer
Senior Engineering -
Technical Support
Richard V. Cady
Senior Engineering -
Configuration Control
C. A. Bethea
Manager -
Training
D. R. Quick
Acting General Manager -
RNPD
S. V. Athavale
Electrical Engineer -
J. M. Curley
Director Regulatory Compliance
Gene Imbro
NRC -
NRR - Section Chief
RSIB
-10-