IR 05000261/1980028
| ML14175B210 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1980 |
| From: | Hardin A, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14175B209 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-80-28, NUDOCS 8011210431 | |
| Download: ML14175B210 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/80-28 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson Unit 2 Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Inspection at Robinson site near Hartsville, SC Inspector: H inDate Approved by:
SUMMARY Inspection on September 8-12, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 34 inspector-hours on site in the areas of procedure review, licensee event reports and operation Results Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie ~j210'~
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. B. Starkey, Jr., General Manager
- C. W. Crawford, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- B. W. Garrison, QA Supervisor
- J. Benjamin, Engineer
- J. Sawyer, RC and T Technician
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 12, 1980 with those persons indiciated in Paragraph 1 abov.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.a(5). Areas Inspected The major item of this inspection was review and evaluation of the licensee's small break loss of coolant procedures and comparison of the procedures with the guidelines prepared by the nuclear steam supplier owners group and approved by the NR.
Review of Small Break Loss of Coolant and Related Procedures RCS Depressurization Procedures (1) General A review was made of the licensee's procedure E.I.-1 entitled
"Incident Involving Reactor Coolant System Depressurization" Revision 19 dated December 31, 1979 and subsequently revised again on March 13, 1980, April 8, 1980, and June 20, 198 The purpose of the review was to verify that the licensee had prepared
-2 small break loss of coolant accident, SBLOCA, procedures based on followup actions which resulted from the NRC staff review of the Three Mile Island Acciden Following the Three Mile Island Accident the licensee participated, as a member of the Westinghouse Owners Group, to develop generic guidelines for emergency procedure In December 1979 NRR approved the Westinghouse generic guidelines, regarding small break LOCAs, for implementation by the license The inspector verified that the SBLOCA procedures follow the guidelines established by the owners group and approved by NRR as follow (2) Symptoms and Diagnostics The Robinson 2 procedure E.I.-1 deals with either a loss of reactor coolant, steam line rupture or steam generator tube ruptur Some of the symptoms of the above accidents are simila The licensee has included a diagnostic chart in the procedure to aid the operator in determining which accident occurred and the proper procedure to us A sufficient and diverse number of symptoms has been included in the procedure to permit identi fication of the emergenc (3) Immendiate Actions During and following a depressurization accident several automatic actions occur and several immediate actions must be initiated by the operator. The inspector verified that the procedure required the operator to determine that required automatic actions had occurred. A review was also made by the inspector to determined if the items addressed in the guidelines immediate actions section were also addressed in the immediate actions section of the licensee's procedure An item by item comparison of the licensee procedure with the guidelines was made. Any items on which there were questions were :discussed and resolved with a licensee repre sentativ (4) Precautions Section F of the licensee's procedure contains precautions following a safety injection signa The inspector concluded the precautions to be observed by the operator were adequat (5) Subsequent Actions The licensee's Emergency Instruction N (E.I.-1) contains three appendice Appendix "A" deals with "Loss of Coolant" Appendix "B" deals with "Loss of Secondary Coolant" and Appendix
"C" deals with Steam Generator Tube Ruptur These sections of the procedures in conjunction with preceeding sections which deal with symptoms, identification of the accident, immediate actions
-3 and precautions were considered adequate by the inspector, with one exception. The orignial requirement in Bulletin 79-06 for subcooling margin for the primary coolant system for termination of JIPI was 50 F. Based on the original requirement and on the NRR Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
of CPLs response to IE Bulletins 79-06 and 79-06A Re dated July 10, 1980, the inspector expected to see the 50*F value used throughout the procedure However, the licensee uses a 40'F value for subcooling of the primary coolan The licensee justifies the use of 40dF versus 500 F by calculating a value for total tempature error and adding the error to a base temperature of 20 0 In the Robinson case the temperature error was calculated to 17.5 0 F. This value, rounded off and added to 20oF to give the licensees value of 400 F for the subcooling limit prior to HPI terminatio At the exit interview the inspector stated that further review the 40wF value with NRR was necessary. The 40*F vs 50*F value was reviewed with NRR on September 23, 198 The inspector informed the Robinson Operations and Maintenance Manager on September 23, 1980, that the item would be unresolved pending verification and approval by NRR of Robinsons justification for using the 4 00 subcoolin The item is
designated 261/80-28-0.
Natural Circulation Procedure The licensee has prepared and issued General Procedure GP-5A entitled
"Plant Temperature and Pressure Control Using Natural Circulation" Revision 0, dated March 1980. The procedure was reviewed and considered adequate by the inspecto.
Procedural Requirements for Termination of Reactor Coolant Pump Operation The inspector verified that a plant specific value of Reactor Coolant Pump trip of 1300 psig has been incorporated into the licensee procedures in accordance with Pump Trip criteria as specified in the approved guideline.
Procedural Requirements for Termination of HPI Operation There are four items to be met for termination of High Pressure Injectio The four items in the licensee's procedure were compared to the four items listed in the guidelines. A significant difference is that the licensee's value for subcooling is 40 F while the guidelines state, "A plant specific valve of subcooling equal to full power normal operation" should be use This item is discussed in paragraph 6.a(5) and has been left unresolved The remaining items pertaining to termination High Pressure Injection system operation meet the guideline requirement.
LER Review The licensee states in the cover letter transmitting licensee event reports that the reports are in accord.ance with the format set forth in NIJREG-016 In a review of several LERs, the inspector concluded that some reports did not meet the NUREG format in an adequate manne At the exit interview, the inspector stated the NUREG instructions requiring interim reports and supplemental updated reports should be more closely observed and that best estimate dates for completion of extended corrective action should be in the report The licensee acknowledged the comments, requested more examples of where the LERs were considered deficient and indicated improvement would be mad. Plant Tour On a plant tour the inspector observed the following items which were later discussed at the exit intervie The inspector was able to move from a containment zone not requiring respirator to a zone in which personnel were wearing respirator without violating any posting or barriers. Airborne contamination was not present in the zone where personnel were using respiratory equipment thus noncompliance did not occur). However, a licensee representative stated it was not intended that anyone would be ab.e to eove without administrative restraint from the non-respirator zone to the respirator zon The inspector observed radiation zone tape being used for safety rope The licensee acknowledged these areas represented poor practices and corrective actions would be considere :
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