ML14191B099
| ML14191B099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1989 |
| From: | Dance H, Garner L, Jury K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14191A976 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-89-03, 50-261-89-3, NUDOCS 8903300247 | |
| Download: ML14191B099 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1989003
Text
HE
-
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
.
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-261/89-03
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.: DPR-23
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson
Inspection Conducted: January 11 -
February 10, 1989
Inspector:
C
.
L. W. Garner, Sehior Resident Inspector
0 e igned
K. R Jury, Resident Inspector
ate
igned
,Approved by:
.14
-rU
H. C. Dance, Section Chief
te
igned
Reactor Projects Section 1A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced inspection was conducted in the areas of
operational safety verification, physical protection, surveillance
observation, maintenance observation, ESF system walkdown, and onsite
review committee.
Results:
One violation for which a Notice of Violation is being issued was
identified concerning failure to properly implement surveillance
procedure OST-162, paragraph 3.c.
The failure resulted from
improperly controlling the OST-162 test configuration valve lineup
while
performing the
valve
restoration, lineup
portions of
-surveillance procedure OST-163.
Two licensee identified violations (no Notices of Violation are being
issued)
involving failure to follow procedures are discussed in
paragraphs 2 and 3.c.
The first violation involved an operator
verifying a circuit breaker associated with instrument bus 3 as being
ON when it was actually in the OFF position. The inspectors observed
a second operator discover this fact while he was performing
independent verification activities. The method and conditions under
which this alignment is performed is considered awkward and prone to
human error,
and is being reviewed by the licensee.
The second
violation involved an operator failing to restart safety-related
89033C)027 890310
ADOCK
0/0002C1:,f
2
battery charger A in accordance with procedure OP-601.
Failure to
open the A battery charger output breaker prior to re-energizing the
battery charger resulted in degraded mode operation. In addition, a
failure to utilize redundant indications was observed (i.e.,
the
operator failed to notice the battery charger was malfunctioning).
He only relied on an indicator lamp to verify the battery charger was
inservice, when other readily available indications revealed it
was
not performing correctly.
A potential
need to provide refresher training to control room
operators on certain auxiliary operator evolutions is discussed in
paragraph 3.c. A licensed operator was observed not being familiar
with manually closing a DB-50 breaker during a surveillance test.
The licensee demonstrated a high degree of responsiveness to and
cooperation with the inspectors in resolving a concern with the
seismic qualification of the DB-50 breakers, paragraph 3.c.
The licensee has expended a substantial effort during the refueling
outage to improve housekeeping.
The improved CV conditions are
especially noteworthy, paragraph 2.
REPORT DETAILS
1. Licensee Employees Contacted
R. Barnett, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical
R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Performance
P. Crocker, Supervi-sor, Radiation Control
J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance
C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project Department
R. Femal, Shift Foreman, Operations
W. Flanagan, Manager, Des ign Engineering
W. Gainey, Support Supervisor, Operations
P. Harding, Project Specialist, Radiati.on Control
E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
R. Johnson, Manager, Control and Administration
D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations
D. McCaskill, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
- R. Morgan, Plant General Manager
M. Page, Acting Manager, Technical Support
D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
- D. Sayre, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations
- J. Sheppard, Manager, Operations
R. Steele, Operating Supervisor, Operations
- H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians,
operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- L. Garner
- K,. Jury
- Attended exit interview on February 15, 1989.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspecto rs observed licensee activities to confirm the facility was
being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and
that the licensee's management control system was effectively discharging
its responsibilities for continued safe operation. These activities were
confirmed- by direct observations,
facility tours,
interviews and
discussions with
licensee
management
and
personnel,
independent
verifications of safety system
status
and
limiting conditions for
0
operation, and reviews of facility records.
2
Periodically, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, operations records, data
sheets, instrument traces, and.records of equipment malfunctions-to verify
operability of safety-related equipment and compliance with TS.
Specific
items reviewed include control
room logs,
auxiliary logs,
operating
orders, standing orders, and equipment tagout records.
Through periodic
observations of work in progress and discussions with operations staff
members,
the inspectors verified that the staff was knowledgeable of
plant conditions; responding properly to alarm conditions; adhering to
procedures and applicable administrative controls; aware of equipment out
of service;
and cognizant of surveillance testing and maintenance
activities in progress. The inspectors observed shift changes to verify
that continuity of system status was maintained and that proper control
room staffing existed. The inspectors also observed that access to the
control room was controlled and operations personnel were carrying out
their assigned duties in an attentive and professional manner.
The
control room was observed to be free of unnecessary distractions.
On January 27,
1989,
the inspectors observed independent verification
activities required by OP-001,
Reactor Control and Protection System, to
place the reactor protection
system in service.
During the
second
operator check,
it
was'discovered that circuit breaker
no.
17 on
instrument bus 3 was in the OFF position and had not been noted by the
first operator
as being in the OFF position.
OP-001 requires all
non-spared breakers to be turned ON or noted as being out of position if
under clearance. This breaker was labeled as being a supply to the fixed
incore neutron monitors and had no clearance tag on it. Subsequently, the
inspectors were informed by the licensee that the breaker had been spared
more than ten years earlier. The failure of the first operator to perform
OP-001 correctly is considered to be a violation:
Failure to Follow
Procedure OP-001, LIV (261/89-03-01). This violation meets the criteria
specified in-
Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a
Notice of Violation and is not cited.
The inspectors determined that the method
used by the licensee to
determine which breakers are spares is awkward and readily lends itself
to human error.
SD-16,
Electrical Systems,
is the document used by
operations
personnel *to determine which
breakers supply vital and
safety-related instrumentation.
SD-16 incorrectly describes circuit
breaker 17 as being in-service even though it had previously been spared
by a plant modification.
The need
was discussed with the Operations
Manager to upgrade the methodology for verifying correct instrument bus
breaker alignment to include human factor considerations and the concern
over the accuracy of SD-16. The Operations Manager indicated that these
items would be reviewed and a determination made on what actions, if any,
will be taken.
On January 30, 1989, the inspectors conducted a general tour of the CV in
anticipation of a restart from the 1988 refueling outage. The inspectors
visually verified that safety-related equipment such as the containment
fan coolers,
PZR PORVs,
and major valves were operable
3
and/or aligned for service as required
by plant conditions.
The
inspectors observed that the substantial effort during the outage to
improve the overall site cleanliness and housekeeping had resulted in
significant improvements inside the CV. Though additional future measures
will be necessary to stay in line with evolving industry norms,
the
licensee has improved
CV
housekeeping from marginally adequate (as
discussed in the most recent SALP report) to good, and in some areas
outstanding.
Minor conditions observed during the tour were reported to
the licensee for correction as they deemed necessary.
The inspectors verified by general observation, perimeter walkdowns, and
interviews that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met current requirements.
The performance of various security
force shifts was observed to verify that daily activities were conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the security plan.
Activities
inspected included: protected and vital areas, access controls, searching
of personnel and packages, badge issuance and retrieval,
patrols,
escorting of visitors, and compensatory measures.
In addition, the
inspectors routinely observed protected and vital .area
lighting and
One licensee identified violation was identified within the areas
inspected.
3. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain surveillance activities of safety-related
systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted
in accordance with license requirements.
For the surveillance test
procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and
LCOs were met, the tests were completed at the required frequency, the
tests conformed to TS requirements, the required administrative approvals
and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the tests, the testing was
accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test
procedure, and the required test instrumentation was properly calibrated.
Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following
test activities:
a. EST-048 (revision 6), Control Rod Drop Test
The inspectors verified that the test was performed in accordance
with the procedure.
b.
EST-049 (revision 3), Rod Drive Mechanism Operation Testing
The inspectors witnessed performance of the test and verified that
TS, prerequi.stes, and other limitations were complied with.
c. OST-162 (revision 12), Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start On Loss
of Power And Safety Injection - Emergency Diesel Trips Defeat
4
The inspectors witnessed and reviewed selected parts of the subject
test on January 24 and 25,
1989.
While verifying that the initial
test configuration was in conformance with that specified in the OST,
the inspectors noted that BIT inlet valves SI-867 A and B indicated
OPEN on the RTGB, whereas steps 7.1.7.1. and 7.1.7.2 of the the OST
had been initialed that they were in the CLOSED position.
This
discrepancy was discussed with the test coordinator and the valves
were positioned in accordance with the OST.
The partial performance
of the restoration section of OST-163, Safety Injection Test, and the
initial lineup for OST-162 had not been coordinated properly.
This
allowed performance of OST-163 to position the valves in a different
position than required by OST-162.
This failure to control the
evolutions properly is considered to be indicative of a weakness in
procedure utilization.
This was discussed with the Operations
Manager and during the exit on February 15,
1989.
The failure to
establish the proper test configuration in accordance with OST-162 is
considered a violation: Restoration Lineup of OST-163 Results in BIT
Inlet Valves Being in a Position Other-Than That Established For
Performance of OST-162 (261/89-03-02).
During performance of OST-162,
the A battery charger tripped on
undervoltage as designed and had to be manually restarted.
The
inspectors observed two unsuccessful attempts to restart the battery
charger. On the first attempt, the supply breaker to the battery
charger tripped and the battery charger failed to restart. On the
second attempt, a red ON
lamp illuminated.
Upon indication of a
restart (i.e., the red light) the operator immediately exited the
area to continue to perform other steps of OST-162.
Inspection of
the battery charger revealed that the output ammeter was pegged
downscale.
Furthermore,
the A DC
bus ammeter indicated that the
battery was still carrying the
DC bus and the bus voltage was
observed to be 122 volts (.i.e., the battery terminal voltage).
The
bus voltage is normally 130 volts or more if the battery charger is
functioning correctly. These abnormal indications were reported to
the operator. The battery charger was secured and the backup battery
charger A-1 was placed in service. Subsequent review by the licensee
revealed that the operator had attempted to re-energize the battery
charger with its output breaker closed.
The voltage regulating
circuit was unable to function correctly under these conditions.
Subsequent inspection and testing indicated that operation in a
malfunctioning state for approximately five minutes had not damaged
the battery charger. The licensee also identified that a procedure
revision to OP-601, DC Supply System, issued and effective on January
24,
1989,
provided a section with instructions requiring opening of
the output breaker prior to re-starting the battery charger.
This
section was not previously in the procedure.
Failure to follow
OP-601 is considered a violation:
Failure To
Follow Procedure
OP-601, LIV (261/89-03-03).
This violation meets the criteria
specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing
a Notice of Violation and is not cited.
5
Of greater significance, was that the operator failed to observe the
abnormal battery charger ammeter indication, and walked past the DC
bus voltmeter and ammeter without looking at them.
As described by
the operator, he was in a hurry to complete subsequent steps of the
OST.
Since the operator had experienced trouble restarting the
battery charger, reliance on a singular indication without taking the
time to observe readily available redundant indication is considered
poor operator performance. This was discussed with the Operations
Manager and with plant management during the exit on February 15,
1989.
During the first SI signal simulation of OST-162, both the C SIP and
HVH-3
CV Fan Cooler failed to start.
The inspectors had observed
that the HVH-3 breaker had closed,,but instantaneously tripped open.
Two attempts to manually initiate the C SIP from the RTGB also had
similiar results. Subsequent SI signals resulted in the breakers
successfully closing even though no work had been performed on them.
This was discussed with operations personnel. It was explained that
this is a frequent occurrence after a DB-50 breaker has been racked
out. Sometimes, the breaker is slightly misaligned when it is racked
back in. A closing/tripping action will sometimes reposition the
breaker sufficiently such that it becomes correctly aligned without
having to rack it
out and
back in again.-
Because of this ,
phenomenon, it has been the operations department's practice to cycle
DB-50 breakers twice upon returning them to service.
However, this
testing sequence did not require it.
The licensee is considering
adding appropriate steps to test procedures such as OST-162 to cycle
the breakers prior to the OST performance.
The inspectors verified
that for the SIPs and the CV spray pumps,
GP-002 revision 36, Cold
Solid to Hot Subcritical at No Load TAVG,
contains steps to start
these pumps.after the pump breakers have been racked in.
The inspectors were concerned that if
vibration could align the
breakers, perhaps vibration could unalign them, especially during a
seismic event. The licensee examined the subject compartments for
proper dimensions and clearance. Only normal wear was observed. The
licensee was able to duplicate the condition and determined that once
the alignment corrected itself the breaker would remain in that
configuration.
On January 30,
1989,
the licensee demonstrated for
the inspectors that when racking the breaker in, it
might appear to
be fully in, but the trip tab on the cabinet can still be in contact
with the trip bar. This contact supplies enough pressure on the trip
bar to cause the breaker to immediately trip when an attempt is made
to close it. When the breaker vibrates due to a close/trip pumping
action, it
falls fully down into an engagement slot.
In that
condition, the vendor stated clearance exists between the cabinet
trip tab and the breaker trip bar. The inspectors concurred with the
licensee's determination that once properly aligned a breaker would
remain properly aligned.
6
During the performance of OST-162 step 7.3.28, the operator is
required to manually close B SIP breaker 52/29C.
The licensed
operator performing the test contacted the control room to have
someone explain how to accomplish this task.
Another licensed
operator came and demonstrated how to manually close this particular
style of breaker.
The inspectors discussed with the Operations
Manager that this may indicate a need to supply refresher training to
licensed operators.on certain auxiliary operator tasks which they may
not have performed in several years.
Because the above OST-162 performance was unsuccessful, appropriate
portions were re-performed on January 25,
1989.
The inspectors
reviewed the completed test packages and verified that the acceptance
criteria were met.
d.
OST-163 (revision 9) Safety Injection Test
The inspectors witnessed successful completion of the test from the
control room.
The inspectors verified the equipment responded as
expected to a simulated SI signal.
One violation and one LIV was identified within the areas inspected.
4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed several maintenance activities of safety-related
systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures,
TS,
and appropriate industry
codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that these activities
were not violating LCOs and that redundant components were
when applicable.
The inspectors also determined that: activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures; required
administrative approvals
and
tagouts were
obtained prior to work
initiation; appropriate ignition and fire prevention controls were
implemented; and the effected equipment was properly tested before being
returned to service. In particular, the inspectors observed/ reviewed the
following maintenance activities:
o
WR/JO 89-ABQS1 -
Repair purge inlet outboard isolation valve seal
o
WR/JO 89-ABLW1
-
Repair A EDG cooling water high temperature trip
circuit
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
5.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
On February 10,
1989, the inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the
AFW system. In particular, the inspectors examined portions of the SDAFW
discharge line and steam line.- The inspectors discovered valve V2-14B's
motor operating when the valve was closed.
Valve V2-14B is the SDAFW
7
injection valve to B S/G. The condition was reported to the control room
and the valve was cycled successfully opened and closed.
Subsequent to
this report period,
the licensee determined that the problem was an
'
isolated event. Disassembly of the actuator revealed that during the last
overhaul in 1986,
the fork assembly associated with the declutching
mechanism had been installed backwards.
This allowed the drive dogs to
only partially engage.
Due to wear on the dogs and partial engagement,
the drive assembly had degraded to the point that the dogs would not
consistently engage when
being driven in the close direction.
The
licensee verified that the overhaul procedure in 1986,
CM-113,
SMB-000,
SMB-00 and SB-00 Motor Operator Overhaul,
revision 0, contained specific
directions and a diagram
addressing the proper orientation during
reassembly. The licensee inspected V2-14A and C, as well as two other
valves overhauled in 1986.
These four valves had been overhauled under
the same supervision as V2-14B. No other problems were discovered. The
inspectors concur that the V2-14B misassembly was most likely an isolated
error.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
6. Onsite Review Committee (40700)
The inspectors evaluated certain activities of the PNSC to determine
whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS
and other regulatory requirements. In particular, the inspectors attended
the refueling outage pre-startup PNSC on January 27, 1989. During this
meeting existing JC~s were reviewed for continual applicability, and two
new JCOs were approved.
It
was ascertained that provisions *of the TS
dealing with membership,
review process,
and qualifications were
satisfied.
The inspectors also followed up
on selected previously
identified PNSC activities to independently confirm that corrective
actions were progressing satisfactorily.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
7.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Items (92701)
(Open) URI 88-24-05, Service Water Flow Analysis To Show Adequacy of Flows
to Safety-Related Components
Inspection Report 261/88-38 addressed measured
SW flows to. certain
components being less than recommended by the vendor and/or per design.
The licensee's resolution of these discrepancies is as follows:
Components
Resolution
A and B EDG Hx (maximum 8%
EE-89-019 calculation
low flow)
demonstrated that reduced
heat transfer due to less SW flow
was bound by 10% Hx tube plugging
allowed by the vendor.
8
Components
Resolution
(cont'd)
HVH 1-4 motor cooler
Analysis documented in DCN 858-22
(maximum 20% low flow)
shows coolers remain operable for
up to 24% reduced flow.
EST-102
is being
written
to perform
quarterly
surveillance on
flow
rates.
Cooler cleaned to remove fouling.
(33% low flow)
AO required once per shift to
flush system.
A and B MDAFW pump lube
Coolers cleaned. AO required
oil cooler (maximum 100%
once per shift to flush system.
low flow)
Values still 16% below UFSAR
Values.
SP-808 demonstrated lube
oil temperature limit specified by
vendor
(140
degrees F) is not
exceeded with reduced flow.
The inspectors reviewed EE-89-019
and EE-89-022 which evaluates the
results of the flow test conducted per SP-814. The inspectors agree that
the above described items have been satisfactorily addressed.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 15,
1989,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below and those addressed in the report summary. Dissenting comments were
not received from the licensee. Proprietary information is not contained
in this report.
No written material was given to the licensee by the
Resident Inspectors during this report period.
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
88-24-05
Open
URI - Service Water Flow Analysis to
Show
Adequacy of
Flows to Safety
Related Components (paragraph 9)
89-03-01
Closed
LIV - Failure To Follow Procedure
OP-001 (paragraph 2)
89-03-02
Open
VIO - Restoration Lineup of OST-163
Results in BIT Inlet Valves Being in a
Position Other Than That Established
For OST-162 (paragraph 3.c)
9
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
(cont'd}
89-03-03
Closed
LIV -
Failure to Follow Procedure
OP-601 (paragraph 3.c)
9.
List of Abbreviations
Auxiliary Operator
BIT
Boron Injection Tank
CFR
Code of Federal Regulation
Corrective Maintenance
CV
Containment Vessel
Direct Current
DCN
Design Change Notice
EE
Engineering Evaluation
Engineered Safety Feature
EST
Engineering Surveillance Test
General Procedure
Hx
Heat exchanger
HVH
Heating Ventilation Handling
JCO
Justification For Continued Operation
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
LIV
Licensee Identified Violation
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OP
Operating Procedure
OST
Operations Surveillance Test
PNSC
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Power Operated Relief Valve
PZR
Pressurizer
Quality Control
Reactor Turbine Generator Board
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
System Description
System Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Safety Injection
Safety Injection Pump
Special Procedure
TAVG
Temperature, Average
TS
Technical Specification
Unresolved Item*
Violation
WR/JO
Work Request/Job Order
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.