IR 05000261/2023001
| ML23121A172 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/2023 |
| From: | David Dumbacher NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3 |
| To: | Basta L Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23121A172 (17) | |
Text
May 2, 2023
SUBJECT:
H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2023001
Dear Laura Basta:
On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant. On April 19, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. George Curtis, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, David E. Dumbacher, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000261 License No. DPR-23
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000261
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-001-0028
Licensee:
Duke Energy Progress, LLC
Facility:
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Location:
Hartsville, South Carolina
Inspection Dates:
January 01, 2023 to March 31, 2023
Inspectors:
B. Caballero, Senior Operations Engineer
V. Gaffney, Resident Inspector
J. Hamman, Senior Project Engineer
N. Lacy, Operations Engineer
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
David E. Dumbacher, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Implement Adequate Post-Modification Testing for Design Change Involving New Protective Digital Relay System for Main Generator, Main Step-Up, and Auxiliary Transformers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000261/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71152A A self-revealed Green finding was identified for the licensees failure to implement adequate post-modification testing for a design change that installed a new digital relay protection system for the main generator, main step-up, and auxiliary transformers. As a result, the licensee failed to identify that the main generator current transformers (CTs) were miswired as part of the modification implementation. This caused a main generator lockout signal to be generated when the main generator was synchronized to the grid during the subsequent plant startup, resulting in a turbine trip actuation and lifting of a main steam safety valve (MSSV) in response to the steam generator pressure transient experienced.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period in Mode 1, operating at 8 percent reactor power while completing a forced outage to correct miswiring of electrical power protective relays that caused a turbine trip on December 30, 2022. The unit was synchronized to the grid on January 1, 2023, and returned to rated thermal power (RTP) on January 5, 2023. The unit remained at or near RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met, consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather from a Tornado Watch issued on January 4, 2023.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)
'A' and 'B' train service water pumps during inspection of underground electrical cables in service water pumphouse manholes, on January 9, 2023 (2)
'A' motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump while 'B' MDAFW pump was out of service for preventive maintenance, on February 7, 2023 (3)115 kilovolt (kV) / 230 kV switchyard and switchyard relay building during preventive maintenance activities on 230 kV transmission breaker 52-4, on March 14, 2023
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the dedicated shutdown diesel generator (DSDG) system on March 13, 2023.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
'A' and 'B' vital battery room (fire zone 16), on January 9, 2023
- (2) Unit 2 cable spreading room (fire zone 19), on January 10, 2023 (3)
'A' emergency diesel generator room (fire zone 2), on February 3, 2023
- (4) MDAFW pump room (fire zone 6), on February 7, 2023
- (5) Hagan (reactor protection relay room) (fire zone 23), on March 8, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill, on February 24, 2023.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated external flooding mitigation protections in manhole cable vaults M-50A and M-50B, associated with the service water pump motors, on January 9, 2023.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors completed an inspection to verify the licensees ability to evaluate the performance of their licensed operators during the conduct of examinations, to assess their ability to properly develop and administer requalification annual operating tests and biennial written examinations, to evaluate the performance of the control room simulator and their testing and maintenance of the simulator, to ensure that licensed individuals satisfy the conditions of their licenses, and to assess their effectiveness in ensuring that operator license conditions are satisfied.
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on February 24, 2023.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room between January 1-4, 2023, during reactor power ascension from a turbine trip event.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an annual operator requalification exam simulator scenario on February 28, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)failures of direct current emergency lighting unit batteries ELS-51 and ELS-52 during testing on January 23, 2023 [Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 2457218]
(2)
'A' safety-related battery charger failure of equalize circuitry relay K306 during testing on January 25, 2023 (NCR 2457599)
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)elevated risk (Green) during power ascension between January 1-4, 2023, following forced outage R2F34A for a turbine trip event (2)elevated online risk (Green) during planned preventive maintenance to replace the electrical breaker for pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) RC-535, on January 9, 2023 (3)elevated online risk (Green) during planned preventive maintenance to replace the pump oil cooling water relief valve for the steam driven auxiliary feedwater (SDAFW)pump, on March 7, 2023 (4)elevated online risk (Green) during planned preventive maintenance to conduct coupling inspections and lubrication on the 'B' service water booster pump (SWBP),on March 22, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) NCR 2454068, evaluation of seal table leakage identified from high pressure fitting for incore thimble L-4 following unit startup from refueling outage, on January 26, 2023
- (2) NCR 2454336, MSSV SV1-C lifted during unexpected turbine trip while synchronizing to the grid, on December 30, 2022
- (3) NCR 2454778, 'A' safety injection cold leg accumulator level tank leakage causing frequent makeup evolutions and evaluation for operator burden, on February 1, 2023
- (4) NCR 2460252, control rod G-05 indicated position exceeded 15 inch deviation from
'A' control bank demand position, on February 13, 2023
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)
(Temporary) engineering change (EC) 422089, install catchment device inside containment to collect seal table leakage online (2)
(Permanent) EC 414969, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)compliance - generator, main step-up, and auxiliary transformer digital protective relay upgrade
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) OST-701-5, Reactor Coolant System Inservice Valve Test, following breaker replacement for pressurizer PORV RC-535, on January 9, 2023
- (2) OST-201-2, MDAFW System Component Test - Train B, following preventive maintenance activities on the 'B' MDAFW pump, on February 7, 2023
- (3) OST-202, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Component Test, following scheduled replacement of pump oil cooling water supply relief valve AFW-79 for the SDAFW pump, on March 7, 2023
- (4) OP-905, Instrument and Station Air System, Section 6.1.2, for placing 'A' instrument air compressor in service, following emergent repairs to address excessive cycling and overheating, on March 15, 2023
- (5) OST-303-2, Service Water Booster Pump B Test, following coupling inspection and pump/motor lubrication preventive maintenance on the 'B' SWBP, on March 22, 2023
- (6) OP-306, Component Cooling Water System, Section 6.2.1, for running 'A' component cooling water pump, following motor testing and pump bearing lubrication preventive maintenance, on March 23, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) MST-023, Safeguards Relay Rack Train "B", on January 9, 2023
- (2) WO package 20414289, Task 1, 'C' Deepwell Pump Performance Testing, on February 14, 2023
- (3) OST-151-6, Comprehensive Flow Test for Safety Injection Pump C, on March 23, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) OST-701-4A, 'A' Diesel Generators Inservice Valve Test, on February 3, 2023
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) OST-453, Fukushima Flex 4.2 Diesel Generator 1A and 1B Surveillance Test, on February 15, 2023
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) A simulator-based licensed operator annual examination scenario involving a steam generator tube rupture event on February 28,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)===
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) NCRs 2454340 and 2455086, unexpected main generator lockout and turbine trip actuation during turbine synchronization, on December 30,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Implement Adequate Post-Modification Testing for Design Change Involving New Protective Digital Relay System for Main Generator, Main Step-Up, and Auxiliary Transformers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000261/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71152A A self-revealed Green finding was identified for the licensees failure to implement adequate post-modification testing for a design change that installed a new digital relay protection system for the main generator, main step-up, and auxiliary transformers. As a result, the licensee failed to identify that the main generator current transformers (CTs) were miswired as part of the modification implementation. This caused a main generator lockout signal to be generated when the main generator was synchronized to the grid during the subsequent plant startup, resulting in a turbine trip actuation and lifting of a main steam safety valve (MSSV) in response to the steam generator pressure transient experienced.
Description:
On December 30, 2022, while H. B. Robinson Unit 2 was operating at approximately 18 percent reactor power and in the process of synchronizing the turbine to the grid following a refueling outage, an unexpected main generator lockout signal was received approximately 15-30 seconds after closing one of the two generator output breakers. As designed, this generator lockout signal resulted in an automatic turbine trip actuation. Since the reactor was operating at less than 40 percent power, permissive P-8 prevented an automatic reactor trip signal from being generated. However, as a result of experiencing a turbine trip while operating with higher than normal steamline pressures while synchronizing the generator to grid, steamline pressures reached a high of 1056 psig. This resulted in one of the four C loop MSSVs, SV1-1C, which has the lowest lift setpoint of the four, lifting and remaining partially open due to post-trip steamline pressure remaining above the valves close reset pressure of 922.5 psig, which by design is 15 percent of its lift setpoint. The operators successfully manually lowered steamline pressure below 922.5 psig, at which point, MSSV SV1-1C fully reseated without creating any additional operational problems. It was later determined that at the highest steamline pressure experienced during the event (1056 psig), this was within the allowable 1052.5 psig to 1117.6 psig (+/- 3 percent) lift setpoint range required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1 for MSSV SV1-1C operability. Therefore, while MSSV SV1-1C lifted on the low end of its required setpoint range, it was still within its TS allowance.
Following the event, it was determined the cause of the main generator lockout was a result of miswiring the digital relay protection system that was installed during the Fall 2022 refueling outage as part of modification EC 414969, NERC Compliance - Generator, Main Step-Up and Auxiliary Transformer Protective Relay Upgrade. Specifically, the wiring to the new main generator primary multifunctional digital lockout protection relay from the main generator CTs were rolled (i.e., installed backward), resulting in reverse polarity as seen by the newly installed generator output differential protection relay and generation of the generator lockout signal. The miswiring was created during the modification development due to a latent error that existed since 2007 in the wiring drawing of the main generator CTs that was used as a design basis input that depicted the backward CT wiring configuration.
Licensee procedure AD-EG-ALL-1155, Post Modification Testing, requires all appropriate testing, including pre-demolition testing, as well as post-modification implementation testing, be performed prior to returning equipment to service to verify acceptable operation and function of the equipment affected by a design change. The inspectors noted there were multiple opportunities for the licensee to have identified and corrected the miswiring error as part of the design control post-modification testing process required by AD-EG-ALL-1155. Specifically, EC 414969 failed to include the required pre-demolition testing, which was specifically designed to confirm the as-found electrical wiring configuration (such as the polarity of the CTs) to ensure that no legacy plant drawing or labeling discrepancy existed. Such demolition testing was necessary since access to the actual CTs was not possible with the generator online due to the electrical hazard risk of opening the compartment and exposing personnel to the high voltage energized circuits. A subsequent opportunity to identify and correct the miswiring occurred on November 28, 2022, during specific post-modification implementation testing conducted via special procedure SP-1661-GEN, Main/Neutral Side Generator, Neutral Transformer CT and Generator Iso-Phase Potential Transformer EC 414969. This special procedure was specifically developed, in part, to verify the polarity of generator and auxiliary transformer CT input signals to the newly installed digital protective relays were correct. The results of the polarity check for the generator CTs demonstrated that the polarity was reversed. However, the test personnel involved believed that revising the test procedure to allow swapping of the measuring equipment test leads, which would provide the desired polarity results, was an acceptable course of action. Subsequently, the special procedure was completed with this procedure change without the test personnel understanding the impact of the identified reversed generator CT polarity condition. The inappropriate test procedure change resulted in the licensees failure to identify and correct the generator CT miswiring.
Corrective Actions: The licensee investigated the cause of the turbine trip, as well as other challenges and issues related to the digital relay protection modification. The wiring associated with the main generator CTs polarity was corrected and a wiring verification extent of condition of other newly installed digital protection relays was performed to identify any other wiring discrepancies. Several Case Studies were being developed to address weakness in engineering design change product reviews and expectations, as well as fundamental worker knowledge gaps when identifying testing and drawing discrepancies.
Corrective Action References: Nuclear Condition Reports 2454340 and 2455086
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to implement adequate post-modification testing as part a modification for installing a new digital relay protection system for the main generator, which is contrary to procedure AD-EG-ALL-1155, Post Modification Testing, is a performance deficiency (PD) that was within the licensees ability to foresee, prevent, and/or correct. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify through adequate post-modification testing that the main generator CTs were miswired which resulted in an unnecessary turbine trip and secondary pressure transient that caused the opening of an MSSV.
Screening: The inspectors determined the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the PD resulted in a turbine trip and opening of a MSSV during plant synchronization to the grid.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because, although it caused a turbine trip and opening of an MSSV, it did not cause a reactor trip or loss of mitigating equipment relied on to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to a stable shutdown condition. Specifically, plant safety systems properly responded to the turbine trip and the licensee was able to manually reduce steam header pressure which allowed closure of the MSSV.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, licensee post-modification test personnel failed to understand, investigate, and validate the impact of obtaining abnormal main generator CT polarity test results from post-modification testing of a main generator protection system digital relay upgrade modification. This resulted in an inappropriate decision to modify the post-modification procedure that left a relay miswiring condition undiscovered and ultimately resulted in a turbine trip event.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On April 19, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.
George Curtis, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
On February 23, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71111.11B inspection results to Laura Basta, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AP-053
Severe Weather Response
Rev. 10
Procedures
OMM-021
Operation During Adverse Weather Conditions
Rev. 63
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Rev. 114
Dedicated Shutdown System
Rev. 89
OP-603
Rev. 153
Procedures
Service Water System
Rev. 158
CSD-RNP-PFP-
AB2-0226-001
Auxiliary Building Elevation 226 Pre-Fire Plan
Rev. 0
CSD-RNP-PFP-
AB2-0246-001
Auxiliary Building Elevation 246 Pre-Fire Plan
Rev. 1
Fire Plans
CSD-RNP-PFP-
TB2-0226-001
Turbine Building Elevation 226 Pre-Fire Plan
Rev. 0
Miscellaneous
Drill ID: 23-1Q-
05U
Fire drill scenario 21 for CCW Pump Room
Rev. 8
AD-OP-ALL-0207
Fire Brigade Administrative Controls
Rev. 5
Procedures
Response to Fire Event
Rev. 16
Licensed operator annual operating exam scenarios and
JPMs administered the weeks of 2/14/23 and 2/20/23.
Licensed operator biennial written test (RO and SRO)
administered the week of 2/20/23
Licensed operator training attendance, remediation, and
license maintenance records; 2021-2023, since the previous
71111.11B inspection.
Medical records for 10 % of the licensed operators.
Miscellaneous
Simulator fidelity scenario-based testing records and
Simulator Work Requests, 2021-2023, since the previous
71111.11B inspection.
AD-TQ-ALL-0068
Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program
AD-TQ-ALL-0230
AD-TQ-ALL-0230 Licensed Operator Requalification Annual
and Biennial Exam Development
AD-TQ-ALL-0320
Development of Simulator Training and Evaluation Guides
Procedures
AD-TQ-ALL-0430
Development and Administration of Job Performance
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Measures
Miscellaneous
Licensed
Operator
Continuing
Training
23 Exam 08
Rev. 0
AD-TQ-ALL-0420
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
Rev. 19
Procedures
GP-005
Power Operation
Rev. 145
AD-WC-ALL-
200
On-Line Work Management
Rev. 21
AD-WC-ALL-
240
On-Line Risk Management Process
Rev. 3
CSD-WC-RNP-
240-00
Rev. 1
Procedures
OMM-048
Work Coordination and Risk Management
Rev. 71
Replace breaker for pressurizer PORV block valve RC-535
1/9/2023
B SWBP motor lubrication
3/22/2023
B SWBP coupling inspection
3/22/2023
B SWBP drain, flush, and oil refill
3/22/2023
Work Orders
WOs 20540076
and 20557721
SDAFW pump preventive maintenance
3/7/2023
Troubleshoot and repair 'A' instrument air compressor
excessive cycling and overheating
3/15/2023
WOs 20446216,
20511994,
20561455, and
20514397
Various preventive maintenance activities associated with 'B'
AFW pump
2/7/2023
WOs 20540071
and 20557721
SDAFW relief valve AFW-79 replacement and lubrication
preventive maintenance
3/7/2023
WOs 20562687
and 20483756
'A' CCW pump lubrication and motor preventive
maintenance
3/23/2023
Work Orders
WOs 20573317,
20555480, and
20564859
'B' SWBP coupling inspection and pump/motor lubrications
3/22/2023