IR 05000261/1989025
| ML14176A825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1990 |
| From: | Dance H, Garner L, Jury K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A824 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-89-25, NUDOCS 9001190190 | |
| Download: ML14176A825 (16) | |
Text
§ REG&,
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-261/89-25 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: November 11 -
December 15, 1989 Inspectors:
/
/
ft L., W. Garner, Senion Resident Inspector Date Signed K. S. Jury, Resident Inspector Date/Signed Approved by: /)
H. C. Dance,!Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, ESF system walkdown, evaluation of licensee self-assessment capability, onsite followup of events at operating power reactors, onsite review committee, reactor operator license verification, and followu Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie Licensee evaluation determined that Agastat time relay tolerances of the SI sequencer combined with anticipated ESF motor acceleration times could have placed multiple loads onto the emergency bus during an acciden These items plus certain grid conditions could have resulted in actuation of the degraded voltage relays during sequencing with offsite power availabl Solid state digital timers with 0.5 seconds tolerance have been installed to address this problem. Pending NRC evaluation, the degraded voltage issue was left as an unresolved ite I I0
- 2e
Adequate controls have been established to ensure that reactor operators on watch have medical examinations and have passed requalification trainin Current practices to verify 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> per quarter of watch standing were adequate but not incorporated into procedual requirement Inspections of the licensee's self-assessment capability revealed that: the PNSC was effectively discharging its charter, however, actions resulting from a proactive function were infrequent; the CNS oversight functions were weak and not being effectively performed; and ONS had identified safety-related issues but its nuclear safety oversight was not evident due to a large workload associated with OEF/procedure reviews and special technical assignment A project quality team had been established to address problems associated with the CNS oversight function REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted R. Barnett, Shift Outage Manager, Outage Management C. Baucom, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance C. Bethea, Manager Training
- W Biggs,.Manager, Site Engineering Support R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Performance
- 0. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- J. Curley, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project J. Eaddy, Supervisor, E&RC Support R. Femal, Shift Foreman, Operations
- Flanagan, Outage Manager, Outage Management S. Griggs, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety R. Johnson, Manager, Control-and Administration
- J* Kloosterman, Director, Regulatory Compliance 0. Kn ight, Shift Foreman, Operations E. Lee, Shift Outage Manager, Outage Management A. McCauley, Principal Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Safety R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
- R. Morgan, Plant General Manager D. Myers, Shift Foreman, Operations D. Nelson, Shift Outage Manager, Outage Management
- M. Page, Manager, Technical Support D. Quick, Manager,, Plant Support D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Ope rations
- J Sheppard, Manager, Operations
- R. Smith, Manager, Maintenance R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations
- K. Williams, Senior Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Engineering Department H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne *Attended exit interview on December 19, 198 Acronyms and initi 'alisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph of the inspection repor. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facilit record To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, operations records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunction Through work observations and discussions with Operations Staff members, the inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms, adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of in-process surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of inoperable equipment statu The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters to verify conformance with TS. Shift changes were randomly observed to verify that system status continuity was maintained and that proper control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective manne Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly implemente No violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirement For the surveillance test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, and that the tests conformed to TS requirement Upon test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data was complete, accurate, and met TS requirements, test discrepancies were properly documented and rectified, and that the systems were properly returned to servic Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
OST-162 (revision 15)
Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start On Loss Of Power And Safety Injection Emergency Diesel Trips Defeat
OST-163 (revision 14)
Safety Injection
EST-010 (revision 2)
Containment Personnel Air Lock Leak Test
On December 13, 1989, OST-162 failed the acceptance criteria of TS 4.6. The TS required that the EDG start and assume required load within 50 seconds after the initial starting signal, e.g., simulated loss of all AC power together with a simulated SI signa The A EDG assumed loads in 50 second The B EDG assumed loads in 51 second Review of the data indicated that the new SI digital timing relays had performed as expecte However, the EDG output breakers were closing later than anticipated. The A EDG breaker closed after 10.4 seconds. The B EDG breaker closed after 11.2 seconds. Section 8.3.1.1.5.1 of the UPFSAR indicated that the EDGs are capable of accepting load with 10 second The licensee assembled a team to review and make recommendations to correct the deficienc Another performance of OST-162 was conducted on the same day with similar result Local observation of the EDG engine/generator panels revealed that the generators had reached 480 volts between 7 and 8 seconds, but the output breakers did not close for another additional 3 second Based upon these observations, the licensee concluded that the undervoltage relay associated with the EDG output breaker control circuits were out of adjustmen These undervoltage relays are used to verify that the generator is at voltage before closing the output breaker. The inspectors observed the as-found testing of the B EDG undervoltage rela The relay actuated between 2.9 and 3.0 seconds when subjected to 120 volts, the voltage sensed by the relay when the generator is at rated voltage (480 volts). After consulting with the EDG vendor, both the A and B EDG undervoltage relays were adjusted to a one plus or minus one-tenth second reset tim After this corrective action, OST-162 was successfully performed on December 15, 198 The undervoltage relays performed as expected and both the EDG output breakers closed in approximately 9 second The licensee is conducting an investigation into the adequacy of the last calibration performed in December 198 This item is identified as an IFI:
Review EDG Undervoltage Relay Calibration Problem (89-25-01).
No violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703).
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes and standard The inspectors determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that-required redundant components were operable. The inspectors verified that required administrative, and testing controls were adhered t In particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance activities:
PIC-805 (revisions 1 and 2) Westinghouse Type CV-7 Undervoltage Relays
SPP-011 (revision 3)
Removal and Restoration of SI Actuation WR/JO 89-AKPA1 Replacement of HVH 1 Agastat Relay WR/JO 89-AKWG1 Calibration of SI Relay 2BR2 WR/JO 89-AKWH1 Calibration of SI Relay 2BR1 WR/JO 89-AKWI1 Calibration of SI Relay 2SID1 WR/JO 89-AKWJ1 Calibration of SI Relay 2SID2 WR/JO 89-ALLY1 Calibration, Installation of A EDG 27 Device WR/JO 89-ALKZ1 Calibration of EDG 27 Devices No violations or deviations were identifie.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed a visual inspection of components associated with the MDAFW subsyste Items inspected included:
pumps, motors, piping, instrumentation, instrument tubing, supports and valve No condition was observed which would prevent the subsystem from performing its intended functio The inspectors also witnessed operation of the subsystem and verified that surveillance activities had been successfully complete The SDAFW subsystem had not been tested since insufficient steam has been available after the rebuild associated with the current outage. The inspectors intend to witness post-maintenance testing of the SDAFW when performe No violations or deviations were identifie. Evaluation Of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
The inspectors have evaluated the licensee's self-assessment capability on a continuing basi This evaluation is performed through attendance of PNSC meetings (both special and regular meetings), management meetings (including Project Review),
review of performance indicators and LERs, a continuing interface with the ONS group and review of the ONS and PNSC's findings/recommendations and action item TS Section 6.5.1.6 delineates the responsibilities, composition, and meeting frequency of the PNS The PNSC serves as the principal management overview group for reviewing, evaluating and resolving issues related to plant safet The inspectors frequently attend both special and regular PNSC meetings; the meeting minutes are routinely reviewed and
action item resolution is monitored for effectivenes As part of this inspection, the inspectors interviewed PNSC members concerning how they view the activities of the PNSC and their effectiveness in providing an overview and evaluation of plant operational safet The PNSC was effective in discharging the responsibilities they are chartered with. All TS required activities were routinely performed, as well as providing an effective monitoring/overview function of non-TS activitie Subcommittees (e.g.,
Trip Reduction and ALARA)
have been utilized by the PNS The results of these subcommittees were inconclusive, in that the ALARA subcommittee was changed into an ALARA committee which is no longer under the auspice of the PNSC, and the Trip Reduction program subcommittee responsibilities were being re-evaluate The PNSC membership is a conglomeration of experienced technical and managerial personnel that has demonstrated the ability to make technically sound and conservative decision The safety conscious nature of the PNSC has been demonstrated through their decision making on the RTD thermowell cracking problem, the RHR flooding issue, the AFW system operability concerns, and the recent SI sequencer issu The PNSC met membership and meeting frequency requirement The group also frequently utilized special meetings to discuss safety-significant issues that aris PNSC action items were frequently assigned and tracked to resolutio Other issues were identified by the PNSC; however, if they were not formally tracked as an action item, the item was frequently not re-visited by the PNSC and any action taken may not be visible (e.g.,
changing of the FR/NCR trending programs and evaluation/resolution of the high number of mechanical inspection rejections).
The action items were routinely discussed for status at each regular PNSC meeting and did not appear to remain open for unreasonable periods of tim Action items were normally assigned on a reactive basis, i.e. in response to known problem areas or event Actions resulting from a proactive overview function were infrequen This was partially attributed to a lack of effective trending of both programmatic and hardware corrective action The licensee has implemented a repetative failure trending mechanism; however; due to this system's infancy, its effectiveness cannot be evaluated. Additionally, CNS has rarely (if ever) utilized the PNSC for a special review, investigation, or report resulting from any independent overview CNS has performed (see TS 6.5.1.6.6.d).
Section 6.5.2 of TS delineated the responsibilities for the CNS Section in performing their off-site independent review functio These responsibilities included: review of significant plant changes, tests, and procedures (including TS and OL); verification that reportable events are investigated in a timely manner and corrected in a manner that reduces the probability of recurrence; and detection of trends that may not be apparent to "day-to-day" observer The corporate portion of the
CNS Section was made up of two units, the Nuclear Safety Review (NSR)
Unit and the Analysis and Evaluation Uni The Analysis and Evaluation Unit is primarily responsible for the development and refinement of the PRA progra The NSR Unit is primarily responsible for performing independent reviews and special investigation During the course of the inspection, the inspectors determined through observations, interviews, and document review that the CNS corporate units are frequently utilized for purposes other than those originally chartere A corporate -QA audit (QAA/0115-89-01)
was conducted in September 1989, and although compliance oriented, identified that the responsibilities of the individual units within CNS are not clearly defined nor followe The audit report also addressed the lack of timeliness of documents requiring OEF review For example, during the semi-annual OEF Review Meeting conducted on August 23, 1989, it was identified that CNS had yet to review approximately ten percent of the 1988 LERs for all three CP&L plants and had yet to review any of the 74 1989 LERs. Additionally, the CNS function of LER reviews was currently being performed by ONS for any immediate required site actions or training (originally identified by CNS).
Thus, the TS requirement for verification that reportable events are investigated in a timely manner and corrected in a manner that reduces the probability of recurrence, is not being effectively implemented through the CNS off-site independent review functio CNS has performed a service to HBR; however, through their use of a special investigation, CNS spearheaded an internal AIT into the issues promulgating the AFW system concern CNS was frequently utilized for special investigations; however, these investigations were normally event driven as compared to being a result from independent overview activitie Due to CNS not effectively reviewing on-site events (LERs),
they rarely identified trends independently from the site nor had they requested any special reviews or investigations from the PNSC as a result of trends. This utilization of the PNSC and its membership was charted to CNS in the T If effectively implemented, it could provide a valuable service to the sit It appeared that while CNS routinely performed their TS responsibilities (except the weaknesses detailed above), the CNS "oversight" function was not being effectively performed. LER reviews are not performed timely by the group tasked with the responsibility, the PNSC was not utilized for special evaluations nor investigations, and HBR-specific trends have not been identified. Additionally, although the plant recognized the value of CNS conducting Special Investigations, PRA activities, and performing some reviews (i.e., TS changes, FSAR changes, etc.), it did not recognize what, if any, independent oversight function CNS was providin **
7 The ONS unit provided the primary site activity overview that had been charged to the CNS Section. ONS was responsible for reviewing Operating Experience Feedback. The items reviewed/evaluated included, but were not limited to: 0ERs, POERs, NSSS/Vendor Service Bulletins, INPO SOERs and SERs, IENs, and other industry generated informatio ONS was also responsible for procedure evaluations and modifications review, as well as performance of field observations and special investigation The inspectors routinely reviewed the results of ONS special investigations and reviewed selected IEN and IEB evaluations performed by ONS and/or the plant department The ONS section spends the majority of time performing the OEF function, with special investigations performed on an as-needed or requested basi In the past two years, ONS had performed 15 special investigation The subjects range from evaluations and investigations into specific site events (i.e.,
Hydrogen and Instrument Air System Crosstie Event) to program reviews (i.e.,
EOP Transition Document Review).
Most of these special investigations resulted from an event or equipment problems as compared to proactive, trend-generated investigations. This appeared to be due to time constraints placed on ONS personnel and the lack of any currently effective site trending programs which could be utilized for this purpos The Field Observation Program could also have been effectively utilized in that, plant tours were normally confined to an issue being evaluated by ONS. These tours were normally conducted in non-vital areas as compared to a random tour of vital areas and the witnessing of selected safety-related work in progres The inspectors, interviewed various ONS personnel to ascertain and evaluate an introspective view of ONS and its function ONS's main role on site was perceived to be that of monitoring overall plant safety through oversight. However, due to the large work load imposed on ONS with the OEF and procedure review functions, coupled with time-consuming special technical assignments (e.g.,
DBD validation and SSFI participation), this nuclear safety oversight function was not eviden ONS had identified safety-significant issues as evidenced by their evaluation/review of the AFW system performance, anomalies which eventually resulted in the current AFW system outage. However, ONS has been handicapped by the "lack of -clout" experienced by many independent groups and by the routine de-prioritization by the plant of the necessary OEF review/analysis which ONS initiate ONS had a.well coordinated and managed tracking system for OEF/ONS item status; however, as discussed above, the lack of the plant's timeliness in responding had the potential to not allow safety-significant items (such as the AFW NPSH concern and IEN 87-66.review of Agastat relays)
from being promptly investigated and resolve It appeared that the plant did not fully comprehend the ONS "role" and may be just now realizing its function and effectivenes While performing followup of the Diagnostic Team Inspection at Brunswick, the licensee had identified weaknesses in their corporate (CNS and.ONS)
self-assessment capability. A task force was charted to develop recommendations to address the modification or deletion of non-productive assessment functions, the addition of more relevant and productive functions, and the merging of any overlapping or duplicated functions where appropriate. The goal was to provide, on a proactive basis, more focused and useful independent assessment information to the proper levels of managemen Implementation of initial recommendations of this task force was scheduled to begin before the end of 198 No violations or deviations were identifie. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
SI Sequencer Operation Could Result In Operation Outside FSAR Analysis On November 15, 1989, NED issued Potential Significant Deficiency No. 89-54. The deficiency identified that operation of the SI sequencer Agastat timing relays within a plus or minus 2 second operating band when combined with safeguard pump motor acceleration times could have resulted in pump motor starts which overlap with one anothe When a large motor starts, it may pull locked rotor current until it accelerates. to approximately 85% of rated spee During this time interval, the large current demand can cause the supply bus voltage to drop below the degraded voltage relay setpoint of 415 plus or minus 4 volt By design, the motor should accelerate at such a rate that the voltage will recover above the degraded voltage relay reset value of approximately 432 volts before the relay trips. The relays trips if not reset within 10 plus or minus one-half seconds after the trip setpoint is reache If another motor starts before the reset voltage value is reached, another voltage drop will occur, thereby, lengthening the time before the voltage recovers and the degraded voltage relay reset occur When a motor starts at a reduced voltage, it requires a longer time to accelerat Thus, when motor starts overlap, the acceleration time of each can be significantly increased above that which would occur if each was started alone. This synergetic effect could result in actuation of the degraded voltage relay. The deficiency identified that under certain postulated accident scenarios and equipment responses, motor overlap could be sufficient to result in actuation of the degraded voltage relay during SI sequencing. This would cause the emergency busses to be separated from offsite power and a re-sequencing of ESF equipment onto the EDG powered busses. Interruption of SI sequencing, e.g., ESF pumps stopping and then later restarting, is not bound by the existing LOCA analysi On November 16, 1989, the licensee determined that the potential for operation outside the approved safety analysis could have existe This unanalyzed condition was reported to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.7 This determination was based upon engineering judgemen During
'@
performance of calculations to support potential solutions to the deficiency, it was found that even with the proposed solutions, the voltage might stay below the relay reset value for approximately six second The specific case being analyzed assumed that: a LOCA had occurred with offsite power available, HBR unit 1 was not in service, the ten Darlington County IC turbines were not available, the switchyard capacitor banks were available, system load would result in 113.7 kV at the startup transformer when unit 2 tripped, all loads not automatically stopped by the LOCA would immediately be loaded onto the startup transformer, the emergency busses would be supplied by the 2F and 2G SST, the A and C SW pumps were already running, the HVH 2 and 4 containment fan coolers were already running, HVH 1 and 3 would start 2 seconds later than their nominal sequence time of 30 seconds, A and B MDAFW pumps would start 2 seconds earlier than their nominal sequence time of 40 seconds, containment pressure would cause the A and B CS pumps to start at the same time as HVH 1 and 3 and a transformer tap change had been installed on 2F and 2G SST to raise the voltage on the emergency busses by two and one-half percen From this case study, it was apparent that if the assumed running HVH units also had to be sequenced onto the emergency busses, the voltage would stay below the reset voltage for greater than 10 second No controls had been in place to assure that the HVH units had always been in service; however, having four HVH units in service was the normal plant operating mod Furthermore, the licensee did not believe that more than 4 of the 10 IC turbines have been out of service since their installation in the mid-seventie Whether or not prior to the IC turbine installation, switchyard voltage would have ever been at 113.7 kV or below upon the trip of unit 2 is not know Also prior to M-860 which installed the 2F and 2G SST, in May 1986, capability of offsite power to support the emergency busses was less. Whether or not the previous configuration would have resulted in an unanalyzed condition has not been determined. Because of all the unknowns and the time and effort it would take to guarantee that a LOCA with offsite power available would never have put the plant in an unanalyzed condition under all past plant operating configurations, the licensee decided to report the item per 10 CFR 50.7 The licensee conducted an evaluation to assess the impact of the motor overlap question on the EDG emergency power syste The EDGs were procured with a voltage regulator with the capability to recover voltage to 90 percent of the nominal voltage within 1 second after loading a 900 horsepower load. The maximum calculated effective horsepower of the different combinations of motors overlapping within the plus or minus 2 second repeatability of the Agastat time relays and the CS pumps starting was less than 900 horsepower. Thus, the licensee determined that operation of the EDGs were not adversely impacted by motor overla On the evening of November 21, 1989, the inspectors reviewed the vendor's (Amerace)
statement concerning repeatability of the 7000 series Agastat
time relay The 7000 series relay is one of the relay series installed in the SI sequence The vendor's catalogue material indicated that th tolerance is plus or minus 10 percent of settin For the 7000 series Agastats used in applications of more-than 20 seconds, this would result in tolerances of greater than the plus or minus 2 seconds used in the analysi This was discussed with plant management on November 22, 198 The licensee's initial response indicated that this had been discussed earlier by system engineering and NE The licensee indicated that refueling interval OST-163 contained a plus or.minus 2 second acceptance criteria for the relays, hence, this would provide confidence that they would perform better than the vendor guaranteed, e.g. with a 2 seconds operating band. However, subsequent review by the licensee and inspectors of previous Agastat performance history, from OST-163 and other available data sources, revealed that this was not the situatio Evaluation of a longer than a 2 second Agastat operating band revealed that a combined load in excess of 900 horsepower could be loaded onto the EDGs due to additional motor overlappin The licensee considered various JCO approaches, including use of PRA to justify operation until the relays could be replaced. However, based upon safety considerations, it was best to keep the plant shutdown until the relays could be replace The licensee has developed and implemented a modification, M-1035, to replace the electro-pneumatic type time delay relays with solid state Agastat DSC digital timer However, the DSC timer contacts were not rated for the DC current required to actuate the *DB-50 breakers associated with the ESF pump motor This required the addition of interposing relays with heavier duty contacts to be included into the circuits. The DSC timers will energize the interposing relay coils. The interposing relays when energized will close contacts which will then supply DC control power to actuate the DB-50 breaker Agastat GP series AC powered relays were chosen as the interposing relays because there were no DC powered relays available on short notice which were suitable for the applicatio The AC power required for operation of the.
interposing relays is from the A and B inverters associated with the safety-related A and B batterie The inspectors verified that the new equipment was properly installe In addition, the inspectors also verified, that based upon performance of OST-162 and OST-163, both trains of the safeguard sequencer, functioned properly. The new timers resulted in actuation of the DB-50 breakers with a repeatabili-ty of plus or minus one-tenth of a second as measured by ERFIS. Region II DRS personnel have reviewed the design modification of M-103 This item is an unresolved item:
Sequencer Load Overlap Problem-Agastat Relays (89-25-02).
During installation of M-1035, Operations personnel observed that loss of AC power to the interposing relays may not be detectable from the control room or locall Currently, the loss of DC power to the safeguards logic would be annunciated in the control room. Subsequent discussions between
- 11 operations and NED resulted in a loss of AC power alarm being added to the modification. The inspectors considered that Operations personnel's sensitivity to the potential for existence of an undetected fault which would render a train of safeguard inoperable was especially noteworth No violations or deviations were identifie. Onsite Review Committee (40500)
The inspectors evaluated certain activities of the PNSC to determine whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS and other regulatory requirement In particular, the inspectors attended the PNSC on November 22, 1989, concerning a proposed tap change to 2F and 2G SST (M-1034).
It was ascertained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were satisfie Previous meeting minutes were reviewed to confirm that decisions and recommendations were accurately reflected in the minute The inspectors also followed up on selected previously identified PNSC activities to independently confirm that corrective actions were progressing satisfactoril No violations or deviations were identifie.
9. Reactor Operator License Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted a review per enclosure 1 of RAI 89-34 to assess the licensee's methods for control of license status of reactor operators on watch and the thoroughness with which these was being implemente The primary responsibility for ensuring that a list of fully qualified licensed personnel are available to stand watch was assigned to the operations support section schedule This position was filled by a former shift forema The training department maintained status of requalification exams and medical certification During a training cycle if an individual unsuccessfully completed the written examination, the Operations Manager was immediately notified by telephone with written followup. Upon verbal notification, the scheduler removed the individual's name from the schedul The inspectors verified that within the previous year this situation had occurred only once and that the individual had not assumed licensed duties until he had completed accelerated retrainin If an individual unsuccessfully completed the simulator senarios, he would be given an addition chance to demonstrate his proficiency during the training week before he was removed from dut Medical physical dates were tracked by computer. A computer printout was generated monthly of the individuals who must obtain physicals within the subsequent two months. This was provided to the schedule The scheduler notified the individuals and scheduled appointments. If a physical was not completed
by the due date, the individual's name was removed from the schedul Records indicated that this had not occurred within the last yea Shift foreman were responsible for calling in individuals to replace personnel not reporting for duty. The replacements are chosen from those assigned to the relief/training shift and who were on the schedule and were not actively in trainin The inspectors consider,that these controls are adequate to ensure that reactor operators on watch have passed requalification training and have a current medical certificatio Both the training department and the operations support unit tracked that licensed operators maintained a minimum of 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> per quarter of watch standing. However, personnel have not submitted their watch hours for up to three weeks after the end of the mont Both tracking groups were revewing the information after two months into a quarter to identify personnel who needed hours in the third month to meet the requiremen This information was submitted to the schedule The inspectors verified that during the current quarter one active licensed operator was identifed by this proces He was subsequently scheduled for additional hours and had met the requirement by the end of report perio The current practices were adequate to verify the 60 hour6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> per quarter requirement but these were not required by procedur This was discussed with the Operations Manage The inspectors discussed with two shift foremen their ability to independently verify during backshifts, weekends and holidays the current status of operators on shif If they had cause to question an individual's licensed status, they could review records and/or contact the training department. This process could take up to 1 hou The shift foreman had the primary responsibilty for determining that a person was capable of assuming his duties (temporary physical impairments and aberrant behavior).
In instances of self-referrals of problems such alcoholism or drug dependency, plant management was informed and the individual's duties and assignments were reviewed as well as whether or not unescorted access would be continue No licensed operators had participated in this program within the previous yea No violations or deviations were identifie.
Followup (92701)
(CLOSED)
URI 89-12-04, Review Resolution of Single Failure Impact on SW System Performanc As described in IR 89-12, the licensee had put procedural controls in place to close the turbine building SW supply valves remotely from the RTGB if the automatic function failed to perform properl The licensee has completed sufficient modeling of the HBR systems such that an order of magnitude PRA analysis could be performe Preliminary results indicated that a failure to isolate the SW to the
turbine building when required would result in a core damage frequency of 8 E-0 Installation of a modification to remove the single failure modes from the automatic closure feature would improve the core damage frequeny to 3 E-0 The license installed M-1021 to remove the single failure modes from the isolation circuitr The inspectors reviewed the modification package and have no question No violations or deviations were identifie. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 19, 1989, with those persons indicated in'
paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below and in the summar Dissenting comments were not received from the license Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph 89-25-01 IFI - Review EDG Undervoltage Relay Calibration Problem (paragraph 3)
89-25-02 URI -
Sequencer Load Overlap Problem Agastat Relays (paragraph 6)
1 List of Acronyms and Initialisms AC Alternating Current AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AIT Augmented Inspection Team ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations CNS Cooperate Nuclear Safety CP&L Carolina Power & Light CS Containment Spray DBD Design Basis Documentation DC Direct Current DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EOP Emergency Operation Procedures ERFIS Emergency Response Facility Information System ESF Engineered Safety Feature EST Engineering Surveillance Test FR Field Report FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report HBR H. B. Robinson HVH Heating Ventilation Handling
IC Internal Combustion IEN Inspection Enforcement Notice IFI Inspector Followup Item INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IR
Inspection Report
JCO
Justification For Continued Operation
KV
Kilovolts
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
Licensee Event Report
Loss of Coolant Accident
M
Modification
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water
Maintenance Surveillance Test
MWt
Megawatts Thermal
Non-conformance Report
NED
Nuclear Engineering Department
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Safety Review
Nuclear Steam Supply System
0EF
Operating Experience Feedback
Operating Experience Report
Operating License
Onsite Nuclear Safety
OST
Operations Surveillance Test
PNSC
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
POER
Plant Operating Experience Report
Quality Assurance
Resident Action Item
RTB
Reactor Trip Breaker
Resistence Temperature Detector
Reactor Turbine Generator Board
Safety Evaluation Report
Safety Injection
Significant Operating Experience Report
Safety System Functional Inspection
Station Service Transformer
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report
Unresolved Item
WR/JO
Work Request/Job Order