ML14181A881
| ML14181A881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris, Brunswick, Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A879 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-97-02, 50-261-97-2, 50-324-97-01, 50-324-97-1, 50-325-97-01, 50-325-97-1, 50-400-97-02, 50-400-97-2, NUDOCS 9703110129 | |
| Download: ML14181A881 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1997002
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50-325, 50-324, 50-400, and 50-261
License Nos:
DPR-71, DPR-62, NPF-63 and DPR-23
Report Nos:
50-325/324/97-01, 50-400/97-02, and 50-261/97-02
Licensee:
Carolina Power & Light Company
Facilities:
Brunswick, Harris, and H.B. Robinson Nuclear Stations
Location:
Carolina Power & Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Date:
January 13 to February 6, 1997
Inspectors:
D. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector
L. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector
Approved by:
J. Jaudon, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
9703110129 970228
PDR ADOCK 05000261
G
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Brunswick, Harris and H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plants
50-325/324/97-01, 50-400/97-02 and 50-261/97-02
This special announced inspection was conducted in the area of Plant Support by two
regional safeguards specialist. The specific areas evaluated was the Access Authorization
and Fitness For Duty Programs.
From January 13 to February 6, 1997, the NRC conducted an inspection at the General
Office, Raleigh, North Carolina, which consisted of a review of the Access Authorization (AA)
and Fitness For Duty (FFD) Programs for the Brunswick, Harris, and Robinson facilities. The
purpose of the NRC inspection was to follow up on the self-audits of the AA and FFD
Programs which were conducted by Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L), on July 8-12
and 15-19, 1996, respectively. The audits determined that the AA Program was "ineffective,"
and the FFD Program was "marginally effective."
During the NRC inspection, the inspectors noted that extensive corrective actions had been
implemented at the time of the inspection and activities at the Corporate Office relating to the
current AA and FFD Programs were considered excellent.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had currently implemented and staffed an
organization that was very capable of managing and implementing the AA and FFD program
requirements.
Based on review of the licensee's newly developed training program, AA procedures, Desk
Top Instructions, records and interviews with personnel responsible for administering and
implementing the AA and FFD Programs, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's sites
were currently very capable of continuing to provide assurance that the personnel who were
granted unescorted access to the nuclear facilities met regulatory requirements. However,
while reviewing the corrective actions to the audit, the inspectors noted examples of apparent
violations of regulatory requirements. The examples were: granting unescorted access to
individuals who did not meet the criteria, failing to review AA documentation properly, and
failing to ensure that specific required elements of the AA Program were accomplished. Also,
the inspectors noted that personnel who previously had been granted unescorted access
were capable of gaining unauthorized access after their employment had been terminated.
While reviewing the FFD requirements, the inspectors noted that individuals had been
granted unescorted access without being in the random drug testing pool. Additionally, the
inspectors noted numerous examples of FFD personnel failing to complete all elements of the
FFD documentation, which reflected a significant lack of attention or carelessness toward
their responsibilities. These type errors are significant because the chain of custody for the
specimens was involved, and positive linkage of the specimen to a specific individual was not
always possible without accurate documentation. Additionally, the chain of custody would be
very critical in the event a specimen was found to be positive for drugs and was legally
challenged.
REPORT DETAILS
S1.2 Access Authorization
S1.2.1 Proqram Administration and Implementation
a.
Inspection Scope
Determine how the Access Authorization (AA) Program is administered including
applicable organizational and contractor responsibilities.
b.
Observations and Findings
The NRC conducted an inspection of the AA and Fitness For Duty (FFD) Programs,
January 13 to February 6, 1997, as a followup to the annual Performance Evaluation
Section (PES) audit conducted July 8-12 and July 15-19, 1996. The audits concluded
that the AA Program was "ineffective" and that the FFD Program was "marginally
effective." As a result of the PES assessment, the NRC considered it necessary to
review the AA and FFD Programs after corrective actions were implemented. The
reported of two audits conducted by PES, Report No. 95-05-SC-CORP, dated June 8,
1995, and Report No. 96-15-SPP-C, dated August 14, 1996, were reviewed during the
inspectors. The auditors found during the 1995 audit that, "...documentation control
and the processes governing these programs are in a state of flux and are considered
weak." During the 1996 audit, the auditors determined that the program continued to
be weak; in addition, the "self-assessment and corrective action was ineffective." The
inspectors concluded that the auditors were thorough and had clearly defined the state
As part of the background review, the inspectors noted that in April 1994 the AA and
FFD Programs were organized and staffed with managers, and a decision was made to
centralize the AA and FFD functions at the Corporate Office. From April 1994 to
February 1995, the licensee established the plant in-processing facilities, developed a
Computerized Access Tracking System (CATS), and moved Health Screening into
Access Authorization. In September 1994, the licensee also initiated a transition from
using self-screening contractors to a licensee function in January 1995.
The licensee's Procedure SEC-NGGC, "Nuclear Worker Screening Program for
Unescorted Access," and Desk Top Instructions, developed to provide guidance for
"grandfathering," reinstating, updating, transfer, and granting temporary access, were
reviewed by the inspectors and found to be well written and to have clearly defined the
licensee's program requirements and regulatory requirements.
The AA and FFD Programs were organized under the Manager, Corporate Security.
According to the organizational chart, the Director of Access Authorization position
(currently vacant) has the Administrator AA Program and the Administrator FFD
reporting to him or her. Currently these two administrators report to the Manager,
Corporate Security.
2
During the inspection, the administrators were found to be experienced and fully
capable of administering their portion of the programs. The staff was interviewed
during the inspection and found to have been well trained and capable of performing
the specific requirements they are tasked to perform.
Although the AA and FFD Programs had been centralized at the Corporate level, the
licensee continued to use outside screening agents to conduct the background
investigations and credit checks. The licensee had reviewed the outside screening
agents program to ensure that they met requirements; however, as noted in Paragraph
S2.1.1, the outside agents failed to meet the licensee's requirements.
c.
Conclusion
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had currently implemented and staffed an
organization that was very capable of managing and implementing the AA and FFD
program requirements.
S1.2.2 Background Investigations (BI) Elements
a.
Inspection Scope
Review the BI elements and verify that the program has been adequately designed and
implemented in accordance with the licensee's approved plans and procedures.
b.
Observation and Findings
The inspectors determined, at the time of the inspection, that the licensee could verify
true identity and develop information concerning employment, education, credit,
criminal history, military service, and the character and reputation of individuals prior to
granting unescorted access to protected and vital areas. However, the inspectors also
determined, through review of the licensee's condition reports (CRs) and self-audits,
that the licensee had identified that, on several occasions the licensee had failed to
complete adequately all elements of the background information criteria which are
noted below.
From January 22 through March 1, 1996, an individual was granted temporary
unescorted access to the Brunswick Nuclear Plant prior to one of his past employments
being verified. The applicable regulation, 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3), requires that the
licensee base its decision to grant, deny, revoke, or continue an unescorted access
authorization on review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed.
Paragraph 1.0, of Procedure SEC-NGGC-2101, "Nuclear Worker Screening Program
for-Unescorted Access," Revision 5, dated November 15, 1996, requires the licensee to
implement an Unescorted Access Authorization Program which satisfies the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.56. Paragraph 9.1.1, of Procedure SEC-NGGC-2101,
"Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access," requires that employment
history must be obtained for the past five years through contacts with previous
employers by obtaining the following information: (1) verification of claimed periods of
employment of 30 days or more, (2) reason for termination and eligibility for rehire, and
3
(3) any other information that would adversely reflect upon the reliability and
trustworthiness of the worker as it relates to the worker being permitted unescorted
access.
The verification of the past employment would have disclosed that the individual had
been terminated by his last employer for falsification of records. Subsequently, on
March 1, 1996, the licensee was made aware of the derogatory information; however,
the licensee failed to adjudicate the derogatory information, which resulted in the
individual being granted a final clearance on June 26, 1996. The licensee indicated
that full access would not have been granted if the licensee had been aware of the
derogatory information. Also, based on granting the final clearance, the individual
could have been transferred to other licensee sites without another background
investigation being accomplished. The individual had unescorted access to the
protected area.
In summary, as noted above, from January 22 through March 13, 1996, an individual
was granted temporary access to Brunswick Nuclear Plant for when the licensee had
not verified prior employments. Subsequently, the individual was determined to have
been terminated by previous employer for record falsification. This example is an
apparent violation of regulatory requirements (EEI 50-325/324/97-01-01).
During further review of CRs, the inspectors determined the licensee had identified that
from March 31 through May 7, 1994, and July 1 through July 7, 1994, an individual was
badged and granted unescorted access with a final clearance to the Brunswick Nuclear
Plant although the individual only met the requirements for a temporary clearance
(criminal history check not completed). The criminal history check was completed by
another licensee on October 26, 1994, with negative results. The individual had access
to the vital areas.
Also, the inspectors noted that an employee was granted unescorted access in 1991
without a valid set of fingerprints being submitted for review as required by
10 CFR 73.57. Regulation 10 CFR 73.57(b) requires that the licensee fingerprint each
individual who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear facility. Also, based on
the criminal history check resulting from the fingerprint review, the licensees must
determine either to continue to grant or to deny further unescorted access to the
facility. The licensee found that the individual had been fingerprinted in 1987 but was
not granted unescorted access until 1991. Desk Top Instruction AA-DI-03, "in
Processing," Revision 0, dated November 10, 1996, requires that employees who have
lost access over 365 days shall complete fingerprinting upon being granted unescorted
access authorization. Therefore, the individual had exceeded the 365 day timeframe
requirement between being fingerprinted and being granted unescorted access.
In summary, as noted above, the licensee failed to implement an AA Program to meet
the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56 and the requirements of Desk Top Instruction
AA-DI-33 for two specific individuals, as follows:
.4
From March 31 through May 7, 1994, and July 1 through July 7, 1994, an
individual was granted final unescorted access to Brunswick Nuclear Plant
without the completion of a criminal history check based on the fingerprints; and
Fingerprints were not obtained from an individual who had exceeded the 365-day
timeframe between being fingerprinted and being granted unescorted access to
the Brunswick Nuclear Plant from August 1991 to August 1996.
These two examples are identified as apparent violations of regulatory requirements
(EEI 50-325/324/97-01-02).
Additionally, while reviewing the licensee's corrective actions to the PES audit, the
inspectors determined through review of CRs, that the licensee had identified other
elements of the licensee's programs had not been met to establish and maintain an AA
program to assure that individuals granted unescorted access are reliable and do not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public. Regulation
10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) requires that the licensee base the decision to grant, deny, revoke,
or continue an unescorted access authorization on review and evaluation of all
pertinent information developed. Desk Top Instruction, AA-DI-03, "In-Processing,"
Revision 0, dated November 10, 1996, requires that fingerprint results are to be filed in
each worker's access authorization folder. Specific problems identified were as follows:
On November 29, 1995, an individual was granted unescorted access to
Robinson Nuclear Plant even though the background investigation report
indicated that the individual was not reliable or trustworthy. Additionally, the
information was not adjudicated. Subsequently, the licensee discovered that the
background investigators should have noted "trustworthy" on the report.
On January 22, 1996, an individual was granted unescorted access to Brunswick
Nuclear Plant although adjudication of derogatory credit information was not
documented.
On March 26, 1996, a contractor had been granted final clearance to Brunswick
Nuclear Plant without adjudication of the failure to provide a best effort to contact
two developed references.
On December 14, 1995, an individual was granted final unescorted access to
Robinson Nuclear Plant with only one developed reference.
On March 28, 1990, fingerprint results were not filed for an individual who was
granted unescorted access to Brunswick Nuclear Plant.
In summary, as noted above, for five specific instances, the licensee failed to
accurately document or note that documentation was missing upon which it had based
its decision to grant unescorted access authorization. These five examples are
identified as apparent violations of regulatory requirements (EEI 50-324/325/97-01-03
and 50-261/97-02-01).
5
The inspectors noted as part of the licensee's continuing self-assessment that the
licensee had identified that on March 3, 1995, an individual's employment was
terminated at the Harris Nuclear Plant, and the licensee failed to remove the individual
from the access authorization list, collect the access badge, or delete the individual
from the hand geometry system until April 24, 1995. Therefore, the individual could
have had unauthorized access for 51 days. The licensee determined that the individual
did not gain access to the site during the 51-day period. Also, on December 31, 1996,
another individual's employment at the Harris Nuclear Plant was terminated; however,
access was not terminated until January 17, 1997. The licensee determined that the
individual's contractor supervisor was aware of the termination and had failed to collect
the individual's badge and notify plant access. Also, the CP&L individual responsible
for the contractor was aware of the termination and failed to notify plant access
personnel. During the 17 days that the badge was active, the licensee conducted a 31
day review of personnel who were required access and failed to note that the individual
remained on the active plant access list. The licensee determined that the individual
did not enter the protected area during the 17-day period.
Paragraph 6.2.1, of the Harris Nuclear Plant's Physical Security Plan (PSP), Revision 0,
dated April 29, 1996, requires that a current access list for vital areas must be
upgraded and re-approved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least
every 31 days. The PSP further requires that the names of personnel whose
employment is terminated, for whatever reason, are purged from the access
authorization list.
In summary, as noted above, during the periods of March 3 through April 24, 1995, and
December 31, 1996, through January 17, 1997, the licensee's 31-day review of the
access list for vital areas failed to identify and to purge frori the access authorization
list two individuals whose employment had been terminated, resulting in their continued
capability to gain unescorted access to the Harris Nuclear Plant. These examples are
identified as apparent violations of regulatory requirements (EEl 50-400/97-02-01).
c.
Conclusion
Based on review of the licensee's newly developed training program, AA procedures,
Desk Top Instructions, records and interviews with personnel responsible for
administering and implementing the AA/FFD Programs, the inspectors concluded that
the licensee's sites were currently very capable of continuing to provide assurance that
the personnel who were granted unescorted access to the nuclear facilities met
regulatory requirements. However, while reviewing the corrective actions to the audit,
the inspectors noted examples of apparent violations of regulatory requirements. The
examples were; granting unescorted access to individuals who did not meet the criteria,
failing to review properly AA documentation, and failing to ensure that specific required
elements of the AA Program were accomplished. Also, the inspectors noted that
personnel who previously had been granted unescorted access were capable of
gaining unauthorized access after their employment had been terminated.
6
S1.3 Fitness For Duty Program
S1.3.1 Program Administration and Implementation
a.
Inspection Scope
Ensure that the licensee has developed procedures to be utilized in testing for drugs
and alcohol, including procedures for protecting the employee and the integrity of the
specimen, and the quality controls to ensure that the test results are valid and
attributable to the correct individual.
Observation and Findings
While reviewing licensee FFD documentation to determine the overall effectiveness of
corrective actions, the inspectors noted that numerous examples of documentation
errors were found during the licensee's total review of the FFD records. 10 CFR
26.20(c) requires that the licensee develop procedures to be utilized in testing for drugs
and alcohol, including procedures for protecting the employee and the integrity of the
specimen, and the quality controls to ensure the test results are valid and attributable
to the correct individual. Procedure SEG-NGGC-2143, "Fitness for Duty Drug Testing
Specimen Collection," Revision 1, dated October 31, 1996, Section 9.2, requires the
licensee, if the specimen was of insufficient volume, to measure temperature and to
record the information on the Permanent Record Book and in the chain of custody
collector's notes section. Procedure SEG-NGGC-2143, Section 1.0 and 10.1.5,
requires that the Permanent Record Book shall have a donor certification signature
which must match the signature on the Release of Medical Information/Authorization for
FFD Testing/FFD Information and Consent form to promote donor's confidence in the
accuracy and integrity of the specimen collection and analysis. Procedure SEG-NGGC
2143, Section 9.1.33, requires the collector to have the donor print and sign the same
name on the chain of custody form. Desk Top Instruction-51, "Blind Proficiency Sample
Processing," Revision 1, dated July 12, 1995, requires that the collector shall print and
sign the blind sample name prior to submission. The following are the significant
examples of the findings identified during the review:
On August 2, 1995, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant FFD staff failed to have the
donor sign the chain of custody form.
On August 20, 1996, the Robinson Nuclear Plant FFD staff forwarded a pre
access chemical test to the testing laboratory without the donor's signature.
On September 4, 1996, the Robinson Nuclear Plant FFD staff failed to require
the donor to date the consent form.
On September 4 and 20, 1996, the General Office FFD staff, on four separate
occasions, allowed the donors to sign a name different than the one on the FFD
forms.
7
On September 5, 1996, two Robinson Nuclear Plant FFD collectors allowed a
donor to sign the FFD forms incorrectly in that the names were not the same as
printed on the forms.
On September 9, 1996, the Robinson Nuclear Plant FFD staff failed to require a
donor to sign the same signature as printed on the FFD form.
On September 9, 1996, the Robinson Nuclear Plant FFD staff failed to require
one individual to sign the permanent record book, and allowed another individual
to put the wrong date on the permanent record book.
On October 1, 1996, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant FFD staff recorded the wrong
social security number on the chain of custody form.
On October 1, 1996, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant FFD staff misspelled the
donor's name on the chain of custody form.
On October 7, 1996, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant FFD staff failed to record that a
specimen was of insufficient volume, in the specified box on the Chain of
Custody form.
On November 11, 1996, a Harris Nuclear Plant FFD staff member failed to date a
donor's chain of custody.
On December 11, 1996, the General Office FFD staff forwarded a blind sample to
the testing laboratory without printing and signing the donor's name on the chain
of custody.
In summary, as noted above, on several occasions the licensee failed to complete the
chain of custody form properly or to obtain the proper signature or to obtain a signature
on fitness for duty documentation at the Brunswick, Harris, and Robinson Nuclear
Plants. This is an apparent violation of regulatory requirements
(EEI 50-325/324/97-01-05, 50-400/97-02-02, and 50-261/97-02-02).
Additionally, the inspectors determined that three individuals were granted access to
the Brunswick Nuclear Plant without being included in the random drug and alcohol
testing program. The first individual was granted access from May 9, 1994, to
February 2, 1995, approximately eight months. The second individual was granted
access from April 26, 1994 to February 21, 1995, approximately 10 months. The third
individual was granted access from January 24, 1996, to March 21, 1996,
approximately 39 days. All three individuals were not aware of being omitted from the
FFD testing program.
Regulation 10 CFR 26.24(a)(2) requires the licensee to implement unannounced drug
and alcohol tests imposed in a statistically random and unpredictable manner so that
all persons in the population subject to testing have an equal probability of being
selected and tested.
8
In summary, as noted above, the licensee failed to implement unannounced drug and
alcohol test for all persons in the population subject to testing. Specifically, from
May 9, 1994 through February 2, 1995; April 26, 1994, through February 21, 1995; and
January 24 through March 21, 1996, three individuals, respectively, were granted
unescorted access to Brunswick Nuclear Plant yet were not included in the random
drug/alcohol testing program. These examples are apparent violations of regulatory
requirements (EEI 50-325/324/97-01-04).
c.
Conclusion:
While reviewing the FFD requirements, the inspectors noted that individuals had been
granted unescorted access without being in the random drug testing pool. Additionally,
the inspectors noted numerous examples of FFD personnel failing to complete all
elements of the FFD documentation which reflected a significant lack of attention or
carelessness toward their responsibilities. Two violations were identified from the FFD
unescorted access and the FFD documentation problems. These type errors are
significant because the chain of custody for the specimens was involved, and positive
linkage of the specimen to a specific individual was not always possible without
accurate documentation.
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspection scope and findings were summarized to licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on February 6, 1997. The inspector described the areas
inspected and discussed the inspection results. The inspector discussed the specific failures
to meet the regulatory requirements for the AA/FFD Programs. Also, the aggressive self
audit program and the excellent corrective actions to the audit findings were discussed. The
licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings. Proprietary information is not contained in
this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
9
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
D. Braund, Harris Security Manager
A. Brittain, Brunswick Security Manager
B. Castonguay, Vice President, Human Resources
A. Daune, Acting Access Authorization Administrator
P. Douglas, Access Specialist
R. Gill, Corporate Security Manager
A. Graves, Fitness For Duty Program Administrator
W. Hatcher, Access Authorization-Compliance
C. Henderson, Access Specialist
B. Lingren, Brunswick Site Support Services Manager
P. Morales, Senior Analyst, Corporate Regulatory Affairs
M. Taylor, Fitness For Duty Specialist
F. Underwood, Compliance Specialist
T. Walt, Manager, Operations and Environmental Support
R. Watson, Senior Engineer, Performance Evaluation Support
S. Young, Security Manager
NRC
L. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector
D. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP
81502:
Fitness For Duty Program
IP
81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
TI
2515/127: Access Authorization
LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
SEG-NGGC-2101, Nuclear Worker Screening Program For Unescorted Access
SEC-NGGC-2140, Fitness For Duty Program
Access Authorization Desk Instructions
Fitness For Duty Desk Instructions
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
_T.e Item Number
Status
Description and Reference
50-325/324/97-01-01
Open
Failure to complete background investigation
EEl
50-325/324/97-01-02
Open
Failure to complete fingerprint checks
50-325/324/97-01-03
Open
Failure to complete AA documentation
EEl
50-325/324/97-01-04
Open
Failure to properly complete FFD documentation
50-325/324/97-01-05
Open
Failure to include personnel in the random
drug/alcohol program
EEl
50-400/97-02-01
Open
Failure to remove access for terminated
- 1
employees
50-400/97-02-02
Open
Failure to properly complete FFD documentation
EEl
50-261/97-02-01
Open
Failure to complete AA documentation
EEl
50-261/97-02-02
Open
Failure to properly complete FFD documentation
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