IR 05000261/1990005
| ML14176A867 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1990 |
| From: | Dance H, Garner L, Jury K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A866 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-90-05, 50-261-90-5, NUDOCS 9005090201 | |
| Download: ML14176A867 (8) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-261/90-05 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: March 11 -
April 10, 1990 Inspectors:
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L. W. Garner, Seniordesidft Inspector Date Signed K R Jur, Residex Ine~ector Date Signed Approved by-y___
C. ance, Chief Datd Si ned Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, maintenance observation, inspection of quality verification functions, onsite followup of written reports of nonroutine events, and followup on previous inspection finding Results:
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie The practice of verifying the latest revision of a procedure other than immediately prior to its use was identified as a weakness (paragraph 2).
Housekeeping inside the containment vessel continued to warrant management attention (paragraph 2).
Accelerated microbiologically induced corrosion attack on'service water piping inside the auxiliary building has been detected (paragraph 2).
Lack of initial work request reviews was indentified as a weakness in the quality assurance program (paragraph 5).
9005090201900424
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FDR ADOCK 05o00261 Qa PDC
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted C. Baucom, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance C. Bethea, Manager, Training
- F. Bishop, Project Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Safety R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project R. Femal, Shift Foreman, Operations
- S. Griggs, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- E. Harris, Manager, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- L. Lynch, Supervisor, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
- T. Kinnaman, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations
- J. Kloosterman, Director, Regulatory Compliance R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
- R. Morgan, Plant General Manager M. Page, Manager, Technical Support F. Roy, Engineer, Technical Suppor D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations J. Sheppard, Manager, Operations
- E. Shoemaker, Project Engineer, Operations
- Smith, Manager, Maintenance
- D. Stadler, Onsite Licensing Engineer R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations
- K. Williams, Senior Engineer, Technical Support H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne *Attended exit interview on April 16, 199 Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility record To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, operation's records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunction Through work observations and
discussions with operations staff members, the inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms, adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of in-process surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of inoperable equipment statu The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters to verify conformance with T Shift changes were routinely observed, verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper control room staffing existe Access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective manner. Control room demeanor and communications continued to be informal yet effectiv Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly implemente On April 4, 1990, the inspectors observed performance of PLP-006, Containment Vessel Inspection/Closeou When the auxiliary operator contacted the control room for permission to enter the pump bays, he was informed that entry was no longer procedurally require The AO was performing revision 12 of the procedure; however, revision 13, approved March 29, 1990, had become effective on April 4, 199 The inspectors were informed that on April 3, 1990, the CV entry had been pre-planned to ensure that the entry would be well coordinated and effectively conducte One of the preplanning activities included verification, as documented by an operator's signature, that "this revision (of PLP-006) is the latest revision available and has been verified against the Revision Status List."
By performing this procedural step on the day prior to the actual performance of the procedure, an outdated revision was utilized. Verifica tion of the latest procedure revision other than immediately prior to its use was considered a weakness. This weakness was discussed with Operations supervisio Operations management subsequently issued instructions to all shifts to clarify when the latest revision verification is to be performe On April 9, 1990, the inspectors reviewed the completed PLP-006 procedur The completed procedure was revision 13, not revision 12 which had been utilized in the field. The inspectors were informed that revisions 12 and 13 had been compared, and that the appropriate information had been transferred from the field copy to the new revisio Transfer of information between a field copy (especially one used in a contaminated area) and a clean copy is norma However, no notation had been made to indicate that different revisions were involved. Transferring information between revisions without appropriate documentation is considered a poor practic This poor practice was also discussed with Operations supervisio During the CV inspection, the inspectors observed some debris. Specific items noted included three balls of tape, a plastic glove, a small plastic bag (approximately 10 X 15 inches), a cloth hand towel (probably used for decontamination),
and several broken valve tag A temporary sign (adjacent to valve RHR-751)
warning of a radiological hazard had been secured with duct tape that had become partially unstuck. Additionally, a rectangular section of flashing covering the CV liner (behind the PRT) had become unsecured on one side and approximately two thirds around on the adjacent sides. These conditions were discussed with plant managemen SW Pipe MIC Attack Previous inspection reports numbered 84-45, 84-48, 85-12, 85-22, 86-12, 87-03, 87-16, 87-35, 88-03, and 88-12 contain background information on MIC in SW piping. In accordance with commitments to the NRC, a sample of SW pipe welds are periodically radiographed to ensure that the amount of MIC damage will not exceed structural limitations prior to scheduled piping replacement. An administrative limit with a safety factor of two has been established as a sleeving criteri Since all but one short section of SW piping inside the CV had been replaced with a material not susceptible to MIC, the piping of concern is the auxiliary building SW piping. Approximately one third of the 35 welds in the March 1990 sample showed an accelerated (more than the anticipated) amount of MIC increas Consequently, all accessible welds were then radiographed (approximately 70 additional welds). Preliminary analysis of this later sample indicated an increased MIC rate on some weld affected areas, but not on as many welds as would be expected from the first sample result No weld has exceeded the administrative sleeving limit. However, at the end of the report period, analysis was in progress to determine how the monitoring program needs to be modified to account for the accelerated MIC growth on certain welds. This is an IFI: Review SW MIC Monitoring Program Changes Required by Accelerated MIC Growth Rates, 90-05-0 No.violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirement For the surveillance test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at the required frequency, and that the tests conformed to TS requirements. Upon test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data was complete, accurate, and met TS requirements; test discrepancies were
properly documented and rectified: and that returned to servic Specifically, the ins; portions of the following test activities:
MST-012 (revision 9)
Inspection And T Bypass Breakers OST-401 (revision 25)
Emergency Diesel OST-610 (revision 17)
Unit No. 2 PortE Ire Hose Static No violations or deviations were identifie nth, Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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s4 The inspectors observed safety-related mainte
= nd m
TOand components to ascertain that these act U-codrda accordance with TS, approved procedures, and and standards. The inspectors determined the violate LCOs and that required redundant coq inspectors verified that required administrat 0o controls were adhered to. In particular, the the following maintenance activities:
CM-305 (revision 3)
Westinghouse DB Maintenance WR/JO 90-AEBH1 Replacement of L Contacts on B Re No violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspection of Quality Verification Functions During a review of the WR system, the inspectc the site's policy of independent WR revie identified in work control and WR planning licensee. In attempting to ascertain the mec to identify where improvement was needed, the initial QA review of WRs is specified per Cor(
review procedures, 0QA-202, revision 1 and OQJ These procedures detail that QA's initial rev'
as specified by the Director (Manager) QA/Q QA/QC Manager, the inspectors were informed t[
conducted due to a conscious management decisi QA's involvement in line function Part o eliminating a formal QA initial review of WR There is no formalized site QC inspection program (including assignment of hold points in WRs).
This fact, coupled with the recent problems identified in the WR and work control processes, led the inspectors to question the prudency of QA/QC not performing initial WR review Subsequently, the QA/QC management implemented a WR initial review program during the week of March 26, 1990. The non-review of initiated WRs was considered to be a QA program weaknes Completed WR have been randomly reviewed through surveillance activities as evidenced by Surveillance Reports89-032 and 89-05 No violations or deviations were identifie. Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events (92700)
(Closed) P2188-03, Gamma-metrics Cable Assemblies Installed As.Part of the Neutron Monitoring System May Possibly Leak, and LER 88-12, Potential For Post-Accident Neutron Flux Signal Interference Due to Manufacturing Defec The inspectors reviewed M-977, Repairs to Protect Penetration F0 The Inspectors verified that QC had verified proper installation of the vendor recommended repair procedures and that the acceptance testing had been successfully performe (Closed)
LER 88-23, Potential for Overcurrent Conditions on Two Motor Control Center.Inspection of this item is contained in inspection reports 88-30 and 89-36. On April 6, 1989, EA 89-02 identified this issue as a severity level III violatio This LER is being closed since the closeout inspection is being tracked by violation number 88-36-0 (Closed)
LER 88-24, Inoperable Containment Fan Coolers Due To Lack of Environmentally Qualified Splices on Motor Lead This issue was addressed in EA 89-02, dated April 6, 1989, as an additional example of a previously cited violation in the NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty dated June 16, 1988. Hence, no additional enforcement action was taken concerning this matte See inspection report 89-26 for followup inspection activities associated with the June 16, 1988, enforcement letter. The inspector witnessed installation of environmentally qualified splices on selected motor lead The installations were performed in accordance with approved procedure (Closed)
LER 89-12, Diesel Generator Inoperability Due To Inadequate Exhaust Line Seismic Analysi This item was addressed by inspection report 89-32. The exhaust line was upgraded to seismic Class I criteri. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) UNR 88-28-03, Failure to Have Vent Valves Environmentally Qualified, and LER 88-20, Reactor Vessel Head Vent System Not Environmentally Qualified. Inspection report 88-36 identified this issue as a violation,
designated as 88-36-0 Subsequently, EA 89-02 was issued on April 6, 198 The EA classified this issue as an additional example of a previously cited violation contained in the NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, dated June 16, 198 Thus, no additional enforcement action was taken relative to the vent system. See Inspection Report 89-26 for followup inspection activities associated with the June 16, 1988, enforcement lette No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 16, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below and in the summary. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph 90-05-01 IFI - Review SW MIC Monitoring Program Changes Required by Accelerated MIC Growth Rates
. List of Acronyms and Initialisms AO Auxiliary Operator CM Corrective Maintenance CV Containment Vessel EA Enforcement Action IFI Inspector Followup Item LCO Limiting Conditions for Operation LER Licensee Event Report M
Modification MIC Microbiologically Induced Corrosion MST Maintenance Surveillance Test NOV Notice of Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OQA Operational Quality Assurance OST Operations Surveillance Test PLP Plant Program PRT Pressurizer Relief Tank QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control RHR Residual Heat Removal SW Ser ice Water TS Te~nical Specification
UNR Unresolved Item*
WR Work Request WR/JO Work Request/Job Order
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.