IR 05000261/1980020
| ML14175B206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1980 |
| From: | Conlon T, Hardwick R, Merriweather N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14175B205 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-80-20, IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8011050300 | |
| Download: ML14175B206 (5) | |
Text
0 RUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/80-20 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson License No. DPR-23 Inspection at R inson sit near Hartsville, South Carolina Inspectors:
R. J. Hardwi, J Date Signed N. Merriweather Date Signed App roved
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T. E. Conlon, Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on August 25-29, 1980 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 61 inspector-hours on site in the area of installed electrical equipment review with respect to the IE Bulletin 79-01B respons Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviaitions were identifie DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Starkey, General Manager
- W. Crawford, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- S. Zimmerman, Manager, Technical and Operations
- B. Garrison, QA Supervisor
- J. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
- S. Bohanan, Principal Engineer
- B. Schwager, Corporate Staff Engineer
- R. Connally, Director, Nuclear Safety and QA
- R. McGirt, Generation Specialist
- R. Stirling, Plant Engineer NRC Resident Inspector
- S. Weise
- Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 29, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
IE Bulletin 79-01B A physical examination was made of installed electrical instrumentation and control equipment associated with the Safety Injection (SI),
Auxiliary Cooling (Aux. Cooling), Reactor Coolant (RC), Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
system The equipment that was examined is located inside the primary containmen The specific equipment examined is listed below:
-2 Safey Injection System:
Electrical Plant ID N Description Cable N Penetration N V-866A Valve Operator C-2241-A D8 Auxiliary Cooling System:
Electrical Plant ID N Description Cable N Penetration N V-744 B Valve Operator C-2221-A D8 Reactor Coolant System:
Electrical Plant ID N Description Cable N Penetration N LT-459 Level Transmitter PT-455 Pressure Transmitter HVAC System:
_Electrical Plant ID N Description Cable N Penetration N HVH-1 Fan Motor C-2511-A D5 HVH-3 Fan Motor C-2513-A C6 HVH-4 Fan Motor C-2514-A C8 During examination of elecrtical penetrations, the cable connectors and cable splices, which terminate the penetration feed-thru cables to the field run cables, were examined. The inspectors observed the installation of a cable splice per cable splice procedure M-52 This procedure, "Safety-Related Cable Splices Inside Containment",
is the work instruction for replacing cable splices which were previously identified by the licensee as not having documentation available to substantiate environmental qualificatio A review of the 90-day response to the Bulletin has identified areas where additional information or clarification is necessary. These specific areas are identified below: Section 1.0, Paragraph 1:3.1:
-In the discussion of maximum flood level expected inside containment, it is pointed out that three level instruments would be submerged and other instruments would be partially immersed to a depth of two inche Additional information is required for evaluation of this conditio This information should include the following:
(1)
A listing of the equipment which would be partially immerse (2)
The effect partial immersion would have on equipment operation and functional capability including the radiation aspec (3) A discussion of the required equipment operating time relative to expected time of immersion/submergenc (4) A discussion of the effect equipment failure would have relative to accident mitigation and post-accident monitorin (5) Further detailed discussion of why the partial immersed and submerged equipment condition is acceptable in the licensee's judgemen Section 3.0, Paragraph 3.2.1:
In the discussion of electrical penetration assemblies (EPA), a compar ison by similarity of the equipment at Brunswick and H. B. Robinson Nuclear Power Plants is mad Further clarification should be provided to indicate why these EPA's are considered "similar" and how the test data from the Brunswick equipment is to be use The discussion on EPA construction material states that Diallyl phtha late has a radiation threshold between 108 and 1010 RADS. This is an exception to IE Bulletin 79-01B, Enclosure 4 (DOR Guidelines).
The DOR guidelines indicate that Diallyl phthalate radiation threshold is 106 RADS. The basis for this exception should be specified and sup porting documents reference A discussion of the Crouse-Hinds electrical connectors used in conjunc tion with the EPA's states that the connectors are watertight and corro sion resistant to salt spray for 300 day However, the information provided does not explain how or why the salt spray test demonstrates connector qualification with respect to the chemical spray solutio Additional information to support this engineering judgement should be provide Section 3.0, Paragraph 3.2.2:
In discussion of Fisher & Porter (FP) transmitter Model N B2496, it is stated that the transmitter failed during high temperature, steam/
chemical spray testing for qualification to IEEE 323-71 parameters. A Westinghouse document, WCAP 9157, is referenced for the test dat Based on the information given, it is not evident why the FP transmitter was/is acceptable for use at the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant. Additional information should be provided that clarifies the basis for transmitter acceptanc Section 3.0, Paragraph 3.2.4:
Typical electrical connections discussed in this paragraph specifies use of electrical tape for overall protectio Also, the Bulletin response "Master List" indicates that a Silicone Rubber Tape #70 is
-4 used for connection protection. However, there is no component evalu ation sheet provided to address its qualification. Clarification should be provided which specifies whether the tape used with electrical con nections was qualified in conjunction with other equipment testing or whether separate testing is required/or has been performe General Comments:
The 90-day response should include discussions which delineate the procedures which were used to compile, review and analyze equipment qualification dat This discussion should also reflect any field verification, second review efforts, and any QA or QC procedures which were accomplishe Additionally, a general discussion of how the DOR guidelines were used should be provide This discussion should be by DOR guideline paragraphs and reflect the judgements which were made where plant specific options were allowe The basis for each judgement should be discussed in detai The above five areas where additional information or clarification is needed were discussed with the license The licensee agreed to provide the information/clarification in a subsequent revision to the 90-day response of the Bulletin. This item is identified as Inspector Follow-up Item 50-261/80-20-01, Clarification of IE Bulletin 79-01B 90-day respons Within the areas examined, there were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified.