IR 05000261/1999010
| ML14182A302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris, Brunswick, Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14182A301 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-99-10, 50-324-99-10, 50-325-99-10, 50-400-99-10, NUDOCS 9905190099 | |
| Download: ML14182A302 (13) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.:
50-325,324, 50-400, and 50-261 License Nos.:
DPR-71, DPR-62, NPF-63 and DPR-23 Report Nos.:.
50-325, 324/99-10, 50-400/99-10 and 50261/99-10 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company Facilities:
Brunswick Nuclear Plant Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Location:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayettevile Street Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Dates:
March 10, 18, 19, and 25, 1999 Inspector:
David H. Thompson Safeguards Inspector Approved by:
George B. Kuzo, Acting Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9905190099 990506 PDR ADOCK 05000261 G
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Brunswick, Shearon Harris and Robinson Nuclear Power Plants, NRC Special Inspection Report Nos. 50-325/324/99-10, 50-400/99-10 and 50-261/99-10 This special safeguards inspection reviewed and evaluated Corporate Office implementation of the Physical Security Program for the Brunswick, Shearon Harris and Robinson Nuclear Power Plant facilities. Specifically, Access Authorization (AA) Program activities were reviewed in detai Based on the inspectors review of an access authorization event concerning inaccurate recordkeeping at the Carolina Power and Light Corporate Security Office, the inspector identified five apparent violations of regulatory requirements associated with AA documentation accuracy, untimely removal of unauthorized unescorted access authorization, AA record retention, untimely logging/reporting of security events, and documentation of security personnel training. The following apparent violations were identified:
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Failure to review and evaluate background information for persons granted unescorted AA in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) and the licensees' plans and procedures and the failure to maintain complete and accurate records of these reviews in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9 was identified as an apparent violation. (Section 1.2.2)
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Failure to discontinue temporary unescorted AA for three individuals having inaccurate background information records as required by 10 CFR 73.56(b) and licensees' plans and procedures. (Section S1.3.3)
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Failure to maintain original data upon which the licensees granted unescorted access authorization for five years as required by 10 CFR 73.56(h)(1).
(Section S1.4.4)
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Failure to appropriately resolve and document safeguards events in the security event logs in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(c). (Section S3)
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Failure to document training in accordance with the licensees' plans and procedures. (Section S5)
REPORT DETAILS S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities Corporate Access Authorization Program Event (81700)
On March 10, 1999, during a routine security inspection at the Harris Nuclear Plant, the inspector reviewed a licensee-identified Access Authorization (AA) Program issue involving a potential instance of an incomplete background investigation for an individual granted temporary access authorization at the Harris facility. During the initial review of the issue, the inspector identified potential concerns associated with activities at the Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) Corporate Security Office which has responsibility for the site's AA program. The identified concerns included AA Program documentation accuracy, security event logging timeliness, site access authorization, and record retention. These concerns were characterized as unresolved items (URI)
50-400/99-09-01 pending further detailed review of AA Program guidance, record review, and further discussions with security management at the corporate office From March 10, 18-19 and 25, 1999, the inspector reviewed the licensees' AA program against the applicable regulatory requirements and Physical Security Plan (PSP)
commitments for the Brunswick, Shearon Harris and Robinson Nuclear Power Plant The specific AA program areas reviewed included background investigations, temporary unescorted access, records, safeguards procedures and documentation, and staff training and qualificatio Summary of Licensee's Access Authorization Program Requirements The licensees' AA program guidance and implementation were reviewed against the site Physical Security Plan (PSPs), implementing procedures and specific regulations as follows:
Facility Operating Licenses for the Brunswick, Harris and Robinson facilities (i.e.,
Nos. 50-325, DPR-71, Amendment 204, dated November 9, 1998, and 50-324, DPR 62, Amendment 234, dated November 9, 1998,50-400, NPF-63, Amendment 84, dated December 31, 1998, 50-261, DPR-23, Amendment 15, dated October 21, 1998, require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
10 CFR 50.9(a) requires that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee, or information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respect CFR 73.56(b) requires the licensee to establish and maintain an AA program granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy
and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotag CFR 73.56(b)(3) requires that the licensee base its decision to grant, deny, revoke, or continue an unescorted AA on review and evaluation of all pertinent information develope CFR 73.56(h)(1) requires each licensee who issues an individual unescorted AA to retain the records on which the authorization is based for the duration of the unescorted AA and for a five-year period following its terminatio The Brunswick PSP, Revision 1, dated August 22, 1997, paragraph 2.0, requires the licensee to establish procedures to provide detailed information to the security force for implementation of plan performance objectives and commitments. Additionally, paragraph 6.1, of the approved PSP provides that, at CP&L's nuclear plants, all elements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.66 have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.5 The Harris PSP, Revision 0, dated March 15, 1996, paragraph 2.0, requires the licensee to establish procedures to provide detailed information to the security force for implementation of plan performance objectives and commitments. Additionally, paragraph 6.1, of the approved PSP provides that, at CP&L's nuclear plants, all elements of RG 5.66 have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.5 The Robinson PSP, Revision 0, dated July 17, 1998, paragraph 2.0, requires the licensee to establish procedures to provide detailed information to the security force for implementation of plan performance objectives and commitments. Additionally, paragraph 6.1, of the approved PSP provides that at Robinson, all elements of RG-5.66 (June 1991) have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.5 Carolina Power & Light's Procedure SEC-NGGC-2101, "Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access," Paragraph 1.0, Revision 10, dated July 2, 1998, requires the licensee to implement an unescorted AA program which satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 73.5 Carolina Power & Light's Procedure SEC-NGGC-2101, "Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access," Paragraph 9.3, Revision 10, dated July 2, 1998, requires CP&L to make a best effort to obtain required information and to document such attempts to address the applicant's employment history, education history, credit history, criminal history, military service, motor vehicle history, and character and reputation using the criteria set forth in the procedur Carolina Power & Light's Procedure SEC-NGGC-2101, Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access, Paragraph 10.1.2, Revision 10, dated July 2, 1998, requires that records generated as a result of this procedure shall be retained for a minimum of five years following the termination of a person's unescorted A The inspection scope, observations and findings, and conclusions for each of the reviewed program areas in relation to these requirements, are documented in Paragraphs S 1.2.2 through S 5.1 of this repor S1.2.2 Background Investigation (BI) Elements Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the design and implementation of BI elements against the licensee's approved PSPs and procedures and NRC regulation Observations and Findings According to licensee representatives and verified by the inspector, on November 17, 1998, the Corporate Superintendent of AA implemented a process for in-house investigators to conduct background investigations (Bls). These BI's are part of the process of granting unescorted access authorization for the three CP&L site Previously, Bis were conducted by external vendors. As part of the trial program by CP&L to conduct in-house Bis, a recently hired and trained temporary worker was tasked on January 8, 1999, to conduct BIs. Based on the information provided by the licensee, the temporary investigator conducted 17 non-nuclear BIs and 5 nuclear BI On January 29, 1999, the Supervisor of Performance Evaluation Support (PES)
conducted a follow-up review of AA records as part of the licensee's commitment for AA program violations documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-325/324-97-0 The review of Bl's indicated clerical/transposition errors on verification of information from one of the previous employers, who would normally have been contacted during the BI process reviewed (Energy Services, i.e., name spelling and answers to Suitable Inquiry (SI) questions). The Supervisor-PES continued the review and called another previous employer, who would normally have been contacted during the BI process reviewed (Quantum Resources) to reverify their information. The contact sources for both these previous employers indicated that they had not been asked SI/employment questions by the investigator on January 21, 1999, as documented on the BI, or on any other day. They indicated that they were very sure they would have remembered such a detailed inquiry. Based on these apparent discrepancies, the Supervisor-PES requested the investigators telephone records to verify that the inquiry was made on January 21, 1999,.as indicated on the BI report. Based on information provided by the Supervisor-PES, the Superintendent-AA was briefed on the initial event on January 29, 1999. The Supervisor-PES, returned to duty on February 2, 1999, at which time the verification process continued. At that time, three records and subsequent additional telephone information discrepancies were identified. The telephone records which were reviewed on February 2, 1999, indicated that a call to one of the contacts for BI verification had lasted 24 seconds, which the licensee determined was not sufficient
.time to complete an SI. Also, based on information provided by the Supervisor-PES, several other telephone numbers that were included in the BI report as having been contacted were not on the telephone recor On February 2, 1999, attempts were made to contact Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) and Parralax to verify that the sources listed by the investigator were contacted and background checks were performed as indicated on the BI repor When the supervisor at FP&L was contacted, he indicated that he had not been contacted by the background investigator. The telephone log confirmed that there was no contact with FP&L from the investigators telephone. The telephone number listed on the investigator's report for the supervisor at Parralax was not on the telephone record and was a wrong number (an incorrect prefix for a school in New York). The correct number as listed on the Personal History Questionnaire had the area code changed in September 1998, and the telephone with the correct prefix was disconnected. According to licensee representatives another staff member contacted three references, two of whom indicated that they were never contacted by the background investigator. Additional checks by the licensee's staff on other BI files indicated similar patterns of discrepant information when contact was made with the sources listed on the BI repor On February 3, 1999, the Supervisor-PES and the Superintendent-AA, met with the background investigator who confirmed that documented background information on five nuclear workers was inaccurat From discussions with cognizant licensee representatives and review of individual site AA records, the inspector determined that the licensee granted unescorted access authorization to three individuals, one at Harris and two at Robinson, prior to obtaining required Bl. Failure to review and evaluate background information for persons granted unescorted access authorization in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) and licensee's plan's and procedures and the failure to maintain complete and accurate records of these reviews in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9 was identified as an apparent violation EEl 50-400/99-10-01 and EEl 50-261/99-10-0 Conclusion Failure to review and evaluate background information for persons granted unescorted access authorization in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) and the licensee's plans and procedures and the failure to maintain complete and accurate records of these reviews in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9 was identified as an apparent violatio S1.3.3 Temporary Unescorted Access Inspection Scope (81700)
The licensee's granting of unescorted access was reviewed against PSP requirements and NRC regulation Observations and Findings On January 29, 1999, licensee representatives became aware that the background investigator had documented potentially inaccurate background information for three individuals who were granted authorization for temporary unescorted access on
January 27, 28, and 29, 1999. Even though the licensee knew of background documentation deficiencies on January 29, 1999, and subsequently confirmed the inaccurate background information on February 2, 1999, the licensee did not take action to remove the temporary AA for the individuals in question until the afternoon of February 3, 1999. The unescorted access removal actions did not include the removal of AA for all of the nuclear workers for whom inaccurate information had been documented. Although the investigator admitted recording inaccurate information on February 3, 1999, the licensee did not take action until February 5, 1999, to remove all elements of temporary unescorted AA. Further, on February 4, 1999, one of the individuals with inaccurate BI records was badged for unescorted access to the Robinson facility. For the two additional individuals with inaccurate BI records, one could have been badged at Harris and one at the Robinson facilities. The badged individual did not gain access to the protected area and the two other individuals were not badge Based on discussions with cognizant licensee representatives and review of applicable records, the inspector determined that the licensee continued to grant unescorted AA even though they were aware that the background information was inaccurate. The inspector identified this as apparent violation: EEl 50-400/99-10-02 and EEl 50-261/
99-10-02, Failure to discontinue temporary unescorted AA to individuals at Harris and Robinson with inaccurate BI records in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56(b) and licensees' plans and procedure Conclusion The failure to discontinue temporary unescorted AA to individuals at Harris and Robinson with inaccurate BI records was identified as an apparent violation of 10 CFR 73.56(b) and the licensees' plans and procedure S1.4.4 Records Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed AA records to verify that the licensee retains AA records in accordance with approved PSPs and applicable NRC regulatory requirement Observations and Findings On January 27, 28, and 29, 1999, Unescorted Access Authorization Certification Letters were provided to the Site Access Authorization functions at Harris and Robinson authorizing one individual at Hars and two individuals at Robinson to be badged for unescorted acces During discussion's with Corporate AA management, the inspector was informed that according to their records, on February 2, 1999, the superintendent of AA was briefed on the apparent inaccurate Bls and based on this information, he directed that they determine which files had been worked on by the investigator in question. On
February 3, 1999, Corporate AA determined that five nuclear files had been worked by the investigator. On February 3, 1999, the superintendent of AA contacted Harris and Robinson Nuclear Plants and informed them that one individual at each site had been inappropriately certified for access and to destroy their copies of the Unescorted Access Authorization Certification Letters. Additionally, on February 3, 1999, the Superintendent of AA authorized the destruction of the two original Unescorted Access Authorization Certification Letters at the Corporate Office. Additionally, the third original Unescorted Access Authorization Certification Letter was destroye From discussions with licensee representatives and review of applicable records, the inspector determined that the licensee failed to maintain original data on which the licensee granted unescorted AA authorization for five years. This was identified as an apparent violation: EEl 50-400/99-10-03 and EEI 50-261/99-10-03, failure to maintain original data upon which the licensee authorized unescorted AA for five years in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56(h)(1) and the licensees' plans and procedure Conclusion The licensee failed to maintain original data upon which the licensee authorized unescorted AA for five years in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56(h)(1), and the licensee's plans and procedure S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S Security Event Loqs Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed a sample of event logs as a result of the identified safeguards AA events to evaluate timeliness of reporting and to determine whether the issues were documented in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(c), as applicabl Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the security event logs for the Brunswick, Harris, and Robinson plants. Based on the reviews, the inspector noted that the licensee was aware of the inaccurate AA records event on January 29, 1999. According to regulatory requirements, the events were required to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of identification (discovery) in the safeguards event logs. However, the licensee did not record the event until February 8, 1999, at the Robinson Plant and until February 9, 1999 at the Harris facility, resulting in reporting delays of 10 and 11 days respectively. The inspector was informed that the Superintendent of Corporate AA had determined that the events were not required to be logged in the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Safeguards Event Logs based on his interpretation of the requirements. The decision to document the event in the safeguards event logs was made by the security managers at Harris and Robinson when they became aware of the events on February 8 and 9, 199 CFR 73.71(c) requires each licensee to maintain a current log and to record the safeguards events described in paragraphs 11 (a) and (b) of Appendix G of this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery by a licensee employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization. Specifically, Appendix G, paragraph 11(b), requires any other threatened, attempted, or committed act not previously defined in Appendix G with the potential for reducing the effectiveness of the safeguards system below that committed to in a licensed physical security or contingency plan or the actual condition of such reduction in effectiveness to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery in the safeguards event lo SEC-NGGC-2101, Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access, Paragraph 9.26.1 requires that upon discovery of the incomplete pre-employment screening records (to include falsification of a minor nature or inadequate administration, control, or evaluation of psychological tests) of individuals granted unescorted access, the security organization will be notified so that the event can be evaluated for reportability to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 and the guidelines outlined in NRC Generic Letter 91-03, dated March 6, 199 Robinson Nuclear Plant, Security Procedure-16, Notification of Significant Events, Revision 22, Paragraph 5.2.2, states, a partial failure of an otherwise satisfactory access control program in which malevolent intent is not established may be logged rather than reported if properly compensated or mitigate Harris Nuclear Plant, Security Procedure-17, Reporting of Safeguards and Fitness for Duty Events, Revision 9, dated September 22, 1997, Paragraph 6.0, states, a partial failure of an otherwise satisfactory access control program in which malevolent intent is not established may be logged rather than reported if properly compensated or mitigate Brunswick Nuclear Plant, Security Procedure-20, Reporting of Safeguards Events, Revision 17, dated March 12, 1997, Paragraph 6.2.11, states, if pre-employment screening records are found to be incomplete (to include falsification of a minor nature),
or inadequate administration, control, or evaluation of psychological tests is discovered, unescorted access of the individual may need to be suspended until the identified anomaly is resolved. If CP&L review determines that a programmatic failure exists, a one-hour report is required. Single AA failures and/or falsification do not require a one-hour report. If it is determined that unescorted access would have been granted, the event need only be logge From discussions with licensee representatives and independent review of records, the inspector noted that entry of the identified AA events were not documented in the Robinson and Harris security events logs within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The inspector identified this issue as an apparent violation: EEl 50-400/99-10-04 and EEl 50-261/99-10-04, Failure to log the safeguards events within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(c) and the licensee's plans and procedure Conclusion The licensee did not appropriately resolve and document safeguards events in the security event logs in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(c) and the licensee's plans and procedure S5 Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S Security Training and Qualification Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the training and qualification of persons conducting assigned AA-related validation tasks against the licensee's PSP and procedural requirement Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the training records for the investigator discussed in Section S1.2.2 which consisted of two memorandums. One with the subject, "Suitable Inquiry Training for the Investigator," dated December 22, 1998, stated that the investigator was trained on SEC-NGGC-2101, and that hands-on training was conducted on related training modules, SEC-CPL-015 and 016. A hand-written note on the memorandum, dated March 5, 1999, reflected that "common use of the term 'suitable'
is the process of verifying employments, unemployment, fitness for duty questions, education, and references (developed/listed)." The second memorandum, dated January 8, 1999, reflected that the investigator had two weeks of hands-on SI trainin On the March 5, 1999 memorandum, in two places, the SI is crossed through and replaced with B. The inspector questioned the use of memos to document training and questioned why the individual had not been required to sign a training roster indicating that they were in attendance and trained. Cognizant licensee representatives responded that they documented training with memos. However, the inspector noted that the licensee's procedure required that attendance and completion of training modules be documented on appropriate training and certification forms and that training for personnel be documented on an attendance shee NGGS-SEC-0004, Access Authorization and Fitness for Duty Skills Development and Certification Program, Revision 4, Paragraph 1.0 states that this procedure provides direction to ensure that Access Authorization and Fitness for Duty program personnel are informed about work practices and acquire the basic knowledge and skills needed to meet job specification NGGS-SEC-0004, Access Authorization and Fitness for Duty Skills Development and Certification Program, Revision 4, Paragraph 4.4.4 requires that attendance and completion of training modules be documented on appropriate training attendance and certification form The failure to document an individual's training in accordance with licensee plans and procedures was identified as an apparent violation: EEl 50-400/99-10-05 and EEl 50 261/99-10-05, Failure to document and certify background training in accordance with PSP commitments and licensee procedure Conclusions An apparent violation was identified for not documenting a temporary background investigator's training in accordance with the licensee's procedure X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspection scope and findings were summarized to licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 25, 1999. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Braund, Superintendent, Security, Harris Plant J. Clements, Manager, Site Support, Robinson Plant R. Gill, Manager, Corporate Security S. Hinnant, Chief Nuclear Officer T. Morton, Manager, Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs J. Scarola, Vice President, Harris Plant S. Young, Superintendent, Security, Robinson Plant NRC J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector, Harris Plant T. Easlick, Senior Resident Inspector, Brunswick Plant INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED OPENED TYPE ITEM NUMBER STATUS DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE EEl 50-400, 50-261/
OPEN Failed to review and evaluate 99-10-01 background information for persons granted unescorted access authorization in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) and licensees'
plan's and procedures and the failure to maintain complete and accurate records of these reviews in accordance with 10 CFR 5 EEl 50-400, 50-261/
OPEN Continuation of the granting 99-10-02 unescorted access authorization even though licensee was aware that the background information was inaccurat EEl 50-400, 50-261/
OPEN Failure to maintain original data on 99-10-03 which the licensee granted unescorted AA authorization for five years.
EEl 50-400, 50-261/
OPEN Failure to log safeguards 99-10-04 events within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discover EEl 50-400, 50-261/
OPEN Failure to document individuals'
99-10-05 training in accordance with licensee requirement CLOSED TYPE ITEM NUMBER STATUS DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE URI 50-400/99-09-01 CLOSED Follow-up on the licensee's action to investigate a corporate access authorization individual's falsification of site access background information. Section (Sl)