IR 05000382/1987007: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20209J337
| number = ML20215A626
| issue date = 04/27/1987
| issue date = 06/10/1987
| title = Insp Rept 50-382/87-07 on 870301-0415.Violations Noted: Failure to Follow Written Procedures in Maint & Surveillance Programs
| title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/87-07
| author name = Jaudon J, Luehman J, Staker T
| author name = Gagliardo J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Dewease J
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| docket = 05000382
| docket = 05000382
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-382-87-07, 50-382-87-7, NUDOCS 8705040265
| document report number = NUDOCS 8706170007
| package number = ML20209J271
| title reference date = 05-29-1987
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 9
| page count = 2
}}
}}


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JUN 101987 l
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In' Reply Refer To:    l Docket: 50 382/87-07-
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APPENDIX B
,s_  U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


==REGION IV==
Louisiana Power & Light? Company-   !
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  .,'J NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/87-07  License: NPF-38 Docket: 50-382 Licensee: Louisiana Power &' Light Company (LP&L)
ATTN: .J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations N-80 317 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Gentlemen:
142 Delaronde Street  -
Thank you for your . letter of May 29,1987,. in response to our letter and l
New Orleans, Louisiana 70174  _
Notice of Violation dated April 29, 1987. We have reviewed your reply and find 1 it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice'of Violation. We will !
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review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection
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Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3  ,
  'to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintaine
Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: March 1 through April 15, 1987 1 9 Inspectors:  w    '//2y/s 7 f r J. G. Luehman, Senior Resident Inspector  Date
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h 5f/L R~. Staker, Resident Inspector  _
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Date
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Approved: r  . A, M  Y 27 / ,
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Jofins P. Jaudory/, Chi , Reactor $ Project '
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      . i-Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted March 1 through April 15, 1987-(Report.50-382/87-07)
Sincerely, Original Signed By J. E. Gagliardo J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch cc:
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspkction of: (1) Plant Status, (2) Licensee Event Report (LER) Follo'wup, (3) Followup on Previously Identified Items, (4) Monthly Maintenance, (5) Monthly Surveillance, (6) ESF System Walkdown, (7) Routine Operational Safety Inspection, and (8) Potential Generic Problem *
Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: G. E. Wuller, Onsite    ,
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to follow written procedures in the maintenance and surveillance programs, paragraphs 6 and 7).
Licensing Coordinator    {
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P. 0. Box B Killona,-Louisian !
Louisiana Power & Light Company    l ATTN: N.~ S. Carns, Plant Manager    j
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P 0.:B.ox B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Middle South Services ATTN: Mr. R. T. Lall P. O. Box 61000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 (cccont'dnextpa PI ' C:P '  C:RPB '  .
MESL w:cs JPQu n JEGagi a do  /hM 6/1/87 6/ g 7 6/s/8   ;
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8706170007 870610
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8705040265 870429 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G  PDR
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,. p-2-DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee ~ Employees J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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  *R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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*N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear T. F. Gerrets, Corporate QA Manager S. - A. Alleman, Assistant ~ Plant Manager, Plant Technical Staff J. R. McGaha, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance J. N. Woods, QC Manager A. S. Lockhart, Site Quality Manager R. F. Burski, Engineering and Nuclear Safety Manager K. L. Brewster, Onsite . Licensing Engineer
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  *G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator T. H. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, Nuclear
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  *Present-at exit interview In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various operations, engineering,' technical support, maintenance, and administrative members of the licensee's staf . Plant Status The inspection period began with the plant at full power. On the evening of March 6-7,:1987, a power reduction was initiated at the request of the system operator. At 9:01 a.m. (CST) on March 7th, the reactor tripped on high pressurizer pressure from 56 percent power. In preparation for main turbine valve testing, an operator was valving in electro-hydraulic fluid (EH) to the No. 4 governor valve when the turbine intercept valves i closed. The steam bypass system responded by modulating the bypass valves. The modulation was not enough to prevent the RCS from reaching the pressure trip setpoint. RCS temperature was below the temperature setpoint (566*F) at which the quick opening feature of the bypass valves is enabled. The licensee investigated and found that the EH fluid supply and the emergency trip lines to the No. 4 governor valve were cross connected (apparently during reassembly following the refueling outage).
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  : Louisiana-Power & Light.Compan9 -2-0: Louisiana Power l& Light. Company
'- ' ATTN:' :K.: W. Cook, Nuclear Safety and -
Regulatory. Affairs Manager-  ;
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317'Baronne Street
  ~P.10.'. Box 60340 .
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  : New' Orleans, Louisiana . 70160 -  i
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Louisiana Radiation _. Control-Program Directo ,
c' LbectoDMB(IE01)     !
  . bcc.distrib. by RIV:'
RPB'  'D. Weiss, RM/ALF RRI- . . D.' Martin, RA SectionChief'(RPB/A).


This caused a loss of EH fluid when the operator opened the EH fluid isolation valve to the No. 4 governor valve. After correcting this problem, the reactor was returned to criticality at 10:00 p.m. on March 8, 198 On March 15,1987, at 3:44 p.m., a reactor trip occurred from 100 percent power due to high level in the number one steam generator. The high level condition occurred because of a malfunction in the No. I feedwater control
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    -3-system. After repairs to the feedwater control system, the reactor was returned to criticality at 5:30 a.m. on March 16, 198 After the unit was again on the electrical grid, output was limited as requested by the system operator. Full power was reached by the reactor on the morning. of March 20, 1987. At 12:48 p.m. (CDT) on April 13, 1987, the reactor tripped from 100 percent power. Prior to the reactor trip, Control Element Assembly Calculator (CEAC) No. I was already in 'an inoperable status because of a problem with indication on CEA No. At the time of the trip, Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Channel C was in bypass undergoing a functional test. While performing this test, the instrument and control technician placed the memory protect switch in
"0FF" with the selector switch in the "CEAC" position; this caused a penalty factor to be generated. This penalty factor, in addition to the penalty factor already present because of the inoperable CEAC, generated LO-DNBR trips on CPC Channels A and The reactor was again taken critical at 6:30 p.m. on April 14, 1987, and the main turbine was synchronized with the grid at 9:30 p.m. At 7:01 the following day, with the plant at 50 percent power, an automatic insertion of control element assembly (CEA) Subgroup No. 5 by the Reactor Power Cutback System (RPCBS) took place in response to an apparent loss of a main feedwater pump. A primary to secondary mismatch resulted, and at 7:04 a.m. a reactor trip on high steam generator level occurred. This event was actually initiated by a failure to follow the procedural sequence of OP-10-001, Revision 8, " General Plant Operations".
Step 8.5.47 of OP-10-001 places the second main feedwater pump in operation while Step 8.5.48 places the RPCBS in auto. In this case the second feedwater pump was not latched when the RPCBS was enabled, and the system, recognizing the apparent loss of the feedwater pump, inserted the manudlly selected subgrou Because of the plant power level, there was no RPCBS initiated runback of the main turbine, and before the plant operators could correct the induced primary to secondary mismatch, the reactor trippe The reactor was subsequently taken critical again at 11:39 a.m. on April 15th, synchronized with the grid that afternoon, and the inspection period ended with the plant at full powe No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the NRC inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and that violations of regulations or Technical
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l Specification (TS) conditions had been identified.
DRSP RPSB- .
RSB C  MIS Sistem ,  Project Inspector, RPB ,
RSTS Operator  R. Hall  ''
RIV File  NRR Project' Manager- -i q
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   -4-(Closed) LER 382/85-38, " Fire Wrap Installation Deficiency." The NRC inspector verified that Procedure ME-3-007 was completed to verify fire wrap operabilit (Closed) LER 382/85-42, " Reactor Trip Due to Operator Distraction." The NRC inspector verified that Station Modification 1258, which changes the power supplies to the four emergency diesel generator air dryers, was complete (Closed) LER 382/86-05, " Surveillance Procedure Error Resulted-in the Hot Leg Temperature Accident Monitoring Instrument Operability (Not Accuracy)
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to be Suspect." The NRC inspector verified that PORC members and alternates attended training on the requirements of 10 CFR 50.5 Additionally, the NRC inspector verified that several plant operating manual procedures were reviewed to ensure that there were no general implications of inadequate safety reviews. The NRC inspector also reviewed the changes made to Procedure UNT-1-003 as specified in this LE (Closed) LER 382/86-17, " Deficiency in Communications Results in Failure to Sample the Proper Gas Decay Tank." The NRC inspector verified that changes were made to the gaseous waste management and sampling procedures as specified in this LE (Closed) LER 382/87-01, " Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable Due to Improper Reassembly During Construction."
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d 1   P. O. BOX 60340 LOUISI&AN POWER A / 317 LIGHT NEWBARONNE STREET
(Closed) LER 382/87-02, "Small Size Snubber Test Failures Due to Improper Installation." The NRC inspector verified that the snubber installation procedure was revised as specified in this LE (Closed) LER 382/87-03, " Technician Wore Contaminated Clothing Offsite Due to Failure to Follow Procedures." The NRC inspector verified that procedure changes were made as specified in this LE The NRC inspector observed that loss of power indicators were installed on the PAP portal radiation monitor (Closed) LER 382/87-04, " Fire Barrier Requirement Not Met Due to Lack of Awareness of Fire Protection Requirements."   -
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No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup of Previously Identified Items
ORLEANS, LOUISlANA 70160 *
      (504) 595-3100 Ut ikNs'ysit$
May 29, 1987 W3P87-1069 A4.05 QA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  @7 ATTN: Document Control Desk  j I
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Washington, D.C. 20555    g l jgg7 j ;.
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      - 'i Subject: Waterford 3 SES    l Docket No. 50-382     "
License No. NPF-38 NRC Inspection Report 87-07 Attached is the Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L) response to Violation No. 8707-01 identified in Inspection Report No. 87-0 If you have any questions on the response, please contact G.E. Wuller, Operational Licensing, at (504) 464-3499,
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Very truly yours,
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    / wh K.W. Cook Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manager i
KWC:PTH:ssf Attachment cc: : U Martin, NRC Region IV 5.* Calvo, NRC-NRR i
J.H. Wilson, NRC-NRR NRC Resident Inspectors Office    l E.L. Blake
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(Closed) Violation 382/8629-02, " Failure to Verify the Positions of Tw'o Fire Protection Valves Every 31 Days." The NRC inspector has reviewed.the licensee's response to this violation which is contained in a letter dated March 9, 1987. The NRC inspector verified that Procedure OP-903-054,.
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Revision 6, " Fire Protection Valve Lineups Check" has been changed to
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  "AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER"   Ay C gc- 97 lblo
incorporate Valves FP-601A and FP-601 .


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  -5-(Closed) Violation 382/8629-03, " Failure to Follow a New Fuel Receipt Procedure." The NRC inspector has reviewed Procedure NE-1-001, Revision 4, "New Fuel Shipping Container Operations," and verified the changes discussed in the licensee's March 9,1987, letter had been mad (Closed) Open Item 382/8704-01, " Revision of MM-12-001." The NRC inspector verified that this procedure was revised as specified in LER 382/87-0 No violations or deviations were identifie '
f ''E s    Att:chmnt to
5. Monthly Maintenance Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with T Portior.s of the following condition identification work authorizations (CIWAs)
)    W3P87-1069 Shest 1 of 2  -;
and maintenance procedures were observed by the NRC inspectors:
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LP&L Response To Violation No.~8707-01 VIOLATION NO. 8707-01 l
CIWA 032213 - Replacement of an electro-hy&aulic fluid system
Technical Specification (TS).6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures be implemented for the applicable procedures recommended in'  ,
"0"-ring in the dump valve block on turbine (;overnor valve number tw CIWA 032325 - Core protection calculator Channel "B" spurious spike CIWA 020838 "A" component cooling water pump "A" mechanical seal repair and outboard bearings replacemen *
Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Two  I examples of failure to follow these procedures are listed below: Surveillance testing of emergency power systems is one of the applicable. procedures recommended in paragraph 8.b of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 197 ME-3-220, Revision 4, " Station Battery Bank and Charger," is an approved surveillance procedure for testing a portion of the emergency power syste Step 8.3.15 of ME-3-220, Revision.4', requires, " Operations isolate the charger from its 125 Vdc PDP by danger-tagging (OPEN) the charger's output circuit breaker on the PDP."
CIWA 027540 - Replacement of position indicator limit switches on control ventilation area system isolation valve 302 to satisfy equipment qualification requirement Maintenance Procedure ME-4-131, Revision 4, "4.16KV GE Magne-Blast Breaker" as performed on essential services Chilled Water Chiller "B" breaker. The NRC inspector observed that Step 8.4.48 of this procedure uses " maximum clearance" when referring to the minimum clearance. Also, Step 8.4.47 states that the changing mechanism ratchet wheel-driving and latching pawl clearances should be
"approximately equal," but there was no criteria established as to how equa Maintenance Procedure MM-4-002, Revision 3, " Vibration Measurements and Limits for Rotating Equipment," as performed on Charging Pump "A/B."


The NRC inspector observed that many PSA snubbers were installed with lock wire in the flange bolts /capscrews while several other PSA snubbers were
Contrary to the above, on March 10, 1987, Section 8.3 of ME-3-220, Revision 4, was performed on Battery Charger 3AB-1, and the charger was not isolated from its 125 Vdc PDP by a danger tag as required by  l Step 8.3.1 ' Procedures for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment are recommended in paragraph 9.9 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,. February 197 MM-12-007,-
Revision 1, " Pipe Hanger Support Installation, Fabrication, Removal,"
is an approved procedure for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Step 9.5.10 of MM-12-001 requires the installation of lock wire on snubber flange bolts during  i installation, i
contrary to the above, on March 20, 1987 Snubbers SIRR-1055, SISR-1064, SISR-704, CCSR-1067A, CCSR-1067B, SISR-961A, SISR-961B, and SI'? 1064 were found to be installed without lockwire on the snubber  j W nge bolt #
l This is a Severity Level V violatio .
l i RESPONSE  ,
l-(1) Reason for the Violation For both items identified in the violation Waterford 3 maintenance personnel failed to strictly follow procedures for performing  l maintenance on plant equipmen (2) Corrective Action That Has Been Taken The following actions have been taken to address the failure of personnel to follow procedures. The Assistant Plant Manager, l  Operations and Maintenance issued an Operations and Maintenance Directive (O&M Directive #16) on April 15, 1987, on the subject of


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    -6-installed without lock wire in the flange bolts /capscrews. The NRC inspector found this to be inconsistent with Procedure MM-12-001, Revision 1, " Pipe Hanger Support Installation Fabrication, Removal," which requires lock wire to be installed in the flange bolt /capscrews during snubber installation per Step 9.5.10. This requirement for lock wires was found to be consistent with the snubber vendors manual, " Pacific Scientific Installation and Maintenance Manual." The NRC inspector questioned the licensee about the lock wire installation inconsistences on PSA snubbers. The licensee's response was that special high torque bolts /capscrews were used in lieu of the PSA bolts /capscrews in order to eliminate the lock wire. Therefore, lock wire was not required, although it had been inadvertently included in the installation Procedure MM-12-00 The licensee is also writing a Quality Notice on the failure to follow procedure (not installing lock wire when installing snuboers since the installation procedure required it). This failure to follow procedure is an apparent violation (382/8707-01).
N ,/ ' " *    Attachm:nt to W3P87-1069 Sheet 2 of 2 (
procedure compliance. On April 20 and 21 meetings were held with Operations and'Haintenance Department supervisors and craft personnel to discuss the importance of procedural complianc For procedure ME-3-220, there is no technical requirement to danger tag the battery charger's output circuit breaker in order to perform the procedure. The procedure, as written, was very restrictive with respect to tagging for an item in which there was no hazard to .
personnel or equipmen l To address the concern for not lockwiring nutt on snubber flange bolts the manufacturer was consulte It was determined that lockwiring is not required as long as proper torque is applied during snubber assembly. As a result, no action is considered necessary to correct field condition In both items above, it has been determined that no technical issues are involved. The above actions are considered sufficient to avoid further violation (3) Corrective Action To Be Taken Procedures ME-3-220 and MM-12-001 are being revised to delete the unnecessary requirement The revisions are expected to be, completed by June 5, 198 (4) Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliar.ce will be achieved by June 5,198 e
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No other violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance The NRC inspectors observed and reviewed TS required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were met, and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve The NRC inspector observed portiuns of ME-3-220, " Station Battery Bank and Charger," specifically, the charger capacity performance test for the 3AB-1 battery charger. This test is performed to verify that the 3AB-1 battery charger meets the requirements of Technical Specification 4.8.2.1. During the performance of the test, the NRC inspector noted that the charger's 125 Vdc output circuit breaker was open but not danger-tagged as required by Step 8.3.15 of ME-3-220. The NRC inspector discussed this failure to follow procedures with licensee personnel. Apparently, the danger-tagging requirements of this procedure are routinely ignore Though the failure to use danger tags will not alter the test results or damage the equipment, the procedure requires them, and failure to use them could result in inadvertent operation of the breakers during the tes This failure to follow procedures is a second example of apparent violation (382/8707-01).
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While reviewing Potentially Reportable Event 86-97, the NRC inspector questioned changes made to the surveillance procedures for measuring the emergency safety features response times. These changes allowed the measurement of the pump start time portion for the "A/B" High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump with the pump lined up to either the "A" or
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"B" train but not requiring measurements for the "A/B" pump lined up to each train. The licensee stated that the response time measured for the
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"A/B" HPSI pump'would not change when lining the pump up to theI "A" or "B" train, because the only difference would be a closed contact'between th pump and the "A" or "B" pump test power supply. Since the ' licensee's "-
procedures for measurinp the total ESF response time each measure portion of the response time with individual acceptance' criteria'for each portion that prevent the total time from exceeding the ESF limits as specified in Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2, the total response time would meet the TS requirement if all components meet their individual criteria. The NRC inspector questioned the effect of aligning the "A/B" HPSI pump.to the different piping systems associated with the "A" or "B" train as performed when replacing the "A" and "B" pump, and how this change in hydraulic circuit would affect pump start time. The licensee was already processing procedure revision and has subsequently changed the HPSI pump start time Procedure OP-903-029 to require that the "A/B" pump start time be measured with the pump lined up to each loo After the reactor was stabilized at full power on March 20, 1987, the NRC inspector observed the performance of OP-903-001, " Technical Specification Logs," Attachment 10.13, " Adjustment of CPC and Excore Instrumentation."
 
This surveillance was performed to verify the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) power inputs were consistent with secondary calorimetric calculations and to change a number of addressable CPC constants to their full power valve No other violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown The Essential Services Chilled Water (ESCW) system was verified operable by performing a walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the system on March 10 and 16, 198 The NRC inspector used the ESCW valve lineup specified on Attachment 1 of Procedure OP-903-062, Revision 3, in conjunction with the referenced drawing While performing the walkdown of the ESCW system, the NRC inspector observed oil on the floor between the "A" and "B" chillers, which appeared to be leaking from the "A" chiller. This oil was later cleaned up by plant personnel. The NRC inspector noted that fire wrap installed on electrical conduit in this area was in contact with the oil and appeared to be discolored by the oil. The NRC inspector brought this to the attention of the plant loss control engineer, who investigated and later stated that he would initiate a condition identification work authorization to remove, replace, and study this fire wrap in order to determine the effect of oil on i No violations or deviations were identified.


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    -8-8. Routine Operational Safety Inspection By observation during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the NRC inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The NRC inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of the plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the MC inspectors verified compliance with selected TS and limiting conditions for operation During the course of the inspection, observations relative.to protected and vital area security were made including access controls, boundar ,
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integrity, search, escort, and badgin , ;
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed an'd'the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were -
periodically checked, and equipment operability and' calibration frequency; .~
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were verifie '
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The NRC inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of.overall, status of plant and of any significant safety matter related to plant operations. Discussions were held with plant management and various ""
members of the operations staff on a regular basi Selected portions of_ f operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The NRC inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits of the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator alarms; and housekeepin During this inspection period, the NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's routine use of the Containment Atmosphere Release System (CARS) for containment pressure control. Paragraph 6.2.1.1.2 of the Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit No. 3 Final Safety Analysis Report states that the Containment Cooling System maintains containment pressure during normal plant operation. While paragraph 6.2.5.2.3 states that the CARS is a backup to the Hydrogen Recombiner System and is employed only after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
 
Because of a large amount of noncondensible leakage in the containment (mostly from control air systems), the Containment Cooling System.has not been an effective method of pressure control. The CARS has been routinely used to transfer the containment noncondensibles to the Reactor Building annulus where the Shield Building Ventilation System processes them to
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release via tha plant stac The NRC inspector has reviewed the licensee's present use of CARS, including Section 6.4, " Containment Pressure Control Using the CAR System," of OP-8-002, Revision 4,
" Containment Atmosphere Release." The procedure is adequate, and the l
 
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. .L-9-routine use-of the CARS during normal plant operations appears to conform with all regulatory requirements. The NRC-inspector concluded that the FSAR needs to be revised to reflect this routine use of the CAR Licensee management agreed that such a change was'necessary,.and that additional reviews would be pursued to see that over two years of operating experience, additional employment of systems, which were not
  . fully described in the FSAR, had develope While performing a routine plant tour, the NRC inspector noted that the nuts securing a number of pipe whip restraints in the area of the main ~
steam isolation valves appeared to be improperly installed. The nuts on some of the restraints, though fully engaged on the stud, were not fully tightened against the washer and support. Other nuts that appeared to be up against-the washers were less than hand tigh The NRC. inspector brought these observations to the attention of the plant technical support staff. Review by the licensee of installation and~ test records indicated that the critical tolerance for these u-bolt restraints is the clearance between the restraint and the pipe circumferenc Therefore, the nuts securing these restraints have to be far enough down the stud to remove sufficient play to ensure that, should the restraint be called on to prevent pipe movement, the maximum clearance between the pipe and restraint would not be exceeded. There did not appear to be a requirement to torque the nuts; however, the licensee agreed that leaving them on at least hand tight would prevent vibration-or thermal expansion and contraction, which could cause the nuts to back down the stud, allowing the maximum clearance between the pipe and restraint to be exceeded. The licensee plans to mark the studs on pipe whip restraints to indicate the maximum nut engagement position to ensure proper restraint clearance. Followup of the marking of whip restraints is an open item (382/8707-02).
 
No violations or deviations were identifie , Potential Generic Problems  .
The NRC inspector provided the licensee with the fol' lowing 10 CFR Part 21 reports:
Defective coaxial cable in post-LOCA High Range Radiation Monitors (GA Technologies)    '
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No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 16, 1987, wi,th those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the NRC inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors during this inspection.
 
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Latest revision as of 12:49, 18 December 2021

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/87-07
ML20215A626
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/10/1987
From: Gagliardo J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Dewease J
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 8706170007
Download: ML20215A626 (2)
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Text

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JUN 101987 l

In' Reply Refer To: l Docket: 50 382/87-07-

Louisiana Power & Light? Company-  !

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ATTN: .J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations N-80 317 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Gentlemen:

Thank you for your . letter of May 29,1987,. in response to our letter and l

Notice of Violation dated April 29, 1987. We have reviewed your reply and find 1 it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice'of Violation. We will  !

review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection

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'to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintaine

Sincerely, Original Signed By J. E. Gagliardo J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch cc:

Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: G. E. Wuller, Onsite ,

Licensing Coordinator {

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P. 0. Box B Killona,-Louisian !

Louisiana Power & Light Company l ATTN: N.~ S. Carns, Plant Manager j

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P 0.:B.ox B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Middle South Services ATTN: Mr. R. T. Lall P. O. Box 61000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 (cccont'dnextpa PI ' C:P ' C:RPB ' .

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Louisiana-Power & Light.Compan9 -2-0: Louisiana Power l& Light. Company

'- ' ATTN:' :K.: W. Cook, Nuclear Safety and -

Regulatory. Affairs Manager-  ;

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317'Baronne Street

~P.10.'. Box 60340 .

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New' Orleans, Louisiana . 70160 - i

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Louisiana Radiation _. Control-Program Directo ,

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RPB' 'D. Weiss, RM/ALF RRI- . . D.' Martin, RA SectionChief'(RPB/A).

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DRSP RPSB- .

RSB C MIS Sistem , Project Inspector, RPB ,

RSTS Operator R. Hall

RIV File NRR Project' Manager- -i q

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d 1 P. O. BOX 60340 LOUISI&AN POWER A / 317 LIGHT NEWBARONNE STREET

ORLEANS, LOUISlANA 70160 *

(504) 595-3100 Ut ikNs'ysit$

May 29, 1987 W3P87-1069 A4.05 QA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission @7 ATTN: Document Control Desk j I

Washington, D.C. 20555 g l jgg7 j ;.

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- 'i Subject: Waterford 3 SES l Docket No. 50-382 "

License No. NPF-38 NRC Inspection Report 87-07 Attached is the Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L) response to Violation No. 8707-01 identified in Inspection Report No. 87-0 If you have any questions on the response, please contact G.E. Wuller, Operational Licensing, at (504) 464-3499,

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Very truly yours,

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/ wh K.W. Cook Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manager i

KWC:PTH:ssf Attachment cc: : U Martin, NRC Region IV 5.* Calvo, NRC-NRR i

J.H. Wilson, NRC-NRR NRC Resident Inspectors Office l E.L. Blake

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"AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER" Ay C gc- 97 lblo

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) W3P87-1069 Shest 1 of 2 -;

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LP&L Response To Violation No.~8707-01 VIOLATION NO. 8707-01 l

Technical Specification (TS).6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures be implemented for the applicable procedures recommended in' ,

Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Two I examples of failure to follow these procedures are listed below: Surveillance testing of emergency power systems is one of the applicable. procedures recommended in paragraph 8.b of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 197 ME-3-220, Revision 4, " Station Battery Bank and Charger," is an approved surveillance procedure for testing a portion of the emergency power syste Step 8.3.15 of ME-3-220, Revision.4', requires, " Operations isolate the charger from its 125 Vdc PDP by danger-tagging (OPEN) the charger's output circuit breaker on the PDP."

Contrary to the above, on March 10, 1987, Section 8.3 of ME-3-220, Revision 4, was performed on Battery Charger 3AB-1, and the charger was not isolated from its 125 Vdc PDP by a danger tag as required by l Step 8.3.1 ' Procedures for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment are recommended in paragraph 9.9 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,. February 197 MM-12-007,-

Revision 1, " Pipe Hanger Support Installation, Fabrication, Removal,"

is an approved procedure for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Step 9.5.10 of MM-12-001 requires the installation of lock wire on snubber flange bolts during i installation, i

contrary to the above, on March 20, 1987 Snubbers SIRR-1055, SISR-1064, SISR-704, CCSR-1067A, CCSR-1067B, SISR-961A, SISR-961B, and SI'? 1064 were found to be installed without lockwire on the snubber j W nge bolt #

l This is a Severity Level V violatio .

l i RESPONSE ,

l-(1) Reason for the Violation For both items identified in the violation Waterford 3 maintenance personnel failed to strictly follow procedures for performing l maintenance on plant equipmen (2) Corrective Action That Has Been Taken The following actions have been taken to address the failure of personnel to follow procedures. The Assistant Plant Manager, l Operations and Maintenance issued an Operations and Maintenance Directive (O&M Directive #16) on April 15, 1987, on the subject of

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N ,/ ' " * Attachm:nt to W3P87-1069 Sheet 2 of 2 (

procedure compliance. On April 20 and 21 meetings were held with Operations and'Haintenance Department supervisors and craft personnel to discuss the importance of procedural complianc For procedure ME-3-220, there is no technical requirement to danger tag the battery charger's output circuit breaker in order to perform the procedure. The procedure, as written, was very restrictive with respect to tagging for an item in which there was no hazard to .

personnel or equipmen l To address the concern for not lockwiring nutt on snubber flange bolts the manufacturer was consulte It was determined that lockwiring is not required as long as proper torque is applied during snubber assembly. As a result, no action is considered necessary to correct field condition In both items above, it has been determined that no technical issues are involved. The above actions are considered sufficient to avoid further violation (3) Corrective Action To Be Taken Procedures ME-3-220 and MM-12-001 are being revised to delete the unnecessary requirement The revisions are expected to be, completed by June 5, 198 (4) Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliar.ce will be achieved by June 5,198 e

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