ML20058A477
| ML20058A477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1990 |
| From: | Collins S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Barkhurst R ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9010260231 | |
| Download: ML20058A477 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1990017
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In Reply Refer To:
Docket: 50-382/90-17
Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATTN:
Ross P. Barkhurst, Vice President
Operations, Waterford
P.O. Box B
Killona, Louisiana 70066
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Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of October 1,1990, in response to our letter
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and Inspection Report 50-382/90-17 dated August 28, 1990. We have reviewed
your reply and find it responsive to the weakness identified in our report. We
will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future
inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be
maintained.
Sincerely,
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, bSamuel J. Collins, Director
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Division of Reactor Projects
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Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATTN:
Donald C. Hintz, Executive Vice
President & Chief Operating Officer
P.O. Box 31995
J.ekson, Mississippi
39286
Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATTN: Gerald W, Muench, Vice President
Operations Support
P.O. Box 31995
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Jackson, Mississippi
39286
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ATTN: Robert B. McGehee, Esq.
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P.O. Box 651
Jackson, Mississippi
39205
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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ATTN:
J. R. McGaha, Jr. , General
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Manager Plant Operations
P.O. Box B
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K111ona, Louisiana 70066
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Entergy Operations, Inc.
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ATTN:
J. G.-Dewease, Senior Vice
President, Planning & Assurance
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATTN:
L. W. Laughlin, Site
Licensing Support Supervisor
P.O. Box B
Killona, Louisiana 70066
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Monroe & Leman
ATTN:
W. Malcolm Stevenson, Esq.
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201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3300
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170-3300
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
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ATTN: Mr. E. Blake
2300 N Street, NW
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Washington, D.C.
20037
Chairman
Louisiana Public Service Commission
One American Place, Suite 1630
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697
Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATTN:
R. F. Burski,- Director
Nuclear Safety
317 Baronne Street
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New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
Department of Environmental Quality
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ATTN: William H. Spell, Administrator
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Radiation Protection Division
P.O. Box 14690
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70858
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President, Parish Council
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Mr. William A. Cross
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Bethesda Licensing Office
3 Metro Center
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Suite 610
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ATTN:
Resident Inspector
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P.O. Box 822
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K111ona, Louisiana 70066
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Regional Administrator, Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
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Arlington, Texas 76011
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Chief, Technological Hazards Branch
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FEMA Region 6
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Federal Center
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800 North Loop 288
Denton, Texas 76201-3698
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bec with licensee's letter:
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Lisa Shea, RM/ALF
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Resident Inspector
Section Chief, DRP/A
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MIS System
RSTS Operator
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Inspector
Section Chief, SEPS-
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Project Engineer, DRP/A
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D. Wigginton, NRR Project Manager
R. Erickson, NRR
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October 1, 1990
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ATTN:
Document Control Desk
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Washington, D.C. 20555
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Subject:
Waterford 3 SES
Docket No. 50-382
License No. NPF-38
NRC Inspection Report 90-17
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Gentlemen t
Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits, as Attachment 1, our response to
the weakness noted in the subject Inspection Report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
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F.J. Englebracht, Emergency Planning & Administration Manager, at
(504) 739-6607.
Very truly yours,
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RFB /TWG'/ssf
Attachment
cc:
Messrs. R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV
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N.M. Terc, NRC Region IV
D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR
E.L. Blake
W.M. Stevenson
R.B. McGehee
NRC Resident Inspectors Office
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Att:chment to
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Page 1 of 2
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ATTACHMENT 1
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ENTERGY OPERATIONS RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM WEAKNESS
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IDENTIFIED IN INSPECTION REPORT 90-17
WEAKNESS NO. 9017-01:
The two groups tested with the simulator operating on an interactive mode
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performed their emergency response duties almost flawlessly.
In general,
crew prioritization of response and mitigation actions and resource al'.ocation
were good.
Teams properly classified, notified, protected the health and
safety of injured plant personnel, conducted site evacuation announcements,
and made adequate protective action recommendations.
Several areas for
improvement were identified, as follows:
1.
One of three teams failed to properly perform dose calculations.
2.
One team underestimated the magnitude of the release because they
failed to interpret the exponent in the monitor readout.
3.
In addition, the inspectors found that in some areas, key decision
makers had not received sufficient guidelines to effectively make
decisions (e.g., habitability criteria, reasons to contact NRC,
difference between delegating work and responsibilities, etc.).
4.
Finally, the information flow between the control room (CR) operatorn
and the Shift Supervisor (SS) functioning as the Emergency
Coordinator (EC) was less than optimal and sometimes lagged the
actual change in plant status by 5 to 10 minutes.
In part, this may
have been the result of the architectural design pertaining to the
location of the SS space within the CR.
The EC tended to remain in
the SS booth, which restricted his ability to hear the information
exchanged between the CR operators.
Additionally, the activities of
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the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) were not uniform from crew to crew
with respect to the method of supporting the EC concerning plant
status.
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Att:chment to
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Page 2 of 2
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RESPONSE:
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Analysis of the Weakness / Schedule of Corrective Action
In light of the overall performance of
e operations teams in handling
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the first phase of the emergency restp.se, Entergy Operations, Inc.
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considers the various aspects of the inentified weakness to be isolated
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occurances rather than indicative of a programmatic failure,
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The failure by one of the three teams to properly perform dose
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calculations was the result of simply misreading the associated
nomograph.
In this particular instance, one individual on one crew
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briefly misread the nomograph and then instantly recognized his
mistake when the error was pointed out to him.
Entergy Operations
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will address this particular issue by installing computer software that
will be used to perform off-site dose calculations with the nomographs
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remaining as a backup.
This system will be in place and fully
operational by October 24, 1990; it will result in calculation of
accurate, reitable dose estimates more quickly than is possible with the
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nomograph method.
In addition, the importance of careful, deliberate
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use of the nomographs will be an element of the training seminars to
be conducted with each shift crew during the first ouarter of 1991.
The faulty interpretation of the exponent in the monitor readout is,
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again, an isolated failure with one individual on one team making an
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error.
This particular issue will be addressed in terms of a " lesson
learned" during the training seminars in the first quarter of 1991.
The weakness also characterized key decision makers as not having
sufficient guidelines to make certain decisions.
Given the teams'
noteworthy performance in other aspects of the scenario, Entergy
Operations, Inc. intends to provide further guidanoe and address the
philosophical aspects of delegation during the first quarter 1991
training seminars.
Finally, the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan dictates that the Control
Room Supervisor is responsible for placing the plant in a safe
condition in an emergency; the Shift Supervisor becomes the
Emergency- Coordinator with primary responsibility for implementing the
Given the different responsibilities, in a fast
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developing emergency situation it is not necessarily unusual or
unacceptable for some delay to exist before the EC beoomes aware of
changes in plant conditions.
In some cases, however, the STA oould
ease this lag time by assisting the EC in staying abreast of rapidly
changing plant status.
This topic will be examined during the first
quarter 1991 training seminars.
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