ML20058A477

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Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-17
ML20058A477
Person / Time
Site: Waterford 
Issue date: 10/16/1990
From: Collins S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Barkhurst R
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
NUDOCS 9010260231
Download: ML20058A477 (3)


See also: IR 05000382/1990017

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In Reply Refer To:

Docket: 50-382/90-17

Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN:

Ross P. Barkhurst, Vice President

Operations, Waterford

P.O. Box B

Killona, Louisiana 70066

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Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter of October 1,1990, in response to our letter

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and Inspection Report 50-382/90-17 dated August 28, 1990. We have reviewed

your reply and find it responsive to the weakness identified in our report. We

will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future

inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be

maintained.

Sincerely,

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, bSamuel J. Collins, Director

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Division of Reactor Projects

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Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN:

Donald C. Hintz, Executive Vice

President & Chief Operating Officer

P.O. Box 31995

J.ekson, Mississippi

39286

Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN: Gerald W, Muench, Vice President

Operations Support

P.O. Box 31995

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Jackson, Mississippi

39286

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ATTN: Robert B. McGehee, Esq.

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P.O. Box 651

Jackson, Mississippi

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Entergy Operations, Inc.

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ATTN:

J. R. McGaha, Jr. , General

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Manager Plant Operations

P.O. Box B

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K111ona, Louisiana 70066

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Entergy Operations, Inc.

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ATTN:

J. G.-Dewease, Senior Vice

President, Planning & Assurance

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN:

L. W. Laughlin, Site

Licensing Support Supervisor

P.O. Box B

Killona, Louisiana 70066

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Monroe & Leman

ATTN:

W. Malcolm Stevenson, Esq.

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201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3300

New Orleans, Louisiana 70170-3300

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

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ATTN: Mr. E. Blake

2300 N Street, NW

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Washington, D.C.

20037

Chairman

Louisiana Public Service Commission

One American Place, Suite 1630

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697

Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN:

R. F. Burski,- Director

Nuclear Safety

317 Baronne Street

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New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Department of Environmental Quality

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ATTN: William H. Spell, Administrator

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Radiation Protection Division

P.O. Box 14690

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70858

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Entergy Operations, Inc.

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President, Parish Council

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St. Charles Parish

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Mr. William A. Cross

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Bethesda Licensing Office

3 Metro Center

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Suite 610

Bethesda, Maryland 20814

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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ATTN:

Resident Inspector

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P.O. Box 822

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K111ona, Louisiana 70066

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ATTN: Regional Administrator, Region IV

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000

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Arlington, Texas 76011

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Chief, Technological Hazards Branch

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FEMA Region 6

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Federal Center

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800 North Loop 288

Denton, Texas 76201-3698

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bec with licensee's letter:

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Lisa Shea, RM/ALF

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Resident Inspector

Section Chief, DRP/A

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MIS System

RSTS Operator

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Inspector

Section Chief, SEPS-

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Project Engineer, DRP/A

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D. Wigginton, NRR Project Manager

R. Erickson, NRR

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W3P90-1506

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October 1, 1990

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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ATTN:

Document Control Desk

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Washington, D.C. 20555

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Subject:

Waterford 3 SES

Docket No. 50-382

License No. NPF-38

NRC Inspection Report 90-17

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Gentlemen t

Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits, as Attachment 1, our response to

the weakness noted in the subject Inspection Report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact

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F.J. Englebracht, Emergency Planning & Administration Manager, at

(504) 739-6607.

Very truly yours,

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RFB /TWG'/ssf

Attachment

cc:

Messrs. R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV

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N.M. Terc, NRC Region IV

D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR

E.L. Blake

W.M. Stevenson

R.B. McGehee

NRC Resident Inspectors Office

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Att:chment to

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W3P90-1506

Page 1 of 2

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ATTACHMENT 1

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ENTERGY OPERATIONS RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM WEAKNESS

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IDENTIFIED IN INSPECTION REPORT 90-17

WEAKNESS NO. 9017-01:

The two groups tested with the simulator operating on an interactive mode

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performed their emergency response duties almost flawlessly.

In general,

crew prioritization of response and mitigation actions and resource al'.ocation

were good.

Teams properly classified, notified, protected the health and

safety of injured plant personnel, conducted site evacuation announcements,

and made adequate protective action recommendations.

Several areas for

improvement were identified, as follows:

1.

One of three teams failed to properly perform dose calculations.

2.

One team underestimated the magnitude of the release because they

failed to interpret the exponent in the monitor readout.

3.

In addition, the inspectors found that in some areas, key decision

makers had not received sufficient guidelines to effectively make

decisions (e.g., habitability criteria, reasons to contact NRC,

difference between delegating work and responsibilities, etc.).

4.

Finally, the information flow between the control room (CR) operatorn

and the Shift Supervisor (SS) functioning as the Emergency

Coordinator (EC) was less than optimal and sometimes lagged the

actual change in plant status by 5 to 10 minutes.

In part, this may

have been the result of the architectural design pertaining to the

location of the SS space within the CR.

The EC tended to remain in

the SS booth, which restricted his ability to hear the information

exchanged between the CR operators.

Additionally, the activities of

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the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) were not uniform from crew to crew

with respect to the method of supporting the EC concerning plant

status.

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Att:chment to

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W3P90-150S

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Page 2 of 2

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RESPONSE:

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Analysis of the Weakness / Schedule of Corrective Action

In light of the overall performance of

e operations teams in handling

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the first phase of the emergency restp.se, Entergy Operations, Inc.

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considers the various aspects of the inentified weakness to be isolated

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occurances rather than indicative of a programmatic failure,

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The failure by one of the three teams to properly perform dose

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calculations was the result of simply misreading the associated

nomograph.

In this particular instance, one individual on one crew

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briefly misread the nomograph and then instantly recognized his

mistake when the error was pointed out to him.

Entergy Operations

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will address this particular issue by installing computer software that

will be used to perform off-site dose calculations with the nomographs

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remaining as a backup.

This system will be in place and fully

operational by October 24, 1990; it will result in calculation of

accurate, reitable dose estimates more quickly than is possible with the

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nomograph method.

In addition, the importance of careful, deliberate

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use of the nomographs will be an element of the training seminars to

be conducted with each shift crew during the first ouarter of 1991.

The faulty interpretation of the exponent in the monitor readout is,

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again, an isolated failure with one individual on one team making an

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error.

This particular issue will be addressed in terms of a " lesson

learned" during the training seminars in the first quarter of 1991.

The weakness also characterized key decision makers as not having

sufficient guidelines to make certain decisions.

Given the teams'

noteworthy performance in other aspects of the scenario, Entergy

Operations, Inc. intends to provide further guidanoe and address the

philosophical aspects of delegation during the first quarter 1991

training seminars.

Finally, the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan dictates that the Control

Room Supervisor is responsible for placing the plant in a safe

condition in an emergency; the Shift Supervisor becomes the

Emergency- Coordinator with primary responsibility for implementing the

Emergency Plan.

Given the different responsibilities, in a fast

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developing emergency situation it is not necessarily unusual or

unacceptable for some delay to exist before the EC beoomes aware of

changes in plant conditions.

In some cases, however, the STA oould

ease this lag time by assisting the EC in staying abreast of rapidly

changing plant status.

This topic will be examined during the first

quarter 1991 training seminars.

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