IR 05000382/1987023
| ML20236N362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1987 |
| From: | Baird J, Fisher W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236N349 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-87-23, NUDOCS 8711160130 | |
| Download: ML20236N362 (8) | |
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APPENDIX
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O.S. NUCLEAR REGllLATORY COMMISSION l
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/87-23
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License:
NPF-38 j
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Docket:
50-382 Licensee:
Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
317 Baronne Street
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New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Facility Name: Waterford 3 Steam Electric St'ation (SES)
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s Inspection At:
Waterford 3 SES site near Killona,. Louisiana Inspection Conducted:
October 13-16, 1987
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Inspector-It'
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//[5If 7 r'L-J. B. Baird, Technical Assistant 0at'e
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Accompanying Personnel:
H. D. Chaney, NRC RIV W. F. Smith, NRC SRI
'G. Bryan, Comex Corporation f
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Approved:
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W. L. Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials and Date Emergency Preparedness Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 13-16, 1987 (Report 50-382/87-23)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Four deficiencies were identified by NRC inspectors.
8711160130 871112 PDR ADOCK 05000392 G
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DETAILS o
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Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel
- R. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear MA. Lubinski, Drill and Exercise Coordinator
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/*L. Simon, Radwaste Engineer
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Etheridge, Radwaste Engineer
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- G. Miller III, Emergency Plan and Procedures Coordinator
~*M. Mills, Emergency Response Facilities Coordinator
- V. McAdams, Staff Engineer
- D. Hoel, Health Physics Supervisor
- W. LaBonte, Health Physics Superintendent
- J. O'Hern,, Technical Support Training Superintendent i
- R. Prados, Licensing Program Supervisor
- T. Garrets, Nuclear Services Manager
- P. Backes, Quality Assurance Manager, Acting
- J. McGaha, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services
- K. Cook, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs
- N. Carns. Plant Manager, Nuclear
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- R. Burski, Manager, Nuclear Operations Engineering
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- D. Aswell, Senior Vice President,1 ossil Operations
- R. Azzarello, Manager, Electrical
- R. Lailheugue, Manager, Nuclear Administration
- G. Espenan, Corporate Health Physicist
- G. Paranjape, Chemistry
- G. Wuller, Operational Licensing Supervisor
- G. Zetsch, Nuclear Security Agent
- F. Englebracht, Emergency Planning Manager
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- J. Lewis, Onsite Emergency Planning Coordinator j
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- J. Wilson, NRR Project Manager
- W. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
G. Jones, Emergency Management Program Specialist The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training,
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and emergency response organization.
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- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
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3 2.
- Followup on'Previously Identified Items i
-(Closed) Deficiency (382/8525-C5):
!y9 Director (EOFD) Management of Overall Emergency.Psesponse - The NRC
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inspector observed adequate management of emergency response by the EOFD after the EOF had been activated.
In addition, it was observed that sufficient reactor operations expertise and support were available in the EOF to assist the.EOFD in making decisions for offsite protective action recommendations.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Deficiency (382/8622-02):
The Internal Organization of the EOF h
was not Conducive to Information Flow - The NRC inspector observed that the layout of the E0F had been changed to provide better communication between the E0FD and the operations and radiological coordinators.
In addition, it was noted that three additional positions had been added to perform routine tasks for these key management personnel.
During the exercise, it was observed that these changes improved the command and control and information flow in the EOF.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Program Areas Inspected The following program areas were inspected.
Unless otherwise noted, the inspection was completed and revealed no violations, deviations, deficiencies, unresolved items, or open items.
The inspection included interviews with cognizant individuals, observations of activities, and
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record reviews.
The depth and scope of these activities were consistent
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with past findings and with the current status of the facility.
Notations after a specific inspection item are used to identify the following:
I = item not inspected or only partially inspected; V = violation; D = deviation; H = deficiency; U = unresolved item; 0 = open item.
Procedure Program Area and Inspection Requirements 82201 Emergency Detection and Classification 021 - Adequacy of'EALs in site emergency plan and l
procedures (Exercise EALs reviewed.) (I)
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022 - Initial offsite notification procedures based on l
EALs.
Procedures for recommending protective
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actions for onsite nonessential personnel
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(Evacuation observed.) (I)
023 - State and local agency agreement with EALs (I)
024 - Emergency event classification (Exercise classification reviewed.) (I)
025 - Use of post-TMI indicators for core and
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containment status (I)
026 - One individual onsite at all times understands authority and responsibility to classify events
and initiate emergency actions (Exercise response reviewed.) (I)
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027 - Emergency Operating, Alarm, or Abnormal
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Occurrence Procedures direct the user to classify emergencies-(Exercise response reviewed.) (I)
028 - EAls consistent with appropriate control room instrumentation.
Decisional aids readily j
available and consistent with EALs (Exercise i
response reviewed.) (I)
029'- Shift supervisors and other responsible personnel
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promptly and correctly classify events (Exercise response reviewed.) (I)
i 82202 Protective Action and Decision Making 021 - Authority and responsibility clearly and unambiguously assigned (I)
022 - Authority and responsibility for making protective action decisions are in procedures and understood by licensee personnel (Exercise response reviewed.) (I)
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023 - Emergency response f.!cilities can implement j
onsite and offsite protective measures (I)
f 024 - Understanding'of relationships between plant conditions, offsite consequences, and i
effectiveness of. protective measures (I)
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025 - Offsite officials have the capability to make
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prompt'public notifications and protective action decisions in 15 minutes (Exercise response reviewed.) (I)
82206 Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training)
021 - Training program established and maintained (I)
022 - Amount and type of training is appropriate (I)
j 023 - Key personnel understand their emergency responsibilities and can perform their assigned duties (Exercise response reviewed.) (I)
82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors 021 - 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Part IV.F.1 (I)
022 - Evaluation Criteria:
(1) Control Room (Exercise response observed.)
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(2) Technical Support Center (Exercise response j
observed.)
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(3) Emergency Operations Facility (Exercise response observed.)
(4) Operational Support Center (exercise response i
observed.)
(5) Corporate Command Center (I)
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. -u (6)' Offsite Mon'itoring Team (I)
(7) Corrective Action / Rescue Team (Exercise J
response observed.)
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.(8) Security / Accountability Team'(Exercise N;
response reviewed.').(I)
(9) Press Center (I)
j (10) Medical Team (Exercise response observed.)
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(11) Postaccident Sampling'(I)
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-Control Room 82301 (1)
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. The NRC inspector observed that the control. room operators were well j
organized and that'they properly identified and classified the Notice of
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Unusual Event and Alert as the scenario events unfolded.
During the time
'that the control room was responsible for communications, initial i
notifications to offsite agencies were made within the. time requirements.
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The inspector noted that the exercise scenario events impacted realistic control room response in at least two cases.
First, the control
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room operators immediately consulted procedure OP-901-014, Revision 4, i
" Loss of. Charging and/or Letdown Flow" when it was determined that all charging capability had been lost.
The procedure directed a reactor trip; however, an exercise controller had to override this requirement to
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accommodate the scenario.
In the other case, control room personnel
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responded rapidly.with the appropriate emergency procedures and diagnosed
'l the problem when,the letdown line failed resulting in a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) outside of containment..The.first attempt to isolate the l
line'and. secure'the coolant release was expedited, but this was'
unsuccessful and it became apparent that the exercise scenario would not allow prompt termination of the leak.
This resulted in a. loss of the sense of urgency and during the approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that followed until the leak was finally stopped, efforts to minimize the leakage were not apparent in the control room.
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During the post-exercise critiques, the exercise participants and
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controllers also identified exercise activities that were impacted by inconsistencies and lack of appropriate scenario data.
Based on the above observations, the following item is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
o Development of the exercise scenario was deficient in that inconsistencies and lack of appropriate scenario data adversely
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affected the demonstration of some exercise objectives (382/8723-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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g 5.
Technical Support Center 82301 (2)
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The NRC inspector observed that the Technical Support Center (TSC) was i
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staffed and activated as required in less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the declaration of an Alert' classification.
About 2' minutes after activation the TSC Emergency Coordinator (EC) declared a S*,te Area Emergency classification based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) No'.;6, a radiation
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level greater than 10 times the high alarm set point on the fuel handling building ventilation monitor.
This was approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> earlier than-anticipated by the' scenario timeline.
Both the NRC inspector and licensee's staff subsequently determined that this monitor has 4 channels with different ranges, each with~a high alarm set point, and the licensee's EALs do not specify which channel is applicable.
This was identified in the. licensee's post-exercise critique as an item requiring corrective action in identifying the appropriate range in the EAL.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Operations Facility 82301'(3)
l The_ NRC' inspector observed that.the EOF wa*, staffed and activated within l
the 1-2 hours staffing goal specified in the emergency plan.
However, all l
of the minimum staff required for operability were in place. shortly after l
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> had elapsed and it appeared the additional hour to brief, check
equipment, and conduct the turnover of functions from the TSC was more
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than necessary.
The inspector observed that the layout of the EOF had been revised to provide better communication between the EOFD and the operations and radiological coordinators.
In addition, it was noted that three i
additional positions had been added to perform routine tasks for these key management personnel.
Also, it was observed that sufficient reactor operations expertise and support were available in the E0F to assist the
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EOFD in making decisions for offsite protective action recommendations.
During the exercise, it was observed that these changes improved the j
command and control and information flow in the E0F, l
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Operational Support Center 82301 (4)
The NRC inspector observed that the Operational Support Center (OSC) was d d ared operational within about 30 minutes after the declaration of an
Alert classification.
The inspector noted that the OSC staff failed to
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adequately determine initial and continual hat,itability for the facility in a timely manner.
It was observed that habitability surveys were not i
initiated until about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the OSC had been declared operational (a release of radioactivity from the fuel handling building had been in progress for about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 30 minutes) and were not completed until
about 20 minutes later, at which time the release had been stopped.
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addition, the NRC inspector determined that the continuous air l
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monitor-(CAM) used for habitability purposes in the OSC was inoperable due to-the11ack of an operable readout and failure to verify the set point and alarm capabilities.
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The inspector also observed formulation, preparation, and'inplant
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activities of repair teams dispatched from the OSC.
The NRC inspector noted that the initial-entry repair team entering the simulated reactor
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containment did noticonduct a gas-free habitability survey as* required by procedure UNT-07-017, " Confined Space Entry." The initial-entry team was
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supplied with self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators; i
however, the followup team entered without aLsurvey using only air i
purifying respirators.
For the followup team,.it was also noted that they did not comply with the reentry requirements to stay with health physics personnel when, at one point, they left the health physics technician who y
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was using the telephone and proceeded without coverage into the area.
Based on the above observations, the following items are considered to be emergency preparedness deficiencies:
Initial habitability determinations for the OSC were not adequate o
(382/8723-02).
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o Procedures for gas-free habitability survey were not followed for-
' 5; simulated entries into the reactor containment (382/8723-03).
o A repair team failed to _ comply with reentry requirements to stay with
health physics personnel (382/8723-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Critique
The NRC inspector attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee staff on October 16, 1987, to evaluate the licensee's identification of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q),
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F.5.
The licensee staff identified the deficiencies listed below.
Corrective actions for licensee identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC inspection.
Licensee Identified Deficiencies o
Medical first aid for the simulated contaminated, injured person was i
not adequate.
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o Emergency action level-No. 6 is ambiguous in that it fails to specify which of the 4 channels the high alarm applies to.
o The release of radioactivity from the fuel handling building was not properly identified and assessed in a timely manner, j
t, o-The TSC status boards were not maintained current.
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LThe initial responders =to the OSC did not setup the facility in a i
timely manner and check radio equipment.
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The OSC health physicist did not maintain the status board or a log.
g An in plant team separated'in the plant without health physics I
o coverage or routing information for one part,of the team.
l No violations-or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with the NRC senior resident inspector and licensee representatives denoted in paragraph.1 on October 16, 1987, and summarized the. scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.
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