IR 05000382/2023001
| ML23110A762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/2023 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBD |
| To: | Ferrick J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EA-23-008 IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23110A762 (20) | |
Text
April 24, 2023
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2023001, INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 07200075/2023001, AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear John Ferrick:
On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. On April 17, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mandy Halter, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The licensee identified a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10) CFR 72.212(b)(6), associated with tornado hazard protection. Because this violation was identified during the discretion period covered by Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 22-001, Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of Tornado Hazard Protection requirements at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, and because the licensee was implementing compensatory measures and has taken or plans to take the necessary actions to restore compliance, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for the violation and is allowing continued Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation handling operations. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Projects Branch D Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000382 and 07200075 License No. NPF-38
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000382 and 07200075
License Number:
Report Number:
05000382/2023001 and 07200075/2023001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-001-0009 and 1-2023-001-0081
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location:
Killona, LA 70057
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2023, to March 31, 2023
Inspectors:
L. Brookhart, Senior Spent Fuel Storage Inspector
D. Childs, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Freeman, Spent Fuel Storage Inspector
A. Patz, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Sanchez, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Projects Branch D
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, (Waterford) in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status EDG EA-23-008 Enforcement Action 23-008:
Tornado Hazards Protection at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (EGM 22-001)60855 Closed LER 05000382/2022-005-00 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Relay Failure Results in Reactor Trip and Emergency Feedwater Actuation 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Waterford, Unit 3, began the inspection period at full power and remained at full power until January 17, 2023, when the unit was down powered to 50 percent to perform maintenance on the generator output breakers. The unit returned to full power on January 19, 2023. On March 9, 2023, the unit experienced excessive reactor coolant system leakage and was shut down. The unit was restarted on March 14, 2023, and returned to full power on March 16, 2023, where it remained for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)emergency diesel generators, startup transformers, and permanent temporary emergency diesel during planned generator output breaker maintenance on January 18, 2023 (2)controlled ventilation area system train B during planned maintenance for controlled ventilation areas system train A on January 31, 2023 (3)component cooling water and auxiliary component cooling water train B during auxiliary component cooling water train A outage for planned maintenance on February 9, 2023 (4)low pressure safety injection system train B while train A was inoperable for surveillance testing on February 28, 2023 (5)high pressure safety injection system trains A and B during and following elevated reactor coolant system unidentified leakage on March 10, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)fire area RAB-15A-001, elevation +46.00' reactor auxiliary building emergency diesel fuel oil feed tank B space on January 5, 2023 (2)fire area RAB-2-003, elevation +69.00' auxiliary building chilled water tanks and component cooling water surge tank rooms on January 10, 2023 (3)fire area RAB-3-001, elevation +46.00' reactor auxiliaries building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment room on February 27, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill in the +15.00' elevation of the turbine building involving a lube oil fire on main feed pump B on January 27, 2023
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power maneuvers for main generator output breaker maintenance from January 17-19, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator training in the simulator for a down power from 100 to 50 percent and a subsequent reactor trip and loss of offsite power on January 12, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)shutdown cooling train B following bearing failures in the auxiliary component cooling water pump B motor on May 9 and May 23, 2022
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)yellow risk due to planned outage of turbine driven emergency feedwater pump AB on January 12, 2023 (2)elevated green risk due to generator output breaker maintenance from January 17-20, 2023 (3)yellow risk due to planned outage of auxiliary component cooling water pump A from February 9-10, 2023 (4)elevated green risk due to forced shutdown and restart following high unidentified reactor coolant system leakage from March 10-16, 2023 (5)yellow risk due to replacement of capacitive voltage transformer on offsite power line 1 from March 26-30, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)auxiliary component cooling train B operability determination following identification that a cover was not used on the out-of-service wet cooling fan 4B on January 19, 2023 (2)reactor coolant leakage detection system operability determination following identification of non-functional flow switches on the containment fan coolers A, B, and C on January 24, 2023 (3)controlled ventilation area system train B operability determination following identification of damage to isolation damper on January 31, 2023 (4)component cooling water train B operability determination following identification of errors in calculation for severe corrosion on a pipe support on February 13, 2023 (5)safety-related 4kV bus 3A operability determination following relay surveillance failure and relay replacement on February 21, 2023 (6)reactor coolant system boundary operability determination following identification of leakage into containment on March 13, 2023
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)temporary modification EC-94938 to isolate core differential pressure instrument following identification of a deep notch in the instrument piping on March 13, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)high pressure safety injection pump B flow control valve testing following replacement of thermal overload relay on January 26, 2023 (2)safety-related 4kV bus 3A following replacement and calibration of undervoltage relays on February 21, 2023 (3)startup transformer B following corrective maintenance on generator output breaker B and associated disconnects on March 2, 2023 (4)component cooling water pump A after lube oil change and sight glass refurbishment on March 8, 2023, and subsequent retest after test failure on March 9, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)low pressure safety injection pump A surveillance test on February 28, 2023
- (2) reactor protection system matrix testing on March 12, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)spent fuel pool heat exchanger temperature control valve quarterly inservice testing on January 4,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022 IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)engineered safety features actuation system relay failure resulting in main steam isolation valve and main feed isolation valve closure on June 24, 2022
71153 - Follow up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a plant shutdown due to exceeding technical specification reactor coolant system leakage and licensees response on March 10, 2023.
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000382/2022-005-00, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Relay Failure Results in Reactor Trip and Emergency Feedwater Actuation (ADAMS Accession No. ML22361A050). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
===60855 - Operation of an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) The inspectors performed a review of the licensees ISFSI activities to verify compliance with requirements of the Certificate of Compliance 72-1032, License Amendment 5, and the HI-STORM FW Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), revision 8. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures, corrective action reports, and records to verify ISFSI operations were compliant with the Certificates technical specifications, requirements in the FSAR, and NRC regulations.
Operation Of An ISFSI===
- (1) Inspectors evaluated the licensees dry cask storage loading operations from January 2-6, 2023, during an on-site inspection. The Waterford ISFSI is sized to store 72 casks containing a mix of HI-STORM 100 storage casks and HI-STORM FW storage casks. At the time of the inspection, the ISFSI pad contained a total of 31 HI-STORM 100 storage casks and the licensee was in the process of loading the first HI-STORM FW cask. The HISTORM FW casks will each contain a Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) with 37 fuel assemblies (MPC-37).
During the on-site inspection, the inspectors evaluated and observed the following activities:
placement of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask and empty MPC into the spent fuel pool
loading and verification of spent fuel into canister #32 walkdown of the ISFSI pad
heavy load lifts using the cask handling crane to place the canister lid, while under water in spent fuel pool cask loading pit
heavy load lifts to remove the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask and loaded MPC from the spent fuel pool
canister welding and non-destructive testing activities on the lid-to-shell weld The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following documentation during the inspection:
fuel selection evaluations for the canisters loaded since the last NRC ISFSI inspection (canisters 28-32)
radiation surveys for radiological dose at the owner-controlled boundary to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 for years 2020-2022
selected ISFSI-related condition reports issued since the last NRC ISFSI inspection
quality assurance program implementation, including recent audits, surveillances, receipt inspection, and quality control activities related to ISFSI operations
compliance to technical specifications for operational surveillance activities and FSAR required annual maintenance activities
INSPECTION RESULTS
Enforcement Discretion Enforcement Action EA-23-008: Tornado Hazards Protection at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (EGM 22-001)60855
Description:
Upon issuance of NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 22-001 (ML22087A496), dated April 15, 2022, the licensee performed an assessment of all outdoor dry cask storage activities that were not explicitly analyzed for tornado hazards in the systems Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Two configurations were identified by the licensee where transport activities did not have a related tornado wind and hazard analysis consistent with the casks design basis requirements. These situations occurred during outside operations when the HI-STORM FW overpack was on the low-profile transporter and when the Vertical Cask Transporter carried the overpack using the HI-STORM FW lifting brackets.
The Holtec HI-STORM FSAR Section 2.2, HI-STORM FW Design Loading, which includes Section 2.2 iv. Short Term Operations, "normal operation evolutions necessary to support fuel loading or unloading activities," describes the general design criteria for the cask system. This includes all off-normal condition loads, environmental phenomena, and accident conditions.
Specifically, FSAR Section 2.2.3.e. Environmental Phenomena and Accident Condition Design Criteria - Tornado, describes that the FW system must withstand pressures, wind loads, and missiles generated by a tornado while maintaining kinematic stability and continued integrity of the canister must be demonstrated. Tornado hazards are evaluated in the FSAR Section 3.1.2.1.e., Design Criteria and Applicable Loads - Tornado, Section 3.4.4.1, Safety Analysis, and Section 12.2.6.1, Tornado
Analysis.
These sections of the FSAR do not include an analysis for tornado hazards when the overpack was on the low-profile transporter and when the Vertical Cask Transporter carried the overpack using the HI-STORM FW lifting brackets.
Corrective Actions: The licensee followed the guidance actions as described in the EGM. The issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) and the licensee established additional measures to mitigate tornado hazards, through procedures, during periods of ISFSI handling operations. These actions included, restricting outdoor dry cask storage activities during periods of adverse weather, establishing meteorological criteria, designating staff to monitor weather during ISFSI handling operations, describing actions to take in the event of severe weather necessary to place the cask in an analyzed condition, minimizing the duration of ISFSI handling operations during which ISFSI important to safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are in an unanalyzed condition, documentation that required weather checks are complete prior to the start of ISFSI handling operations, and documenting in the CAP a request for the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holder to request an amendment within 6 months of the date of the EGM or implement physical design modifications and/or perform evaluations that demonstrate important to safety SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, including tornadoes and tornado-generated missiles prior to the expiration date of the EGM (April 15, 2024).
Corrective Action References: CR-HQN-2022-00782
Enforcement:
Significance/Severity: This violation was dispositioned in accordance with the traditional enforcement process using Section 2.3 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This issue was determined by inspectors to be of more than minor safety significance, since if left uncorrected, the deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern. Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the NRC Enforcement Manual, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it should be assigned a severity level:
- (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and
- (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The violation was evaluated to be similar to a Severity Level IV violation in Enforcement Policy Section 6.5.d.2.
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 72.212 (b)(6), states, in part, that the general licensee must review the Safety Analysis Report referenced in the CoC or amended CoC and the related NRC Safety Evaluation Report, prior to use of the general license, to determine whether or not the reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports.
Contrary to the above from January 10, through March 7, 2023, the licensee failed to determine whether reactor site parameters including analyses of tornado missiles were enveloped by the cask design bases. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an analysis consistent with FSAR Section 2.2 to demonstrate the FW cask system would maintain kinematic stability and continued integrity of the canister during short term operations, such as, when the overpack was on the low-profile transporter and when the Vertical Cask Transporter carried the overpack using the HI-STORM FW lifting brackets.
Basis for Discretion: In general, the NRC has extensive history analyzing severe weather events including tornado hazard scenarios using probabilistic methods (or risk assessments)in licensing on a case-by-case basis to assess specific plant features to prevent a release of radioactivity exceeding regulatory limits. For ISFSIs, such methods can be employed, supported by analysis, to demonstrate that tornado hazards will not impair the capability of SSCs important to safety to perform their intended design functions.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) completed a generic risk analysis of potential tornado missile protection non-compliances to examine the risk significance of tornado hazard scenarios (ML14114A556). In this case, the generic bounding risk analysis performed by NRR concluded that a tornado missile scenario is of low-risk significance at power reactor sites, due in part to the low probability of wind speeds exceeding 75 miles per hour (less than 4x10-4 per year). This generic analysis did not specifically address ISFSI handling operations but there are several key insights in the analysis that may apply to a risk assessment for this issue. Specifically, rather than evaluate site-specific configurations, the NRR generic analysis used bounding assumptions regarding tornado and high winds initiating event frequencies (IEFs) coupled with bounding assumptions for missile strike area to develop conservative estimates of core-damage frequency. This generic analysis assumes that plants are in a condition vulnerable to a tornado for a full reactor-year worth of exposure time.
For ISFSI handling operations, the vulnerable configuration would be typically limited to a few weeks of exposure time per year which would result in additional conservatism to the results documented in the NRR generic analysis. Furthermore, ISFSI handling operations that may lead to loss of confinement of radioactive material due to a missile strike or high winds should be bounded by the assumptions regarding tornado and high winds IEFs. Appropriate administrative controls including compensatory measures would provide defense-in-depth and further reduce the likelihood of occurrence and mitigate loss of confinement events. This defense-in-depth approach should include provisions to
- (1) preclude ISFSI handling operations during periods of adverse weather or when adverse weather is predicted, and
- (2) provide compensatory measures to place important to safety SSCs in an analyzed condition or provide physical protection as necessary to maintain confinement of radioactive material during ISFSI handling operations.
In summary, the combination of the low probability of tornado events in conjunction with formally documented administrative controls that
- (1) restrict initiation of ISFSI handling operations during projected periods of adverse weather and,
- (2) cease ISFSI handling operations and place important to safety SSCs in a protected configuration or analyzed condition at the outset of adverse weather conditions, form the basis for the exercise of enforcement discretion for ISFSI handling operations. As a further condition of this enforcement discretion, licensees will conduct a site-specific assessment to determine the appropriate corrective actions to ensure that important to safety SSCs will not be adversely impacted by tornado hazards. As such, the exercise of enforcement discretion limited to the conditions of this EGM will not impose significant additional risk to public health and safety.
Since this violation was identified during the discretion period covered by Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 22-001, Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of Tornado Hazard Protection requirements at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, and because the licensee was implementing compensatory measures and has taken the necessary actions to restore compliance, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for the violation and is allowing continued ISFSI handling operations.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On March 7, 2023, the inspectors presented the ISFSI triennial inspection results to John Ferrick, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 17, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mandy Halter, General Manager for Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60855
Calculations
HI-2200993
ISFSI Site Boundary Dose Rate Calculations for Waterford 3
60855
Corrective Action
Documents
CR HQN 2022-
0782
04/19/2022
60855
Miscellaneous
Holtec HI-STORM
HI-STORM FW FSAR - REV 8 - Waterford
60855
Miscellaneous
QS-2022-W3-007
Nuclear Independent Oversight (NIOS) Follow-up
Surveillance for the Performance Assessment Finding (PAF)
for ineffective management of the Waterford 3 Dry Fuel
Storage campaign issues documented in CR-WF3-2022-
06489.
60855
Miscellaneous
Surveillance
Report No. QS-
20-W3-006
Nuclear Independent Oversight Follow-up Surveillance of a
Quality Assurance Finding (QAF) documented in
CR-WF3-2020-04257 for procedure use and adherence
issues identified during the 2020 Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation (ISFSI) Audit, QA-20-2020-W3-01.
60855
Miscellaneous
Surveillance
Report No. QS-
21-W3-004
Nuclear Independent Oversight Second Follow-up
Surveillance of a Quality Assurance Finding (QAF)
documented in CR-WF3-2020-04257 for procedure use and
adherence issues identified during the 2020 Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Audit, QA-20-2020-
W3-01.
60855
Miscellaneous
USA/72-1032
Certificate of Compliance for Spent Fuel Storage Casks -
Certificate No. 1032
60855
Procedures
OP-903-001
Technical Specification Surveillance Logs
2
60855
Procedures
Surveillances for
Week of 04-12-
20.pdf
Surveillances for Week of 04-12-2020 using OP-903-001.
60855
Procedures
Surveillances for
Week of 08-15-
21.pdf
Surveillances for Week of 08-15-2021 using OP-903-001.
60855
Procedures
Surveillances for
Week of 09-18-
Surveillances for Week of 09-18-2022 using OP-903-001.
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
22.pdf
60855
Radiation
Surveys
Data April 2019 to
Jul 2022 by Area
Designation.xlsx
ISFSI AREA DLR Data April 2019 to Jul 2022 by Area
Designation
60855
Radiation
Surveys
21
Dose from year 2021 on all TLDs on perimeter fence.
60855
Self-Assessments QA-20-2020-W3-
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Audit
20
60855
Self-Assessments QA-20-2022-W3-
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) Audit
22
60855
Work Orders
CRNMCRN0006 - INSPECT CRANE PER MM & ME
PROCEDURES
60855
Work Orders
Annual External Surface Examination on Accessible
Surfaces of the HI-STORM 100S Overpack - 2022
60855
Work Orders
Annual External Surface Examination on Accessible
Surfaces of the HI-STORM 100S Overpack - 2020
60855
Work Orders
Annual External Surface Examination on Accessible
Surfaces of the HI-STORM 100S Overpack - 2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
23-00733
Miscellaneous
W3-DBD-001
Safety Injection System Design Basis Document
305
Procedures
OP-002-001
Auxiliary Component Cooling Water
20
Procedures
OP-002-003
Component Cooling Water
2
Procedures
OP-002-010
Reactor Auxiliary Building Heating Ventilation and Air
Conditioning and Containment Purge
317
Procedures
OP-006-008
Transformer Operation
311
Procedures
OP-009-002
360
Procedures
OP-009-008
Operating Procedure Safety Injection System
Work Orders
2931846
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
23-00328, 2023-00330, 2023-00333, 2023-00341
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Resulting from
Inspection
Fire Plans
NS-TB-001
+15 Turbine Building Switchgear/East
Fire Plans
NS-TB-002
+15 Turbine Building West
Fire Plans
RAB 2-003
Chilled Water Tanks and CCW Surge Tank Rooms
Fire Plans
RAB 3-001
HVAC Equipment Room
Fire Plans
RAB-15A-001
Emergency Diesel Oil Feed Tank B Space
Fire Plans
RAB-16A-001
Emergency Diesel Oil Feed Tank A Space
Procedures
EN-OP-115-17
Fire Brigade Organization and Responsibilities
Procedures
Fire Brigade Drills
Procedures
Conduct of Operations
Procedures
PWR Reactivity Maneuver
Procedures
OP-010-004
Power Operations
341
Procedures
OP-010-005
Plant Shutdown
343
Procedures
OP-902-000
Standard Post Trip Actions
Procedures
OP-902-003
Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
22-03704, 2022-04112
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
23-01104, 2023-01171
Engineering
Evaluations
Availability of Shutdown Cooling in Modes 5 & 6 for Refuel
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
23-00739, 2023-01181
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
23-00789, 2023-00734
Miscellaneous
1-EFW-PUMP-
EFWMPMP0001
Tagout
01/12/2023
Procedures
On Line Risk Assessment
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
580044, 563477, 585886
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
22-03463, 2022-04265, 2022-06268, 2023-00343,
23-00510, 2023-00743, 2023-00862, 2023-00863,
23-00867, 2023-00870, 2023-01181, 2023-01185
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
23-00934
Drawings
5817-514
36" Type 9220 Valve
February
1978
Engineering
Changes
Operability Input to Evaluate Corrosion
01/14/2019
Engineering
Changes
Operability Input for Corroded Weld on CCRR-393
2/10/2023
Miscellaneous
W3-DBD-010
Containment Cooling HVAC and Related Systems
Miscellaneous
WSES-FSAR-
UNIT-3
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
316
Procedures
MI-003-409
Containment Aire Cooler Condensate Flow Switches
Channel Functional Test
2
Work Orders
516390, 580421, 580779, 586267, 590775
Drawings
G172
Flow Diagram Reactor Coolant System
Drawings
G204 Sh7
Reactor Auxiliary and Containment Building Miscellaneous
Piping
Engineering
Evaluations
Impact of Isolation of RC-115B and RC-108B
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
23-00466
Miscellaneous
W3-DBD-001
Safety Injection System Design Basis Document
305
Miscellaneous
W3-DBD-4
Component Cooling Water Auxiliary Component Cooling
Water
307
Procedures
ME-003-318
GE Undervoltage Relay Model 12IAV55C
307 and 308
Procedures
ME-003-410
Motor-Operated Valve Thermal Overload Channel
Calibration
314
Procedures
OP-903-030
Safety Injection System Pump Operability Verification
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
OP-903-050
Component Cooling Water and Auxiliary Component
Cooling Water Pump and Valve Operability Test
Procedures
OP-903-107
Plant Protection System Channel Functional Test
318
Procedures
OP-903-118
Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Tests
Procedures
OP-903-121
Safety Systems Quarterly Inservice Testing Valve Tests
Work Orders
2979572, 53020393, 52968090, 52969093, 52978733
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 1st Quarter 2022
04/20/2022
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 2nd Quarter 2022
07/20/2022
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 3rd Quarter 2022
10/20/2022
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 4th Quarter 2022
01/20/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
22-4908, 2022-4926, 2022-4937