IR 05000382/1987024
| ML20236Y264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1987 |
| From: | Jaudon J, Will Smith, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Y249 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-87-24, NUDOCS 8712110207 | |
| Download: ML20236Y264 (10) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/87-24 Operating License:
NPF-38 Docket:
50-382 Licensee:
Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
142 Delaronde Street New ' Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility Name:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Inspection At:
Taft, Louisiana
.Inspectien Conducted:
Octoper 16 through November 15, 1987 r
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 16 through November 15, 1987 (Report 50-382/87-24)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection consisting of:
(1) onsite followup of events, (2) operational safety verification, (3) monthly maintenance observation, (4) monthly surveillance observation, (5) followup of previously identified' items, (6) licensee event report followup, and'(7) plant status.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
One i
unresolved item was identified regarding possible improper balancing of
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safety-related motors (paragraph 2); another unresolved item was identified regarding use of proper fasteners on dry cooling tower (DCT) Fan 48 (paragraph 4); and a third unresolved item concerning the "A/B charging pump was identified (paragraph 4).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Emp1oyees R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Staff J. R. McGaha, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance J. J. Zabritski, Operations QA Manager A. S. Lockhart, Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments Manager
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R. F. Burski, Engineering Service Manager
- G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator D. W. Vinci, Maintenance Superintendent (Acting)
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and administrative members of the licensee's staff.
2.
Onsite Followup of Events a.
Dry Cooling Tower Fan Motor Failures During the week of October 19, 1987, the NRC inspectors noted that the dry cooling tower (DCT) Fan IB motor was removed for repair or
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replacement because of excessive vibration.
Upon opening and
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inspecting the motor, the licensee discovered that it had been balanced using an epoxy compound known as "Dino-weight". This material has the appearance of a hard and dense wad of putty stuck in a corner of the rotor.
Further investigation by the licensee revealed a similar piece of balancing material had been found in another motor that had been previously installed on DCT Fan 18. The motor manufacturer, Westinghouse Electric, was contacted by the licensee to
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determine the adequacy of using Dino-weight. Westinghouse Electric j
representatives indicated that the use of bolts and washers to balance these motors is their accepted practice.
Further inquiry revealed that a total of seven DCT fan motors had been sent out for repair and balancing since the plant was built (1B (twice),14B, 7A, 48, 9B, and 138). The licensee concluded that five motors installed j
in the DCT were, therefore, suspect and, as such, declared them j
inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4 limits, depending on
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atmospheric temperature, the number of DCT fans that can be inoperable.
Each of the two DCT trains contains 15 fans. With four fans inoperable in DCT Train B and one fan inoperable in DCT Trcin A, a sufficient number of fans remained to satisfy the TS limit. During the week of November 5, 1987, the licensee removed one nf the suspect fan motors (148). Dino-weight was found in it.
One piece had broken
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loose. The licensee removed one of the nonsuspect fan motors (1A).
No Dino-weight material was found in it; this established a reasonable confidence that bolts and washers had been used by Westinghouse for balancing the origincl motors. The licensee plans to remove the four remaining suspect moters (7A, 4B, 98, and 138) anJ to replace them with motors balanced by bolts and washers. The licesee is also investigating to determine if there are other safety ielated motors in the plant which may have been balanced with Dino-weight material.
As of the end of this inspection period, no.other safety-related motors have been identified as possibly containing Dino-weight other than the motors for DCT Fans 7A, 48, 9B, and 13B.
These four motors have been conservatively declared inoperable. The licensee has I
indicated that this problem is under evaluation and is being considered for deportability pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 and 10 CFR Part 50.73.
The use of the Dino-weight material to balance the DCT fan motors is considered an unresolved item -(382/8724-01) pending review by the NRi' inspectors of the results of the licensee's evaluation.
b.
Failure to Comply with Technical Specification Sampling Surveillance On October 16, 1987, while operating at 95 percent power, the licensee discovered that a required weekly tritium sample of the fuel handling building ventilation exhabst had been missed on October 9, 1987. The weekly sample was required by technical specification 4.11.2.1.2, Table 4.11-2, footnote "e."
On October 21, 1987, while operating at full power, the licensee
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discovered that a required weekly sample of gas decay tank noble
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gasses had been missed on October 16, 1987. This sample was required by technical specification 4.11.2.6.
These two instances were reported in conjunction with two similar examples occurring previously in Licensee Event Report (LER)87-025, dated November 4, 1987. The failure of the licensee to comply with i
technical specification action statements for sampling was identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/87-22 as a of violation.
Since the licensee had not completed corrective action for this violation, a separate violation has not been issued herein. The licensee has
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reported by LER that all four incidents are the result of a programmatic breakdown in administrative controls.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Verification l
l The objectives of this portion of the inspection were:
to ensure that
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requirements, to ensure that the licensee's management controls are effective in discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation, to assure that selected activities of the licensee's i
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radiological protection programs are implemented in conformance with plant l
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and to inspect the licensee's compliance with the approved physical I
security plan.
The NRC inspectors visited the control room every day of this inspection period when'on site.
Control room staffing, access, decorum, and operator behavior were observed; no problems were noted.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the operator's logs, verified compliance with technical specification limiting conditions for operation, and scanned the control panels for anomalies.
There were no unexplained alarms.
Each week during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the plant to verify adequate housekeeping, equipment condition, and radiation protection controls.
The NRC inspectors inspected the Emergency Operations Facility, the Technical Support Center, and the Alternative Shutdown Panel to verify readiness.
No problems were found.
The NRC inspectors verified that the protected area barrier was maintained and was not compromised.
The NRC inspectors noted that security officers were posted as compensatory measures when required.
The security officers appeared to be alert and aware of their responsibility.
On frequent occasions, the NRC inspectors observed controls at the radiological controlled area access point.
The NRC inspectors observed the operation of the central alarm station.
The NRC inspectors also observea access controls at the primary access point.
No problems were found.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation The station maintenance activities listed below were observed and documentation was reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and technical specifications.
a.
Work Authorization 01004499.
The NRC inspector observed the reactor coolant charging pump "A" shaft coupling alignment check and lubrication as performed in accordance with Procedures MM-06-004, Revision 3, "Shaf t Coupling Alignment and Belt Tensioning," and UNT-05-007, Revision 01, " Plant Lubrication Program." The NRC inspector verified alignment equipment set-up and calibration status.
The NRC inspector observed the measurement of parallel and angular alignment readings.
The NRC inspector also discussed the alignment technique with the technicians performing the task.
A portion of the vibration survey performed per Procedure MM-04-002, Revision 3,
" Vibration Measurements and Limits for Rotating Equipment," was also observed.
The NRC inspector noted that readings were being taken at the correct locations.
The NRC inspector verified worker compliance with the applicable radiation work permit.
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l The NRC inspector noted that the "A/B" reactor coolant charging pump was aligned to the "B" power train while the "A" pump was removed from service on October 27, 1987.
This is in conflict with Section 8.3.1.1.2.3 of the updated Waterford 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
This FSAR section states that administrative controls require extra redundant equipment to be aligned to the power source (division or train) of equipment rendered inoperable.
In this circumstance, the "A/B" charging pump should have been aligned to the
"A" train.
The licensee's administrative controls for removal of equipment from service contained in Procedure OP-100-010, Revision 3,
" Equipment Out of Service," do not require such equipment power source realignment prior to removal from service.
The licensee's representative stated that this realignment is not normally performed during plant operation because the "A/B" bus is deenergized for this transfer. When the "A/B" bus is deenergized, some non-engineered safety feature loads are deenergized.
This is undesirable during operations.
Since the applicable technical specification action statements allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to complete the maintenance, the licensee's practice was to line up the extra redundant equipment during outages (prior to startup) to replace equipment scheduled for maintenance.
If maintenance became necessary during operation, then the applicable technical specification action statements was followed.
After the NRC inspector questioned this, the licensee started a safety
evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.59.
The purpose of the I
safety analyses is to modify the FSAR.
It was not clear to the NRC inspector that the "A/B" bus loading met the original FSAR intent.
Therefore, this item is considered unresolved pending the completion of the safety review and NRC evaluation of this analysis (382/8724-02).
b.
Work Authorization 01004270.
The NRC inspector observed functional testing of annunciator Units G-N bar.kup power supply breaker PDP3-81-0C-19 per Procedure ME-7-002, Revision 5,
" Maintenance Procedure Molded-Case Circuit Breakers and Thermal Overload Relays." Observations included measurement of insulation resistance, continuity, and trip testing.
The NRC inspectors verified that test results met the acceptance criteria.
c.
Work Authorization 01005250.
The NRC inspector observed the alignment portion of the installation of a replacement motor for DCT Fan 18.
The NRC inspector reviewed procedure.s and documentation contained in the work package and verified calibration of dial indicator gages.
The NRC inspector also verified that tagout was placed.
d.
Work Authorization 01006572.
The NRC inspector witnessed the removal and replacement of a loose and damaged fan blade on DCT Fan 48.
The instructions were reviewed by the NRC inspector for evidence of corrective actions to prevent the fan blade from coming loose again.
The instructions placed emphasis on getting the blade retaining rings properly seated and obtaining propar torque on the blade retaining
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Several years ago, there were a number of instances in which DCT fan blades had come loose; this resulted in excessive. vibration and a loss of pitch adjustment.
The licensee's solution had been to install and torque lock nuts on the 3/8-inch blade. securing bolts so that they would not'come loose.
This solution appeared to have been successful until recently, when the blade on Fan 48 came loose.
The NRC inspector noticed that the 24 bolts (four per blade) on Fan 4B
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had only a partially threaded shank.
There were little or no. threads I
showing between the bolt shanks and the lock nuts.
All the other fans had bolts with fully threaded shanks. As a result, it appeared that when torque was applied to the bolts on Fan 48, the compression-forces intended to hold the fan blade in place could have been.
exerted between the bolt shank and the lock nut.
Thes, the. fan blade might not have been as secure as was intended by the technical manual i
method..The instructions did not specify whether a partially or fully threaded bolt was required. ~The NRC inspector expressed the concern that incorrect bolts might have been installed.
The licensee
stopped the job and, as of the end of this inspection period, was investigating.
Review of the licensee's investigation is an unresolved item (382/8724-03).
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The NRC inspectors observed the surveillance testing listed below to verify that the activities were being performed in accordance with the technical specification and surveillance procedures.
The applicable
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procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified
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to be in calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and
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completeness.
The. NRC inspectors ascertained that deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolved, a.
Procedure OP-903-068, Revision 4, " Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Verification." The NRC inspector observed portions of the operability run of emergency diesel generator (EDG) "B" on November 2, 1987.
The observations were made both locally and from the control room.
The NRC inspector reviewed the data and verified that the acceptance criteria contained in Procedure OP-903-068 were met.
Compliance with technical specifications 4.8.1.1.2.a.1 through 4.8.1.1.2.a.6, and 4.8.1.1.2.b was verified.
The NRC inspector identified the following problems to the licensee after review of OP-903-068, Revision 4:
The note at Procedure Step 8.2.8.9 requires timing to be stopped
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at greater than or equal to 4400 Kw during rapid loading testing.
This is in conflict with Procedure Step 8.2.8.a and technical specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.5, which require loading to 4200-4400 Kw when performing rapid loading testing.
Licensee letter WBE87-0095, dated June 1, 1987, states that a
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level of 4.1 feet in the diesel oil feed tank corresponds to 309 gallons.
Technical specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.1 requires a
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minimum volume of 337 gallons in the day tank.
The acceptance criterion in Procedure OP-903-068 for feed tank oil level is 4.1 feet which'is 28 gallons less than required by the technical
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specification.
The reactor operation surveillance log > require a minimum feed tank oil level of 4.5 feet, which meets the technical specification limit.
Thus, it appears that the licensee has been in compliance with the technical specification notwithstanding the error in Procedure OP-903-068.
Procedural Step 8.2.15 refers to Attachments 8.1 (EDG "A" valve
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lineup) and 8.6 (EDG "B" valve lineup) of EDG Operating Procedure OP-9-002.
Step 8.2.15 should refer to Attachments 8.1 through 8.6 of OP-9-002 instead of just Attachments 8.1 and 8.6.
Correction of the above deficiencies shall be tracked under Open Item 382/8724-04.
b.
Prccedure MI-3-503, Revision 2, " Ammonia Detection System Channel Functional Test HVC-IA-5300 A (B)."
The NRC inspector observed the performance of functional testing on channels "A" and "B" of the ammonia' detection system as required by technical specification 4.3.3.7.2 on November 4, 1987.
The NRC inspector discussed the procedure with I&C technicians performing the testing.
The NRC inspector verified test equipment calibration.and that acceptance criteria specified in the procedure were met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup of Previously Identified Items (Close') Open Item 382/8420-05:
Neutron flux indication and atmospheric d
dump valve (ADV) controls independence from the cable vault fire area.
During a special' safety inspection conducted in April 1984, the NRC inspectors had determined that neutron flux indication and ADV controls for alternate shutdown capability were not electrically independent of the cable vault.
This matter was identified and referred to NRR for resolution.
The details of the April 1984 inspection are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/84-20.
During a fire protection followup inspection conducted in August 1984 (NRC Inspection Report 50-382/84-40),
the NRC inspectors noted that the licensee had installed local pneumatic operation capability for each ADV.
The NRC inspectors verified that operator training for the use of this modification was complete and that the installation had been functionally tested.
NRR imposed License Condition 2.C.9.f, which required electrically independent neutron flux indication to be installed at LCP-43 prior to startup from the first refueling outage.
In NRC Inspection Report 50-382/87-11, dated June 24, 1987, this license conditior, was closed.
The NRC inspectors reverified that the subject neutron flux indication was installed on LCP-43.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 382/9701-05:
Followup of licensee review of QA audit checklists.
The NRC inspector verified that the licensee performed a review and verified that the requirements of techncial specification 6.5.2.8.p were met.
This action was documented in licensee letter W3K87-0297, dated March 12, 1987.
(Closed) Violation 382/8711-01:
Failure to follow written procedures for control of maintenance, repair, replacement, and modifications.
The NRC inspectors verified by record review that personnel had been retrained, as committed to'in the licensee's response, LP&L letter W3P87-1729, dated July 24, 1987.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Report Followup The following LER was reviewed and closed.
The NRC inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete.
The NRC inspectors confirmed that unreviewed safety questions and violations of technical specifications, license conditions, or other regulatory requirements had been adequately described.
(Closed) LER 382/87-18, including Revision 1 and Revision 2, " Containment Pressure Isolated Due to Personnel Error."
In addition to the attributes above, the NRC inspectors verified that Procedure OP-903-027, " Inspection of Containment," had been changed to include steps to check the operation of the engineered safety feature containment pressure instruments prior to entering Operational Mode 4.
The NRC inspectors also reviewed licensee letter W3M87-0244, dated September 15, 1987, which states the licensee's policy for procedure use requirements when working in contaminated areas.
This letter was issued to all maintenance personnel to reemphasize the policy.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Plant Status The plant has been operating at or near full power for the entire period of this inspection report, except during the night of October 27, 1987, when reactor power was reduced to about 60 percent for repair of a steam generator blowdown isolation valve and replacement of a reactor trip breaker under-voltage coil.
By October 29, 1987, power was restored.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview The NRC inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 16, l
1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee
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acknowledged the NRC inspectors' findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC
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inspectors during this inspection.
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