IR 05000424/1988020

Insp Rept 50-424/88-20 on 880430-0606.Violations Noted But No Notice Issued.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Maint,Surveillance,Fire Protection, Security,Emergency Planning & Quality Programs

ML20196G921
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	06/17/1988
From:	Burger C, Rogge J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196G903	List: IR 05000424/1988020 ML20196G897
References
50-424-88-20, NUDOCS 8807060055
Download: ML20196G921 (13)

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, . O Eteo . UNIT ED STATES

, o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET, h

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Report No.: 50-424/88-20 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P,0. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 i

Docket No.: 50-424 License No.: NPF-68-Facility Name: Vogtle 1 Inspection Conducted: April 30 - June 6, 1988 Inspect s: O- 9 dd7 /5 I

^ J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident inspector Date Signed c. o . dA pC.W. Burger,ResidentInspector c /o/s s Date Signed l

Accompanied by: R. F. Aiello, Resident Inspector Approved By: E uko /7 ??

M. V. Sinkule, $ectWn~ Chief (Dafe Signed Division of Reactor Projects L i SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed resident inspection in the following areas: plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance, surveillance, fire protection, security, emergency planning, and quality programs and administrative controls affecting qualit A meeting with the local officials was also conducte Results: Four violations were identified in which no notice was issued. (Two violations in the area of operations - failure to sample accumulator boron concentration and failure to follow the action statement for an inoperable diesel . One violation in the area of radiological controls - failure to establish the correct alarm setpoint for monitor 1RE-0848. One violation in the area of quality programs -

failure to establish an adequate surveillance tracking progra One weakness was noted in the area of surveillance performance based on the numerous number of missed surveillances since licensin .

8807060055 880620 PDR ADOCK 05000424 o PDC

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REPORT DETAILS i

i Persons Contacted Licensee Employees ~

• Bockhold, Jr. , General Manager Nuclear Operations

• R. M. Bellamy, Plant Manager  ;

• T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager r

• J. E. Swartzwelder, Nuclear Safety & Compliance Manager -

• W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations

• A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent C. C. Echert, Manager Chemistry and Health Physics

• A. L. Mosbaugh,' Assistant Plant Support Manager H. M. Handfinger,-Assistant Plant Support Manager F. R.- Timmons, Nuclear Security Manager

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R. E. Lide, Engineering Support Supervisor

• E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager

• G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations

• W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor

• Pointer, Regulatory Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, supervision, engineers, operations, maintenance, chemistry, QC inspectors,

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and office personne * Attended Exit Interview Exit Interviews - (30703)

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 6 with those

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persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described the areas

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inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. No dissenting

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comments .ere received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the

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inspector during this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews were

, attended during the inspection period by a resident inspecto This inspection closed one Violation, one Unresolved Item, two Inspector i Followup Items, and three Licensee Event Report The items identified during this inspection were: LIV 50-424/88-20-01 "Failure To Comply With TS 3.8.1.1.b Require-ments When Diesel Generator 1B Was Inoperable In Excess Of One Hour."

- Paragraph 5.b.(3)(a)

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, LIV 50-424/88-20-02 "Failure To Perform Accumulator Boron Sample r Following Volume Change Per TS 4.5.1.1.b." '

- Paragraph 5.b.(3)(b) LIV 50-424/88-20-03 "Failure To Comply With TS 3.3.3.9 By Estab-lishing The Correct Alarm Setpoint For The Turbine Building Drain Effluent Monitor 1RE-0848." '

- Paragraph 5.b.(2)(c) LIV 50-424/88-20-04 "Failure To Establish An Adequate Procedure To Implement Surveillance Completion Per TS 6.7.1."

- Paragraph 5.b.(2)(d)

i Part 21 50-424/88-02 "TDI Diesel Engine Control Device Failures."

- Paragraph 'Jne weakness was noted in the area of surveillance pr formance as discussed in paragraph 5.b.(1) and is identified for followup as: IFI 50-424/88-20-01 "Review Licensee Actions To Upgrade Surveillance Performance." Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - (92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-424/87-37-01 "Failure To Place The Unit In Hot Standby Within 6 Hours As Required By Action Statement 10 Of Technical Specification 3.3.1." Final action for this violation was to submit a proposed change to TS by January 31, 1988. The site forwarded to corporate the change request on January 18, 1988. Corporate, however, has informed the NRC that the change will be submitted at a later date in a February 16, 1988 lette This postponement is acceptable since the Technical Specification is currently adequate without chang . Operational Safety Verification - (71707)(93702)

The plant operated during this inspection period in Power Operation (Mode 1) at approximately 100% power. On June 3, the control room experienced water intru3 ion from the upper cable spreading room, Control Room Activities Control Room tours and observations were performed to verify that facility 'perations were being safely conducted within regulatory requirements. These inspections consisted of one or more of the following attributes as appropriate at the time of the inspectio Proper Control Room staffing

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Control Room access and operator behavior

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Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress

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Observance of instruments and. recorder traces of safety related and important to safety systems for abnormalities

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Review of. annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct

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Control Board walkdowns

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Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring system operability status

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Discussions and interviews with the On-Shift Operations Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and the Shif t Technical Advisor to ' determine the plant status, plans and to ,

assess operator knowledge

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Review of the operator logs, unit log and shift turnover sheets No violations or deviations were identifie Facility Activities Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the effectiveness of the aaministrative controls established by direct observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status and LCOs, licensee meetings and facility record During these-inspections the.following objectives are achieved:

(1) Safety System Status (71710) - Confirmation of system oper-ability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve

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alignment, control and power ' supply alignments, component

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conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of the ESF trains were proper. The inacces. .ble portions are confirmed as availability permit Additional indepth inspec-tion of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water System was performed to review the system lineup procedure with the plant drawings and as-built configurations, compare valve remote and local indications, walkdowns were expanded to include r, angers and supports, and electrical equipment interiors. The inspector verified that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operabilit (2) Plant Houseket. ping Conditions - Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas through-out the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existe .. . .

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Fire protection activities, staffing and '

equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate L and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equip-ment, and fire barriers were operabl (4) Radiation Protection (71709) - Radiation protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify proper program implementatio The inspection included review of the plant program effectivenes Radiation work permits and personnel compliance were reviewed during the daily plant tours. Radia-tion Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to verify proper identification and implementatio (5) Security (71881) - Security controls were observed to verify that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and access to the Protected Area was controlled in accordance with the facility security pla Personnel were observed to verify proper disp",ay of badges and that personnel requiring escort were properly escorte Personnel within Vital Areas were observed to ensure proper authorization for the are Equipment operability or proper compensatory activities were

~/erified on a periodic basi (6) Surveillance (61726)(61700) - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate- to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followe The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillances and reviewed completed data against acceptance criteria:

Surveillance N Title 14546-1 furbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test

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14810-1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump And Check Valve Inservice Test 14228-1 Operations Monthly Surveillance Logs 14825-1 AFW Quarterly Valve Inservice Test 14825-1 NSCW Quarterly Valve Inservice Test 14510-1 CR Emer Filter System Operability Test

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Surveillance'N Title-( con f,' d)

14825-1 Valve Inservice Test 14601-1 SSPS ESFAS Slave Relay Test (7)~ Maintenance Activities (62703) -

The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances .were' in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; retesting and return of systems to service was prompt and correct; TS requirements were being followed. Maintenance Work Order (K40) backlog was reviewe Maintenance was observed and RWO packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:

MWO N Work Description 1880347 Installed TM 1-88-030 In Diesel Generator Panels 1-2403-P5-DG 1 And 1-2403-P5-DG 3 To Correct Phase Rotation To the 160 PT Failure Rela Installed New NRA Card And Calibrate Using Procedure 24229.1 Rev. 4 (NSCW Cooling Tower Spray Header Bypass Valve Control) To NSCW Syste None Incore Flux Mapping Using Procedure 55003-C (Incore/Excore Detector Calibration) As The Controlling Procedur None Procedure 55006-C For The Normal Flux Mapping Sequenc (8) E .ergency Preparedness (82301) - The inspector participated in the May 18, exercise by manning the resident inspector positions in , ie control room and the technical support cente On Me . 1, the same positions were manned during the annual e xt. rc i s e . In addition, the senior resident served an an evaluter in the technical support center. The results of the evaluation are included in a separate repor No violations or deviations were identifie .

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6 . Review of Licensee Reports (90712)(90713)(92700) In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports This- inspection consisted of reviewing the below listed reports to determine whether the information reported by the licensee was technically adequate and consistent with the inspactor knowledge of the material contained within the repor Selected material within the report was questioned randomly to verify accuracy and to provide a reasonable assurance that other NRC personnel have an appropriate document for their activitie Monthly Operating Report - The report dated May 16, 1988 was reviewe The inspector had no comment (0 pen) 50-4?t/P21-88-02 "TDI Diesel Engine Control Device Failures."

On April 29, 1988, the NRC received notification from IMO Delaval Inc. that a potential problem existed with engine control devices in the air start, lube oil, Jacket water systems, and crankcase system As a result of field reported failures, the Calcon manufacturing facility was audited by IMO. This audit identified that there was no objective evidence of product testing. IMO recommends that all warehouse stock be returned, and installed components should receive additional surveillanc A copy of the letter was provided to the license This item will remain open pending completion of corrective actio Licensee Event Reports and Deficiency Cards Licensee Event Reports (LER) and Deficiency Cards (DC) were reviewed for potential generic impact,- to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the technical specifications and other regulatory requirements were satisfied. In-office review of LERs may result in further followup to verify that the stated corrective actions have been completed, or to identify violations in addition to those described in the LER. Each LER is reviewed for enforcement action in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix Review of DCs was performed to maintain a realtime status of deficiencies, determine regulatory compliance, follow the licensee corrective actions, and assist as a basis for closure of the LER when reviewed. Due to the numerous DCs processed only those DCs which result in enforcement action or further inspector followup with the licensee at the end of the inspection are listed belo The LERs and DCs denoted with an asterisk indicates that reactive inspection occurred at the time of the event prior to receipt of the written report.

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(1) Deficiency Card reviews:

(a) *DC 1-88-1062 and 1-88-1072 "Failure To Perform Surveil-lance- On Four Containment Isolation Valves." On April 25, 1988, the licensee identified that the stroke time surveil-lance required by TS 4.6.3.3 had not been accomplishe The surveillanc.e was completed I hour and 53 minutes lat Normalssite practice is to schedule surveillance completion the day prior to the actual expiration. This surveillance-was scheduled with April 24, 1988 as the late dat On April 25, 1988, personnel questioned the status and-requested the absolute time the surveillance could. be complete Upon notification that the surveillance time

- had elapsed, the valves were declared inoperable and the required surveillance performed 'within the next seven minute The first DC written documented the deficiency as a missed surveillance task sheet, while the second DC documented the actual event, the inspector reviewed the sequence of events and identified the following weaknesses:

1) The actual date and time that the equipment becomes inoperable is not provided to management nor controi room personne ) Management is routinely presented a long list of due and overdue surveillances which dilutes the signifi-cance of critical surveillance ) Plant personnel often utilize the maximum amount of grace time allowed by Technical Specification ) Operations personnel were unaware that the plant had briefly entered the TS 3.0.3 shutdown provisions until addressed by the NR In addition to the above event, the inspection reviewed the licensee Events reported since licensing and noted that numerous instances of missed or inadequate surveillance has

. occurred. These range from missing surveillances prior I to a mode change to exceeding the grace periods allowe Several instances where inadequate surveillance procedures lead to inadequate Technical Specification compliance have also occurred. Following the above event, another missed surveillance occurred as a result of inadvertent deletion from the control progra Since the above events indicate a general weakness in the implementation of the surveillance program this concern was l

addressed to managemen Management has established an event critique team to resolve the issu .

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IFI50-424/88-20-01 "Review Licensee Actions To Upgrade Surveillance Performance."

(b) *DC 1-88-1406 "Control Room Water Intrusion." On June 4, 1988, control room operations were impacted when water penetrated from the upper cable spreading rooms, ran along vertical cables and entered three process panel First indication of plant impact came when operators received a momentary "Pressurizer High Level / Deviation And Heater On" alarm. The pressurizer backup heaters were placed in manua Approximately 19 minutes later the pressurizer power operated relief valve, 456A, opened particularly and reduced plant pressure 35 psi Operators closed both block valves to eliminate and further pressure reduction Shortly thereafter, instrument and control personnel identified water entering the process control panels 1-1604-Q5-PC1,PC2 and SPB and commenced cleanup. The event critique team identified that since it was not possible to ensure that the "A" train controls would remain intact that

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the plant was in an unanalyzed condition and made a report to the NRC. This item will receive continued followup in the next inspectio (2) The following LERs were reviewed and are ready for closure pending verification that the licensee's stated corrective actions have been complete (a) *50-424/88-08, Rev. 0 "Reactor Trip Caused By Stator Cooling System Valve Controller Failure." On April 7, the unit tripped from 100% power when stator cooling water temperature control valve, TCV-6800, failed in the heat exchanger bypass position. In this condition temperature became elevated and actuated a turbine tri This event was reviewed during NRC Report 50-424/88-1 Maintenance to correct the failure was reviewe This LER identified that AFW valve 1HV-5139A breaker tripped open as operators attempted to throttle flow to SG #1. This failure appears to be identical to the failure discussed in LER 87-20. The LER does not specifically state that the handswitch was replaced nor does it link this LER with the previous LE Therefore, this item will remain open pending verification of completed repair (b) 50-424/88-09, Rev. 0 "Inadequate Health / Physics Controls Allows Shipment Of Check Source." On April 6, the licensee was informed by Westinghouse that an In-vent radiation monitor had been shipped to their Baltimore, MD facility with a radioactive source installed without the appropriate

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L shipping papers and label As indicated in NRC Rpt.

50-424/88-17, this item was referred to the Regional Radiation Specialists for followup during the next routine inspection. The written report was reviewed for accurac (c) 50-424/88-11, Rev. O "Inadequate Control Of Effluent Monitor Alarm Setpoint Leads To Technical Specification Violation." On April 11, the alert alarm and high alarm setpoints for the turbine building drain effluent monitor 1RE-0848 were found to be set too hig This condition existed since March 9 when the monitor was restored to operable status. Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 requires that this instrument be operable with alarm setpoints determined with- the methodology and parameters in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Instead of using the correct setpoint, a temporary setpoint was verified during the return to service on March This item represents a violation of NRC require-ments which meets the criteria for non citation. In order to track this item, the following is identifie LIV 50-424/88-20-03 "Failure To Comply With TS 3.3.3.9 By Establishing The Correct Alarm Setpoint For The Turbine Building Drain Effluent Monitor 1RE-0848."

(d) 50-424/87-12, Rev. O "Inadequate Administrative Catrols Lead To Missed Surveillances." On April 13, the 1 ensee

? discovered that the weekly cperations surveillanco had not been completed. This event occurred when operations indicated that the previous surveillance had been unsatis-factor The surveillance tracking coordinator issued the surveillance for retest. Operations personnel then failed to recognize the error. Since the administrative procedures will not issue a routine task until the retest is complete the next weekly due date plus grace period expired before detection. The root cause of the event was that operations personnel were not clear on how to properly indicate on the task completion sheet that the surveillance was satisfactory when the acceptance criteria may not be met for a certain item. An example of this is when the technical specifications require several methods of compliance but not all methods. This item represents a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria for non citation. In order to track this item, the following is identifie LIV 50-424/88-20-04 "Failure To Establish An Adequate Procedure To Implemene. Surveillance Completion Per TS 6.7.1."

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(3) Th'e following LERs were reviewed and close (a) 50-424/88-02, Rev. 0 "Personnel Error During Diesel Testing Causes A Violation Of A Technical Specification."

On January 21, the. unit was in Mode 3 when plant equipment operators were conducting moisture checks on Diesel Generator 1B _ per plant procedure- 13145-1. When moisture checks are performed, the mode switch is placed in the

"Maintenance" position and during this period the diesel generator is not available for standby service and is considered inoperable. At approximately 10:35 AM, the diesel generator barring device faile By 12:24 pm, it was decided to postpone the moisture checks pending repair of the barring device and the diesel generator was returned to standby service. At this time, plant personnel realized that the operability of the required A.C. offsite power sources had not been demonstrated as required by TS action statement 3.8.1.1.b. By 1:24 pm, operability of the

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required offsite power sources has derionstrated. This item reviewed in Report 50-424/88-02. The inspector verified completion of the actions. This item represents a viola-tion of NRC requirements were the licensee has met the criteria for no citation. To track this item the following is identifie LIV ; 50-424/88-20-01 "Failure To Comply With TS 3.8.1. Requirements When Diesel Generator IB Was Inoperable In Excess Of One Hour."

(b) 50-424/88-07, Rev. 0 "Personnel Error Leads To Missed Technical Specification Surveillance." On March 22, approximately 85 gallons of borated water was added to the

1. 2 reactor coolant system accumulator. Technical Speci-fication 4.5.1.1'.b requires verification of the boron concentration within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> af ter a volume increase of greater than or equal to l*s of tank volume (67 gallons).

Personnel performing the evaluation failed to implement specific steps of procedure 13105-1 "Safety Injection System" which requires notification of chemistry to sample and document the results in the unit control lo Upon sampling, the boron concentration was found to be within the required range. Corrective action included counseling of control room perse:inel and placing the LER in required reading. This item represents a violation of NRC require-ments which meets the criteria for non citatio In order to track this item, the following is identifie LIV 50-424/88-20-02 "Failure To Perform Accumulator Boron Sample Following Volume Change Per TS 4.5.1.1.b."

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(c) 50-424/88-10, Rev. 0 "Relay Failures Causes A Containment Ventilation Isolation." On' April 10, a containment ventilation isolation occurred following a momentary loss of power to radiation monitor 1RE-2565. The loss of power occurred when a technician operated the mode keyswitch and L .due to a faulty relay a false high radiation signal was sensed. The relay was replaced as part of tha corrective action. The inspector has-no further question (d) 50-424/88-56, Rev. 0 "Technical Specification Not Met Due To Incomplete Vendor Software For Dose Calculations." This event was reviewed in NRC Rpt. 50-424/87-60 and a LIV was

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identifie The inspector reviewed the documentation of corrective action that was completed and could only conclude that the licensee had adequately addressed the issu . Followup on Previous Inspection Items - (92701)

i (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-111-02. "Review PRB Procedure For Proper Incorporation Of Technical Specification."

Procedure 00002-C, Revision 7 dated October 5, 1987 and FSAR Amendment 35 were reviewe The inspectors concerns are resolve (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424/87-37-04. "Review Determination Of Technical Specification Surveillance Compliance Regarding The Control Room Emergency Ventilation." Procedure 14400-1 was revised. The inspector noted during this review that a previous surveillance in March was not performed satisfactorily, however this is not reportable to the NRC based on a June 24, 1987 memo from the corporate offic This item regarding the failure to report events prior to June 24 is currently a violation 50-424/88-09-02 and is considered to be another example of that violatio (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/87-44-03. "Review Licensee Procedure And FSAR Changes Regarding The Fire Protection Program."

Change No. 35 to the FSAR was issued and the corrective action was completed. This change was reviewed and determined to be acceptable to the inspecto . Meeting With Local Officials - (94600) (94703)

On May 3, a public with media presence meeting was held to familiarize local officials of the City of Waynesboro and Burke County Board of Commissioners with the NRC. The meeting presented the mission of the NRC, introduction of key NRC personnel, discussion of lines of communication available to local officials, and discussion of the facility status. The NRC presented the scope of the inspection and emergency prepa*edness program .

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The_: meeting was open. for iquestions during the presentation. NRC persons involved _with the presentation were as follows:

M.:V.'Sinkule,' Chief,' Reactor Projects Section 3B, Division of Reactor Project's J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector, Operations

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, R. J. Schepens, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction C~.'W. Burger,' Resident Inspector

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